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Abstract 
 
This thesis focuses on the criteria established for the use of force in self-
defence in international law. The prohibition on the use of force in Article 
2(4) of the United Nations Charter is subject to exemption by way of 
approval from the Security Council, or by invoking the right to self-defence. 
The use of force in self-defence is promulgated in Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter, but is understood to be restricted by the principles of 
necessity and proportionality. Since the attacks in the United Stated on 11th 
September 2001, the law on self-defence has focused on the emergence of 
non-state actors within the framework of jus ad bellum. In view of this, and 
the contemporary context, this thesis seeks to reappraise the meaning of 
necessity in light of terrorism. In particular, the study asks whether the 
meaning of necessity is affected if self-defence is applied against a non-
state actor, and if so, how. It also explores the establishment of the two 
conditions of self-defence, necessity and proportionality, based on the 
Caroline incident, and examines how the Caroline doctrine has been 
interpreted in the formulation of rules incorporated in jus ad bellum. The 
understanding of necessity in self-defence is also re-evaluated by asking the 
role of necessity in self-defence framework. It is argued that necessity has 
two important roles in self-defence law. First, it argued that necessity acts as 
a requirement to self-defence, specifically by seeking whether an armed 
attack has taken place, and if so, whether there is an alternative option to 
the use of non-forcible measures. Second, necessity acts as a limitation to 
self-defence, establishing that any defensive measures must be employed 
solely to achieve the legitimate aim of self-defence, which is to halt and repel 
an armed attack. However, it is difficult to assess necessity as a limitation on 
the use of force in self-defence when force is directed against terrorist 
groups.  
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits states from using force to 
negotiate international relations.1 This prohibition is also present in 
customary international law. One of the main exceptions to this general rule 
in both cases is the acknowledgment of the right to self-defence, as 
mentioned in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.2 Customary 
international law requires invoking states to comply with two conditions when 
exercising self-defence; these conditions are necessity and proportionality. 
   
The primary focus of this thesis is the concept of necessity in self-defence. It 
aims to appraise the entire concept of necessity comprehensively as a 
component of the legal framework of self-defence and in particular, to 
establish its role in the context of self-defence against terrorism. 
  
In legal literature, discussion surrounding the right to self-defence is a 
contentious topic. The debate has gathered momentum following the attacks 
that took place on 11th September 2001 (hereafter ‘9/11’) in the United 
States (US), with some scholars opining that the right to self-defence is 
applicable against a non-state actor.3 Whilst there is an abundance of legal 
writing discussing this area, few writers dedicate their work to the condition 
of necessity and proportionality.4 Even fewer commentators discuss the 
                                            
1 Article 2(4) United Nations Charter (1945) 1 UNTS XVI  
2 Article 51 United Nations Charter (1945) 1 UNTS XVI  
3 For e.g. Christoph Müller, ‘The Right of Self-Defense in the Global Fight 
against Terrorism’ (2006) 81 International Law Studies 351-366, 354; 
Nicholas Rostow, ‘Before and After: The Changed UN Response to 
Terrorism Since September 11th’ (2002) 35 Cornell International Law 
Journal 475   
4 Judith Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force by States 
(CUP 2004); Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (3rd 
ed, OUP 2008) 119; Abraham Sofaer, ‘On the Necessity of Pre-Emption’ 
(2003) 14 EJIL 209-226; Dapo Akande and Thomas Liefländer, 
‘Clarifying Necessity, Imminence, and Proportionality in the Law of Self-
Defense’ (2013) 107 AJIL 563-570; Christian J Tams and James G 
Devaney, ‘Applying Necessity and Proportionality to Anti-Terrorist Self-
Defence’ (2012) 45 Israel Law Review 91-106  
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concept of necessity in isolation.5 This is perhaps due to the fact that 
necessity may be construed as a simple concept in jus ad bellum which 
does not require in-depth analysis. However, this thesis believes that there is 
more to the principle of necessity which can be developed academically.  
 
In view that there are few commentaries that discuss on the concept of 
necessity extensively, through this research, it is hoped that it contributes to 
the expansion of the scholarship in jus ad bellum. This thesis presents a 
different way of viewing necessity in relation to self-defence against state 
actors and non-state actors. It also opens the discussion on the content that 
constitutes the meaning of necessity in self-defence. Furthermore, necessity 
is examined by looking various elements within self-defence that directly 
affects our understanding of necessity. Among others, necessity is explored 
in relation to the aim of self-defence, the effects of anticipatory and pre-
emptive self-defence on the meaning of necessity and the effects of self-
defence against non-state actors on the concept of necessity.  
 
It is also observed that necessity has a significant importance in self-defence 
framework. This research approach necessity by enquiring the purpose or 
raison d'être of its existence in the law of self-defence. It is argued that 
necessity has a dual role. The first role of necessity is as requirement for a 
state to launch self-defence. This assessment requires a state to establish a 
threat or armed attack that compels it to act by using force. Further, 
necessity also demands the victim state to use force only as a matter of last 
resort. The second role of necessity is it acts as a limitation for states to use 
force in self-defence measure. In doing so, necessity as a limitation links to 
the legitimate aim of self-defence. States that exercise force beyond the aim 
of self-defence is regarded as unnecessary use of force and no longer said 
to be acting in self-defence. Thus, it is contended that the component of 
necessity consists of the two roles. 
 
                                            
5 Daniel Bethlehem, ‘Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed 
Attack by Nonstate Actors’ (2012) 106 AJIL 769-777  
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Furthering the study of necessity, this research uses three examples where 
self-defence were invoked against non-state actors. In each state practice, 
both roles of necessity (as a requirement to self-defence and limitation to 
use force) are applied. As a result, this research discovers that determining 
whether or not the use of force was necessary in order to achieve the 
legitimate aim of self-defence is challenging. This is primarily due to the 
nature of terrorist groups that are often secretive, evasive and hard to 
distinguish between innocent civilians and terrorists. In addition, to prove 
necessity as a limitation to use force relies upon facts on the ground. It is 
hard to verify, in a terrorist-controlled area, whether a defensive measure 
was exercised limited to  meeting the aim of self-defence.  
 
Another contribution of this thesis to the scholarship of jus ad bellum is the 
analysis of the doctrines that are derived from the Caroline incident. Caroline 
doctrine refers to any legal rules that have links to the Caroline incident of 
1837. There are four main Caroline doctrines. First, the Caroline affair 
created limitations on the use of force in self-defence, restricting it to 
necessity and proportionality. Second, the incident established that self-
defence can be exercised against non-states actors. Third, states are 
permitted to exercise self-defence in anticipatory fashion. Finally, the 
Caroline affair established the claim of pre-emptive self-defence. This thesis  
analyses how each doctrine came into existence in jus ad bellum, and then 
explain its relevance to the Caroline case. It is observed that there is no 
proper determinative process to translate the Caroline incident (as a fact) 
into legal rules. As such, the Caroline affair is open to misinterpretation or 
over-interpretation. It is argued that that pre-emptive self-defence that claims 
to have origin from the Caroline incident is a misinterpretation of the Caroline 
affair.  
  
This thesis acknowledges that fulfilling the condition of necessity does not 
necessarily warrant the use of force legal. There are additional conditions 
that a state must abide by when exercising the right to self-defence  such as 
the requirement of proportionality. This thesis is not arguing for a conception 
of necessity that functions outside the framework of self-defence permitting 
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states an excuse to perform their international legal obligations and 
ultimately justify the use of force. Rather, this research is built upon the 
premise that self-defence is applicable against non-state actors by taking the 
view of the majority of scholar post-9/11 although it is noted that the ICJ has 
not pronounced a solid jurisprudence on this matter.  
 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 offers a descriptive outline of 
the general legal framework of self-defence. It thereby acts as a foundation 
for all the arguments used in this thesis. It begins by analysing the 
prohibition on the use of force in the UN Charter and customary international 
law. Following that, Article 51 of the UN Charter is examined along with the 
customary right to self-defence. Among other aspects, the Chapter will 
examine the chief components of self-defence, such as the requirement of 
an ‘armed attack’, the meaning of ‘inherent right’ and the relationship 
between Article 51 and the Security Council. Lastly, Chapter 2 will look into 
the conditions of self-defence, as established by the principles of necessity 
and proportionality. 
  
The origins of the principles of necessity and proportionality in the law of 
self-defence are studied in Chapter 3. Article 51 is silent on the conditions 
for the use of force in self-defence, which can only be found in customary 
international law. The majority of scholars argue that necessity and 
proportionality originate from a classical incident involving the destruction of 
the Caroline vessel in 1837 by British forces at Niagara Falls. Scholars have 
derived the meaning of both necessity and proportionality from the 
subsequent series of letters between the British and American governments. 
Chapter 3 questions the relevance of the Caroline incident as a basis for the 
right to self-defence, since the United Nations Charter in Article 51 has 
guaranteed each state the right to self-defence. Some scholars use the 
Caroline incident to expand the perimeters of the right to self-defence to 
describe anticipatory self-defence, the right to pre-emptive self-defence and 
self-defence against non-state actors. Thus, this Chapter will examine 
whether the rules emanating from the Caroline incident offer a correct 
interpretation of the incident. Furthermore, it will ask if these are the correct 
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interpretations of the Caroline incident, and what methods scholars used to 
derive these legal rules. The study will also examine the approach taken by 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in cases where the right to self-
defence has been invoked.  
 
Chapter 4 then discusses on the content of the principle of necessity within 
the law of self-defence. This includes among others an interpretation of 
necessity, understanding of necessity as a test for the right to self-defence, 
and the relationship between necessity and proportionality. Fundamental to 
this thesis is a re-evaluation of the concept of necessity in the framework of 
self-defence. This is achieved by examining the role of necessity in self-
defence. This thesis asks if necessity acts as a requirement to self-defence, 
or if it merely serves as a limitation on the use of force or both. Further to the 
assessment of necessity, this Chapter investigates its application to the use 
of force in self-defence against a non-state actor.  
 
Chapter 5 extends the discussion about necessity as a concept in jus ad 
bellum. Arguably, there are several factors influencing the principle of 
necessity in self-defence. Inter alia, necessity is affected if force is used in 
anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defence, and necessity is also affected by 
the aim when using force. The principal question raised in this Chapter 
concerns whether our understanding of necessity is affected if self-defence 
is directed against a non-state actor. It asks how, in such cases, a state can 
determine if it has fulfilled the requirement of necessity, and whether there is 
a distinction between necessity when situations involve inter-states and 
states versus non-state actors. It further explains that a state may claim to 
fulfil the principle of necessity when self-defence is employed against 
terrorist group by arguing the ‘unable or unwilling’ theory espoused by 
Ashley Deeks. However, this theory is subject to criticism and this may 
arguably undermine the credibility of any use of force in self-defence.  
 
Discussions about the application of the concept of necessity outlined in 
Chapters 4 and 5 are applied to state practice in Chapter 6. This Chapter 
examines the aspects of necessity as applied in three cases involving the 
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use of force in self-defence against terrorist groups. The examples are the 
use of force in self-defence against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan (2001), 
Hezbollah in Lebanon (2006) and Islamic State in Syria (2014). The focus of 
this Chapter is on understanding the dynamics of necessity in the use of 
force against non-state actors, and analysing the concept of necessity in 
each situation.  
 
The thesis then concludes with Chapter 7 where it will be argued that there 
is no fixed approach determining the meaning of necessity. A state can 
determine necessity from various perspectives, as subject to various 
conditions. For example, necessity can be influenced by the entity of the 
aggressor (a state or a terrorist group) and be judged on whether force is 
employed in traditional self-defence or in anticipatory self-defence. It can 
also be noted that necessity has a dual role in the framework of self-
defence. First, it acts as a requirement for any state initiating self-defence, 
and second it serves as a limitation on the use of force.
- 7 - 
  Chapter 2: The Legal Framework of Self-Defence  
1. Introduction 
 
The legal framework concerning self-defence begins by stating a prohibition 
on the use of force. It is appropriate to start any discussion on self-defence 
by acknowledging that force is generally considered as unlawful in 
international law. After this acknowledgement, the discussion then focuses 
on the law pertaining to self-defence, by examining its sources and contents. 
This Chapter provides a descriptive outline of the framework for self-
defence, and as such, it will serve as a basis for the arguments made 
throughout this thesis. It is vital to outline the basic tenets of self-defence 
before discussing the core of the thesis, which is the principle of necessity.  
 
Discussion will begin with the prohibition on the use of force specified in 
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter 1945. Following that, the 
discussion will move on to examine the law on self-defence in conventional 
law, as stated on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and in customary 
international law. This will include examination of elements of self-defence, 
such as the requirement of an ‘armed attack’, the phrase ‘inherent right to 
self-defence’, and the relationship between the right to self-defence and the 
UN Security Council. Another aspect that will be analysed is the discussion 
surrounding the lawfulness of anticipatory self-defence, and the applicability 
of self-defence targeting non-state actors. Finally, this chapter will end by 
detailing the principles of necessity and proportionality under the law of self-
defence, as required by customary international law. A core focus of this 
thesis is the study of the concept of necessity in the context of self-defence.  
 
In sum, the purpose of this chapter is to serve as a foundation to the thesis, 
offering an exploration of its key arguments within the legal framework of 
self-defence. It will commence with a prohibition on the use of force, 
discussing the scope on the right to self-defence and concluding by 
discussing the principles of necessity and proportionality. 
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2. Prohibition on the Use of Force 
  
The main point of reference on the prohibition on the use of force in the UN 
Charter is in Article 2(4) which states: 
 
“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations.”1  
 
Prior to the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, during the inter-War 
period (1919-1944), there were several efforts to prohibit states to use force 
(or the outlawry of war).2 Such attempts were made for instance through the 
League of Nations and the Kellogg–Briand Pact, which prohibited signatory 
parties to use force against another territory.3 With the inception of Article 
2(4) of the United Nations Charter, it explicitly states that  the prohibition on 
the use of force under international law. This provision is often described as 
the ‘cornerstone’ of the modern international system because it restraints 
states from resorting to force.4  
 
                                            
1 Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter (1945) 1 UNTS XVI  
2 Wilhelm Grew, The Epochs of International Law (Walter de Gruyter, 2000) 
619 – 624  
3 Article 10 of the Covenant of League of Nations (28 April 1919)  
4 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of 
Congo v. Uganda) ICJ Rep. 2005 p 201 para 148 (‘The prohibition 
against the use of force is a cornerstone of the United Nations Charter’); 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua 
v. United States) ICJ Rep 1986 p. 14 in a separate Opinion of President 
Singh, p. 153 (‘the very cornerstone of the human effort to promote 
peace in a world torn in strife’); Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic 
Republic of Iran v. United States of America) ICJ Rep 2003 p. 61, in a 
dissenting opinion of Judge Elaraby, at 291 (‘The principle of the 
prohibition of the use of force in international relations…is no doubt, the 
most important principle in contemporary international law to govern 
inter-State conduct; it is indeed the cornerstone of the Charter’); in a 
separate opinion of Judge Simma at 328.  
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The prohibition on the use of force can be approached in two ways. Firstly, 
the prohibition could be drawn from Article 2(4) of the United Nations 
Charter, as set out above. Secondly, customary international law also 
demands prohibition on the use of force. This can be derived from state 
practice and opinio juris, which confirms the prohibition on the use of force 
proceeds from customs.  
 
a. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter  
 
Much of the discussion associated with this Article emerged in response to 
interpretations of the scope of the prohibition. In particular, whether the 
provision should be read strictly according to the words contained in Article 
2(4) or afforded some flexibility in special circumstances, to allow states to 
exercise force without violating the provision. However, a central 
interpretation made in the Article defines the term ‘force’ as referring to 
military or armed force5 and it can also mean ‘political and economic force’.6  
 
Scholars raised the issue on the meaning of Article 2(4) by examining the 
travaux preparatoires to determine the intention of the states during the 
drafting period. For instance, Randelzhofer and Brownlie, argue that the 
meaning of ‘force’ in the provision refers specifically only to the use of 
military force.7 This is because, they argued, that during the drafting of the 
provision, Brazil attempted to propose the definition of force to include 
economic coercion but the San Francisco Conference rejected the idea.8 
However, Stone questions the clarity of the travaux preparatoires that can be 
                                            
5 Yoram Dinstein, War Aggression and Self-Defence (5th ed., CUP 2012) 88; 
Randelzhofer, ‘Article 2(4)’ in Bruno Simma (ed), The Charter of the 
United Nations: A Commentary (Vol.1, 2nd edn, OUP 2002) 117; Derek 
W Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law (Manchester University 
Press 1958) 148  
6 Randelzhofer (n 5) 118. 
7 Randelzhofer, ‘Article 2(4)’ in Bruno Simma and others (eds.), The Charter 
of the United Nations: A Commentary (Vol. I, 3rd ed, OUP 2012) 209; Ian 
Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (OUP 1963) 
267-8 
8 Ibid 
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construed conclusively that force is restricted to military force only.9 He 
further his argument by stating that it is an extreme view of the provision that 
any use of transboundary force necessarily equates to violation of Article 
2(4). 10 
 
Aside from the meaning of force in Article 2(4), it may be raised here 
whether there is a link between the provision with the meaning of 
aggression. The Definition of Aggression can be derived from GA Resolution 
3314 (XXIX) Article 1 which states: 
 
“Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another 
State, or in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United 
Nations’.11 
 
The language used in defining the meaning of aggression is similar to Article 
2(4) of the UN Charter. However, upon examination, the meaning of 
aggression bears no relevance to Article 2(4). This is because the preamble 
of the GA Resolution states that the definition of ‘aggression’ is intended for 
Article 39 of the United Nations Charter with respect to the powers of the 
Security Council in determining the definition of aggression.12 Therefore, 
there is no link that can be made between the meaning of aggression as 
stated in the GA Resolution with Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force.  
 
Historically, the relevance of this Article has been scrutinised, specifically in 
connection with the effectiveness of Article 2(4) as a measure preventing 
                                            
9 Julius Stone, Aggression and World Order (Stevens and Sons 1958) 95-98  
10 Ibid 
11 Article 1 of Definition of Aggression, UN General Assembly 3314 (XXIX) 
14 December 1974 UN Doc A/Res/29/3314  
12 Ibid. The Preamble of the GA Resolution states ‘Recalling that the 
Security Council, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter of the 
United Nations, shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in 
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international 
peace and security’  
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states from using force contrary to the UN Charter. Arguably, if the Article 
has been effective in preventing states from exercising force, then it is not 
possible to explain the series of conflicts that have occurred since the 
establishment of the United Nations. Critics question whether the Charter 
scheme as a whole is able to withstand the pressure of maintaining 
international peace and security, in line with the aims of the Charter.13 
Franck opines that, although the provision imposes strict obligations, it 
contains various ambiguities, with potential to result in its ‘deadly erosion’.14 
He posits his argument, stating that Article 51 (on the right to self-defence) 
permits states to excuse themselves from the prohibition based on self-
defence, without a proper fact finding system in place to identify who is the 
aggressor and who is the innocent.15 This leads Article 2(4) to be 
undermined, with states choosing ‘to attack first and lie about it afterwards’.16 
This could be said one of the weaknesses of the provision.17 
 
Despite the flaws contained in Article 2(4), states generally agree on the 
basic tenets that each state is sovereign and territorial integrity and political 
independence must be respected. O’Connell claims that since the inception 
of Article 2(4) in 1945, the world has not witnessed a state succeeded in 
conquering another member state of the UN and extinguishing its 
existence.18 Even during the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990, after several 
attempts of negotiations failed, military force was used to liberate Kuwait.19 
This shows that member states reinforce the Charter’s norms of against the 
use of force in international relations.  
 
                                            
13 Article 1(1) of the United Nations Charter (1945) 1 UNTS XVI  
14 Thomas Franck, ‘Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing 
the Use of Force by States’ (1970) 64 AJIL 809-837, 809 
15 ibid 811 
16 ibid 810-812  
17 See opposing discussion L. Henkin, ‘The Reports of the Death of Article 
2(4) and Greatly Exaggerated’ (1971) 65 AJIL 544  
18 Mary O’connell, ‘The Prohibition of the Use of Force’ in Nigel White and 
Christian Henderson (eds.), Research Handbook on International 
Conflict and Security Law (Edward Elgar 2013) 117 
19 See UN SC Res. 678 (1990) November 1999 
- 12 - 
A significant development on the issue of the prohibition on the use of force 
was in 2005. By 2005, the world has witnessed two major armed conflicts 
namely in Afghanistan (2001) and in Iraq (2003). In a UN Document, World 
Summit Outcomes, member states reaffirmed the rules, which states:  
 
“78. We reiterate the importance of promoting and strengthening the 
multilateral process and of addressing international challenges and 
problems by strictly abiding by the Charter and the principles of 
international law, and further stress our commitment to 
multilateralism.”  
 
“79. We reaffirm that the relevant provisions of the Charter are 
sufficient to address the full range of threats to international peace 
and security. We further reaffirm the authority of the Security Council 
to mandate coercive action to maintain and  restore international 
peace and security. We stress the importance of acting in accordance 
with the purposes and principles of the Charter.”20  
 
Another ambiguity in Article 2(4), as explained by Franck could be extended 
by examining the phrase ‘against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State’. Some commentators support a strict approach, 
demonstrating that this Article permits state A to enter state B, without 
contravening Article 2(4), the intention being not to jeopardise the political or 
territorial integrity of state B.21 Others view the use of force within another 
territory as not amounting to a violation of the said Article unless the victim 
state is deprived of its territory permanently.22 However, these arguments do 
not garner majority support from academics. The UN Charter was founded to 
prevent the ‘scourge of war’, as it was conceived in the wake of the First and 
                                            
20 2005 World Summit Outcome document, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, 24 
October 2005  
21 Derek Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law (Manchester University 
Press 1958) 150-151 
22 See D’Amato, International Law: Process and Prospect (Transnational 
Publisher 1987) 58-59 
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Second Word Wars.23 Furthermore, another stated purpose of the Charter is 
‘…to maintain international peace and security…to take effective collective 
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace’.24 If Article 
2(4) is unable to restrain the use of force, except in situations permitted 
under the Charter regime, this would undermine the entire UN system, 
determining the prohibition on the use of force.25 Even if these arguments 
were directed toward the vagueness of the term ‘territorial integrity or 
political independence of any State’, the following phrase: acting ‘in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations’ is 
considered to be ‘a residual “catch-all” provision’, limiting the scope of the 
use of force.26 As such, various perspectives can be seen here with regard 
to the evaluation of Article 2(4). On the one hand, it is argued that the 
vagueness of Article 2(4) undermines the purpose of the provision by 
preventing states from using force. On the other hand, it is also argued that 
the prohibition is clear, as no use of force is permitted in any circumstances 
except those permitted in the Charter. Furthermore, the argument above 
also indicates that analysis of the provision divides the interpretation of the 
prohibition according to two interpretations: a broader and a strict approach.  
 
The division on the strict and broad interpretations of Article 2(4) can be 
seen in state practice. In 1976, a plane was hijacked by an armed terrorist 
group, which subsequently landed in Entebbe International Airport in 
Uganda.27 It was clear during the incident that the terrorists were targeting 
Israeli nationals. During the course of negotiations, and in an effort to 
release the captors, Israeli forces landed at the airport without awaiting the 
permission of the Ugandan government, and employed force in order to 
rescue the victims.28 In doing so, airport buildings were targeted and several 
Ugandan aircrafts destroyed. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
                                            
23 Preamble of the United Nations Charter 1945 1 UNTS XVI 
24 Article 1(1) of the United Nations Charter 1945 1 UNTS XVI  
25 Hilaire McCoubrey and Nigel White, International Law and Armed Conflict 
(Dartmouth 1992) 25 
26 Yoram Dinstein, War Aggression and Self-Defence (4th ed, CUP 2005) 90 
27 See UN Doc. S/PV.1939 (1976)  
28 Murray Colin Alder, The Inherent Right of Self-Defence (Springer 2013) 
138-139 
- 14 - 
strongly condemned the actions of Israeli forces, describing them as an act 
of aggression and a breach of Ugandan sovereignty.29 Similar sentiments 
were echoed by other states such as Benin, China, Cuba, Romania, Algeria, 
Tanzania and USSR among others. Qatar, on behalf of the Arab States, 
claimed that Israel had committed a flagrant violation of Uganda’s territory 
and committed an act of aggression.30 Israel defended its actions, claiming it 
had acted on humanitarian grounds to rescue its nationals. It was supported 
by the US, who claimed that in such circumstances Israel had the right, 
derived from the right to self-defence as recognised under international law, 
to breach Ugandan territory temporarily.31  
 
In another incident, in 1983, the Security Council convened to discuss US 
intervention in Granada.32 Following the murder of the Grenadian Prime 
Minister and other cabinet members, the US intervened, ostensibly to 
restore peace and security, while at the same time assisting evacuation 
efforts. Several countries supported the US intervention in Grenada, 
including Barbados, Chile and Jamaica; however, forty-three countries 
opposed the invasion claiming it was a violation of the UN Charter. The 
opposing countries requested to the states involved to refrain from the use of 
threat and force when conducting international relations. Singapore did not 
condemn the military operation in Grenada because they recognised that 
neglecting the country would undermine the moral and legal principles of the 
Charter.33 France stated that the justifications forwarded by the US did not 
                                            
29 Repertoire of the Practice of the UN Security Council- Regional 
Arrangements (Chapter XII) – List of Communications from Regional 
Organisations – (1975-1980) - Consideration of the Provisions of other 
Article of the Charter Part II: Consideration of the Provisions of Article 2 
411 (http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/75-80/75-80_12.pdf#page=17)  
30 ‘Complaint of Aggression by Israel against Uganda’ (1976) UN Yearbook 
315-320, 318 
31 Ibid 319.  
32 See for factual events L Doswald-Beck, ‘The Legality of the United States 
Intervention in Grenada’ 31 (1984) NILR 355-377, 356-359; See also 
‘The Situation in Grenada’ UN Doc. GA A/RES/38/7 (2 November 1983). 
See the discussion  in Francis A. Boyle and others, ‘International 
Lawlessness in Grenada’ 78 (1984) AJIL 172-175  
33 ‘Grenada Situation’ (1983) UN Yearbook 213 
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conform to international law, furthermore, that such intervention could only 
be permitted when authorised by the Security Council.34  
 
The different interpretations of the scope of Article 2(4) can be exemplified in 
the two events outlined above. In both cases, the aggressor states provided 
a broad interpretation of the prohibition allowing the use of force without 
contravening Article 2(4), arguing that they acted to achieve hostage rescue 
and restore peace. Both states, the US and Israel, contended that their use 
of force were legal and within the framework of the UN Charter. However, 
other states argued their interpretations of Article 2(4) were wrong, as shown 
when France objected to the US invasion of Grenada. Similarly, other states 
upheld the integrity of the UN Charter, insisting that force could only be 
resorted to if the Security Council gives permission. From the examples cited 
above, it shows that Article 2(4) can be interpreted broadly and strictly by 
states and claim that using force in another state’s territory does not 
necessarily violate Article 2(4).  
 
In the Corfu Channel case,35 the first case put before the ICJ, the United 
Kingdom initiated ‘Operation Retail’ within the territorial seas of Albania after 
two British navy ships were hit by sea mines in the Corfu Channel straits. 
The government of the United Kingdom justified its operation in the context 
of Article 2(4), stating: 
 
“…but our action on the 12th/13th November threatened neither the 
territorial integrity nor the political independence of Albania. Albania 
suffered thereby neither territorial loss nor any part of its political 
independence.”36 
 
The statement implied that, although the UK had employed force within the 
territory of Albania, it did not intend to threaten Albania’s territorial integrity or 
                                            
34 ibid  
35 Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom vs. Albania) ICJ Rep 1949 p. 4  
36 ICJ Pleadings in Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania) Vol, III 
1949 p. 296 
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its political independence. This defence, however, was rejected by the Court, 
whereby it emphasised that respect for territorial sovereignty as an essential 
foundation of international relations.37 The Court also stressed that although 
there are ‘defects in international organisation’, such as the ambiguities 
contained in certain provisions of international documents, powerful states 
must not pervert the administration of international justice.38  
 
Article 2(4) of the Charter imposes strict obligations on member states to 
observe the prohibition on the use of force. The prohibition does not excuse 
substantial violations of human rights or humanitarian crises within other 
states.39 However, the Charter only permits recourse to force in exercising 
the right to self-defence, or by the collective endorsement of the Security 
Council.40 Beyond these exceptions, use of force is a derogation of the 
attacked state’s territorial integrity and political independence.41 In the case 
of Military and Paramilitary Activities In and against Nicaragua (hereafter 
‘Nicaragua’), the Court considered the issue of forcible humanitarian 
intervention invoked by the US. The Court held that the use of force is not an 
appropriate mechanism for upholding humanitarian values.42 This reflects 
the strict interpretation followed by the ICJ with regard to the scope of Article 
2(4). The case also demonstrates that the use of force may only be 
                                            
37 Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom vs. Albania) ICJ Rep 1949 p. 35 
38 Ibid. 
39 Thomas Franck, Recourse to Force (CUP 2002) 137 
40 Articles 42 and 51 of the United Nations Charter 1945 1 UNTS XVI  
41 Oscar Schachter, ‘The Rights of States to Use Armed Force’ (1984) 82 
Michigan Law Review 1620-1646, 1632 
42 The Court states: ‘In any event, while the United States might form its own 
appraisal of the situation as to respect for human rights in Nicaragua, the 
use of force could not be the appropriate method to monitor or ensure 
such respect. With regards to the steps actually taken, the protection of 
human rights, a strictly humanitarian intervention objective, cannot be 
compatible with the mining of ports, the destruction of oil installations, or 
again with the training, arming and equipping the contras. The Court 
concludes that the argument derived from the preservation of human 
rights in Nicaragua cannot afford a legal justification for the conduct of 
the United States, and cannot in any event be reconciled with the legal 
strategy of the respondent State, which is based on the right of collective 
self-defence. See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) ICJ Reports 1986 p. 
268  
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permissible if the Charter provides such course of action such as Article 51 
or by permission from the UN Security Council. Observers argued that the 
ICJ’s decision not to uphold the humanitarian justification made by the US 
indicated not a total rejection by the Court on the concept of humanitarian 
intervention, rather the actions taken by the US did not conform to 
humanitarian objectives.43  
 
The wider impact of the Court’s decision to reject humanitarian values as a 
basis for the use of force indicates that the Court provides no flexibility in 
Article 2(4), emphasising that no use of force is permissible, except for the 
exceptions stated in the Charter. In addition, the judgment also reveals that 
the Court followed a broad interpretation of the scope of the prohibition. 
However, the ICJ’s position on humanitarian intervention in Nicaragua was 
an approach taken in 1986 and it is unclear whether the Court maintains this 
view today.44 In few instances, states invoked humanitarian intervention as a 
basis for the use of force. Gray observes that, since the Kosovo crisis in 
1999, states have been more prepared to rely openly on the legal doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention.45  
 
In 1997, the Yugoslavian government, which controlled Kosovo, faced 
domestic opposition from the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which rejected 
central government control. On 5 March 1998, government forces allegedly 
killed fifty-people, including women and children, in Drenica. By September 
1998, it was reported that 230,000 people had been displaced by the 
conflict.46 The friction between the two sides worsened, and on 31 March 
1998, the Security Council condemned the use of excessive force by the 
Serbian police against peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo and stated the 
Security Council’s opposition to terrorist activities in Kosovo.47 On 24 March 
1999, NATO launched military air strikes against the Yugoslavian 
                                            
43 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (3rd ed, OUP 2008) 
35 
44 See Security Council 3989th meeting on 26 March 1999 (S/PV.3989) 
45 Gray (n 43) 33-36 
46 S/RES/1199 of 23 September 1998  
47 S/RES/1160 of 31 March 1998  
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government, to end the humanitarian atrocities committed against the 
civilians.48  
  
The use of force for humanitarian reasons is a controversial position to take 
under the Charter, because the does not explicitly permit such recourse. 
However, the Kosovo crisis illustrated arguments both in support and against 
the use of humanitarian grounds as a reason for force as a violation of the 
prohibition under Article 2(4). During the Kosovo crisis, the Security Council 
had not approved the use of force, and the right to self-defence was not 
raised. During the crisis, some NATO members argued that, despite there 
being no Security Council resolution allowing military operations against 
Yugoslavia, the humanitarian catastrophe was so immense that force was 
necessary to stop further killings. The US Ambassador said: 
 
“We and our allies have begun military action only with the greatest 
reluctance. But we believe that such action is necessary to respond to 
Belgrade’s brutal persecution of Kosovar Albanians, violations of 
international law, excessive and indiscriminate use of force, refusal to 
negotiate to resolve the issue peacefully and recent military build-up 
in Kosovo – all of which foreshadow a human catastrophe of 
immense portions.”49 
 
The UK Secretary of State for Defence made a similar comment, stating: “in 
international law, in exceptional circumstances and to avoid humanitarian 
catastrophe, military action can be taken and it is on that legal basis that 
military action was taken”.50 Essentially, the line of argument employed by 
the supporters of NATO military action was that the exceptional 
humanitarian crisis warranted the use of force by the international 
community, although it was implicitly acknowledged that there was no 
                                            
48 Statement by Dr Javier Solana, Secretary-General of NATO on 23 March 
1999 http://www.nato.int/DOCU/pr/1999/p99-040e.htm  
49 S.C.O.R (LIV) 3988th Meeting, 24 March 1999 at 4. (It can also be argued 
that the justification made by the US is not strictly a legal justification 
based on humanitarian intervention).  
50 UKMIL, 70 BYIL, 1999 p. 586  
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endorsement of this by the Security Council. The argument follows that if the 
Security Council is deadlocked and no proposed outcome could resolve the 
issue, the international community must act, albeit with force. The 
Netherlands representative, exemplified this line of narrative, saying:  
 
“The Secretary-General is right when he observes… that the Council 
should be involved in any decision to resort to the use of force. If, 
however, due to one or two permanent members’ rigid interpretation 
of the concept of domestic jurisdiction, such a resolution id not 
attainable, we cannot sit back and simply let the humanitarian 
catastrophe occur.”51 
 
Although other Member States did not share the view advanced by NATO, 
they considered that principles, such as respect for territorial integrity and 
international law, as prescribed in the UN Charter must be upheld, 
irrespective of any international crisis. A Russian diplomat said during 
deliberations by the Security Council, ‘attempts to justify the NATO strikes 
with arguments about preventing a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo are 
completely untenable. Not only are these attempts in no way based on the 
Charter or other generally recognized rules of international law…’52 Similarly, 
China expressed the view that other member states should not interfere with 
the internal affairs of Yugoslavia, emphasising that China opposed any 
intervention in whatever form and on whatever pretext.53 Other member 
states, such as India54 and Namibia55 opposed NATO’s decision to 
undertake military operations. Russia attempted to table a draft resolution in 
the Council, proposing that NATO’s ‘unilateral use of force constitutes a 
flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter’; this was rejected by a large 
margin in support of the motion: 12 against and 3.56  
                                            
51 S.C.O.R (LIV), 3988th Meeting, 24 March 1999 at 8  
52 Security Council 3988th meeting on 24 March 1999 (S/PV.3988) at 2 
53 S.C.O.R. (LIV), 3988th Meeting, 24th March 1999 at 12  
54 ibid 16.  
55 ibid 10. 
56 Security Council 3989th meeting on 26 March 1999 (S/PV.3989) at 6. 
Three countries were in support of the motion; China, Namibia and 
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The discussion in the Security Council regarding the Kosovo crisis illustrates 
the difficulty encountered when applying humanitarian intervention; as an 
exception to prohibition on the use of force. From a wider perspective, 
humanitarian military operations offer an opportunity to examine the scope of 
Article 2(4), as seen through state practice. On the one hand, supporters of 
NATO strikes seemed to suggest that prohibitions on the use of force should 
be relaxed to permit the use of force on a humanitarian basis. This affects 
the interpretation of Article 2(4), as humanitarian intervention is not covered 
by the two exceptions to the use force stated under the Charter. Meanwhile, 
the other camp advocated a strict interpretation of Article 2(4) because there 
was no Security Council resolution nor was the operation invoked under the 
right to self-defence. Thus, in their view, the absence of these two legal 
avenues rendered NATO’s strikes a violation of the prohibition.  
 
As evidenced above, there appears to be a gradual transition, among some, 
from the strict understanding of Article 2(4), toward a loose interpretation 
concerning the use of force, permitting states to intervene on humanitarian 
grounds. As one commentator observes:  
 
“If the use of force by NATO in Kosovo is seen as a precedent for a 
reinterpretation of Article 2(4) absolute prohibition on the discretionary 
use of force by states, the substitution of a more ‘reasonable’ 
principle, one that accommodates the use of force by any government 
to stop what it believes to be an extreme violation of fundamental 
human rights in another state, could launch the international system 
down the slippery slope into an abyss of anarchy.”57 
 
This concern is widely shared by other legal commentators, who claim that 
any new interpretation of Article 2(4) should be avoided, so that the 
                                                                                                                           
Russia. The 12 opposing states were Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, 
Canada, France, Gabon, Gambia, Malaysia, Slovenia, United Kingdom 
and United States of America.  
57 Franck (n 43) 171-172. 
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unilateral use of force by states remains illegal in all cases.58 It is argued that 
Article 2(4) should remain interpreted broadly and the Kosovo intervention 
cannot be used as precedent in state practice. The German Foreign 
Minister, in a statement in the General Assembly in 1999, commented that:  
 
“[The intervention in Kosovo] must not set a precedent for weakening 
the United Nations Security Council’s monopoly on authorizing the 
use of legal international force. Nor must it become a licence to use 
external force under the pretext of humanitarian assistance. This 
would open the door to the arbitrary use of power and anarchy and 
throw the world back to the nineteenth century”.59  
 
Similarly, the French Foreign Minister stated that ‘we French, we have 
declared it was an exception, this Kosovo matter, and not a precedent’.60 
The pronouncement made by the Ministers show that other state members 
were not keen to relax the interpretation of Article 2(4). 
  
In a further example of discussions regarding the possibility of humanitarian 
intervention, the UN Security Council convened in February 2011 to discuss 
civil unrest in Libya, raising concerns that the government was 
systematically violating human rights.61 In a following meeting, the Council 
passed a Resolution permitting states to ‘use all necessary measures’ to 
protect civilians.62 This language tacitly authorised the use of force in Libya 
                                            
58 Dinstein (n 5) 93-94.; Randelzhofer (n 7) 130-132.; See Gray (n 43) 34 
59 UN Doc. A/54/PV.8 (22 September 1999) 12 
60 UN Doc. A/54/PV.14 (25 September 1999) 17  
61 SC Res 1970 (2011) S/RES/1970 (2011) 26 February 2011  
62 Para 4 states: 
Authorized Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting 
nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting 
in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary 
measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to 
protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign 
occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory, and 
requests the Member States concerned to inform the Secretary-General 
immediately of the measures they take pursuant to the authorization 
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by members of the United Nations,63 although the Resolution explicitly 
prohibited ‘foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan 
territory’.64 The Resolution did not clarify permissible limits for forcible 
measures.65 In ensuing discussions, opinions diverged regarding the level at 
which forcible measures amounted to violations of the UN Charter, 
exceeding the force needed to resolve the humanitarian crisis. Five Member 
States abstained from voting Resolution on 1973 (2011) on various 
grounds.66 Brazil was not convinced militarisation of the conflict would settle 
the humanitarian problems, and feared it would ‘lead to exacerbating 
tension’.67 Expressing similar opposition, China argued that the Security 
Council should act in accordance with the Charter and international legal 
norms, and respect Libya’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.68 The 
Resolution was eventually adopted: ten states voted in favour, no state 
opposed, and five states abstained. This Resolution reflects the willingness 
of states to adapt Chapter VII of the Charter to apply force on the basis of 
humanitarian crisis.69 Although humanitarian intervention in this instance 
was approved via the Security Council, it should not be understood as a 
reflection of greater flexibility under Article 2(4). In fact, conversely, it 
reiterates that, even when faced with a humanitarian catastrophe, 
appropriate mechanisms must be followed in accordance with the Charter 
                                                                                                                           
conferred by this paragraph which shall be immediately reported to the 
Security Council (emphasis added) S/RES/1973 (2011) 
63 Ben Smith and Arabella Thorpe, ‘The Interpretation of Security Council 
1973 on Libya’ (House of Commons Library, International Affairs and 
Defence Section, (SN/IA/5916) 6 April 2011) 2  
64 S/RES/1973 (2011) 17 March 2011  
65 See Pierre Thielbörger, ‘The Status and Future of International Law after 
the Libya Intervention’ (2012) 4 Goettingen Journal of International Law 
11-48, 19-21; Paul Williams and Colleen Popken, ‘Security Council 
Resolution 1973 on Libya: A Moment of Legal and Moral Clarity’ (2011) 
44 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 225-250, 236; M 
Schmitt, ‘Wings over Libya: The No Fly Zone in Legal Perspective’ 
(2011) 36 Yale Journal of International Law Online 45-58, 47   
66 Countries abstained from voting the Resolutions are Brazil, China, 
Germany, India and Russia.  
67 S/PV.6498 (2011) UN Security Council 6498th Meeting on 17 March 2011 
pg. 6 
68 ibid 10.  
69 Although the discussion did not reach consensus but neither states in the 
Security Council vetoed to use force in Libya.   
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especially with regard to the use force. Therefore, this case strengthens the 
view that Article 2(4) should be interpreted strictly.  
 
In summary, the scope of the prohibition on the use of force has been read 
both strictly / narrowly and broadly. Some nations consistently argue that 
Article 2(4) should be read strictly, with force only allowed in accordance 
with the limits stated in the Charter. Those preferring a broad interpretation 
on the prohibition, seek avenues that permit states to exercise force outside 
the realm of the Charter; for example, humanitarian intervention as above. 
Nevertheless, Article 2(4) remains a relevant instrument governing 
international relations, with states (even during a crisis) preferring to comply 
with the prohibition as far as possible, however it is interpreted.  
 
b. The Prohibition on the Use of Force in Customary 
International Law  
 
Similar to the prohibition on the use of force outlined in the UN Charter, a 
similar prohibition is present in customary international law. This signifies 
that aside from the UN Charter the prohibition exists in other legal sources.  
 
The customary prohibition was first confirmed in the case of Nicaragua.70 On 
this occasion, the US was involved in supporting the contras to overthrow 
the Nicaraguan government. It was contested whether the Court had the 
jurisdiction to assess both parties on the basis of Article 2(4), and so the US 
excluded itself from the Court’s jurisdiction to try the case under Article 
2(4).71 The case was eventually determined according to customary 
international law, specifically whether the US had violated the customary 
prohibition on the use of force, and not in reference to the prohibition 
prescribed in the UN Charter.  
 
                                            
70 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America) ICJ Reports 1986 p.14  
71 Reservation on the Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to Article 36(2) of the ICJ 
Statute (1945) 51 Stat. 1031 
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The Court passed a judgment, which considered both the Charter and 
customary law. The Court explained the existence of the prohibition in both 
sources of the law: 
 
“The Court thus finds that both Parties take the view that the 
principles as to the use of force incorporated in the United Nations 
Charter correspond, in essentials, to those found in customary 
international law. The Parties thus both take the view that the 
fundamental principle in this area is expressed in the terms employed 
in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter…The Court 
has however to be satisfied that there exists in customary 
international law an opinio juris as to the binding character of such 
abstention.72…A further confirmation of the validity as customary 
international law of the principle of the prohibition of the use of force 
expressed in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United 
Nations may be found in the fact that it is frequently referred to in 
statements by State representatives as being not only a principle of 
customary international law but also a fundamental or cardinal 
principle of such law…”73 
 
From this judgment, it follows that customary law on the prohibitive 
obligation regarding using force without lawful justification, applies to all 
states, irrespective of whether they are signatories to the UN Charter or 
other multilateral treaties imposing a similar responsibility. Notably in the 
case of Nicaragua, the Court relied on the General Assembly’s ‘Declaration 
on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States’,74 to deduce the opinio juris and form the 
conclusion that the prohibition comprises part of customary international 
                                            
72 Nicaragua (n 70) para. 188 p. 99. 
73 ibid para. 190 p. 100. 
74 GA Res. 2625 (XXV) ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States’ (24 
October 1970) 
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law.75 The Court, however, minimally described the scope of this customary 
law prohibition, not elaborating on how it conforms to the ‘general practice’ of 
state.76 Noting that customary law is based upon ‘general practice accepted 
as law’77 the Court did not explain how this aligns with the requirements set 
out in the Continental Shelf to form customary law; the requirements of state 
practice and opinio juris.78 
 
In Nicaragua, Judge Jennings’ Dissenting Opinion acknowledged a 
restriction on the use force in previous state practice (prior to the drafting of 
the UN Charter), but questioned the difference between the Charter’s Article 
2(4) and the customary prohibitive obligation.79 Drawing from the judgment, 
it can be said the Court gave vague answers on the question of whether the 
Charter is identical to customary international law on the use of force. First, 
the Court suggest that the rules content in customary international law and 
Charter are distinct. The Court explained that ‘on a number of points, the 
areas governed by the two sources of law do not exactly overlap, and the 
substance rules in which they are framed are not identical in content’.80 
 
Second, the Court also expressed that although the rules in Charter law and 
customary international law do overlap in all aspects, customary 
international law continue to exist alongside with treaty law. In this passage, 
the Court gave the example of the conditions of necessity and proportionality 
                                            
75 Preamble of the Declaration reiterates the wording in Article 2(4) of the 
Charter except it omitted the word ‘Every State’ and replaces it with ‘all 
Members’. The Preamble provides ‘Recalling the duty of States to refrain 
in their international relations from military, political, economic or any 
other form of coercion aimed at the political independence or territorial 
integrity of any State’.  
76 Rendelzhofer (n 7) 133-134.; Dinstein (n 5) 92-93. 
77 Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945) 
51 Stat. 1031  
78 North Sea Continental Shelf, ICJ Rep 1969 para 77 p.3  
79 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America) ICJ Rep 1986 Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Jennings at p 530 
80 Nicaragua (n 70) 94 para 175  
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in self-defence that are absent in Article 51 but continue to exist in 
customary international law.81  
 
Finally, the Court stated that even if the norms in Charter law and customary 
international law are not identical, customary international law has 
developed under the influence of the Charter – ‘to such an extent that a 
number of rules contained in the Charter have acquired a status 
independent of it’.82 
 
Furthermore, he criticised the Court’s method of interpreting opinio juris by 
directing to an international document, General Assembly Resolution (1970), 
whilst at the same time denouncing the jurisdiction of Article 2(4) (the 
Charter).83 Judge Jennings contemplated this inconsistency in deducing 
customary law, arguing that had the General Assembly’s Resolution been 
rejected, the outcome of the judgment would have been different.84  
 
Another point that may be raised is the method of the ICJ in reviewing the 
similarities and differences of the prohibition in  Article 2(4) and customary 
international law. The ICJ tends to deduce the content of the prohibition in 
customary law as identical to Article 2(4) and viewed the matter under 
general international law.85 The Court could have gone further by explaining 
in detail the different content of the prohibition under Article 2(4) and in 
customary international law. Nonetheless, one common theme espoused by 
the Court is that the prohibition on the use of force exists under customary 
law as well as in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 
 
Conclusion  
 
                                            
81 Nicaragua (n 70) 94 para 176  
82 Ibid 96-97 para 181  
83 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Jennings in Nicaragua (n 79) 532-533. 
84 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America) ICJ Rep 1986 Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Jennings at p 533 
85 Nicaragua (n 70) para 190  
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The prohibition on the use of force is an essential element determining the 
circumstances of jus ad bellum, which underpins the integrity of international 
law, serving to maintain international peace and security. The prohibition on 
the use of force originates from two main sources of law: namely through the 
UN Charter and customary international law.  
 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits member states from using force, 
unless where permitted under the UN mechanism. There is a division in 
terms of interpreting this provision in the form of broad and narrow readings. 
A strict interpretation of Article 2(4) advocates the non-use of force in 
international relations, only accepting forcible measures under the right to 
self-defence and under the authorisation of the UN Security Council. While 
the broad interpretation calls for the use of force in exceptional 
circumstances, even without the permission of the Security Council and 
without invoking the right to self-defence, this is deemed as not violating 
Article 2(4). The confirmed that the prohibition on the use of force is also 
contained in customary international law.  
 
The prohibition on the use of force, however, has several acknowledged 
exceptions. One of these exceptions is the right to self-defence. The 
following section will consider this right in relation to the UN Charter and 
customary law, and its effects on the entire framework of self-defence. 
  
3. The Law on Self-Defence  
 
Primarily, Article 51 of the UN Charter prescribes the law on self-defence in 
international la as an exception to the prohibition on the use of force. Article 
51 of the UN Charter provides:  
 
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against 
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. 
Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-
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defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and 
shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the 
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such 
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.”86  
 
The collective security system of the United Nations offers Article 51 as key 
to understanding the procedures for exercising the right to self-defence. 
Member states must exercise this right in accordance with the requirements 
prescribed in Article 51.87 The provision is clarified by several key phrases 
comprising key elements of self-defence, which will be examined below.  
 
a. Elements of Self-Defence 
 
The wording of Article 51 imposes the requirement of an ‘armed attack’ as a 
condition that states must meet before exercising the right to self-defence. It 
is for the victim state to prove that it has suffered from an ‘armed attack’ in 
order to trigger the right to self-defence.88 The prevailing view of legal 
commentators on the meaning of an ‘armed attack’ is that it refers to the use 
of physical force in another state.89  
i. ‘Armed Attack’ and Self-Defence against Non-State Actors  
 
The issue on the use of force in self-defence against non-state actors is one 
of the most contentious subjects in international law and it is an ongoing 
                                            
86 Article 51 of United Nations 1945 (1945) 1 UNTS XVI  
87 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
ICJ Rep 1996 p 263 para 96 
88 Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States) 
ICJ Rep 2003 p 189 para 57. 
89 Albrecht Randelzhofer, ‘Article 51’ in Bruno Simma (eds), The Charter of 
the United Nations: A Commentary (Vol. II, 3rd ed, OUP 2012) 1407-
1408; Tom Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the UN Charter (CUP 
2010) 55-56; Olivier Corten, The Law against War (Hart Publishing 
2012); Dinstein (n 5) 196-197; Elizabeth Williamhurst, ‘Principles of 
International Law on the Use of Force by States in Self-Defence’ 
(Chatham House, October 2005) 5   
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discussion amongst commentators and practitioners. Article 51, which 
outlines the right to self-defence in the UN Charter, is silent on the 
permissibility of self-defence against non-state actors. While in state 
practice, there are diverging examples that can be construed in support and 
against the right to self-defence against non-state actors. To further add the 
complexity in this area, the jurisprudence from the ICJ is unclear in this 
regard. The Court till today has never explicitly mentioned the lawfulness of 
a state taking defensive measure against a non-state entity that is 
independent from any state involvement. As such, scholars too are divided 
on the issue of self-defence against non-state actors. However, it is argued 
that despite the ambiguity of such right in the ICJ’s jurisprudence, there is a 
growing tendency in state practice to accept the right to self-defence against 
non-state actors and this is supported by several highly respected legal 
authors. No doubt as this is a highly contentious area of international law, 
there are still strong opposition to the right to use self-defence against non-
state entity in practice and also in writings.  
 
This part will outline the discussions that surround the issue of self-defence 
against non-state actors. This part underpins the basis of this thesis that 
states have the right to use self-defence against non-state actors, where the 
principle of necessity will be considered in that context – ‘necessity within 
the legal framework of self-defence against terrorism’. Therefore, the 
following discussion focuses on the arguments of self-defence against non-
state entities in state practice and academic discussions.  
 
The terms ‘armed attack’ and ‘aggression’ (French: ‘aggression armée’) are 
present in Articles 1(1), 39, 51 and 53 of the UN Charter, but are not defined. 
The same terms can also be found in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty 
(NATO Treaty), which prescribes that an armed attack against one or more 
of the signatory Parties to the treaty in Europe or North America shall be 
considered an attack against them all.90 The drafting history of Article 51 
(travaux préparatoires of the UN Charter) indicates that the drafters of the 
                                            
90 North Atlantic Treaty 1949 (4 April 1949), 34 (1949) UNTS 243  
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provision were deeply divided on what would comprise the scope of an 
‘armed attack’, and only agreed to include the term ‘armed attack’ in Article 
51 to safeguard the right to self-defence in the Charter.91 In 1974, the 
General Assembly passed Resolution 3314 (XXIX), the ‘Definition of 
Aggression’,92 providing a non-exhaustive list of acts constituting 
‘aggression’ under Article 3 of the Resolution.  
 
Confusion should be clarified between the meaning of aggression and 
armed attack. The definition  of aggression contained in the GA Resolution 
3314 has no correlation with the meaning of ‘armed attack’ stipulated in 
Article 51. This is because the definition of aggression in the Resolution 
refers to Article 39 of the UN Charter and the preamble of the Resolution 
makes this point clear.93 Furthermore, Ruys argues that according to travaux 
preparatoires of the Definition of Aggression, parties to the discussion 
consciously avoided the reference of aggression to the right of self-
defence.94  This is evident in Article 6 of the Definition of Aggression, where 
it states that: 
 
“Nothing in this Definition shall be construed in any way enlarging or 
diminishing the scope of the Charter, including its provisions 
concerning cases in which the use of force is lawful.”95  
 
Therefore, it can be said that there is little relevance of the meaning of 
aggression with Article 51 on the right to self-defence.  
 
The question of what amounts to an ‘armed attack’ for the purpose of self-
defence under Article 51 was considered first in the aforementioned case of 
                                            
91 Ruys (n 89) 128-136; Corten (n 89) 414-416; Randelzohfer and Nolte (n 
89) 1407 
92 GA Res 3314(1974) ‘Definition of Aggression’ UN Doc. A/RES/29/3314, 
14 December 1974  
93 See the argument above regarding the meaning of aggression and Article 
2(4) of the UN Charter.  
94 Ruys (n 89) 130-131 
95  Article 6 of Definition of Aggression GA Res 3314(1974) ‘Definition of 
Aggression’ UN Doc. A/RES/29/3314, 14 December 1974 
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Nicaragua.96 Nicaragua claimed that the US had breached its sovereignty by 
laying mines in Nicaraguan internal and territorial waters, damaging its 
merchant ships and foreign freight, and damaging its ports and naval bases. 
It further contended that the US was indirectly using force against Nicaragua 
by extending its support and assistance to Nicaraguan guerrillas (the 
Contras) who had tried to topple the Sandista government (the sitting 
government). In its defence, the US argued that it was exercising the right to 
collective self-defence, in response to the alleged armed attack against El 
Salvador by Nicaragua. The Court ruled in favour of Nicaragua, finding that 
the US had used force against Nicaragua. When issuing the judgement, the 
Court explained that not every situation could be categorised as an armed 
attack:  
 
“…the Court does not believe that that the concept of "armed attack" 
includes not only acts by armed bands where such acts occur on a 
significant scale but also assistance to rebels in the form of the 
provision of weapons or logistical or other support. Such assistance 
may be regarded as a threat or use of force, or amount to intervention 
in the internal or external affairs of other States.”97 
 
The Court further explained the meaning of an armed attack, stating, “There 
appears now to be general agreement on the nature of the acts which can 
be treated as constituting armed attacks.”98 Elaborating the components of 
an armed attack in relation to types of attack and the role of irregular forces, 
the Court referred to Article 3(g) of the General Assembly Resolution 3314 
(XXIX) on the Definition of Aggression.99 The Court stated:  
 
“In particular, it may be considered to be agreed that an armed attack 
must be understood as including not merely action by regular armed 
                                            
96 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua vs. 
United States of America) ICJ Rep. 1986 p. 14  
97 ibid p. 104 para. 195 
98 ibid  
99 General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) 14 December 1974  
- 32 - 
forces across an international border, but also the “sending by or on 
behalf of a State of armed band, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, 
which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such 
gravity as to amount to” (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted 
by regular forces, “or its substantial involvement therein”…The Court 
sees no reason to deny that, in customary law, the prohibition of 
armed attacks may apply to the sending by a State of armed bands to 
the territory of another State, if such an operation, because of its 
scale and effects, would have been classified as an armed attack 
rather than as a mere frontier incident had it been carried out by 
regular armed forces.”100 
 
The passage above reflects that the Court attempted to categorise ‘scale 
and effect’ to determine what constitute as an armed attack. The Court gave 
the example that ‘a mere further incident’ does not equate an armed attack. 
In another case, the Court gave another example to explain the meaning of 
an armed attack where it states ‘localized border encounters between small 
infantry units, even those involving the loss of life, do not constitute an 
armed attack for the purpose of the Charter’.101 The Court seems to follow 
the jurisprudence of ‘scale and effects’ in its judgment of an armed attack.  
 
Some judges were critical the Court’s position on this matter. Judge Higgins, 
for instance in Nicaragua, claimed that the Court’s approach in defining an 
armed attack as ‘operationally unworkable’. She goes on to comment: 
 
“When a state has to decide whether it can repel incessant low-level 
irregular activity, does it really have to decide whether that activity is 
equivalent of an armed attack by a foreign army – and, anyway, is not 
any use of force by a foreign army entitled to be met by sufficient 
force to require it to withdraw? Or is it that now in doubt also? Is the 
question of level of violence by regular forces not really an issue of 
                                            
100 Nicaragua (n 70)  
101 Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award, Jus ad Bellum, (19 
December 2005) 433  
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proportionality, rather than a question of determining what is an 
‘armed attack’.”102 
 
Some commentators were equally unhappy with the Court’s approach on 
this matter. For example, Dinstein disagrees that small scale incident cannot 
amount to an armed attack and any armed attack above, which he describes 
as de minimis threshold (however that is defined), warrant a response in 
self-defence.103 However, Gray sympathises with the Court’s view as it 
reflects state practice where it represents the legal position of the UN 
Security Council.104  
 
In another part of Nicaragua judgment, the Court distinguished ‘the most 
grave forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from 
other less grave forms’.105 The Court expounded the latter forms of the use 
of force by referring to Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in (GA 
Resolution 2625 (XXV). The Court endorsed the distinction between the two 
forms of the use of force in Oil Platforms in determining whether there was 
an armed attack by Iran against the US.106 In spite of the Court’s attitude in 
explaining the gravity of an attack that constitute an armed attack for the 
purpose of Article 51, the Court however, did not dismissed the possibility of 
a single attack might be sufficient to trigger the inherent right to self-
defence.107 Therefore, the Court sees the possibility that a single armed 
attack, may according to scale and effects, constitute as an armed attack for 
the purpose of Article 51.  
 
The Court also stressed that not all acts committed by armed bands 
constitute an ‘armed attack’. In defining the meaning of ‘armed attack’, it 
                                            
102 Dissenting Judgment of Judge Higgins in Nicaragua 251  
103 Dinstein (n 5) 211 
104 Gray (n 43) 132, See also Lindsay Moir, Reappraising Resort to Force 
(Hart Publishing 2010) 24  
105 Nicaragua (n 70) p 101 para 191  
106 Oil Platforms (n 88) para 51  
107 Ibid p 195 para 72 
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must be noted that the Court in Nicaragua was judging the case in relation to 
customary international law, and not the law as specified in the UN Charter; 
hence, the Court was not discussing the issue of an armed attack.108 
Therefore, there was no direct suggestion that the meaning of armed attack 
as discussed in Nicaragua was intended to define that propagated in Article 
51. Furthermore, the Court was not tasked with defining the actual meaning 
of an ‘armed attack’, but only with envisaging the hypothetical need to take 
defensive action.109 In addition, the Court in Nicaragua was reluctant to 
express its views on the meaning of an ‘armed attack’ because neither party 
disputed the existence of an armed attack.110 Thus, the Court only referred 
to an armed attack by stating, ‘there appears now to be general agreement 
on the nature of acts which can be treated as constituting armed attacks’.111 
This created some ambiguities with regard to the nature and meaning of an 
armed attack under Article 51. 
 
The judgment above also alludes to the issue of the role of non-state actors 
in the legal framework of self-defence. In particular, the issue of threshold 
and attribution. The underlying question here is whether the acts committed 
by a non-state actor is attributable to the host state. This is often known as 
the question of attribution. If so, to what degree of state’s involvement which 
can be deemed as attributable to the acts of the non-state actor? This is 
commonly referred to as the threshold question.  
 
The Court suggested that an armed attack executed by a non-state actor 
must have a degree of state involvement which the Court termed as ‘sending 
on behalf of a state…’. The Court also made it clear here that the threshold 
outlined for a state to be held responsible for the conduct of a non-state 
                                            
108 Nicaragua (n 70) p 103 para 194. 
109 Raphaël Van Steenberghe, ‘Self-Defence in Response to Attacks by 
Non-state Actors in the Light of Recent State Practice: A Step Forward?’ 
(2010) 23 LJIL 183-208, 198 
110 Nicaragua (n 85) 103 para. 194. 
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actor is ‘substantial involvement’. Unfortunately, the Court did not elaborate 
the meaning of ‘substantial involvement’.  
 
Some members of the bench in the Nicaragua case had varying opinions 
with regards to the degree of state involvement. For example, Judge Singh 
opined that even a regular and substantial arms supplies would not amount 
to an armed attack – a narrow approach.112 While Judge Schwebel criticised 
the Court for taking a restrictive approach which may deny the victim state to 
take rightful respond to self-defence. He further suggested that the concept 
of ‘substantial involvement’ should also be taken as to include financial and 
logistical support.113 Another criticism raised by another judge in the case, 
Judge Jennings, raised the concern that it is ‘dangerous to define 
unnecessarily strictly the conditions for lawful self-defence’ as this would 
restrict states to launch defensive measures. 114  
 
The case of Nicaragua reflects that Court was willing to accept the notion of 
self-defence against a non-state actor with the condition of meeting the 
attribution and threshold as mentioned above. Some judges, whilst agree on 
a common view that an armed attack may be attributed to a non-state actor, 
however differ on the degree of threshold. Nonetheless, Nicaragua outlines 
that in certain circumstances an armed attack can be attributed to a non-
state actor.  
 
In the Advisory Opinion of Wall case, the issue of non-state actors and the 
right to self-defence was raised again.115 In this instance, the Court seems to 
divert from its opinion in Nicaragua. In the Wall case, the Court was tasked 
to consider the construction of wall as a measure of defence against terrorist 
                                            
112 Separate Opinion of President Nagendra Singh (1986) ICJ Rep 151  
113 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel (1986) ICJ Rep 259  
114 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Jennings in Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America) ICJ Rep 1986 p. 543-544. See also Natalino Ronzitti, ‘The 
Expanding Law of Self-Defence’ 11 JCSL (2006) 343-359, 351  
115 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. 2004, p. 136 (The full 
facts of this case can be found in Chapter 3 6(c)).  
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attacks against Israel. The Court was also asked to determine Security 
Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 (2001) in relation to the right of self-
defence against non-state actors.  
 
The Court found that the Security Council Resolutions was not applicable in 
the present case as the attacks originated within and not outside the territory 
of Israel. Therefore, Israel ‘could not in any event invoke those resolutions’ 
to substantiate the claim of self-defence against non-state actors.116 More 
importantly, the Court stated that Article 51 permits the inherent right to self-
defence in cases of ‘armed attack by one state against another state’.117 
Such pronouncement is a diversion from the jurisprudence mentioned in 
Nicaragua where an armed attack may be attributed to a non-state actor in 
certain conditions. As a result, it seems that the Court in Wall case approves 
self-defence between states against states only.  
 
The main judgment in Wall Advisory Opinion was criticised by Judge Higgins 
where she states: 
 
“There is, with respect, nothing in the text of Article 51 that thus 
stipulates that self-defence is available only when an armed attack is 
made by a state. That qualification is rather a result of the Court so 
determining in [Nicaragua].”118 
 
Similar positions were taken by other judges in the Wall Advisory Opinion 
such as Judges Buerghental119 and Kooijmans120 where they disagree that 
self-defence is not exclusive in inter-states conflicts.  
 
Whilst in another case, the case of Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo (hereafter ‘Armed Activities’), the Court seems unwilling to mention 
                                            
116 ibid p 194 para 139 
117 Ibid 
118 Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins in Wall Advisory Opinion para. 33  
119 Declaration of Judge Buergenthal in Wall Advisory Opinion para 6  
120 Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans in Wall Advisor Opinion para 35  
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on the question of attribution and threshold.121 Here, the Court enquired into 
the contention that Uganda exercised its lawful right to self-defence against 
Congo, despite no specific allegation having been made against Uganda for 
such armed attack. The Court expressly specifies its position by stating:  
 
“…there is no satisfactory proof of the involvement in these attacks, 
direct or indirect, of the Government of the DRC. The attacks did not 
emanate from armed bands or irregulars sent by the DRC or on 
behalf of the DRC... The Court is of the view that, on the evidence 
before it, even if this series of deplorable attacks could be regarded 
as cumulative in character, they still remained non-attributable to the 
DRC.”122 
 
The Court further adds:  
 
“Accordingly, the Court has no need to respond to the contentions of 
the Parties as to whether and under what conditions contemporary 
international law provides for a right to self-defence against large-
scale attacks by irregular forces.”123   
 
The Court was reluctant to outline the circumstances in which it is 
permissible for states to respond to large-scale attacks by non-state entities. 
Indeed, this reluctance by the Court was not popular among commentators, 
especially considering the case was decided after the 9/11 attacks.124 
However, this case may be taken that the Court had not dismissed the 
possibility that self-defence is applicable to non-state actors in certain 
circumstances. Judge Koojimans, in his Separate Opinion in this case 
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criticised that armed attacks are not necessarily attributable state 
involvement and it is unreasonable to deny an attacked state the right to 
self-defence merely because there is no attacker state.125 But the Court in 
this occasion saw no reason to explain the matter further. Thus, 
jurisprudence for self-defence against a non-state actor is still subject to 
discussion.126  
 
Hence, in all three cases cited above, Nicaragua, Wall and Armed Activities, 
indicate that the Court created a mix jurisprudence on the issue of self-
defence against non-state actors. In Nicaragua, the Court appears to accept 
armed attack may be committed by a non-state actor although there must be 
a degree of state involvement (threshold). In contrast, Wall case explicitly 
mentioned that self-defence applies in inter-states situation which is contrary 
to judgment in Nicaragua. Finally, in Armed Activities, the Court shied away 
from mentioning the conundrum of self-defence against non-state actors in 
international law. Therefore, to date, the Court has not yet created a solid 
jurisprudence on the issue of self-defence against non-state actors. As such, 
in terms of jurisprudential aspects from the ICJ, the permissibility of self-
defence against non-state actors is open to debate.  
 
From one angle, it could be said that the Court was fairly consistent in its 
approach in answering the permissibility of self-defence against a non-state 
actor. In Nicaragua, the Court qualified its judgment by stating there must be 
an element of state involvement and even in Wall case, the Court has not 
dismiss the possibility of self-defence between a state a non-state actor. 
However, upon examination, the Court could be said it has not establish a 
firm position on the question of attribution and threshold.127 In particular, 
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(OUP 2010) 33 
127 James Green, The International Court of Justice and Self-Defence in 
International Law (Hart Publishing, 2009) 47-48 
- 39 - 
post-9/11 where states at times invoke Article 51 in response to armed 
attacks committed by non-state actors.  
 
Scholars offer variety of opinions in approaching the questions of attribution 
and threshold raised earlier. For example, Kimberly Trapp advocates that if 
the host state is unable to suppress terrorist activities within its borders and 
affecting another state, it is suffice that there is an ‘acquiescence’ in 
terrorism by the host state (not necessarily active support by the host state 
to the non-state actor) for the host state be attributed to the conduct of the 
non-state actor.128 For Tom Ruys and Sten Verhoeven, they argue that the 
question of attribution can be resolved by re-interpreting the concept of 
‘substantial involvement’ by applying a broader ‘aiding and abetting’ test.129 
In doing so, it is a useful indicator for cases involving ‘indirect military 
aggression’ for a state to be attributed to non-states conduct.130 They further 
argue that, the ‘substantial involvement’ concept takes into account the 
intention of the host state and the host state is not responsible if it is 
unaware the support given is used to commit attacks abroad.131  
 
In legal literature, there are three jurisprudence on state responsibility for 
actions of non-state actors. First, in Nicaragua, the ICJ introduced the 
‘effective control test’, which determines culpability based on a state 
participating in financing, organising, training and supplying the non-state 
armed group.132 This makes the state appear imputable over the conduct of 
the non-state actor in another state. The effective control test seems to have 
gained some support. The International Law Commission (ILC) adopted the 
notion of an effective control test in its Draft Articles on State 
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Responsibility.133 Later the ICJ, in a separate case, considered the Draft 
Articles as customary international law.134 Therefore, by precedent and 
conventional law, the main method of assessment is the effective control 
test.  
 
Second,  also developed in Nicaragua, is ‘dependence test’ or ‘agency test’. 
Recalling the facts of Nicaragua, the Court asked the following question:  
 
“whether or not the relationship of the contras to the United States 
Government was so much one of dependence on the one side and 
control on the other that it would be right to equate the contras, for 
legal purposes, with an organ of the United States Government, or as 
acting on behalf of that Government”.135 
 
In this case, the Court found that there was insufficient evidence to suggest 
the contras had ‘complete dependence on the US aid’.136 This test requires a 
high degree of proof to attribute a state with a non-state actor where the 
dependency must be ‘complete’. Furthermore, this test requires a state to be 
in actual exercise of control in ‘all fields’ of a non-state actor’s activity. In 
effect, this test equates a group of individuals with an organ of a state that 
relies on a relationship of dependence and control.  
 
Finally, another means of examining a state control over a non-state actor 
involves using the ‘overall control test’. This test was propounded in the 
appeal decision of Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic in the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).137 The Tribunal considered 
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whether Yugoslavia should be held responsible for the acts committed by 
Serb forces and consequently determined if the conflict was an international 
armed conflict.138 The Appeal Chamber viewed that different level of control 
test applied to different types of non-state actors, and in this case with an 
armed non-state entity. The Appeal Chamber describes the overall control 
test as: 
 
“In order to attribute the acts of a military or paramilitary group to a 
state, it must be proved that the State wields overall control over the 
group, not only by equipping and financing the group, but also by 
coordinating or helping in the general planning of its military activity. 
Only then can the state be held internationally accountable for any 
misconduct of the group. However, it is not necessary that, in 
addition, the state should also issue, either to the head or to members 
of the group, instructions for the commission of specific acts contrary 
to international law.”139  
 
The overall control test could be described as a less stringent test than the 
effective control test. In the former, the test does not require the state to 
direct a specific order to violate international law in another territory, and it 
suffices that the state has general control over the armed organisation. In 
the latter test, a higher burden of proof is required to link the state and the 
armed group, and it must be shown that a specific direction is being given to 
the group to undertake unlawful international conduct. While the 
dependence test requires a complete control of the non-state actor in all 
fields. This test demands a higher threshold of proof in comparison to the 
other two tests. Hence, there are differences between the three tests.  
 
In all the three cases articulated above, it must be noted the distinction 
between them. The dependence and effective control tests were formulated 
in Nicaragua where the Court (ICJ) analysed the case in light of jus ad 
bellum. While the overall test was developed in Tadic case where the Court 
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(ICTY) was determining the characterisation an armed conflict and not legal 
responsibility of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.  
 
The discussion regarding the three tests was reignited in the case of 
Genocide in Bosnia.140 After establishing the Bosnian Serb Armed Forces 
had committed an act of genocide at Srebrenica, the Court was tasked with 
examining whether the conduct of the Bosnian Serbs could be attributed to 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). In its judgment, the Court 
considered both the tests promulgated in the Nicaragua and Tadic cases. 
The Court relied on the effective control test to determine the state’s 
responsibility, rather than the overall control or dependence tests. The ICJ, 
in effect, endorsed effective control as the correct method of ascertaining the 
legal responsibility of a state for actions of non-state actors.  
 
In the decision Genocide in Bosnia, the Court criticised the judgment of 
Tadic in ICTY on two grounds. First, that the ICTY Appeal Chamber was 
deciding a case that fell under the jurisdiction of international criminal law (to 
a certain extent international humanitarian law), which is distinct from the law 
before the ICJ, as denoted by state responsibility, and therefore the Court 
disregarded the ruling of the ICTY.141 Second, if the overall test concept was 
to be accepted as the benchmark for the attribution of state to non-state 
actors’ conduct, the test had overly broadened the notion of state 
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responsibility, in particular, Article 8 of the Articles on State Responsibility.142 
Thus, the Court found the overall control test inapplicable in the instance of 
Genocide in Bosnia.  
 
However, endorsement of the effective control test by the ICJ has been 
criticised. In Tadic, the ICTY Appeal Chamber introduced the overall control 
test because the Tribunal saw the Nicaragua tests as unsuited to the facts 
before the tribunal. The Tribunal, thus, merely proposed an alternative 
method of attribution of state to non-state actor, not dismissing the merits of 
the effective control test. The Tribunal explained this: 
 
“The degree of control may, however, vary according to the factual 
circumstances of each case. The Appeals Chamber fails to see why 
in each and every circumstance international law should require a 
high threshold for the test of control. Rather, various situations may 
be distinguished.”143 
 
The Tribunal then distinguished what constituted an internationally wrongful 
act performed between ‘private individuals’ and ‘organised and hierarchically 
structured groups’. It ruled with the latter type of non-state actor, which fits 
better with the overall control test. In fact, the Tribunal did not reject the 
notion in Nicaragua outright, but only argued for a flexible approach to the 
issue of culpability and maintained that an effective control test suits different 
scenarios.144 Furthermore, the high-threshold test could easily enable an 
armed group or private individuals to escape legal responsibilities, due to the 
secretive nature of such organisations, as proving a direct effective 
relationship (instruction, direction or control) is very difficult.  
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Despite the divergence of jurisprudence on state’s attributability towards 
non-state actors, the ILC, conscious of differing views, attempted to close 
the gap.145 In its commentary, it acknowledges the views presented by the 
ICTY, yet firmly states the concept introduced in Nicaragua. Thus, matters 
relating to the unlawful use of force in another state by an armed group or 
private individuals are still tested according to the effective control 
method.146  
 
The ‘dependence’, ‘overall control’ and ‘effective control’ tests will have an 
impact on how states respond to an armed organisation. This will be shown 
in state practice, which demonstrates that the application of necessity differs 
between state and non-state actors. Therefore, the tests discussed earlier 
are vital to distinguish the application of necessity between different entities 
in self-defence.  
 
ii.  ‘Inherent Right’ 
 
The language employed in Article 51 refers to the ‘inherent right’ to self-
defence, or as termed in French, the ‘droit naturel’. The meaning of ‘inherent 
right’ in Article 51 is subject to continuous debate among legal 
commentators. 
 
The prevailing view purports that the term inherent refers to the right to self-
defence as afforded to members and non-members of the United Nations.147 
Other commentators have resisted the notion that Article 51 defines a right 
that existed before 1945 and which continues to exist under the Charter. 
Yoram Dinstein believes that if the right to self-defence originates from a 
‘natural right’ (droit naturel), or from a ‘natural law’ it has no place in an era 
                                            
145 ‘Each case will depend on its own facts, in particular those concerning 
the relationship between the instructions given or the direction or control 
exercised and the specific conduct complained of. In the text of article 8, 
the three terms “instructions”, “direction” and “control” are disjunctive; it 
is sufficient to establish any one of them.’ Draft articles on Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with commentaries 2001  p.48 
146 Dinstein (n 5) p. 224 
147 Randelzohfer and Nolte (n 89) 1403, Ruys (n 89) 515   
- 45 - 
dominated by positive law.148 In supporting the supremacy of the Charter, he 
criticises the notion of a ‘natural right’ thus: ‘It may be conceived as an 
anachronistic residue from an era in which international law was dominated 
by ecclesiastical doctrines. At the present time, there is not much faith in 
transcendental truth professed to be derived from nature’.149  
 
Another way viewing the meaning of ‘inherent right’ is it acts as a gateway 
for customary international law to continue to exist alongside with Article 51. 
By relying on the term ‘inherent right’ the Charter also implies that the pre-
existing rights of states prior to 1945 in relation to self-defence endure, 
irrespective of any impediment imposed on them by any subsequent 
treaty.150 This contradicts the right to self-defence as portrayed in Article 51. 
Assuming the right to self-defence implies no prior requirement in the form of 
a breach of international law; this is in stark contrast with Article 51, which 
establishes the need for an ‘armed attack’ as a trigger before exercising the 
right to self-defence. Thus, this complicates the right to self-defence; 
whether the term ‘inherent right’ of self-defence must abide by the 
restrictions levied in Article 51, such as meeting the requirement of ‘armed 
attack’ and reporting to the Security Council, or if ‘inherent right’ denotes the 
permissibility of exercising self-defence without restraint.  
 
More importantly is to what extent does customary international law affect 
Article 51. If ‘inherent right’ means acknowledging previous legal rights, this 
may undermine the whole purpose of the UN Charter. As rightly commented 
by Randelzhofer ‘the content and scope of a customary right of self-defence 
are unclear and could extend far into the spheres of self-help in such way 
that its continuing existence would, to a considerable extent, reintroduce the 
unilateral use of force by states, the far-reaching abolition of which is 
intended by the UN Charter’.151  
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In view of the above, the distinction between Article 51 and customary law 
as a source for the ‘inherent right’ to self-defence is unmistakeable. On the 
one hand, to support the pre-1945 right to self-defence fully without the 
interference of the UN Charter defies the role of the Charter as a multilateral 
agreement subscribed to by states to administer their international affairs. 
On the other hand, purely seeking the right to self-defence through the lens 
of Article 51 fails to account relies on customary international law such as 
the principles of necessity and proportionality. 
 
Although Article 51 is largely silent concerning limitations on the use of force 
in the realm of self-defence it is well established and widely recognised that 
the requirements of necessity and proportionality derive from customary 
international law, which is not mentioned in Article 51.152 It is argued that the 
only logical approach to rationalising these differences of opinion is to have 
a view that Article 51 and customary law work in tandem. The ICJ supports 
this method:  
 
“That Article 51 of the Charter is only meaningful on the basis that 
there is a ‘natural’ or ‘inherent’ right to self-defence, and it is hard to 
see how this can be other than of a customary nature, even if its 
present content has been confirmed and influenced by the Charter. 
Moreover the Charter, having itself recognized the existence of this 
right, does not go on to regulate directly all aspects of its content. For 
example, it does not contain any specific rule whereby self-defence 
would warrant measures which are proportional to the armed attack 
and necessary to respond to it, a rule well established in customary 
international law…It cannot therefore be held that Article 51 is a 
provision which ‘subsumes and supervenes’ customary international 
law. It rather demonstrates that in the field in question…customary 
international law continues to exist alongside treaty law. The areas 
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governed by the two sources thus do not overlap exactly, and the 
rules do not have the same content.”153  
 
In summary, the meaning of inherent self-defence may espoused the notion 
that the right to self-defence is permissible according to Article 51, in 
particular, the requirement that must be an armed attack. While another 
interpretation of inherent right may open the door for other customary right to 
exist alongside with Article 51. This may unnecessarily allow states to justify 
unilateral force on the basis of outdated legal justification.  
 
iii. Self-Defence and the Security Council  
 
Under the UN Charter, the Security Council has a mandate to exercise 
collective action in any circumstances that require the Council’s intervention, 
including the use of force. The powers subscribed to by the Security Council 
stem from the following provisions154: 
 
a. Article 24 – awarding the Security Council primary responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace and security, and to act on 
behalf of member states. 
b. Article 39 – ‘The Security Council shall determine the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and 
shall make recommendations, or decided what measure shall be 
taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security’.  
c. Article 42 – the Security Council may take the necessary measures to 
maintain or restore international peace and security, which includes 
the use of force.  
d. Article 51 - member states exercising self-defence are required to 
immediately report to the Security Council, and by reporting to the 
Security Council ‘…shall not in any way affect the authority and 
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responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to 
take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security’. 
 
The above provisions express the wide-ranging powers of the Security 
Council, and the degree of flexibility it can exercise when determining 
necessary measures in any given situation.  
 
The Security Council is composed of fifteen member states, of which five 
members are permanent,155 and the remainder are non-permanent and 
elected for a period of two years.156 The primary responsibility of the Council 
is to maintain international peace and security,157 with special duties 
conferred under Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII.158 Chapter VII links recourse 
to the Security Council with the right to self-defence as specifically 
mentioned in Article 51.  
 
The Security Council may respond to measures in two ways: first, the 
Council may decide to impose non-forcible measures to maintain or restore 
peace and security.159 This can be in the form of economic sanctions160, 
severance of diplomatic relations, goods or commodities embargo, travel 
restrictions on individuals, and any other non-forcible measure that the 
Security Council deems appropriate. Secondly, the use of force may be 
approved, if in the Security Council’s view the implementation in Article 41 is 
inadequate.161 The use of force may be exercised according to various 
methods; for instance through air, sea or land forces. Following Article 42 of 
the Charter, the use of force is an option for the Security Council to consider 
if necessary to maintain peace and security.  
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The relationship between the use of force and the Security Council is subject 
to debate. One view is that the UN Security Council may decide when to 
exercise force even for the purpose of self-defence. Yoram Dinstein seems 
to follow this line of argument, explaining that the Security Council may 
employ defensive force by invoking the collective security force under a 
degree of latitude conferred by the Charter to the Council, namely under 
Chapter VII.162 In comparison the parameters of Article 51, which permits 
member states to act only in self-defence subject to the fulfilment of the 
armed attack requirement, the Security Council may determine that any type 
of breach of the peace or aggression, not necessarily amounting to an 
armed attack, warrants the use of force.163 This effectively gives the Security 
Council a wide remit to pursue collective security, and to make its own 
determination about when to use force. In some instances, the Security 
Council has endorsed the use of force against member states. For example, 
in Security Council Resolution 83 during the Korean War, the Council stated 
willingness to act, ‘Having determined that the armed attack upon the 
Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the 
peace’.164 Later, during the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the Security Council 
passed a resolution to use all necessary measures against Iraq to reinstate 
Kuwait’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.165  
 
Although the Security Council receives a strong mandate to use force, this 
questions the relationship between the Security Council and the right to self-
defence. Article 51 allows an exception to the rule on the prohibition on the 
use of force in cases of self-defence, stating this right may be exercised 
individually and or collectively: ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair 
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence’.166 It does, 
therefore, elevate the right to self-defence contained within the Charter. The 
right to self-defence is a prerogative of the attacked state, enabling it to 
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determine whether its interests are jeopardised by external threat or attack. 
As such, the appropriate body to determine whether there is any existence 
of an armed attack is the victim state and not another political entity or 
organisation. This is not to deny that the Security Council has the right to 
determine ‘threat to peace’, and may decide to take necessary actions to 
undertake its responsibility to maintain peace.167 However, allowing the 
Security Council to impinge on the exclusivity of victim states to determine 
their exposure to an armed attack may seem to overstretch the Security 
Council’s powers. 
 
The right to self-defence accords any state the privilege to exercise force 
without prior approval from the United Nations. It is a subjective test, by 
which the invoking state must determine what constitutes an ‘armed attack’. 
The function of the Security Council is to maintain international peace and 
security; it might consider a particular situation a threat to peace, a breach of 
the peace, and an act of aggression in accordance with Chapter VII. In view 
of the right to self-defence and the function of the Security Council, it is 
important to ask if it is possible for the Security Council to determine whether 
a situation warrants self-defence. 
 
Recent state practice seems to suggest that the Security Council is 
competent to judge when a state may exercise its right to self-defence. 
Security Council Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) expressed this 
notion following the 9/11 attacks in US. In Resolution 1368 (2001), the 
Council states that it recognises ‘the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence in accordance with the Charter’ and ‘Expresses its readiness to 
take all necessary steps in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 
2001’.168 Similarly in Resolution 1373 (2001), the Council reiterates the right 
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of member states to self-defence, asking for cooperation in the prevention of 
terrorism.169  
 
The two Resolutions highlight that the right to self-defence was available to 
the US to exercise if it chooses to do so. If these Resolutions are established 
as a precedent to the future determination of self-defence, this then raises a 
question over who decides when the right of self-defence occurs: Is it the 
attacked state, the Security Council or both? Reflecting on the language of 
Article 51, the onus is on the victim state, who defines when an ‘armed 
attack’ occurs; the provision does not determine whether the Security 
Council should play this role. If it is accepted that the Security Council can 
determine when self-defence should be exercised, the victim state loses the 
liberty to decide when to launch self-defence. As such, it is not within the 
scope of the Security Council to dictate when to act in self-defence.  
 
The Resolutions in 2001 were not the first instances of the Security Council 
raised the issue of the right to self-defence. In 1949, Israel and several Arab 
States namely Egypt170, Jordan171, Syria172 and Lebanon173 agreed to 
suspend hostilities and pledged to avoid any further act of hostilities.174 In 
1951, Egypt imposed restrictions on Israeli goods passing through the Suez 
Canal and claimed that it was exercising its right to self-defence, and that 
the armistice could not end the state of belligerence.175 In response, Israel 
requested that the Security Council pass a Resolution to reinforce its 
previous Resolution affirming the terms of the Armistice Agreement of 1949. 
Egypt argued that despite a Security Council Resolution restating the 
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Armistice, it could not interfere in the right of Egypt to act in self-defence. 
The representative of Egypt is reported as saying:  
 
“The Charter was based on the principle of respect for the sovereignty 
of Member States and could not restrict their inherent rights. The right 
to self-defence, therefore, might not be overridden in favour of the 
Security Council except in so far as the States concerned were so 
well protected by the resources available to the Security Council that 
the abandonment of their right of self-defence would not harm 
them.”176  
 
The above example reflects the strained relationship between the Security 
Council’s remit and the right to self-defence of each member state. The 
Security Council rejected the argument forwarded by Egypt, confirming that 
Security Council Resolutions must be respected.  
 
Article 51 imposes a reporting duty to the Security Council in the event that a 
state invokes the right to self-defence. The ICJ in Nicaragua held that ‘the 
absence of a report may be one of the factors indicating whether the State in 
question was itself convinced that it was acting in self-defence’.177 Gray 
argues that the act reporting to the Security Council is not merely a 
procedural matter but it indicates the state is acting in good faith.178 
However, failure to report does not necessarily diminish the claim of self-
defence in Article 51. Nonetheless, in Nicaragua, the Court seems to take 
into account in its judgment regarding the duty to report to the Security 
Council.  
 
In Article 51, it states that ‘until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security’. This is often 
referred to as the ‘until clause’ of the provision. The clause raises several 
questions worthy of brief discussion. Issues that may be raised are, among 
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others, what acts constitute as ‘measures necessary’ and who decides when 
the self-defence has ended? 
 
It is perhaps difficult to outline each response that would be regarded as 
‘necessary measure’. Different situation demands different type of response. 
However, Article 51 does give an indication as to what is the aim of any 
measure taken by the Security Council – ‘such action as it deems necessary 
in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.’ It is not 
surprising that the phrase ‘international peace and security’ is used as this 
the main task of the SC provided under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. An 
example of this can be seen during the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990. 
The SC passed a resolution authorising UN members (states that were co-
operating with the Government of Kuwait) ‘to use all necessary means to 
uphold and implement Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant 
resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area’.179  
 
Additional enquiry can be made as to when does the right to self-defence 
ceased to exist in light of intervention from the SC. Some have argued that 
once the SC has taken measure, irrespective of the effectiveness of the 
measure in maintaining in international peace and security, the right to self-
defence cease to exist.180 However, Ruys disagree that mere inclusion of a 
matter would end the right to self-defence. He argues that this may lead to 
‘the absurd result that an aggressor would bring its own unlawful actions to 
the attention of the Council and consequently be shielded from a counter-
attack in self-defence’.181 
 
It is argued that the right to self-defence  deemed cease to exist is subject to 
the effectiveness of measures taken by the SC and this the view taken by 
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most authors.182 It is a common sense approach to suggest that not all 
measures taken by the SC necessarily able to ‘maintain international peace 
and security’. There is a possibility that aggression may continue to take 
place in spite of any SC Resolutions pronouncement.  
 
Referring back to the two Security Council resolutions of 2001, the Security 
Council reminded member states of their right to exercise the right to self-
defence individually or collectively. Specifically Resolution 1368 (2001), the 
Security Council merely ‘recognises’ that the affected member state (the US) 
has the right to self-defence. This does not mean that the Security Council 
endorses action by the US relative to this right. Reviewing the document as 
a whole, it is apparent that the Resolution did not expressly state when the 
US should launch any act of self-defence, nor did it require that the US 
employ force in self-defence. The substantive text of the Resolution heavily 
condemned the attacks against the US, mentioning the right to self-defence 
in the preamble only. The right of the US to forcible self-defence was implied 
as it is accorded to all states. A similar argument could be applied in 
Resolution 1373 (2001) however with additional complexity. The Resolution 
proposed that member states ‘take the necessary steps to prevent the 
commission of terrorist acts’.183 Again, the content of the Resolution 
nowhere explicitly proposes a need to use force in self-defence, simply only 
‘Reaffirming’ the right in the preamble. Thus, it could be argued that the two 
Resolutions only act as a reminder to US that the right to self-defence is 
available if necessary. 
 
b. Anticipatory Self-Defence  
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The concept of anticipatory self-defence in jus ad bellum refers to the use of 
force prior to an actual armed attack as stated in Article 51. The legal issue 
of anticipatory self-defence asks the question whether it is lawful to use force 
before an armed attack materialises. Indeed, the concept of anticipatory self-
defence invites diverging opinions as will be explored below.  
 
At this juncture, it is important to briefly highlight the distinction between 
‘anticipatory’ and ‘pre-emptive’ self-defence. This thesis views that 
anticipatory self-defence refers to the use of force where an armed attack is 
imminent. Whilst pre-emptive self-defence means the use of defensive force 
where the attack is perceived as remote and yet to happen. The two 
terminologies will further be discussed in Chapter 3.a.i.   
 
Partly, the disagreement on the lawfulness of anticipatory self-defence 
originates from interpretation of Article 51. Cases decided by the ICJ were 
silent with regards to the permissibility of anticipatory self-defence. 
Furthermore, some state practice, although inconsistent, may seem to 
suggest that there is a body of opinion that regards anticipatory self-defence 
as acceptable in international law. However, it is doubtful whether selective 
state practice could be used as a generalisation of the whole self-defence 
regime.  
 
The origin of anticipatory self-defence is often linked to the Caroline incident 
that occurred in 1837.184 In that incident, the British government employed 
force against rebels in America despite there being no prior attacks against 
its territory (British Canada), claiming that it acted in self-defence.185 
Correspondence ensued between the British and American governments 
regarding the incident. In one letter, the British defended their actions 
stating:  
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“It will be for that Government to show a necessity of self-defence, 
instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of 
deliberation. It will be for it to show, also that the local authorities in 
Canada, even supposing the necessity of the moment authorized 
them to enter the territories of the United States at all, did nothing 
unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of 
self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clear within 
it.”186  
 
The text above calls for the use of force in self-defence on anticipatory basis, 
when attack is imminent. Many authors acknowledge that the Caroline case 
allows states under customary international law to exercise anticipatory self-
defence.187  
 
The Caroline incident appears to suggest that anticipatory self-defence has 
a basis in customary international law. If this notion were to be accepted, this 
may seem in conflict with Article 51 of the UN Charter. The provision 
requires a state to fulfil the requirement of if ‘an armed attack occurs’ to 
initiate defensive measure. However, if it is argued that customary 
anticipatory self-defence is compatible to current international law, Article 51 
perhaps could be interpreted to encapsulate customary self-defence. In a 
wider perspective, the underlying arguments of the existence of anticipatory 
self-defence raise an important theme; self-defence in Article 51 versus 
anticipatory self-defence in customary international law.  
   
The status to anticipatory self-defence in customary international law may be 
derived from the above mentioned incident and confirm its place in customs. 
Brownlie asserts that there can be little doubt that the right to anticipatory 
                                            
186 British and Foreign State Papers 1840-1841 (Vol. XXIX, James Ridgway 
and Sons, 1857) 1137-1138 
187 Franck (n 39) 97; Moir (n 104) 12; Anthony Arend and Beck, International 
Law and the Use of Force (Routledge 1993) 72; Ian Brownlie, 
International Law and the Use of Force (OUP 1963) 189   
- 57 - 
self-defence can be found in customary international law.188 Such right may 
also be drawn from the Article 51. Bowett argues that Article 51 should be 
read to include anticipatory self-defence because the Charter does not call 
for a restrictive interpretation of the provision and travaux prepartoires that 
safeguard the right to self-defence.189 He further argues that no state can be 
expected to wait for its territory to be attacked while its capabilities to 
retaliate are destroyed by an aggressor.190 As such, the interpretation of 
Article 51 does not explicitly condemn anticipatory self-defence and 
exercising such right may be seen as a pragmatic act.  
 
Meanwhile, the ICJ has not been forthright in expressing its views with 
regards to the lawfulness of anticipatory self-defence. However, Judge 
Schwebel in his Dissenting Opinion in the case of Nicaragua stated that 
Article 51 should not be interpreted ‘if, and only if, an armed attack occurs’, 
implying that other interpretations should be permitted by states seeking to 
initiate the right to self-defence under Article 51.191 In this statement, Judge 
Schwebel may be alluding to his acceptance of the right to anticipatory self-
defence but the Court did not in its merit judgment, state whether it 
supported or rejected anticipatory self-defence, expressing no opinion.192  
 
There are several examples that could be used to exemplify anticipatory 
self-defence in state practice. For instance, in the case of the Israeli-Arab 
War 1967, anticipatory self-defence was central to discussions among the 
international community. On 18th May 1967, the Egyptian government 
requested the United Nations withdraw the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) 
from Sinai; this was a peace keeping mission, which had served as a buffer 
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zone between Israel and Egypt.193 In June of the same year, Israeli forces 
launched an attack against the United Arab Republic (UAR), defending its 
action to the Security Council by stating that the Egyptian government had 
provocatively massed 80000 men and 900 tanks, which were ready to 
mobilise against Israel’s southern frontier.194 The Security Council did not 
pass any resolution condemning Israel for acting in anticipatory self-defence, 
but at that time, no Member States were willing to embrace the principle.195 
Silence from the Security Council in this case did not amount to 
endorsement of the right to anticipatory self-defence, but did reflect 
understanding that it was necessary for states facing an imminent threat to 
defend their territory.196 
 
In another incident, Israel launched an attack near Baghdad on 7th June 
1981, citing anticipatory self-defence. Israel claimed that the nuclear reactor 
‘Osirak’ was being modified for military use, and that this act constituted a 
nuclear threat against Israel.197 Israel added that it could not stand by idly 
when faced with nuclear weapons, and that pre-emptive self-defence was in 
accordance with the inherent right to self-defence under Article 51.198  
 
The international community’s reaction in general was to condemn Israel. In 
the Security Council discussion following the Osirak attack, a Syrian 
delegate emphasised that Article 51 could only be invoked if an armed 
attack occurs against a member state of the United Nations, and that the use 
of a pre-emptive strike was based on ‘a concept that has been refuted time 
and again in the Definition of Aggression’.199 Similarly, Sierra Leone 
criticised Israel for taking action on the grounds of self-defence when no 
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armed attack had occurred, nor was there any imminent recourse to force.200 
The United Kingdom added to the discussion by considering the stance of 
international law:  
 
“It has been argued that the Israeli attack was an act of self-defence. 
But it was not a response to an armed attack on Israel by Iraq… The 
Israel intervention amounted to a use of force which cannot find a 
place in international law or in the Charter which violated the 
sovereignty of Iraq.”201 
 
Consequently, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 487 
(1981) on 19th June 1981, finding Israel in ‘clear violation of the Charter of 
the UN and the norms of international conduct’.202 
 
The above state practice shows instances where anticipatory self-defence 
was invoked by states. These were inter alia claimed by some to reflect the 
acceptance by member states that the right to anticipatory self-defence exist 
in international law. However, it must also be noted that some states were   
unwilling to accept fully the notion of anticipatory self-defence.  
 
This thesis, however, views that the right to anticipatory self-defence is 
lawful in jus ad bellum irrespective of whether it originates from Article 51 or 
customary international law. Notwithstanding the link between the right to 
anticipatory self-defence and the Caroline incident, which is often cited as a 
prime evidence of such right in customs, a policy-based (although not 
entirely legal) argument could also be supplemented to substantiate the 
claim of anticipatory self-defence.  
 
For instance, Franck views Article 51 as a provision that could be interpreted 
in support of anticipatory self-defence.203 He argued that Article 51 cannot 
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be interpreted to ‘compel the reductio ad absurdum that states invariably 
must await first, perhaps decisive, military strike before using force to protect 
themselves’.204 Previously, as early as 1963, another commentator, Rosalyn 
Higgins, has asserted that states may resort to force in response to 
imminent future threats in response to illegal acts, emphasising that self-
defence must be taken proportionality in nature and degree.205 Meanwhile, 
Christine Gray observed that states rarely invoke anticipatory self-defence 
as a basis for their measures because they know that it is not the strongest 
foundation upon which to defend their actions, as they are unlikely to garner 
wide support from the international community.206 
 
Furthermore, the permissibility of anticipatory self-defence has not been 
explicitly condemned the ICJ. This is mainly due to the silence of the ICJ on 
the matter when it had the opportunity to decide cases raising the question 
of self-defence. The Court never made any pronouncement concerning 
whether to accept or dismiss anticipatory self-defence. This may also affect 
the limitations of self-defence, in particular concerning whether or not 
principles of necessity and proportionality are applicable to cases of 
anticipatory self-defence. For example, in Nicaragua, the Court emphasised 
that a state must be subjected to an armed attack prior to exercising the right 
to self-defence.207 Similarly, in discussing the Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons (hereafter ‘Nuclear Weapons’) the Court reiterated that 
the right to self-defence, whether exercised individually or collectively, 
hinges upon the existence of an armed attack.208 In a case in 2005, the 
Court remained firm in its approach to Article 51 explaining that:  
 
“Article 51 of the Charter may justify a use of force in self-defence 
only within the strict confines there laid down. It does not allow the 
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use of force by a state to protect perceived security interests beyond 
these parameters. Other means are available to a concerned state, 
including, in particular, recourse to the Security Council.”209 
 
All of the cases mentioned reflect a pattern of unwillingness on the part of 
the ICJ to explicitly mention the legality of anticipatory self-defence apart 
from stating what is stated in Article 51. Thus, by way of Court’s 
jurisprudence, at present, there has been no precedent from the ICJ 
explicitly confirming or denying the legality of anticipatory self-defence.  
 
Recent state practice directs to the growing support of anticipatory self-
defence although it is only few limited occasions. For example, in 2002, the 
United Stated adopted the narrative of pre-emptive self-defence in National 
Security Strategy which states:  
 
“The United States has long maintained the options of pre-emptive 
actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security…to 
forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United 
States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively…Yet in an age where the 
enemies of civilisation openly and actively seek the world’s most 
destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while 
danger gathers.”210  
 
While in the United Kingdom a debate in the House of Lords in April 2004 
discussed the concept of pre-emption in self-defence and the Attorney 
General, Lord Goldsmith, was asked whether the UK government accepted 
the legitimacy of pre-emptive self-defence. Lord Goldsmith said:  
 
“The Government’s position is supported by the records of the 
international conference at which the UN Charter was drawn up and 
by state practice since 1945. It is therefore the Government’s view 
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that international law permits the use of force in self-defence against 
an imminent attack but does not authorise the use of force to mount a 
pre-emptive strike against a threat that is more remote.”211 
 
The two countries took a different positions with regards to anticipatory and 
pre-emptive self-defence. Indeed, it is questionable whether the two remarks 
from two influential states define the acceptance of anticipatory or pre-
emptive self-defence. Nonetheless, this reflects that some state are willing to 
express their intention to invoke self-defence beyond the traditional meaning 
of self-defence. 
 
In conclusion, it is argued that the right to anticipatory self-defence exists in 
the law on the use of force. This may originates from customary international 
law, primarily by citing the Caroline incident, the interpretation of Article 51 
which does not outright prevent the possibility of anticipatory self-defence 
and the silence of the ICJ. Some state practice show some tendency to 
accept anticipatory self-defence as part of jus ad bellum although this is 
highly debatable. Furthermore, policy arguments to allow the use of 
anticipatory self-defence in the self-defence legal regime supports the basic 
tenets of the purpose of self-defence for a state to defend itself provided that 
the defensive force is taken with caution.212  
 
c. Policy Justification for the Use of Force in Self-Defence 
against Non-State Actors 
 
There are arguments used in favour of the right to self-defence against non-
state actors based on policy or pragmatic basis and not entirely based on 
legal reasoning. Proponents for this type of argument often portray the 
incompetency of international legal system to protect states which resulted in 
the affected states’ interests.  
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The scenario could be portrayed in the following situation. Arguendo, 
assuming that the right to self-defence against a non-state actor cannot be 
substantiated from Article 51 and in customary international law. Or in other 
words, states can only use defensive measures in inter-states situation, such 
narrative puts the aggrieved state in a difficult situation. If a state is attacked 
by a terrorist group emanating from abroad, according to the above 
understanding of Article 51 and customary international law, the victim state 
is helpless and can only act with the approval from the Security Council to 
authorise collective security measure.  
 
If a state cannot defend itself from a terrorist attack emanating from abroad 
because Article 51 does not allow any action to be taken against the 
aggressor (a non-state entity), it may be argued that this may run contrary to 
the purpose of the UN Charter. Article 1 of the UN Charter states that the 
purpose of the UN is ‘to maintain international peace and security and to that 
end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of 
threats to the peace’.213 Following the spirit of the above-mentioned 
provision, it seems that the victim state may take a degree of response, 
however it may be defined, in order to maintain its security. As such, this 
leads some commentators to justify the argument in support of self-defence 
against non-state actors on the basis of pragmatism or policy-based 
consideration.  
 
For instance, Amos Guiora states that the existing international law (Article 
51 of the UN Charter, the Caroline incident, Security Council Resolutions 
1368 and 1373 (2001)) does not outline clear guidance on the permissibility 
to  exercise self-defence against non-state actors. She further argues that, if 
‘sufficient’ intelligence is available, it is ultimately a fundamental duty of a 
state to protect its citizens, then the state may be deemed lawful to use force 
in self-defence against a state or a non-state actor with strict restraints 
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attached to the use of force.214 This type of argument points to the 
practicality of a state to undertake its fundamental duty to protect is territory 
whether international law allows the use of self-defence against a non-state 
actor or otherwise seems subordinate to the argument of pragmatism.  
 
Another example is in a situation where a terrorist group is in possession of 
weapon of mass destruction (WMD) and threaten to use it against another 
state. In such situation, some would argue that it is right for the aggrieved 
state to launch self-defence even if it is directed towards a non-state 
actor.215 This is because, in their view, the effects of WMD is so damaging 
that the risk of allowing it materialise may ruin the whole country’s 
institutions. This kind of reasoning to justify the use of self-defence against a 
non-state actor is not based on legal arguments but on policy consideration. 
It may be argued that these arguments may not be founded on legal grounds 
but it might resolve the threats faced by the aggrieved state. However, 
allowing states to justify the use of defensive force against non-state actors 
not based on international law invites abuse by states and may threaten the 
stability international peace and security.  
 
A case in point to illustrate the argument of practicality in the use of force 
against a non-state actor is in the US National Security Strategy 2002. 
President Bush issued the document in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks. In it, it states that: 
 
“Yet, in an age where enemies of civilization openly and actively seek 
the world’s most destructive technologies, the United States cannot 
remain idle while dangers gather.”216  
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In the document, the US substantiates its stance on the use of force by 
suggesting that it is a view supported by ‘legal scholars and international 
jurist’ which is debatable among legal scholars. Nevertheless, the text above 
reflects that the US was willing to exercise force against any entity if the 
threats warrants the US to exercise force. Such arguments cannot be said to 
be totally based on legal considerations.  
 
In conclusion, the arguments shown above that justifies the use of self-
defence against a non-state actor is a pragmatic and policy considerations. 
These arguments must be distinguished from legal arguments. In a strict 
legal discussion, the right to self-defence against a non-state actor must be 
substantiated by legal texts, customs and established practice. The 
conflation between legal and policy considerations may sway the focus of 
the arguments outside the context of international law. Furthermore, allowing 
states to justify the use of force outside international legal framework such 
as the UN Charter and customs may result in abuses by states.  
 
d. State Practice in Self-Defence against Non-State Actors  
 
The incident that happened on 11 September 2001 in the US and the SC 
Resolutions ensued marked as a focal point in considering the right to self-
defence against non-state actors.217 On that day, the US witnessed horrific 
scenes on its territory. Four commercial aeroplanes were hijacked by 
terrorists; two planes targeted the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre in 
New York causing its total destruction. Another plane crashed into America’s 
Defence Department building, the Pentagon, and another failed to reach its 
intended target in Washington DC. It is reported that the total deaths from 
these attacks amounted to more than 2,900 people.218 In response to the 
attacks, the Security Council convened the next day passing a resolution 
condemning the attack.219 In it, the Security Council labelled the attack a 
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‘terrorist attack…an act of international terrorism’ and a threat to 
international peace and security.220 The preamble of this resolution 
recognises the inherent right to self-defence, and the body of the resolution 
referred to a response to the terrorist attack. Less than three weeks after the 
attacks a similar notion was expressed in Security Council Resolution 1373 
(2001). Its preamble reaffirmed the previous resolution condemning the 
terrorist attacks,221 and again it stressed the right of the individual and 
collective to self-defence. The two resolutions seems to imply, although 
inconclusively, that the affected state (the US) may regard the attacks on 
9/11 was an armed attack and may take lawful self-defence against the 
perpetrators. However, this does not necessarily mean the two resolution 
was a general endorsement by the Security Council that a state may 
recourse to self-defence against a non-state actor.  
 
The Organisation of American States also condemned the attacks in the US 
calling for its inherent right to self-defence under the UN Charter and Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty).222 Similarly, the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) invoked Article 5 of its treaty for 
the first time, which states ‘an armed attack against one or more of them in 
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all… 
such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to 
restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.’223  
 
Following the attacks, the US launched a military campaign in Afghanistan 
(Operation Enduring Freedom), targeting Al-Qaeda and the de facto 
government at the time, the Taliban. The decision to act against the Taliban 
was a result of their non-cooperation in handing over those responsible for 
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the 9/11 attacks.224 President Bush explained to American citizens the 
intention of the military operation:  
 
“…the United States military has begun strikes against al Qaeda 
terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime 
in Afghanistan. These carefully targeted actions are designed to 
disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and to 
attack the military capability of the Taliban regime.”225 
 
On the same day, John Negroponte, US Permanent Representative at the 
United Nations reported to the Security Council that US has acted in self-
defence:  
 
“…the attacks on 11 September 2001 and the ongoing threat to the 
United States and its nationals posed by the Al-Qaeda organization 
have been made possible by the decision of the Taliban regime to 
allow the parts of Afghanistan that it controls to be used by this 
organization as a base of operation… In response to these attacks, 
and in accordance with the inherent right of individual and collective 
self-defence, United States armed forces have initiated actions 
designed to prevent and deter further attacks on the United States.”226 
 
The American government explained that it exercised the right to self-
defence against Al-Qaeda, and also against the Taliban for its non-
cooperation in eradicating Al-Qaeda from its territory. By extension, the 
same consequence could also be directed toward any government 
harbouring a terrorist group.227 Therefore, in one interpretation, the effects of 
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the 9/11 attacks and decisions following the Security Council Resolutions 
may give the notion that states in certain circumstance may act forcibly in 
self-defence against non-state actors.  
 
After the  invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, there were other several 
instances where states invoked the right to self-defence and claimed the 
attacks were perpetrated by non-state actors. Inter alia, the Israeli war in 
Lebanon in 2006, the Turkish operation in Northern Iraq against Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK) in 2008, Columbia’s use of force against FARC in 
Ecuador (2008)228 and the recent conflict in Iraq/Syria against Islamic State 
(IS).229 The question remains, whether these state practice signify an 
acceptance by states that there is a general right to self-defence against a 
non-state actor in international law.  
 
Based on state practice and the inconsistency of the ICJ in the jurisprudence 
with regards to this matter, and in addition to silence of Article 51 on the 
entity of the author of an armed attack, it is submitted that states are 
afforded the right to self-defence against a non-state actor. The example of 
the 9/11 attacks, where the gravity of the attacks executed by Al-Qaeda, a 
non-state actor, could be said to reach the threshold of an armed attack as 
required in Article 51.230 This therefore allows the victim state to initiate 
defensive measure even against a non-state actor.231 However, this is not to 
suggest that the 9/11 attacks is a watershed moment in jus ad bellum where 
the whole law on the use of force changes overnight.232 In fact, it reinforces 
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Article 51 that the role of the host state is taken into consideration in 
considering the use of force against non-state actors. 
 
Indeed, the notion of armed attack exerted by non-state actors (self-defence 
against terrorist groups) is not new, and was discussed prior to the 9/11 
attacks. The practice of self-defence against terrorist groups has most 
commonly been invoked by the US and Israel.233 As early as 1956, Israel 
invoked the right to self-defence under Article 51 when it captured part of the 
Sinai Peninsula, justifying its measures as being directed by the desire to 
prevent the Fedayeen terrorist group from infiltrating Israeli territory.234 The 
justification of self-defence was also invoked on 6 June 1982 when Israel 
occupied parts of Lebanon, explaining to the Security Council that the 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) around the world had targeted 
Israeli citizens.235 Mr Blum, a representative of Israel in the Security Council 
at the time, reminded the Council:  
 
“[W]hen Israel, after years of unparalleled restraint, finally resorts to 
the exercise of its right of self-defence, the fundamental and 
inalienable right of any State, which is also recognized by the Charter 
of the United Nations as the inherent right of Member States of the 
Organization.”236  
  
In another incident, on 7 August 1988 the US embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania were attacked by international terrorist organisations.237 The US 
responded by attacking a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan believed to have 
                                            
233 Moir (n 104) 26.; Gray (n 43) 195. 
234 See Security Council Official Records, 748th Meeting, 29 October 1956 at 
11 para. 71; Security Council Resolution 1125(XI) of 2 February 1957. 
See also Franck (n 39) 55-56 
235 Security Council Official Records, 2375th Meeting, (S/PV.2375) 6 June 
1982, at 3-4, para. 24-35 
236 ibid 4, para. 36. 
237 See: Resolution 1189 (1998) S/RES/1189 (1998) 13 August 1998 
- 70 - 
been used by the terrorists; invoking the right to self-defence.238 In 1993, 
Iran justified attacks against Kurdish groups based within Iraqi territory as an 
act of self-defence. Iran explained to the UN Secretary General: 
  
“During the past few weeks, bands of armed and organized terrorist 
mercenaries have engaged in trans-border military attacks against 
and sabotage in Iranian border. These bands, whose headquarters 
and military bases are located in Iraq… In response to these armed 
attacks from inside Iraq and in accordance with Article 51 of the 
Charter of the United Nations… the Islamic Republic Air Force carried 
out a brief, necessary and proportionate operation against the military 
basis of the terrorist group.”239 
  
All the incidents referred demonstrate that even before 9/11, states justified 
defensive measures against terrorist groups. The 9/11 incident is a 
significant course of event that lead to the approval of two controversial 
Security Council Resolutions in response to terrorist attacks. However, this 
thesis does not advocate that 9/11 is a turning point that allows the use of 
self-defence against non-state actors in international law. Rather 9/11 is an 
indicator amongst other indicators that some states are willing to accept self-
defence against non-state actors is permissible. Christian Tams argues that 
SC Resolutions 1368 and 1373 (2001) was a continuation of momentum by 
states in the past that the use of force is lawful against non-state actors.240  
 
The two Security Council Resolutions presented an opportunity to examine 
whether the law on self-defence has formally acknowledged that state has 
the right to exercise self-defence against a non-state actor. In one aspect, 
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the resolutions can easily be discerned as a testament from states that the 
US has the right to self-defence against the perpetrator of the 9/11 attacks, 
Al-Qaeda, a non-state entity. In fact, in both of the resolutions, it reiterates 
that the US has the right to self-defence.  
 
However, it is doubtful that the two Security Council Resolutions change the 
law on the use of force. This is because the Resolutions had not explicitly 
state in general terms that a state may invoke Article 51 against a non-state 
entity. Furthermore, SC Resolutions 1368 and 1373 (2001) cannot of itself 
give rise to a new custom in international law as the practice and opinio juris 
represent only fifteen states (including the P-5).241 Tom Ruys argues that the 
Security Council Resolutions may indicate a certain views held by limited 
number of states but it certainly cannot form an instant custom.242 As such, 
although the two Resolutions are significant in determining jus ad bellum, the 
documents do not change entirely the scope on the law of self-defence.  
 
Nevertheless, contemporary scholars are largely willing to accept that self-
defence against non-state actors is permissible with the conditions that the 
principles of necessity and proportionality are met.243 In light of Security 
Council Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001), it has been argued that 
there is a support for acknowledging non-state agents carry out armed 
attacks, thus qualifying terrorist attacks as ‘armed attacks’ against which 
force may be used in self-defence.244 Thus, it is no longer an exceptional 
claim to rely on self-defence for the purpose of responding to terrorist and 
other non-state attacks.245  
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The question that follows is not whether self-defence is applicable against a 
non-state actor but rather what the relationship is between the non-state 
actor and the host state that warrants the victim state to launch self-defence. 
Again, this relates to the question of attribution as discussed above.   
 
The assessment that self-defence against a non-state actor is no longer 
centred on defensive measures enacted against terrorist groups has shifted 
the argument toward self-defence, and the issue of necessity and 
proportionality.246 This is the core of discussion in this thesis, which 
examines the concept of necessity in relation to self-defence against 
terrorism.  
 
In conclusion, the ICJ has presented an incoherent jurisprudence on the 
legality on the use of self-defence against a non-state actors. In particular, 
the ambiguities on the questions of attribution and threshold. Furthermore, 
whilst the 9/11 incident and the Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 
(2001) are significant consideration in jus ad bellum, it cannot be said 
conclusively that 9/11 change the law on self-defence against a non-state 
actor. In contrast, state practice seems to suggest that in some instances, 
although inconsistent, states in limited circumstances are willing to embrace 
the notion of self-defence against non-state actors. This includes incidents 
prior to 9/11 and post-9/11. As such, this thesis maintains that a state may 
recourse to self-defence against non-state actors subject to meeting the 
restrictions imposed in exercising self-defence. The legality of any use of 
force in self-defence, regardless if it is directed against a state or a non-state 
actor, should focus on the parameters of self-defence; whether the acting 
state meets the principles of necessity and proportionality.  
 
4. Necessity and Proportionality in the Law of Self-
Defence 
 
                                            
246 Christian Tams, ‘The Use of Force Against Terrorist’ (2009) 20 EJIL 359-
397, 381 
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The governing principles of necessity and proportionality in Article 51 and 
customary international law are clear from Court judgments. It requires the 
invoking state to comply with both principles when exercising the right to 
self-defence.247 However, the two principles are not present in Article 51 of 
the Charter; indeed, it specifies no restriction in the use of force in self-
defence.248 It is argued in this thesis (in the following Chapter), the origin of 
the doctrines of necessity and proportionality is a historical one that can be 
traced back to a famous incident involving the destruction of the vessel 
Caroline in 1837.249 Following the incident, the exchange of correspondence 
between the British and American governments eventually laid the 
foundation for these two principles. For example, the ICJ in Nicaragua stated 
that ‘self-defence would warrant only measures which are proportional to the 
armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule well established in 
customary international law’.250 In the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the Court reiterated this position, stating 
‘the submission of the exercise of the right to self-defence to the conditions 
of necessity and proportionality is a rule of customary international law…This 
dual condition applies equally to Article 51 of the Charter, whatever the 
means of force employed.’251 Thus, the two requirements can be understood 
to originate in customs and applicable for Article 51 of the UN Charter.   
 
The meaning of ‘necessity’ in this context is the implication that the only 
response possible is to exert force.252 At the heart of any defensive 
measures, avenues of non-forcible measures must be sought prior to any 
use of force, and force should only be utilised as a matter of last resort for 
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self-defence.253 The lawfulness of self-defence in necessity, and when 
conducted in proportionality, is thereby established, but should not be 
understood to entail defensive measures of a retaliatory, deterrent or 
punitive character.254 Therefore, the objective of self-defence must be to 
support a country’s security, and should not extend beyond that.255  
 
The principle of proportionality is hard to classify, as it involves application of 
the law relative to the facts.256 The measurement of proportionality is subject 
to competing opinions. Some assert that proportionate self-defence can be 
measured in relation to the events preceding it, in particular an armed attack. 
Meanwhile, others suggest that proportionality in self-defence is measured in 
relation to the threat being faced and the means necessary to end the 
attack.257 Furthermore, when combined with the principle of necessity, there 
is a question about who should decide the scope of ‘enough’ (proportionate 
force).258 However, despite unclear messages regarding the constraints on 
proportionality, Professor Ago asserts that proportionality must be applied 
with some degree of flexibility:  
 
“It would be mistaken, however, to think that there must be 
proportionality between the conduct constituting the armed attack and 
the opposing conduct. The action needed to halt and repulse the 
attack may well have to assume dimensions disproportionate to those 
of the attack suffered. What matters in this respect is the result to be 
achieved by the "defensive" action, and not the forms, substance and 
strength of the action itself.”259 
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Thus, Professor Ago’s report argues that proportionality cannot be evaluated 
based on the scale of armed attack or retaliation commensurate to the 
aggression, but should focus on the aim of self-defence.260  
 
In this thesis, it argues for a different way of observing necessity as a 
principle in the framework of self-defence. Necessity is not seen an abstract 
principle that is only applicable before the use of force. Rather, this study 
looks into the role of necessity in the whole framework of self-defence. As 
such, it is argued that necessity’s role is not merely as a requirement to 
trigger the right to self-defence but necessity is seen as an ongoing basis 
throughout the use of force. It is submitted that necessity consists of two 
parts, first, necessity as a requirement and second, necessity as a limitation 
to self-defence.  
 
Necessity as a requirement primarily consists of the requirement that there is 
an armed attack exists. This point has been discussed above which includes 
among others the discussion of gravity of an armed attack for the purpose of 
Article 51 and the author the armed attack (a state or a non-state actor). In 
addition, part of necessity as a requirement is to acknowledge that the 
armed attack is purposely directed towards the victim state and it was not a 
mistake.261  
 
The latter aspect of necessity (as a requirement) limits the use of force in 
order to achieve the aim of self-defence. It is argued that the legitimate aim 
of self-defence is to repel or halt an armed attack from succeeding.262 It can 
be said that a state responding to an armed attack and exercise defensive 
force beyond the legitimate aim of self-defence could be described as 
unnecessary use of force. Therefore, the second aspect of necessity 
focuses the use of force in achieving the aim of self-defence  
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In pursuing this hypothesis, it is admitted that it may raise several criticisms. 
First, the latter aspect of necessity (necessity as a limitation to self-defence) 
may be seen to resemble with the principle of proportionality. Second, if the 
defensive use of force is scrutinise in great detail, it is a possibility that it may 
encroach into the realm of jus in bello (as oppose to strictly in jus ad bellum).  
 
This study acknowledges that confusion may occur between the concept of 
necessity as a limitation to self-defence and proportionality. This is because 
proportionality, as mentioned above, relates to the size, duration and target 
of the use of force.263 While necessity (as a limitation to self-defence) also 
focuses on the force employed by the state. Both concepts oversee the use 
of force. Another similarity is both necessity as a limitation and 
proportionality observe the use of force on the whole. For example, 
necessity as a limitation observes the whole use of force and similarly, 
proportionality too must assess the whole scale of the operation.264 
 
However, it is submitted that there is a crucial difference between necessity 
as a limitation and proportionality. Necessity as a limitation focuses on the 
use of force meeting the legitimate aim of self-defence while proportionality 
examines the intensity of the use of force. Such distinction is maintain in 
order to separate between necessity and proportionality.  
 
The principles of necessity and proportionality are not easily discernible from 
one and other. That is, ‘if a use of force is not necessary, it cannot be 
proportionate and, if it is not proportionate, it is difficult to see how it can be 
necessary’.265 According to this line of argument, proportionality and 
necessity operate in tandem under the law of self-defence.266 The 
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relationship of these two principles will underpin this thesis although focus 
will be largely directed toward the study of necessity.  
 
Despite the inter-relationship between necessity and proportionality, there 
are distinction between the two. For instance, he ICJ often treats necessity 
and proportionality as differently. In Nicaragua, the Court observed that the 
US was not acting in a response in line with necessity when it supplied arms 
to the opposition (contras) in Nicaragua months after Nicaragua assisted the 
opposition in El Salvador, once a major offensive against the government of 
El Salvador had been completely repulsed.267 The Court also found that 
measures taken by the US that included laying mines in the Nicaraguan 
waters, and attacking ports and oil installations were disproportionate acts of 
self-defence.268  
 
A similar approach, dividing necessity from proportionality, can be observed 
in Oil Platforms. The Court found that the attack on Sea Isle City and the 
mining of the USS Samuel B. Roberts did not justify a US response in self-
defence in the form of targeting Iranian platforms on the basis of it was 
unnecessary use of force.269 Once the Court examined the question of 
necessity only then it proceeded to assess the question of proportionality. 
The Court stated that had the attack of 19 October 1987 been portrayed as a 
response to an armed attack against Sea Isle City committed by Iran it would 
have been regarded as proportionate.270 These cases demonstrate that it is 
possible to dissect necessity from proportionality under the law of self-
defence although facts are unique to a particular scenario. 
 
In conclusion, in any use of force in self-defence, a state must abide to the 
two important principles of self-defence – necessity and proportionality. The 
history of the two principles can be traced back to the Caroline incident in 
1837 and subsequently the two principles are still in use until today. This 
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thesis argues that necessity can be view into two roles. First, necessity acts 
a requirement to self-defence and second, necessity acts as a limitation to 
use force in meeting the legitimate aim of self-defence. The latter aspect of 
necessity could be said to resemble with the concept of necessity. However, 
it is maintained that necessity focuses on the aim of self-defence while 
proportionality examines the intensity of the use of force.  
. 
5. Conclusion  
 
This Chapter outlined the basis of law in jus ad bellum, which will be referred 
in this thesis. The framework on the law of self-defence has a dual 
foundation. First, the law on the prohibition on the use of force is of 
paramount relevance. It acts as an overarching principle requiring states to 
refrain from the use of force in international relations. Article 2(4) of the 
United Nations Charter and customary law highlight this. Second, the right to 
self-defence provides an exemption to the general rules prohibiting the use 
of force. This is acknowledged in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, as 
well as in customary international law.  
 
Article 51 consists of several elements such as the terms ‘armed attack’ and 
‘inherent right’. This Chapter has found that the meaning of an ‘armed attack’ 
is subject to wide debate. It has been argued that it can include a physical 
armed attack that must reach a certain level of intensity to qualify as an 
armed attack under the meaning of Article 51. The Chapter also discussed 
whether the phrase ‘inherent right’ can refer to the customary law on self-
defence, and the extent to which self-defence is established according to 
Article 51 rendering customary law irrelevant. 
 
The Chapter also established that the law on the use of force in self-defence 
is moderated by two limiting principles: necessity and proportionality. 
Although not established in Article 51, however, the two principles have 
been present in customary since the Caroline incident in 1837. The legality 
of any self-defence hinges upon fulfilment of this requirement. Both 
principles are arguably applicable to state versus state, and state versus 
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non-state actors, as Article 51 provides the right to self-defence without 
elaborating on the identity of the aggressor. Under the jurisprudence of the 
ICJ, however, self-defence against non-state actors is only approved if there 
is state involvement in the armed attack. Some state practice can be 
construed as accepting the narrative of self-defence against non-state 
actors. One of the indicators is the Security Council Resolutions 1368 (2001) 
and 1373 (2001) calling for self-defence against terrorism although it cannot 
be said conclusively the Resolutions endorse self-defence against non-state 
actors. Nonetheless, there is a growing body of state practice acknowledging 
the right to self-defence against non-state actors is lawful subject to meeting 
the requirements of necessity and proportionality. As such, it is important to 
understand the establishment of necessity and proportionality in jus ad 
bellum, and the following Chapter will examine this further. 
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Chapter 3: The Caroline Doctrine: Necessity, Proportionality 
and Immediacy in the Law of Self-Defence 
 
1. Introduction  
 
As explained in Chapter 2, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and 
customary international law recognise the right to self-defence. This Chapter 
will examine the right to self-defence, as understood in customary 
international law, concentrating on the features of necessity, proportionality, 
and imminence.  Under customary international law, the right to self-defence 
is associated repeatedly with the Caroline incident, which happened in 1837 
and involved the British government and Canadian rebels. Therefore, to 
understand the background and scope of this right in customary law, this 
Chapter will first present the historical facts of the Caroline incident. 
 
The historical evidence cementing the scope of self-defence is in the form of 
correspondence between the two governments. It is argued that, because of 
this correspondence, the principles of necessity, proportionality and 
imminence in jus ad bellum were established. The Chapter will also examine 
the transformation of the principles from mere evidence of state practice as 
accepted in the nineteenth century, to the level of universality in 
contemporary international law. This will be examined by observing the 
development of jus ad bellum up until the creation of the United Nations 
Charter. 
 
It is argued herein, that the Caroline incident helps us to understand the 
state of jus ad bellum today. However, in 1837, there was no comprehensive 
international legal regime that regulates states. A question is raised, 
therefore, what is the relevance of the Caroline incident in contemporary 
international law. Furthermore, whether the incident is a legal significance  or 
merely a political disputes between states. A this incident only involved two 
countries, could it be said to represent state practice and opinio juris of all 
states? To answer this question, we will examine evidence to determine the 
relevance of the incident in the law on the use of force today.  
 
- 81 - 
Another aspect that will be examined is the doctrine established as a result 
of the Caroline incident. Doctrine refers to the concept of law that was 
applied to following incidents and legal rules based on the Caroline incident. 
The doctrines linked to the Caroline incident are: (i) that the right to self-
defence is limited to necessity and proportionality, (ii) self-defence against 
non-state actors, (iii) anticipatory self-defence, and (iv) pre-emptive self-
defence. This Chapter will also highlight difficulties that manifest when 
interpreting customary international law, and how these affect the 
interpretation of the Caroline doctrine. 
  
2. Historical details of the Caroline affair  
 
This section presents a detailed analysis of the facts and background to the 
Caroline incident. An understanding of the facts of the Caroline incident is 
crucial when analysing doctrines, which revolve around the understanding of 
the parties involved, the socio-economic situation that led to the sinking of 
the Caroline vessel, and the political ramifications between the parties.  
Thus, it is vital to highlight and understand what happened on the night 
concerned.  
 
Throughout the 1830s, the Canadians grew increasingly resentful of British 
rule, accruing both political and social grievances.1 In Lower Canada, 
farmers were dissatisfied with the feudal agricultural system, as 
predominantly, either the Catholic Church or the absentee landowners 
(many of whom were living in the United Kingdom) owned the land they 
worked. The tenants were expected to work the land and pay taxes, but 
were denied hunting and fishing rights, and were not permitted to use it for 
personal economic gain. Similarly, in Upper Canada, descendants of 
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American Revolutionaries (Family Compact’) and the Anglican Church, 
which also controlled the provincial government and economic institutions, 
primarily owned land. The Church of England owned two million acres, and 
each Family Compact inherited ten to fifty thousand acres. This deprived the 
normal citizens of Lower and Upper Canada of their rights to advance 
economically through farming.  
 
In contrast, their neighbours in America prospered as the agricultural 
revolution gathered momentum and industries were established. Although 
several political initiatives were pursued to address social problems in 
Canada, the poor progress failed to meet the demands of the Canadians. 
Consequently, anti-British sentiment grew, and in one incident in Lower 
Canada rebels protested on the streets, wearing the French tri-colour and 
singing La Marseillaise. The grievances and resentment of the people 
ultimately translated into political movements, and several rebellions 
unsuccessful broke out in 1837 in both Upper and Lower Canada.  
 
The rebellion against British rule created sympathy amongst the Canadian’s 
American neighbours, who supported them with supplies and logistics. This 
included a privately owned vessel, the Caroline, from a US citizen for the 
use of the rebels. At that time, several hundred revolutionaries controlled 
Navy Island (the Canadian side of the Niagara River), and used it as a base 
for the inward supply of arms from the US.2 The rebels proclaimed the 
establishment of a provisional government from British-Canada, with a 
distinctive flag. The role of the Caroline was to transport supplies, new 
recruits, sightseers and visitors to Navy Island. The British government was 
aware of the activities of the ship, and on 28 December Colonel McNab, the 
commander of Canadian forces in Chippewa, ordered Commander Andrew 
Drew of the Royal Navy to destroy the Caroline, because it posed a great 
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threat.3  On the night of 29 December 1837, Commander Drew and fifty men 
and seven boats trawled the river searching for the Caroline, which at the 
time was docked at Fort Schlosser in New York (American territory). That 
night the vessel also sheltered more than twenty passengers who had been 
unable to find accommodation.4 The British forces boarded the Caroline, 
attacking it with muskets and cutlasses. One of the attackers took coals from 
the steamer’s furnace and started a fire, which eventually spread. The 
raiders towed the Caroline into the river, where the current dragged it into 
the Niagara Falls. During the incident two Americans were killed; Armos 
Durfee, and a cabin boy (Johnson ‘Little Billy’) were shot as they attempted 
to leave the steamer. 
 
President Van Buren learned of the attack on 4 January 1838 and 
immediately ordered Generals to observe the Niagara frontiers. He also 
instructed the governors of New York and Vermont to assist the military at 
the border. At the diplomatic level, the Secretary of State John Fosyth wrote 
to the British minister in Washington, Henry Fox, and complained about the 
incident and the deaths of two Americans. He stated that the destruction of 
the Caroline and the assassination of American citizens had ‘produced ‘the 
most painful emotions of surprise and regret’, and that the incident would be 
made the ‘subject of a demand and redress’. On 6 February 1838, Mr Fox 
replied that the destruction of the Caroline was executed under the 
instructions of Colonel McNab, and he further explained the piratical status 
of the Caroline.5 Further, Mr Fox stated that at the time of the incident the 
US was patently unable to enforce its borders, which had created an 
opening for rebels to enter America posing a threat to Britain. The British 
claimed the raiding of the vessel was an act of self-defence. The 
disagreement between the two countries concerning the destruction of the 
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Caroline was then put aside for several years until the matter was raised 
again.  
 
In 1840, the US government investigated the Caroline incident once again, 
arresting Mr McLeod on the allegation that he had murdered Armos Durfee.6 
The British government demanded that the US release the detainee. On 12 
March 1841, Mr Fox wrote to Mr Webster, the new Secretary of State, 
justifying Mr McLeod’s actions by stating that he was ‘performing an act of 
public duty for which they cannot be made personally and individually 
answerable to the laws and tribunals of any foreign country’.7 However, the 
US disregarded the plea and tried McLeod. Mr Webster responded again, 
justifying the seizure of the Caroline as an act of self-defence. The following 
passage below, often referred to as the Webster text, now forms the basis 
for customary law of self-defence:  
 
“Under these circumstances, and under those immediately connected 
with the transaction itself, it will be for Her Majesty’s Government to 
show upon what state facts, and what rules of national law, the 
destruction of the Caroline are to be defended. It will be for that 
Government to show a necessity of self-defence, instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of 
deliberation. It will be for it to show, also, that the local authorities of 
Canada, even supposing the necessity of the moment authorized 
them to enter the territories of the United States at all, did nothing 
unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of 
self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within 
it. It must be shown that admonition or remonstrance to the persons 
on board the Caroline was impracticable, or would have been 
unavailing ; it must be shown that day-light could not be waited for; 
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that there could be no attempt at discrimination between the innocent 
and the guilty; that it would not have been enough to seize and detain 
the vessel; but that there was a necessity, present and inevitable, for 
attacking her in the darkness of the night, while moored to the shore, 
and while unarmed men were asleep on board, killing some and 
wounding others, and then drawing her into the current, above the 
cataract, setting her on fire, and, careless to know whether there 
might not be in here the innocent with the guilty, or the living with the 
dead, committing her to a fate which fills the imagination with horror. 
A necessity for all this, the Government of The United States cannot 
believe to have existed.” 8 
 
The Caroline affair did not end with the exchange of diplomatic notes. The 
politics of the event intensified when the President sent a message to 
Congress describing the event as a possible violation of the sovereignty and 
jurisdiction of the US.9 On 28 July 1842, Lord Ashburton wrote to Mr 
Webster, admitting that the US had the right to uphold its territorial integrity 
and that the seizure of the Caroline was, therefore, a violation of its 
sovereignty. The British also apologised over the incident and expressed 
regret. However, the British government further insisted that all nations have 
the right to self-defence, and that a nation’s actions may be excused in the 
event of ‘necessity’. The letter stated:  
 
“…it is admitted by all writers, by all jurists, by the occasional practice 
of all nations, not expecting your own, that a strong overpowering 
necessity may arise when this great principle may and must be 
suspended. It must be so, for the shortest possible period during the 
continuance of an admitted overruling necessity, and strictly confined 
within the narrowest limits imposed by that necessity. Self-defence is 
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the first law of our nature, and it must be recognized by every code 
which professes to regulate the condition and relations of man.”10 
 
On this point, the British government disagreed with the description of 
necessity presented by the US in previous correspondence. Necessity as 
explained by Mr Webster thus, ‘a necessity of self-defence, instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment of deliberation’,11 
was deemed unrealistic because the interpretation was considered too 
restrictively imposed and inapplicable to the current case. The description of 
necessity was subject to further disagreement between the US and the 
British, although both countries were able to mediate the political dispute. In 
response, Mr Webster on 6 August 1842 accepted the apology, but 
continued to disagree on the definition of necessity.  
 
Meanwhile, in the trial of Mr McLeod, the US government pursued the case 
in the Supreme Court, despite the British government’s plea to discharge the 
defendant based on nolle prosequi (no prosecution) and its application for 
habeas corpus. The case, The People vs. McLeod12, went to trial, but 
resulted in discharge of the defendant due to insufficient evidence. As a 
result, the diplomatic disagreements regarding the arrest of Mr McLeod 
gradually declined, although the justification for the sinking of the Caroline 
remained disputed.  
 
3. The Relevance of the Caroline affair in Contemporary 
International Law  
 
The Caroline affair took place in the nineteenth century and yet it still 
influences jus ad bellum today. This section will seek to examine how the 
Caroline affair transformed into a legal doctrine that endures till today, 
despite a series of international legal developments in the intervening period. 
This will involve comparing previous practice and other defensive measures 
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such as ‘self-preservation’, ‘reprisal’ with ‘self-defence’ as we understand it 
today.  
 
The effect of the Caroline case is not immediately apparent in international 
law. The event itself was by its nature a political one, and it involved three 
principal parties, namely the British and American governments, and the 
Canadian rebels. Furthermore, if the Caroline incident is taken as an 
example of legal authority, customary law changes and develops over time. 
The development of customary law is influence by state practice and by the 
judgments from international tribunals. However, Jennings observed that the  
importance of the affair proceeds from the fact that the disputes shifted from 
a political excuse to a legal doctrine.13 In the eyes of international law, the 
commentary on the event shaped the law of self-defence in a manner that 
has been sustained until the present day. Arguably, the correspondence 
between the two countries and the facts surrounding the affair are important 
to understand in any evaluation of the law of self-defence.  
 
Many commentators have quoted the Caroline case as a source of law in 
self-defence and used the incident to justify several doctrines in jus ad 
bellum.14 In particular, it is claimed that the Caroline event established four 
main legal narratives of self-defence; (1) limitations on the use of force in 
self-defence; (2) recognition of the right to self-defence against non-state 
actors; (3) approval of the use of force in anticipatory self-defence; and 
finally (4) approval of the use of force in pre-emptive self-defence. All four 
claims will be assessed in relation to the Caroline case as this study seeks 
to understand what would be the correct interpretation of law. The first three 
claims have broad support in legal jurisprudence, however it is argued thT 
pre-emptive self-defence falls outside the interpretation of the Caroline case.  
 
                                            
13 R.Y. Jennings, ‘The Caroline and McLeod Cases’ (1938) 32 AJIL 82-99, 
85  
14 e.g.Tom Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the UN Charter (CUP 
2010) 255; Hilaire McCoubrey and Nigel White, International Law and 
Armed Conflict (Dartmouth 1992) 87 
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a. Sustainability of the Caroline Doctrine within International 
Law 
 
Disagreement between two nations in the nineteenth century was not 
unique, as states commonly disagreed on a range of issues. However, what 
is exceptional is that the effects of the Caroline incident still resonate in 
contemporary international law. Therefore, it is important to understand in 
what context the Caroline case illustrates in jus ad bellum, and how the 
incident contributes to our understanding of the concept of self-defence.  
 
i. From Multiple Justifications for the Use of Force to the 
Concept of Self-Defence  
 
One of the biggest contributions of the Caroline incident is that it clarifies the 
concept of self-defence in international law. Although Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter defines contemporary understanding of self-defence, 
arguably the elements of Article 51 do not necessarily reflect the concept of 
self-defence as understood in the nineteenth century (at the time of the 
Caroline incident). In 1837 self-defence was not a prominent subject in 
international law, and was usually considered under the heading ‘self-
preservation.15 Furthermore, within the legal literature, there were other 
justifications for using force that were not only limited to self-defence.  
 
The term ‘self-preservation’ is evident in the correspondence between the 
two governments following the Caroline incident. In the correspondence, 
both parties used the term ‘self-defence’ and ‘self-preservation’ throughout 
their exchanges without elaborating on the meaning of each terminology. For 
instance, the letter written by Mr Fox dated 6 February 1838 explained, ‘The 
piratical character of the steamboat ‘Caroline’ and the necessity of self-
defence and self-preservation under which Her Majesty’s subject acted in 
destroying that vessel would seem to be sufficiently established’.16 In 
another exchange dated 24 April 1841, Daniel Webster wrote, ‘it is admitted 
                                            
15 Stephen Neff, War and the Law of Nations (CUP 2005)  
16 H. Ex Doc. 302, 25th Cong. 2nd Session; Public Record Office, F. O 5. 322 
(emphasis added)  
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that a just right of self-defence attaches always to nations as well as to 
individuals, and is equally necessary for the preservation of both’.17 These 
letters suggest that at the time of the Caroline incident there was already a 
body of international law requiring states to justify the use of force. However, 
the letters did not distinguish between the two concepts, a fact that creates 
confusion for modern lawyers.18 
 
Indeed, in the nineteenth century, legal literature on the use of force by 
states referred to both self-defence and self-preservation. Self-preservation 
was understood to be a fundamental right, enabling a sovereign state to 
violate another state’s territory in certain circumstances.19 The concept of 
self-preservation could also be seen as encompassing other legal 
justifications for the use of force, such as self-defence, reprisal, self-help and 
necessity, which were all regarded as lawful prior to 1945.20 Wheaton 
explains that the right to self-preservation derives from the right to self-
defence.21 As early as the eighteenth century, Emrich de Vattel in Le droit 
des gens (The Law of Nations) wrote that the right to self-preservation is so 
paramount that the ‘duties of states are subordinated to the right of self-
preservation’.22 Legal literature at the time was influenced by various legal 
terminologies, which were employed to describe the lawful use of force 
against states, although distinctions and similarities were not then fully 
appreciated.  
 
                                            
17 British and Foreign State Papers 1840-1841 (n 7) 1129  
18 R.Y. Jennings, ‘The Caroline and McLeod Cases’ (1938) 32 AJIL 82-99, 
92 
19 Robert Jennings and Arthur Wartts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law 
(Vol. 1, Longman 1992) 416; W E Hall, Treatise on International Law 
(Clarendon Press 1909) 264    
20 James Green, ‘Self-Preservation’ in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (Oxford Public International Law (online) March, 2009) 
2  
21 Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law (Stevenson and Sons 
1836) 81  
22 Emrich de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law 
(Carnegie Institution of Washington 1916) 14  
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The significance of the Caroline incident in contemporary international law 
was that it marked the recognition of self-defence as the only legitimate 
justification for the use of force. Other justifications such as self-preservation 
and reprisal that were lawful during the time of the Caroline incident are now 
deemed unlawful under current international law. However, since 1945, the 
only lawful unilateral use of force recognised in international law is self-
defence as enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. This right to self-
defence can be linked historically to Caroline incident and in part the incident 
inform our understanding on the concept of self-defence today. However, it 
could also be said that our understanding of self-defence evolved through 
state practice including Article 51 and through the jurisprudence of the ICJ. 
Yet, the Caroline incident is significant in historical terms as a point of 
reference for customary self-defence.  
 
In addition to the concept of self-preservation, there is also discussion over 
the concept of reprisal. The definition of reprisal must be stated with caution, 
because the meaning and lawfulness of reprisal changes over time. The 
meaning of reprisal in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries required an 
actual infringement of territorial sovereignty by the offending nation, which 
the victim could regard as a measure of war.23  An example of reprisal 
contemporaneous with the Caroline incident was the ‘Opium war’ between 
Britain and China in 1839-1840. The dispute began when British nationals 
were mistreated in China for unlawfully importing opium, which the British 
government objected to, not because of restrictions on opium but in relation 
to the custody of the British nationals.24 Consequently, the British 
government issued a Council Order authorising reprisal against China ‘with a 
view of obtaining…satisfaction and reparation’.25  
 
                                            
23 Evelyn S. Colbert, Retaliation in International Law (King’s Crown Press 
1948) 94 
24 Neff (n 15) 230  
25 ibid.   
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Another famous example of reprisal is the Naulilaa dispute between Portugal 
and Germany.26 In October 1914, a German provincial governor and twenty 
soldiers were tasked with negotiating matters of common interest with the 
Portuguese at Naulilaa Fort, located at the border of Portuguese colonial 
territory in Angola. Because of a misunderstanding, Portuguese officials 
killed the Governor and two other German soldiers. Germany responded by 
attacking several Portuguese posts including the Fort. Portugal then claimed 
compensation, and an arbitration tribunal adjudicated the matter. Germany 
justified its actions based on a legitimate reprisal, but the tribunal rejected 
this claim. The Arbitration, did however explain that reprisal is a lawful 
justification if several conditions are met. The judgment of the Arbitration 
reflects the state of international law at the time; showing reprisal was 
considered a lawful justification for the use of force. Today reprisal is no 
longer regarded as a legitimate excuse for the use of force.  
 
In the twentieth century, international law gradually developed to restrict use 
of force between states. In 1920, the Covenant of League of Nations, signed 
by the major powers at the time, such as the US, Great Britain (British 
Empire), China and France, agreed under Article 10 of the treaty ‘to respect 
and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and 
existing political independence of all Members of the League’.27 
Furthermore, member states of the League were obliged to settle dispute 
through non-forcible means such as submitting disputed matters to 
arbitration or judicial process.28 Another development in the twentieth 
century was the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which explicitly denounced 
war as an instrument for national policy.29 This effectively prohibited 
signatory parties (which numbered fifty-four states by 1929) from engaging 
in war to settle international disputes. In 1945, following the inception of the 
                                            
26 For facts of the incident see Portugal v. Germany (The Naulilaa Case), 
Special Arbitral Tribunal, Annual Digest of Public International Law 
Cases 526; Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (The Lawbook 
Exchange Ltd, 1952) 24-25  
27 Article 10 of the Covenant of League of Nations, 28 April 1919 
28 Article 12 of the Covenant of League of Nations, 28 April 1919 
29 Article 1 of the Kellogg-Briand Pact 1928 94 LNTS 57  
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United Nations Charter, the use of force to attack the territorial integrity and 
political independence of any state was made illegal.30 However, the Charter 
allows for the use of force on the grounds of self-defence.31 Thus, the 
development of jus ad bellum was gradually restricted from various legal 
grounds for the use of force in the nineteenth century to only self-defence in 
the twentieth century, such that today the only lawful means to exercise 
unilateral force under the Charter mechanism is in self-defence.   
 
The Caroline incident contributed to shaping the law on the use of force  by 
only recognising self-defence and self-preservation as legal bases for 
violating American sovereignty and not mentioning other justifications such 
as reprisal. Developments in international law in the twentieth century further 
narrowed the scope for the use of force to only self-defence. The right to 
self-defence is now stated expressly in Article 51 of the UN Charter. 
Furthermore, the Caroline incident provides the platform that requires states 
to comply with the conditions of necessity and proportionality in the event of 
self-defence. These two conditions are absent in Article 51 but can be linked 
historically to the Caroline affair. Therefore, not only the right to self-defence 
that can be traced to the Caroline incident but also the limitations in the use 
of defensive measures. Again, it has to be borne in mind that the concept of 
self-defence developed since the nineteenth century but the Caroline 
incident still preserves the status as a point of reference for customary self-
defence.  
 
ii. Travaux Préparatoires and the Caroline Affair  
 
It is beneficial to consider whether the drafters of Article 51 referred to the 
right to self-defence as stated in the Caroline incident by examining the 
travaux préparatoires of the United Nations Charter. By determining this, we 
can establish if there is a direct connection between Article 51 and the 
Caroline incident.  
 
                                            
30 Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter 1945 1 UNTS XVI   
31 Article 51 of the United Nations Charter 1945 1 UNTS XVI    
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Article 51 of the United Nations Charter is the point of reference for the right 
to self-defence for all member states. It was argued earlier that the Caroline 
case shapes contemporary understanding of self-defence; however, Article 
51 does not explain the link between contemporary self-defence and self-
defence as established in the Caroline incident. It may be opined that the 
scope of self-defence in the nineteenth century bore little relevance to the 
meaning of self-defence post-1945, especially during the drafting of Article 
51. Furthermore, that the Caroline incident has no relevance to Article 51, 
because the contexts of the two in terms of the state of international law are 
so different. Despite these differences, it is argued that the Caroline affair 
still shapes the law of self-defence, or at least influences how international 
law sees self-defence.32   
 
The drafting history of the United Nations Charter shows no relationship 
between the right of self-defence and the Caroline incident. Discussions on 
the construction of Article 51 focused on two main issues.33 First, issues of 
collective regional self-defence, such as within Latin American countries and 
the Arab states. Second, on the position of Article 51 within the Charter; this 
was mainly a technical editing issue, rather than one containing substantive 
elements of self-defence. Thus, it appears the drafters were not concerned 
with Caroline self-defence in the 1945 treaty, leading some commentators to 
surmise that the Caroline incident has no meaning within Article 51.34 Article 
51 is thereby judged to be independent of any influence prior to 1945, and to 
be the only reference source for invoking the right to self-defence in 
international law. 
 
                                            
32 James Green, ‘Docking the Caroline: Understanding the Relevance of the 
Formula in Contemporary Customary International Law Concerning Self-
Defense’ (2006) 14 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 429-480, 446-473. The 
author argues that it is unhelpful for scholars to disregard the importance 
of the Caroline incident as it a useful to aid our understanding in the law 
of self-defence. See T.D Gill, ‘The Temporal Dimension of Self-Defence: 
Antcipation, Pre-emption, Prevention and Immediacy’ (2006) 11 JCSL 
361-369, 366-369 
33 Refer to Chapter 2 3.a. of this thesis.  
34 Yoram Dinstein, War, Agression and Self-Defence (5th edn, CUP 2012) 
197 
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There are factors that might be construed to undermine the status and 
relevance of the Caroline incident in contemporary international law. The 
exchanges following the Caroline incident were simply a diplomatic exercise 
by both countries to resolve a dispute without going to war, and therefore the 
documents cannot be regarded as a source of legal rules.35 In addition, there 
is nothing in the documents (correspondence) implying the issues raised 
were intended to govern the rules on the use of force in the future.36 If the 
exchanges were not intended as a basis for the establishment of legal rules, 
it is unclear how the Caroline case became so immersed in contemporary 
international law as to be regarded as an important reference. As Kearley 
asks, ‘why have modern scholars extracted Webster’s statement from its 
context and made it into a rule of general prohibition, even though that 
general application distort history and can lead to the development of 
questionable legal rules?’37 Another criticism of the Caroline affair as a 
reference for self-defence relates to justifications for the use of force in the 
nineteenth century. As explained above, the use of force could be justified 
on various legal grounds at that time. Occelli argues that the Caroline 
incident was not representative of customary international law in the 
nineteenth century, and that the exchange of letters only reflects the 
American political views.38 Therefore, based on the assumption that the 
documents were diplomatic letters and not a legal construction of doctrine, 
and the argument that the explanations made by both parties diverge from 
the practice at the time, it can be said that the Caroline affair cannot be 
regarded as a suitable reference for self-defence.  
 
However, the argument above fails to reflect the significance of the Caroline 
incident in contemporary international law. Several cases before the ICJ 
have concluded that necessity and proportionality are to be imposed as 
                                            
35 Maria Occelli, ‘’Sinking’ the Caroline: Why the Caroline Doctrine’s 
Restrictions on Self-Defense Should Not Be Regarded as Customary 
International Law’ (2003) 4 San Diego International Law Journal 467-
490, 476  
36 ibid.    
37 Timothy Kearley, ‘Raising the Caroline’ (1999) 17 Wisconsin International 
Law Journal 325-346, 330-331  
38 Occelli (n 35) 480  
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limitations on self-defence, something not mentioned in Article 51.39 The ICJ 
states both limitations refer to customary international law, which the 
majority view of scholars regard as a reference to the Caroline incident. It is 
wrong to suggest that necessity and proportionality are derived from Article 
51, and it is also wrong to argue that the two limitations were created by the 
Court itself. The Court drew the notions of necessity and proportionality from 
customary international law, and this indirectly refers to the origin of the two 
limitations, the Caroline incident.  
 
As explored above, there is no direct relationship found between Article 51 
and the Caroline incident with regard to the understanding of self-defence. 
This is evidenced through the travaux préparatoires for Article 51. However, 
the absence of necessity and proportionality in Article 51 indicates that our 
understanding of contemporary self-defence must refer to other sources of 
law, specifically to customary international law. It is argued here that the 
literature of necessity and proportionality in the context of self-defence refer 
to the Caroline incident. This also shows the significance of the Caroline 
affair as a point of reference in customary self-defence.  
  
4. Legal Narratives on the Caroline Doctrine 
 
The destruction of the Caroline by British forces was an incident referred to 
by many commentators as reflecting the right to self-defence in customary 
international law and other legal narratives in jus ad bellum. The creation of 
legal rules as a consequence of the incident is termed the Caroline doctrine - 
legal rules for self-defence that are associated directly with the Caroline 
affair.  
 
Four main doctrines result from the incident. First, the Caroline affair created 
limitations on the use of force in self-defence, restricting it to necessity and 
proportionality. Second, the incident established that self-defence can be 
                                            
39 See below Section 6 of this Chapter ‘The Principles of Necessity, 
Proportionality and Immediacy in Jurisprudence of the International 
Court of Justice’.  
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exercised against non-states actors. Third, states are permitted to exercise 
self-defence in anticipatory fashion. Finally, the Caroline affair established 
the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence. This section will attempt to analyse 
how each doctrine came into existence in jus ad bellum, and then explain its 
relevance to the Caroline case. These four doctrines also reflect the 
complexities of interpreting a historical incident like the sinking of the 
Caroline vessel when establishing it as a reference for contemporary self-
defence. The interpretation of historical events is open to misinterpretation, 
because there is no clear mechanism to interpret customary international 
law for an event like the Caroline incident.  
 
In spite of these doctrines originated from the Caroline incident, it must be 
noted that there were developments in jus ad bellum since the nineteenth 
century. Legal rules, although it can be traced back in history, do not freeze 
in time and it is subject to changes in state practice and customary 
international law. Nonetheless, these narratives that are associated with the 
Caroline affairs signify that the incident can be used as a reference for its 
origin in customary international law. 
 
a. The Doctrine of Limitations on the Use of Force in Self-
Defence  
 
The most important interpretation of the Caroline incident concerns the 
recognition of the right to self-defence within customary international law. 
Notwithstanding the existence of the right to self-defence under the United 
Nations Charter, the sinking of the Caroline vessel is regarded as a primary 
example of the right to self-defence in customary law. Furthermore, the 
Caroline incident created limitations on self-defence, restricting it to the 
principles of necessity and proportionality. This is deduced from 
correspondence between the American and British governments regarding 
the incident.  
 
In the exchanges, both countries affirmed that states have the right to self-
defence. This is clearly expressed in the letter, ‘Self-defence is the first law 
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of our nature, and it must be recognized by every code which professes to 
regulate the condition and relations of man’.40  This statement shows that 
both states acknowledge the right to self-defence is accorded to all states. At 
present, the right to self-defence is not an issue in international law because 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter upholds this right to all member 
states. In the nineteenth century, when the international legal system was 
not as well established or comprehensive as it is today, the Caroline affair 
offered a significant contribution by recognising the right to self-defence as a 
part of customary international law.  
 
Although the right to self-defence is recognised under customary 
international law, force cannot be employed indiscriminately. Another vital 
contribution and interpretation of the Caroline incident is that it outlines the 
conditions imposed on the right to self-defence by establishing two 
principles: necessity and proportionality. Both principles were extracted from 
Webster’s texts and simplified below:  
 
“It will be for Her Majesty’s Government to show upon what state 
facts, and what rules of national law, the destruction of the Caroline 
are to be defended. It will be for that Government to show a necessity 
of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, 
and no moment of deliberation.”41 
 
Whilst the meaning of proportionality was derived from the following 
sentence to describe the extent to which force could be exercised in self-
defence. It states:  
 
“It will be for it to show, also, that the local authorities of Canada, 
even supposing the necessity of the moment authorized them to enter 
the territories of the United States at all, did nothing unreasonable or 
                                            
40 British and Foreign State Papers 1841-1842 (Vol. XXX, James Ridgway 
and Sons 1858) 196  
41 British and Foreign State Papers 1840-1841 (Vol. XXIX, James Ridgway 
and Sons 1857) 1337-1138  
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excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, 
must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it.”42 
 
Aside from the limitations of necessity and proportionality, a further 
restriction often associated with the Webster text was the concept of 
imminence. Although the exact word ‘imminence’ does not appear in the 
document, its meaning can be surmised. It mainly refers to timing in 
association with the exercise of self-defence. Thus, based on the Webster 
text, the limitations of necessity, proportionality and imminence were 
established.  
 
b. The Caroline Incident and the Right to Self-Defence against 
Non-State Actors 
 
Another interpretation of the Caroline incident is the doctrine that self-
defence may be exercised against both states and non-state actors. Similar 
to the above, whereby it is argued that the Caroline doctrine acknowledges 
the principles of necessity and proportionality, it is also argued here that the 
Caroline incident supports the doctrine of self-defence against non-state 
actors.  
 
Several commentators share the view that the Caroline incident is the 
source of customary international law for the right to self-defence against a 
non-state actor.43 For instance, Franck assesses that in today’s context, 
threats and attacks are not only confined to states or governments, can also 
proceed from a non-state entity.44 The law on self-defence against non-state 
actors can be linked to the Caroline incident because it outlined the 
limitations of self-defence in relation to the Canadian rebels, a non-state 
                                            
42 British and Foreign State Papers 1840-1841 (Vol. XXIX, James Ridgway 
and Sons 1857) 1337-1138  
43 E.g. Lubell (n 48) 35; Daniel Bethlehem, ‘Self-Defense Against An 
Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors’ (2012) 106  AJIL 
769-777, 773. See also Helen Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and the 
Framework of International Law (CUP 2005) 153 
44 Thomas Franck, Recourse to Force (CUP 2002) 67 
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group, and not a government.45 This in effect suggests that self-defence 
against non-state actors is lawful. From a slightly different perspective, it 
could be argued that if all the customary law requirements for self-defence 
are met (the requirement imposed as above; necessity and proportionality) 
then self-defence operations are permissible irrespective of the entity of the 
aggressor, whether a state or a terrorist group.46 Maogoto recalls that this 
was the legal narrative espoused by President Clinton’s administration when 
the US launched counter-measure operations against terrorist groups in 
Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998.47  
 
Two main observations can be extracted from the Caroline incident to form 
the doctrine of self-defence against non-state actors. First, if the conditions 
of self-defence (necessity and proportionality) are met by the invoking state, 
the defensive measure is arguably regarded as legal regardless of the entity 
involved. Thus, legality hinges upon the fulfilment of requirements and not 
the identity of the aggressor. Second, the correspondence addressed the 
issue of the use of force by British forces against a rebel, a non-state actor, 
harboured on American territory. Both countries acknowledged that each 
state has the right to protect itself, even if the aggressor is a non-state actor, 
the victim state is still afforded the right to self-defence. Therefore, this 
substantiates the argument that the Caroline doctrine and the Webster text 
were addressing the issue of state against non-state actor. Hence, 
customary law for self-defence against non-states actors arguably has 
strong connections with the Caroline incident.  
 
Indeed, the Caroline incident may allude to the recognition that states have 
the right to self-defence against non-state actors historically. Nevertheless, it 
cannot be said that customary international law freeze in time and devoid of 
further development. As in the case of the Caroline incident, admittedly, at 
present, the right to self-defence against non-state actors may not entirely 
rely on the incident as a source of law. In addition, as explained earlier in 
                                            
45 ibid 67.  
46 Jackson Nyamnuya Maogoto, Battling Terrorism (Ashgate 2005) 114  
47 ibid.  
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this thesis, there are several state practice that may be construed to support 
the right to self-defence against non-state actors. Furthermore, it may be 
argued that Article 51 and jurisprudence of the ICJ are still open to 
interpretation thus allowing state to recourse self-defence against non-state 
actors. Be that as it may, it is maintain that the significance of the Caroline 
incident in legal literature serves as a point of reference for the right to self-
defence against non-state actors and the right may evolve through time such 
as the inception of Article 51 of the UN Charter and with state practice.  
 
Upon examination, there is a difference between the doctrine of self-defence 
against non-state actors and a doctrine that recognises the conditions of 
necessity and proportionality in the Caroline incident. The latter mainly refers 
to the correspondence between the British and American governments 
concerning the incident, whilst the former doctrine primarily concerns the 
entities involved in the incident, i.e. the British forces attacked Canadian 
rebels. Put differently, the doctrine of self-defence against a non-state actor 
relates to the circumstantial and anecdotal facts surrounding the Caroline 
incident whereby a government sank a rebel ship. In this case, the doctrine 
of necessity and proportionality in self-defence was not extracted from the 
historical facts associated with the Caroline incident but with the exchange of 
letters, specifically, the Webster text. Therefore, one doctrine links to the 
facts and one to the letters, although both originated from the same incident.   
 
c. The Right to Anticipatory Self-Defence in the Context of the 
Caroline Incident  
 
Some interpretation of the Caroline incident is the establishment of the right 
to anticipatory self-defence. Anticipatory self-defence differs from traditional 
meaning of self-defence as it allows self-defence to be taken even where the 
aggressor has not yet physically attacked the victim state but with the 
condition that the attack is regarded as imminent.48  
 
                                            
48 See Elizabeth Wilmhurst, ‘Principles of International Law on the Use of 
Force by States in Self-Defence (Chatham House, October 2005) pg. 8 
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Scholars argue that the right to anticipatory self-defence in customary law 
can partly be attributed to the Caroline incident.49 This is derived when the 
British forces raided the Canadian rebel’s outpost leading to the sinking of 
the Caroline, although the group had not attacked them. Later, the British 
government justified the act to the American government as an act of self-
defence. By this, it is said that the sinking of the Caroline supports the 
doctrine of anticipatory self-defence. 
 
However, scholars have not fully embraced the contention that the doctrine 
of anticipatory self-defence originated from the Caroline incident.50 Some 
agree that the general right of anticipatory self-defence has merit without any 
affiliation to the Caroline incident. Dinstein argues that nothing connects the 
right to anticipatory self-defence with the Caroline affair, and that it is a 
misrepresentation to suggest that the Caroline correspondence advocates 
anticipatory self-defence.51 He justifies this by claiming its raison d’etre was 
to determine whether the British could exercise self-defence in America 
without going to war with the US government, and not the legality on the use 
of force.52 Therefore, he argues the notion of anticipatory self-defence 
cannot be attached to the Caroline affair.53 Assuming that anticipatory self-
defence has links with the Caroline affair, the incident can only shed light on 
the general right to anticipatory self-defence in international law, as this 
                                            
49 Lindsay Moir, Reappraising the Resort to Force (Hart Publishing 2010) 12-
13; Franck (n 54) 97-98; Lubell (n 48) 31; Malcolm Shaw, International 
Law (6th edn, CUP 2008) 1140; Amos Guiora, ‘Anticipatory Self-Defence 
and International Law – A Re-Evaluation’ (2008) 13 JCSL 3-24, 11; 
Lous-Philipe Rouillard, ‘The Caroline Case: Anticipatory Self-Defence in 
Contemporary International Law’ 1 (2004) Miskolc Journal of 
International Law 104-120, 118; Dino Kritsiotis, ‘A Study of the Scope 
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under International Law’ in Nigel White and Christian Henderson, 
Research Handbook on International Conflict and Security Law (Edward 
Elgar 2013) 188-191  
50 See: Albrecht Randelzhofer and Georg Nolte, The Charter of the United 
Nations: A Commentary (Vol. II, 3rd edn, OUP 2012) 1421-1424 
51 Dinstein (n 34) 197 
52 ibid.   
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would ‘be excessive in light of the very restrictive interpretation that can in 
fact be given to the Caroline incident’.54  
 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter states that ‘armed attack’ is a pre-
condition to exercise the right to self-defence: ‘if an armed attack occurs…’. 
This makes it difficult to justify anticipatory self-defence within the context of 
Article 51 without referring to other sources of law. Customary international 
law offers an avenue for rationalising the right to anticipatory self-defence 
within the remit of Article 51. As suggested by Bowett:  
 
“It is a fallacy of the first order to assume… that the right has no other 
content than the one determined by Article 51. Such a view produces 
a restricted interpretation of the right not warranted by the Charter. 
Not least of the restrictions involved in this view is the construction of 
Article 51, which limits the right of individual or collective self-defence 
to cases where an ‘armed attack’, occurs. This is a restriction 
certainly unrecognised by general international law, which has always 
recognised an ‘anticipatory’ self-defence.”55 
 
In contemporary international law, there are growing support for the right to 
anticipatory self-defence in strict circumstances. Notwithstanding the 
arguments whether or not the right is established under Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter, it is widely accepted by states that exercising self-
defence in an anticipatory fashion is permissible. For example, in a High-
level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change Report in 2004 by the 
United Nations, the Secretary-General stated that ‘Long-established 
customary international law makes it clear that states can take military action 
as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means would deflect 
it, and the action is proportionate’.56 This narrative was reiterated by the 
                                            
54 Hilaire McCourbey and Nigel White, International Law and Armed Conflict 
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55 Derek Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law (Manchester University 
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Secretary-General in 2005 in In Larger Freedom, which pointed out that 
‘Imminent threats are fully covered by Article 51, which safeguards the 
inherent right of sovereign States to defend themselves against armed 
attack. Lawyers have long recognized that this covers an imminent attack as 
well as one that has already happened’.57 The weight of these two reports 
drafted by the head of the United Nations does indicate that there are some 
proponents that are willing to support anticipatory self-defence, provided 
limitations are observed.  
 
Despite the recognition of anticipatory self-defence by the UN Secretary-
General, it is not universally accepted by all member states of the United 
Nations. For instance, members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) reject 
the notion of anticipatory self-defence and maintained that self-defence must 
be adhered according to Article 51 of the UN Charter.58 Gray argues that the 
rejection from NAM members totalling a number 118 member states show 
that states are still divided on the status of anticipatory self-defence in 
international law.59  
 
In the Caroline incident, the analysis of anticipatory self-defence is primarily 
directed toward the conduct of British forces against the Canadian rebels 
within US territory, and not the correspondence between the two countries. 
Therefore, a theme emerges in regard to the interpretation of the whole 
Caroline affair; that is, a doctrine can be extracted based on both anecdotes 
of the incident and through the letters written by the two governments (the 
Webster text). The doctrine of anticipatory self-defence derives from the 
former. At present, the notion of anticipatory self-defence is still open for 
debate although there are some states who are embracing this narratives 
irrespective whether it is associated with the Caroline incident or otherwise.  
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d. The Caroline and the Claim of ‘Pre-Emptive Self-Defence’  
 
Another doctrine believed to have links with the Caroline affair, and perhaps 
the most contentious of all, is pre-emptive self-defence60. Pre-emptive self-
defence is ‘where a party uses force to quell any possibility of future attack 
by another state, even where there is no reason to believe that an attack is 
planned and where no prior attack has occurred’.61 In contrast, anticipatory 
self-defence as referred above, directs the use of self-defence when an 
attack is perceived as incoming or imminent.  
 
The relationship between the Caroline incident and pre-emptive self-defence 
is unclear, although authors often cite the two together without elaborating 
further. One possible justification for a connection between the two involves 
interpreting the conduct of British forces during the incident. The argument 
for pre-emption in the Caroline affair stresses that British forces raided the 
vessel in advance of any attack by the rebels, and that the British forces had 
no knowledge of any specific imminent attack. Not only did the British 
proceeded to raid the Caroline vessel without such evidence, they also killed 
two Americans. Based on this narrative, it is possible to argue the case 
offers an example of pre-emptive self-defence upheld in customary law.  
 
Another possible connection between the Caroline incident and pre-emptive 
self-defence is mentioned in the Webster text. The text reads, ‘instant, 
                                            
60 David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey, ‘Using Force Lawfully in the 21st 
Century’ (2006) 81 International Law Studies 319-336, 320 (The author 
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overwhelming and leaving no choice of means and no moment of 
deliberation’. This phrase makes no mention of armed attack as an essential 
condition. If the requirements of ‘instant, overwhelming, no other means to 
resolve the matter’ are met, then pre-emptive self-defence can be employed. 
Furthermore, customary international law is not static and can be modified to 
accommodate new contexts, probably giving some allowance to absorb the 
idea of pre-emptive self-defence into customary international law.62  
 
Scholars often cite pre-emptive self-defence with the Caroline incident 
without elaborating further.63 For example, Bothe explains that the Webster 
formula can be expanded as far as acknowledging pre-emptive self-defence, 
but admits that ‘this is as far as pre-emptive self-defence possibly goes’ 
under the current international law.64 However, he fails to explain how it 
could be interpreted in such a way. This issue arose when President Bush 
initiated the debate on pre-emptive self-defence in the National Security 
Strategy (2002) claiming the US has the right to use force in undertaking 
pre-emptive self-defence against its enemies.65 The then legal adviser to the 
State Department, William Taft, argued that pre-emptive self-defence is 
indeed embedded within the Caroline doctrine, forming customary 
international law without explaining how the two relate to one another, he 
states:  
 
“The doctrine of pre-emption to prevent a catastrophe resulting from 
an attack by weapons of destruction is, however, a natural extension 
of – and fully consistent with – the traditional right of individual and 
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collective self-defence to ensure that the right of self-defence 
attaches early enough to be meaningful and effective.”66  
 
It is argued that pre-emptive self-defence has no basis by referring to the 
Caroline incident based on two grounds. First, the Caroline affair cannot be 
said with certainty to reflect the intention and acts of the British forces were 
one of pre-emptive self-defence. It might be the case that it was merely 
anticipatory but not pre-emptive self-defence (absent of the condition of 
imminence). As pre-emptive self-defence is a contentious claim in jus ad 
bellum, any recognition of such right requires a clarity in the Caroline 
incident to reflect that it was indeed a pre-emptive self-defence that 
happened in the incident. As this is unclear reading from the historical 
accounts of the Caroline event, the incident could not be concluded to 
support pre-emptive self-defence in international law.  
 
Second, state practice has shown that states are reluctant to endorse pre-
emptive self-defence. Despite the ‘Bush Doctrine’ advanced by the US post-
9/11, many states still reject the position of pre-emptive self-defence. As 
such, even if one argues that pre-emptive self-defence is part of the Caroline 
doctrine, it is argued that pre-emptive self-defence does not continue to 
evolve in today’s jus ad bellum due to lack of support from states.67 
Therefore, the claim that the pre-emptive self-defence finds support in the 
Caroline affair is a misunderstanding of the incident.  
 
In summary, the claim of pre-emptive self-defence is argued by some to 
have originated from the Caroline incident. How the incident became 
subsumed into a doctrine in support of pre-emptive self-defence is vague. As 
a result, the incident cannot be said to support pre-emptive self-defence in 
customary international law. Partly, this is due to lack of clarity in the account 
                                            
66 William Taft, ‘Pre-emptive Action in Self-Defence’ (2004) 98 American 
Society of International Law Proceedings 331-333, 333   
67 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (3rd ed, OUP 2008) 
214-216 
- 107 - 
of the Caroline incident and state practice is largely unwilling to endorse the 
notion of pre-emptive self-defence.  
 
5. The Identification of Doctrines from the Caroline 
Incident 
 
The above analysis demonstrates that the Caroline incident has been 
interpreted into a series of legal doctrines in customary international law. 
Therefore, it is important here to understand the process of interpretation as 
a means to create legal rules. Before analysing the interpretative process of 
the Caroline incident, it is beneficial to understand first the creation and  
existence of customary international law. Following that, this section will 
attempt an attempt to justify the interpretation of customary international law 
in the context of Caroline doctrine and to try to uncover an explanation for 
the creation of the Caroline doctrine. Simultaneously, this section will also 
identify the problems of interpreting the Caroline incident.  
 
a. Customary International Law  
 
The authority for customary international law can be found in Article 38(1)(b) 
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, where it provides 
‘international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law’.68 
This provision acknowledges the existence of customary law and other 
primary sources of international law, such as treaties and general principles 
of international law.  
 
b. Content and Creation of Customary International Law  
 
There are two main elements in the creation of customary international law: 
state practice and opinio juris. These elements are recognised based on the 
judgment in the case North Sea Continental Shelf from 1969, where the 
Court states:  
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“Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but 
they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be 
evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the 
existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e., 
the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of 
the opinio juris sive necessitatis. The States concerned must 
therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal 
obligation.”69 
 
The two elements have since been re-stated in other cases, such as in 
Continental Shelf Case (Libya v. Malta) where the Court pointed out that 
customary international law must be ‘looked for primarily in the actual 
practice and opinio juris of States’.70 This was mentioned again in 
Nicaragua.71 Therefore, the content of customary international law must 
involve two elements.  
 
One of the problems in customary international law is defining opinio juris 
and state practice. Several writers raised the issue of what amounts to ‘state 
practice’. There appears to be no consensus amongst authors.72 D’Amato 
states: ‘a claim is not an act… claims themselves, although they may 
articulate a legal norm, cannot constitute the material component of 
custom’.73 He believes that statements alone cannot form the basis for state 
practice, as this requires the actions of the state. Meanwhile Akehurst 
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believes that statements can form a component of state practice and that the 
absence of action does not imply state practice does not exist, thereby 
contradicting D’Amato.74 Furthermore, he argues that it is ‘artificial to 
distinguish between what a state does and what it says’.75 The arguments 
posed by scholars in the debate over ‘act versus claim’ reflect unsettled 
interpretations of state practice.  
 
Another problem in customary international law is the complexity involved in 
creating a new customary international law or, as Michael Byers puts it, ‘the 
chronological paradox’.76 Customary international law presupposes there 
was already a practice in existence prior to the creation of a law, i.e. a 
custom that is believed to be a law.77 The implication is that restricts state 
actors from creating new customary laws unless based on previously 
established practice; this would then not be regarded as a new customary 
international law. As a consequence, it is unlikely that a state will suddenly 
regard a practice as custom in international law without evidence of its 
existence.  
 
As discussed previously, the Caroline incident is regarded as the source of 
law of self-defence in customary international law. The development of a 
custom into a legal rule requires both state practice and opinio juris. The 
extent to which these applied to make the Caroline incident custom is 
somewhat undeveloped.  It is often assumed that the Caroline incident is a 
source of law without a need for further investigation. Similarly, the principles 
of necessity, proportionality and imminence are regarded as the benchmarks 
for the legality of self-defence without understanding how they were created.  
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Arguably, there is a gap in knowledge in terms of our understanding of the 
Caroline incident, which eventually transformed into legal rules. This gap in 
knowledge is rooted in the complicated interpretation of customary 
international law and the uniqueness of the Caroline doctrine. As will be 
shown below, the interpretation of customs requires numerous processes 
before they become law. Further adding to this complexity is the act of 
balancing various norms to create interpretation of customary law. Failure to 
justify the interpretation of the Caroline doctrine in legal literature leaves a 
huge gap in our knowledge, affecting the creation of customary self-defence 
based on the Caroline incident.  
 
The uniqueness of the Caroline doctrine is that it is relied on a single 
incident involving just two governments and one rebel group to form a 
custom. Typically, customary interpretations generally refer to several 
practices in place when forming a coherent customary law. Scholars and 
practitioners must therefore act cautiously when interpreting the Caroline 
incident, because their conclusions essentially permit states to exercise 
force against other states. Therefore, an error in interpreting this source of 
law, may result in a grave violation of international law. Therefore, due to the 
uniqueness of the Caroline case, the interpretative process must be 
executed carefully.  
 
c. Determination of Customary International Law  
 
It is important to understand the determination of customary law, as this may 
provide insight into how the Caroline incident could be regarded as a source 
of self-defence in customary international law.  
 
There are generally two main academic debates that apply when 
approaching customary international law. First, traditional custom, which 
primarily focuses on state practice (interaction and acquiescence of states) 
and treats opinio juris as secondary to identifying the difference between 
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legal and non-legal obligations.78 Second, modern custom primarily refers to 
a general statement of rules, which concentrate on opinio juris rather than 
state practice.79 The modern approach could be described as a deductive 
process because it infers custom from general statements, and thus tends to 
create custom more quickly comparative to tradition. Traditional custom is an 
inductive process that relies on observing state practice to create legal rules; 
therefore, it requires time to develop.  
 
In recognising the two approaches in customary international law, it can be 
observed that there is tension between traditional and modern approaches 
to customary international law. Each approach tends to lean toward a 
different outlook. Traditional approaches seek to create legal rules by 
looking into the past and observing previous state practice. This facilitates 
the effectiveness of the legal rules once they have been implemented 
because it is generally acceptable as practice. The modern approach 
prioritises the aspiration of general statements to achieve the intended 
results from legal rules, thereby creating a forward looking approach. 
Koskenniemi characterises these two tensions as the competing tendencies 
of apology (the past practice – facilitative/descriptive) and Utopia (aspiring 
goals of the legal rules - normative). He recognises the competing views as 
follows:  
 
“A law which would lack from State behaviour, will or interest would 
amount to a non-normative apology, a mere sociological description. 
A law which would base itself on principles which are unrelated to 
State behaviour, will or interest would seem utopian, incapable of 
demonstrating its own content in any reliable way.”80 
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Therefore, any interpretation of custom requires understanding of how to 
blend traditional and modern approaches to customary law, and how to 
recognise the tension between descriptive accuracy and normative appeal.  
 
The ideal interpretation for customary international law is to balance the 
need for a facilitative process, which takes into account previous state 
practice, and simultaneously advances aspirations related to the law 
concerned. Kirgis argues that a balance between the two could be achieved 
by using a sliding scale. This scale would allow the creation of legal rules, by 
compensating one element with another. Kirgis explains: 
 
“On the sliding scale, very frequent, consistent state practice 
establishes a customary rule without much (or any) affirmative 
showing of an opinio juris, so long as it is not negated by evidence of 
non-normative intent. As the frequency and consistency of the 
practice decline in any series of cases, a stronger showing of an 
opinio juris is required. At the other end of the scale, a clearly 
demonstrated opinio juris establishes a customary rule without much 
(or any) affirmative showing [of state practice].”81 
 
Based on the sliding scale, it is possible to create legal rules that are based 
on state practice, and which similarly apply to the creation of legal rules 
based on opinio juris only. However, the two extremes of the scale require 
an additional pre-requisite for balance. The problem arises at the middle of 
the scale, which requires the balance of opinio juris and state practice. Kirgis 
tackles this question by stating that it depends on the importance of the 
activity in question, and the reasonableness of the rule involved when 
seeking to strike a balance.  
 
The criticism of sliding scales is that permitting opinio juris or state practice 
to solely form legal rules ignores the problem. The effect can be that opinio 
juris tends to satisfy the facilitative norm but at the cost of the goal of 
                                            
81 Frederic Kirgis, ‘Custom on a Sliding Scale’ (1987) 81 AJIL 146-151, 149 
- 113 - 
attaining a legal rule. Similarly, for state practice, a sliding scale fulfils the 
need for a normative requirement but can disregard the effectiveness of the 
legal rule creating a utopian style standard. In any creation of a customary 
rule, the two elements of opinio juris and state practice must be fully 
satisfied.  
 
Alternatively, traditional and modern approaches to customary international 
law could be amalgamated by applying a ‘fit and substance’ method and this 
is based on the works of Dworkin, who argues that interpretations of 
customary law must reach the threshold of ‘fit’.82 Fit is an analytical process 
that makes practice eligible for interpretation. In doing so, the practice must 
accurately describe the custom.83 There are three possible outcomes of this 
process. First, if there is no potential interpretation then custom cannot be 
presumed. Second, if there is only one possible interpretation then that 
becomes the custom. Third, if the practice qualifies for more than one 
interpretation, according to Dworkin, substance is then applied to the 
interpretations to determine the best interpretation. Substance includes 
consideration of moral and political views. Thus, the application of fit and 
substance is directed backwards, taking into account previous practices that 
help to facilitate the custom, and simultaneously try to achieve the 
aspirations or goals of the custom that denotes the most suitable 
interpretation.  
 
The theory of fit and substance, as argued by John Tasioulas, enables the 
creation of custom by carefully selecting the best possible outcome from 
different practices. Roberts, however, argues that once an interpretation is 
determined then it must be further subjected to a ‘reflective equilibrium’ test, 
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as created by Rawls.84 This is a process in which the interpretation must be 
balanced between two spectrums of practice, in which the interpretation is 
facilitative and principles consist of morals. By doing so, the interpretation 
will take into account reality in practice (lex lata), and simultaneously seek to 
achieve the intended outcome (lex feranda). Roberts further argues that the 
interpretation must be tested continuously with reflective equilibrium. This is 
because she believes customs are fluid and change over time, and therefore 
interpretation must adapt to these changes.85 Therefore, interpretation 
requires continuous re-assessment of state practice and opinio juris to 
determine whether it is applicable in a new climate, in need of modification, 
or if a new custom is created. As a result, this process combines traditional 
and modern approaches to customary international law.   
 
In summary, interpretations of customary law are based on two 
requirements, state practice and opinio juris, and any interpretation must 
consider both elements when forming custom. However, scholars are 
divided in their approach to the interpretation of customary international law, 
as it is generally divided into two methods, a traditional approach and a 
modern approach. How the Caroline incident is interpreted in customary 
international law and whether the approaches discussed fit the interpretation 
of the Caroline incident as customary authority in self-defence is analysed 
below.  
 
d. The Caroline Incident in Customary International Law 
 
The identification of customary international law is a complex process and 
authors have favoured many different approaches when interpreting it. Legal 
rules pertaining to the Caroline incident is a result of the translation of the 
incident into legal doctrines. If the Caroline incident is considered acceptable 
in mainstream views as an authority on customary self-defence, it must be 
possible to interpret the incident to form legal rules. Many contemporary 
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scholars regard the Caroline incident as the embodiment of self-defence 
requirements in customary international law. However, here the issue is not 
whether the Caroline incident is an authority for self-defence, but how the 
incident transforms into customary legal rules.  
 
This analysis assumes that the Caroline doctrine is a well-established 
custom in international law, based on the cases put before the ICJ, where 
necessity and proportionality are regarded as having origin from customary 
international law on self-defence.86 In addition, the majority of scholars 
regard the Caroline incident as the basis for the right to self-defence. Based 
on these positions, we argue that the Caroline incident forms the foundation 
for the right to self-defence in customary international law.  
 
All the cases put before the ICJ that considered the right to self-defence 
agree that necessity and proportionality are derived from customary 
international law. However, the Court has failed to explain the source of the 
customary international law on self-defence.87 Recalling the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, customary international law is defined as 
‘evidence of a general practice accepted as law’.88 
  
An ironic aspect of the judgments made by the ICJ in relation to customary 
self-defence is that the Court never explicitly confirmed nor denied that the 
Caroline incident is the source of the principles of necessity and 
proportionality. However, the mainstream view in legal literature accepts that 
customary law on self-defence links to the Caroline incident, which created 
the conditions of necessity and proportionality. One explanation for the Court 
never having endorsed the Caroline incident is the complexities that might 
arise in its interpretation. As self-defence itself is a highly contentious area in 
international law, the Court has perhaps sought to avoid further 
complications affecting the debate. If the Court were to recognise the 
                                            
86 Refer to Chapter 2 Section 4 of this thesis. – Necessity and Proportionality 
in the Law of Self-Defence.  
87 Maurice Mandelson, ‘The Subjective Element in Customary International 
Law’ (1995) 66 BYIL177, 206-207  
88 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946  
- 116 - 
Caroline incident as the source of customary international law this would 
open the floodgate to multiple legal rights associated with the Caroline 
incident. For instance, the Caroline incident may be interpreted to mean that 
the Court accepts the notions of anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defence, 
which it has preferred to remain silent on thus far. The Court can insulate 
itself from misreading of the Caroline incident by remaining silent, while still 
maintaining that self-defence can be found in customary international law. 
 
Another explanation could be that the Court has considered Article 51 in all 
the cases that relates to the question of jus ad bellum and concluded that 
necessity and proportionality is understood to be part of the provision. 
Therefore, the Court may see that there is no relevance in pronouncing the 
Caroline incident in its judgment. Alternatively, the Court has determined the 
effects of endorsing the Caroline incident would create more harm than 
good, and so have purposely avoided detailing the source of law. The 
criticism that the Court never fully justifies sources of international law 
(explaining the ‘evidence of a general practice accepted as law’) was 
countered by the President of the International Court of Justice, who stated 
that: 
 
“[A]uthors are correct in drawing attention to the prevalent use of  
general statements of rules in the Court’s modern practice, although 
they  take the point too far by insisting on theorizing this development. 
In fact, the Court has never abandoned its view, firmly rooted in the 
wording of the Statute, that customary international law is ‘general 
practice accepted as law’ — that is, in the words of a recent case, that 
‘the existence of a rule of customary international law requires that 
there be a ‘settled practice’ together with opinio juris’. However, in 
practice, the Court has never found it necessary to undertake such an 
inquiry for every rule claimed to be customary in a particular case and 
instead has made use of the best and most expedient evidence 
available to determine whether a customary rule of this sort exists. 
Sometimes this entails a direct review of the material elements of 
custom on their own, while more often it will be sufficient to look to the 
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considered views expressed by States and bodies like the 
International Law Commission as to whether a rule of customary law 
exists and what its content is, or at least to use rules that are clearly 
formulated in a written expression as a focal point to frame and guide 
an inquiry into the material elements of custom.”89 
 
Recognising the Caroline incident as the source of law for customary self-
defence in international law places the Court in a difficult position, as the 
incident may be misinterpreted. Moreover, the Court is not compelled to 
explain the source for every customary law, because it is sufficient for it to 
acknowledge such customary laws exist in international law.  
 
e. Identifying  and Interpreting the Caroline Incident in 
Customary International Law   
 
Recognition of the Caroline doctrine infers that it is possible to identify the 
Caroline incident as a legal rule. To transform an incident to a customary 
rule shows there must be an interpretive justification citing the Caroline 
incident as the customary source for self-defence. This section seeks to 
explore the possible interpretive process of the Caroline incident, leading to 
the creation of the Caroline doctrines.  
 
According to North Sea Continental Shelf and Continental Shelf cases, any 
creation of customary law must involve state practice and opinio juris.90 To 
determine what state practice and opinio juris in the Caroline incident is 
challenging. This is because the creation of a custom usually results from 
multiple practices. In this case, the creation of a customary rule only relies 
on a single incident, which may not reflect an accurate description of state 
practice at the time. Another difficulty of identifying customary law in the 
context of the Caroline incident is it involves only two states (Great Britain 
and the United States). To generalise unilateral interaction only between two 
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states (Britain and America) and apply the rule to all states may appear to be 
an oversimplification of a single incident.  
 
Nonetheless, there are two ways to extract state practice and opinio juris in 
the Caroline incident. First, the state practice can be derived from facts or 
circumstances pertaining to the incident. The facts and circumstances 
regarding the incident show that the British forces exercised force against 
the Canadian rebels on American territory. Furthermore, the British forces 
sank the Caroline vessel in response to threats made by non-state actors 
and British forces killed two Americans having entered America without 
gaining permission. Second, Opinio juris can  be derived from the 
correspondence (written records) between the American and British 
governments regarding the sinking of the vessel. This document reflects the 
attitude of both countries, regarding what they believed to be the law at the 
time which is the right to self-defence. This indicates that the opinio juris of 
both countries is the right to self-defence. By dissecting opinio juris and state 
practice from the Caroline incident, it is the possible to apply the traditional 
and modern approaches in the creation of customary law as discussed 
above.  
 
Traditional custom in the context of the Caroline incident aims to focus on 
state practice. This involves observing the practice of British forces against 
the rebels. British forces raided the Caroline vessel on American territory 
without the permission of the American government, killing two Americans. 
The British government claimed this was an act of self-defence. Thus, the 
primary focus was on observing acts committed by British forces (state 
practice).  
 
By following traditional approaches to custom it could be interpreted that the 
overall theme is the establishment of the right to self-defence. This could be 
extended to encompass the right to self-defence against non-state actors 
and the right to self-defence against an entity prior to an attack from an 
aggressor. The extension to the right to self-defence could be established 
because traditional approaches to custom focus on state practice (facts and 
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circumstances of the incident) and not opinio juris (correspondence). Thus, 
the practice of British forces created the right to self-defence and other rights 
related to self-defence.  
 
In the correspondence, both states agreed that the right to self-defence exist 
but America disagreed with the manner in which the British employed force 
in this instance. In regard to modern approaches where the primary focus is 
on general statements (the correspondence) only the general right to self-
defence could be agreed by both countries. Therefore, other rights related to 
self-defence such as self-defence against a non-state actor, or the right to 
anticipatory self-defence could not be established by modern approaches. 
Therefore, by taking a modern approach, the right to self-defence is 
regarded as the only custom possible to be interpreted and no other rights 
were recognised.  
 
Comparing traditional and modern approaches in the context of the Caroline 
incident, the traditional approach created self-defence and other rights, such 
as self-defence against non-state actors, and exercising self-defence before 
an attack. For all these rights to be regarded as legal rules, subsequent 
practices must uphold that these rights as law or believed to be law. While 
modern approaches establish the general right to self-defence only.  
 
Alternatively, assuming that the requirements of opinio juris and state 
practice are not required to create customary law in the Caroline case (due 
to the uniqueness of the Caroline incident or for any other reason) scholars 
then have just two sets of raw sources to interpret. First, scholars may 
analyse the historical facts and circumstances of the Caroline incident to 
create law or second, they may interpret custom based on the 
correspondence between the two countries.  
 
Arguably there is an inherent flaw in the first type of analysis because this 
method of interpretation relies heavily on circumstantial evidence 
surrounding the incident. In other words, the doctrine is interpreted based on 
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the facts and circumstances of the case. As the incident occurred nearly two 
centuries ago and for contemporary scholars to use the incident to deduce 
legal rules, it is questionable whether the historical records are accurate 
especially in determining the circumstances during the incident. In contrast, 
if legal rules were derived from a written document which is reliable and 
published in reputable journals, it gives more credibility on the source of the 
legal rules. 
 
It can be argued that the second type of analysis offers an expansive 
interpretation of the Caroline doctrine. The principles of necessity and 
proportionality were extracted through literal interpretation of the Webster 
text as explained above. Once the principles had been determined, the 
connotation of each principle evolved to accommodate new contexts. This 
caused each principle to undergo expansive interpretation so that it could 
encapsulate new rights, such as anticipatory self-defence and pre-emptive 
self-defence. Because of these processes the meaning of the Caroline 
doctrine is flexible yet retains its origin from the Caroline incident from the 
Webster text.  
 
If it is correct to interpret from the facts surrounding the Caroline incident, it 
might then be possible to create unnecessary legal rules. This is because it 
only requires certain elements beneficial to jus ad bellum to be present in the 
Caroline incident to create legal doctrine. For instance, the doctrine of self-
defence against non-state actors relates to the belligerents involved: the 
British government vis-à-vis Canadian rebels, a non-state entity. Therefore, 
the doctrine can be simplified into the right to self-defence against non-state 
actors. Similarly, the modus operandi executed by the British forces leads to 
the conclusion that the Caroline incident could be said to support 
anticipatory self-defence. For the sake of argument (perhaps a somewhat 
exaggerated example), it would be correct to suggest that the incident 
implies self-defence could only be exercised if the alleged aggressor is on a 
ship, and so self-defence is unlawful if the aggressor is inside a motor 
vehicle? Of course, no one would agree that self-defence could be executed 
only if a terrorist group was on a ship. However, this example reflects the 
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inexhaustible outcomes that might result from interpreting the circumstances 
of the Caroline incident.  
 
As touched on in the preceding paragraph, the danger of interpreting 
classical events as a basis for legal rules is open to abuse. States may 
advance their arguments for the use of force, as long as they relate to the 
Caroline incident or at least, as long as the Caroline incident has some 
resemblance with its arguments. This will lead to an interpretation based on 
national interest rather than on objective legal rules that ought not to be state 
orientated.91 This may also explain why there are different opinions 
regarding anticipatory and pre-emptive self-defence based on the Caroline 
incident. For example, some commentators confirm that anticipatory self-
defence reflects the Caroline case, simultaneously arguing that pre-emptive 
self-defence is not supported by the incident. Meanwhile other authors would 
argue that pre-emptive self-defence is indeed the correct outcome to be 
assumed from the Caroline incident. The core of this disagreement relates to 
disagreements about how to interpret the Caroline incident. Therefore, 
various outcomes could be concluded when interpreting the circumstances 
and facts associated with the Caroline incident.  
 
The difficulty when constructing legal rules from an historical event stems 
from the unclear interpretive mechanisms of the Caroline case in jus ad 
bellum. These lead to the various doctrines that they are purportedly to 
uphold. For instance, as suggested above, at least four doctrines are 
associated with the Caroline affair. Therefore, states and jurists cannot be 
criticised for advancing their own views based on the Caroline case 
whatever they are. Had there been clear instruction on how to interpret 
incident like the Caroline case misinterpretation could be prevented.  
 
In fact, there are several examples of guidance on methods for interpreting 
sources of international law. The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties outlines procedures for interpreting treaties and international 
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documents.92 However, the method suggested is inapplicable in the Caroline 
case, because it primarily deals with customary law. Regarding customs, the 
ICJ has provided several guidelines to determine what constitutes customary 
law. For example, the Court in the Asylum case stated that customary rule 
must be ‘in accordance with a constant and uniform usage practised by the 
States in question’.93 The Court also proffered further guidance, for instance 
that there must be some degree of uniformity amongst state practices before 
a custom can come into existence,94 and that there is no time limit on the 
existence of state practice as custom, although it must be used extensively 
and be virtually uniform for the affected state.95 These judgments may assist 
in determining the features of customary law; however, they do not shed any 
light on the interpretation of classical incidents like the Caroline case.  
 
It can be concluded that the absence of a legal framework from which to 
construe legal rules regarding an incident that happened in nineteenth 
century leads to different opinions claiming to support various legal rules. 
This may be open to abuses by states arguing for their own national 
interests, while claiming objectivity. It could also be subject to 
misinterpretation or over-interpretation leading to endorsement of the wrong 
outcome. However, whether outcomes relating to the Caroline incident are 
erroneous, states and authors cannot be held responsible for 
misinterpretation because no legal framework is in place offering guidance to 
assist interpretation. Although the above analysis regarding the identification 
and interpretation of the Caroline case involves viewing the incident in the 
past, it is noted that customary international law changes and develops 
through state practice. It is wrong to suggest that the narratives espoused in 
Caroline doctrine should be seen in isolation and ignore the changes in 
international law. However, it is significant that the Caroline incident is a 
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point of reference in legal literature to determine the right to self-defence in 
customary international law.  
 
6. The Principles of Necessity, Proportionality and 
Immediacy in Jurisprudence of the International Court 
of Justice  
 
The establishment of the principles of necessity and proportionality have 
already been discussed in the context of the Caroline incident. These 
principles are also evident in the judgments made by the ICJ in cases 
concerning jus ad bellum. Cases decided by the ICJ on the legality of any 
defensive measures have evaluated fulfilment of the principles of necessity 
and proportionality. This reflects the importance of these principles to any 
state executing self-defence. This section will only highlight issues of 
necessity and proportionality in each case and analyse the Court’s approach 
and in observing the two principles.  
 
a. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States of America)96  
 
The first case to consider when examining the importance of the principles of 
necessity and proportionality is the case of Nicaragua. Nicaragua accused 
the US of violating Article 2(4) of the UN Charter by using unlawful force and 
violating Nicaragua’s sovereignty. In addition, it alleged that the US had 
breached its obligations in the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation of 1956 signed by both countries. In response, the US justified its 
actions, stating that it had acted on the basis of collective self-defence by 
assisting El-Salvador. The Court found the US had been involved in the 
unlawful use of force against Nicaragua, and had violated its sovereignty.  
 
This was the first case on the use of force brought before the ICJ, and it led 
the Court to make several important remarks on the scope of self-defence. 
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First, the Court was challenged over its jurisdiction to adjudicate the law of 
self-defence. The US argued that the Court had no jurisdiction to oversee 
the right to self-defence in this case. The Court determined that, whilst 
acknowledging the content of the 1956 Treaty, it has the power to decide the 
scope of self-defence under customary international law. Thus, the Court 
could decide the legality of the claim of collective self-defence made by the 
US.  
 
Secondly, the Court explained the scope of the law on self-defence. Article 
51 of the UN Charter contains the right to self-defence; however, the same 
right can also be found in customary international law. In fact, the Court 
argued the term ‘inherent right to self-defence’ indicates that Article 51 itself 
refers to customary international law.97 Thus, the source of law for self-
defence can be derived from both the Charter and customary international 
law. In respect to the principles of necessity and proportionality, the Court 
stated that ‘self-defence would warrant only measures which are 
proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule well 
established in customary international law’.98 Therefore, the Court affirmed 
the existence of these two principles under customary law of self-defence. It 
thereby established a precedent in the jurisprudence of jus ad bellum that 
states must comply with the two principles when exercising the right to self-
defence, even when self-defence is invoked under Article 51.  
 
Another observation that can be made based on the judgment from 
Nicaragua is the terms of the assessment of necessity and proportionality. In 
Nicaragua, the Court examined the principles of necessity and 
proportionality according to action taken by the US’ against Nicaragua. The 
Court categorised necessity according to the time taken to materialise the 
support given by the US to the Contras in El Salvador. The measures taken 
by the US only began to materialise months after a major offensive against 
the Government of El Salvador, and at the time the assistance was offered, 
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the opposition’s action against El Salvador had reduced.99 On that basis, the 
Court found no necessity for the US to use force against Nicaragua, 
because it was capable of eliminating the main danger from El Salvador 
without involving Nicaragua. Thus, the Court established that the 
requirement of necessity did not exist to justify the measures taken by the 
US against Nicaragua on the basis of collective self-defence.  
 
The requirement of proportionality was discussed in reference to the extent 
of the destruction enacted against Nicaragua. The Court considered the 
mining of ports, and attacks on oil installations in Nicaragua by the US, from 
September 1983 until April 1984 as not proportionate.100 The Court judged 
there was lack of clarity regarding the extent of the aid provided by 
Nicaragua to the opposition in El Salvador. It could be observed here that 
the Court linked the destruction committed by the US with the extent of the 
aid; the Court states:  
 
“Whatever uncertainty may exist as to the exact scale of the aid 
received by the Salvadorian armed opposition from Nicaragua, it is 
clear that these latter United States activities in question could not 
have been proportionate to that aid.”101 
 
The comparison between the size of the aid and the proportionate 
destruction of Nicaragua’s assets may be confusing. This is because it is 
hard to quantify the size of aid (assuming it is in monetary terms or even to 
quantify supplies such as weapons and logistical support), and this makes 
determining the proportionality of any response difficult to evaluate. 
Furthermore, even if all the evidence were presented to the Court, the 
question of ‘proportionate to what?’ could not be answered based on the 
wrong doing of another party, although it could be realised based on the aim 
of self-defence. The end result of any defensive measures is not to question 
whether the force used by the aggrieved state in self-defence is 
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proportionate to the armed attack, but rather whether the state in question 
has achieved the aim of self-defence. The question of the aim of self-
defence will be argued in the next Chapter.  
 
In summary, in Nicaragua, the Court firmly established that it was feasible to 
decide on the matter of self-defence under customary international law, 
despite reservations about excluding Article 51 from any bilateral or 
multilateral agreements. The Court also concluded that the principles of 
necessity and proportionality are pivotal to the legality of self-defence, and 
failure to comply with these may render the actions of the invoking state 
unlawful. Specifically on the issue of necessity, the Court believes that the 
effects of any measures taken in self-defence should be the countering of 
any attack or threat, and that a threat must exist to justify the execution of 
self-defence. Concerning proportionality, the Court balanced the effects of 
the defensive measures against the alleged wrong doing; claiming the 
proportionality of the riposte must match the wrong doing. This judgment 
firmly establishes that the lawfulness of self-defence requires fulfilment of 
the conditions of necessity and proportionality.  
 
b. Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of 
America)102   
 
The law of self-defence and the requirements of necessity and 
proportionality were further discussed in relation to Oil Platforms. The Court 
found insufficient evidence to suggest that the ‘armed attack’ against the US 
had been executed by Iran, and therefore judged the self-defence measures 
taken by the US as unlawful. The judgment in this case indicates the 
importance of the requirements of necessity and proportionality in the 
lawfulness of any self-defensive actions.  
 
There were two main points raised in this case. The first incident concerned 
the attack against the Sea Isle City, a Kuwaiti tanker flying the US flag, by a 
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missile in October 1987 within Kuwaiti waters. The US alleged that Iran had 
launched a silkworm missile against the Sea Isle City from the Fao area and 
that Iran had captured three Iraqi missile sites in 1986.103 In the attack, the 
vessel was damaged and six crew members were injured. In response, the 
US invoked the right to self-defence under Article 51, using force against the 
Reshdat and Resalat oil complexes, within the territory of Iran. Iran 
contested that it had not launched the missile against Sea Isle City and 
claimed that it was fired by Iraq, although Iran admitted that it had captured 
the Fao area in 1986 the military sites were badly damaged during the Iran-
Iraq War.104  
 
The second incident mentioned in this case was an attack against the USS 
Samuel Roberts. On 14 April 1988, a mine struck the USS Samuel Roberts 
within international waters, and the US accused Iran of the attack. The US 
claimed there was evidence to link the mine with Iran because its serial 
number matched those of other Iranian mines.105 In response to the attack 
against its vessel, the US invoked the right to self-defence under Article 
51106 and attacked the Salman and Nasr complexes, oil platforms, on 18 
April 1988. Iran rejected the claim that it was responsible for the mine 
attacks; although it admitted it had laid mines during the Iraq-Iran war it 
claimed the US also laid mines during the war. It was further contended by 
Iran that the attacks against its territory contravened the Treaty of Amity, 
Economic Relations and Consular Rights 1955, signed by both countries. 
 
In its judgment, the Court analysed the question of necessity and 
proportionality in self-defence by referring to jurisprudence in the Nicaragua 
case. The argument made by the US on necessity was that force could only 
be used as a matter of last resort. This was exemplified when the US argued 
that the force it had enacted against the Reshadat and Resalat Complexes 
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was made after several factors had been considered, and after non-forcible 
measures were taken. The US claimed that Iran had repeatedly attacked 
neutral ships and naval vessels, which seriously impeded their security 
duties, and resulted in its nationals suffering financial losses.107 The US 
stated that ‘it was clear that diplomatic measures were not viable means of 
deferring Iran from its attacks: “Accordingly, armed action in self-defense 
was the only option left to the US to prevent additional Iranian attacks”’.108 
The argument set forth by the US reflected the condition of necessity; it 
argued self-defence measures were being executed in the absence of other 
alternatives.  
 
Another aspect of necessity raised by the Court was the military targets. The 
Court enquired as to why the targets had been chosen by the US, in 
particular why it deemed it necessary to use force against them. The US 
claimed there was military presence and activity on the Reshadat oil 
platforms, and at the Salman and Nasr Complexes. However, it failed to 
present credible evidence to the Court of this, and rather proceeded to 
attack the targets based on self-defence.109 The Court emphasised that 
there must be strong evidence that the targets contributed to the armed 
attack in order to make a case for necessity in using force against them. The 
Court explains:  
 
“In the case both of the attack on the Sea Isle City and the mining of 
the USS Samuel B. Roberts, the Court is not satisfied that the attacks 
on the platforms were necessary to respond to these incidents. In this 
connection, the Court notes that there is no evidence that the United 
States complained to Iran of the military activities of the platforms, in 
the same way as it complained repeatedly of minelaying and attacks 
on neutral shipping, which does not suggest that the targeting of the 
platforms was seen as a necessary act.”110 
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Thus, in order for lawful self-defence, the invoking state must show that the 
targets were the origin of the armed attack, thereby proving it was necessary 
to use force against them.111 Failure to do so may result in a judgment of 
illegality regarding the act of self-defence because the requirement for 
necessity would not be met.  
 
In terms of the target, in Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the Court 
stated that self-defence must ‘also meet the requirements of the law 
applicable in armed conflicts which compromise in particular the principles 
and rules of humanitarian law’.112 The Advisory Opinion from the Court 
seems to suggest that there must be an element of jus in bello in 
determining jus ad bellum and this was criticised by some commentators.113 
Moir, however, suggested that it might be the case that the Court was 
referring to the requirement of necessity rather than creating additional 
requirement for a lawful self-defence.114  
 
Another point raised in the judgment of Oil Platforms is the meaning of 
necessity itself. The Court highlights that: 
 
“[T]he requirement of international law that measures taken avowedly 
in self-defence must have been necessary for that purpose is strict 
and objective, leaving no room for any “measure of discretion”.115 
 
This text amplifies the meaning of necessity by attaching to it the ‘purpose’ 
of self-defence. However, the Court went no further in explaining what it 
intended by this passage. The question that arises here relates to the 
purpose of self-defence and lack of clarity in terms of the meaning of the 
                                            
111 Ruys (n 14) 106 
112 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion ICJ Rep. 1996 p 226 para 51 
113 James Green, ‘Self-Defence: A State of Mind for State?’ (2005) 55 
Netherlands International Law Review 380-381 
114 Lindsay Moir, Reappraising the Resort to Force (Hart Publishing 2010) 
125 
115 Oil Platforms (n 101) p 196 para 73 
- 130 - 
phrase ‘measure of discretion’. Nonetheless, it was a step forward that the 
Court had identified necessity as something that must be assessed in 
relation to the aims of any use of force in self-defence.  
 
The Court also considered the principle of proportionality, although briefly. 
The Court explained that the proportionality test must be judged according to 
overall measures taken by the invoking state, or in the words of the Court, ‘it 
cannot close its eyes to the scale of the whole of the operation’.116 Hereby, 
the Court noted that it must take into account the destruction of Iranian 
vessels and aircraft by the US. The Court found the US use of force in self-
defence in this case could not be justly regarded as proportionate.  
 
An interesting point made by the Court related to the interaction between the 
requirements of necessity and proportionality. The Court first considered all 
the arguments for the principle of necessity and found the US did not meet 
the requirement. When the Court then considered the issue of 
proportionality, the Court commented, ‘as to the requirement of 
proportionality, the attack of 19 October 1987 might, had the Court found 
that it was necessary to the Sea Isle City incident as an armed attack 
committed by Iran, have been considered proportionate’.117 This signifies 
that the two requirements are to be considered separately, and that the first 
requirement that must be met by the invoking state is necessity and not 
proportionality. This demonstrates the significance of necessity in the self-
defence framework. However, the Court did not expand on what happens if 
proportionality is met and how then necessity is determined. 
 
In summary, Oil Platforms shows that the jurisprudence of the Court, as it 
describes the lawfulness of self-defence relates to the fulfilment of the 
requirements of both necessity and proportionality. Necessity in this case 
was determined by asking whether the use of force was necessary upon the 
intended target and enquired regarding the chosen target. There was also 
mention of whether the targets contributed to the armed attack. This case 
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also highlights that the principle of proportionality must be understood as an 
overall measure of the self-defence and as such cannot be judged in 
isolation.  
 
c. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall Case in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion)118 
  
On 8 December 2003, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a 
Resolution that sought the opinion of the Court on the construction of wall in 
the Palestinian territory.119 The Court assessed several issues related to the 
implications of the construction of the wall in international law, the status of 
Israel as an occupying power, the right of the Palestinian people to self-
determination, and the right to self-defence. In respect to the claim of self-
defence the specific question posed to the ICJ was: 
 
“What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of the 
wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied 
Palestinian territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, as 
described in the report of the Secretary-General, considering the rules 
and principles of international law, including the Fourth Geneva 
Convention of 1949, and relevant Security Council and General 
Assembly resolutions?”120 
 
When justifying the construction of the Wall, Israel, among other claims, 
invoked the right to self-defence. Israel stated that the construction of the 
wall was an act of self-defence consistent with the right as enshrined in 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.121 Israel further argued that it relied 
on Security Council Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) that reflect 
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the right to self-defence against terrorists, and that Israel was the victim of 
continuous terrorist attacks.122  
 
Palestine counter argued that the construction of the Wall by Israel did not 
meet the criteria for self-defence.123 Palestine states that Israel failed to 
satisfy three main points. First, Palestine denied that the violence in the 
Occupied Territory qualified for the meaning of an ‘armed attack’ as required 
in Article 51.124 Secondly, Palestine argued that Israel could not justify the 
construction of the Wall because self-defence could only be exercised if 
there is an imminent or actual armed attack.125 Finally, that the construction 
of the Wall did not meet the requirement of proportionality. The act of 
constructing a Wall, as Palestine argued, was a disproportionate response to 
terrorist attacks.126  
 
The Court held that it is not applicable to apply Article 51 in this case.127 The 
Court based its judgment on two main factors: First, that the armed attack in 
question was not imputable to a foreign state, maintaining that Article 51 
recognises the right to self-defence in the case of ‘armed attack by one state 
against another state’.128 Secondly, the Court deemed the threats with which 
Israel was concerned had originated from within its own territory.129 
Therefore, as Article 51 refers to an armed attack by a foreign entity, the 
invocation of self-defence was not relevant. Thus, the Court found that under 
the criteria of self-defence (based on the first requirement stated in Article 51 
‘if an armed attack occurs’) this case did not meet the standard envisaged in 
the Charter.  
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A further observation that can be made relative to this case is the reading of 
Article 51. The Court stated that the armed attack was not imputable to a 
foreign state. This implies that the Court could only accept action if an armed 
attack was committed by a state. That is, Article 51 is only applicable in state 
versus state disputes.  
 
The view taken by the Court in this case is a diversion from the 
jurisprudence of Nicaragua case. Recalling the judgment of the Court in 
Nicaragua, the Court was willing to accept that in limited circumstances, a 
state may recourse to self-defence against non-state actors if the conditions 
of attribution and threshold are met. However, in Wall case, the Court 
expressly state that self-defence is between states. This position is criticised 
by Judge Higgins where she commented that ‘nothing in the text of Article 
51… stipulates that self-defence is available only when an armed attack is 
made by a State. That qualification is rather a result of the Court so 
determining in [the Nicaragua case]’.130 
 
Indeed, it is questionable whether the facts of this case should be viewed in 
light of jus ad bellum or it should be determined in other aspects of 
international law.131 This is because Israel had control over the Occupied 
Territory of Palestine and the attacks originated within the Occupied 
Territory. The Court rightly decided that this case is not within the realm of 
the law of self-defence. Furthermore, the Court saw no relevance of SC 
Resolution 1368 and 1373 (2001) and cannot judged this matter to be a jus 
ad bellum issue.  
 
In summary, this case reiterates the importance that states in exercising self-
defence, requires that there must be an armed attack and any response 
must meet the requirements of necessity and proportionality. It is highly 
doubtful that Wall case contributes any significant discussion on the issue of 
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131 ibid at para 34  
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jus ad bellum. In fact, it creates more confusion. This is by making a 
statement that Article 51 is applicable between states. This position is in 
contrast to the jurisprudence espoused in Nicaragua. The Court also 
highlighted that the facts of this case is not a question of international but 
rather it should be dealt with Israel’s domestic law.  
 
d. Case Concerning Armed Activities in the Territory of the 
Congo132  
 
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) initiated this case against Uganda 
in June 1999. The DRC submitted several claims against Ugandan, inter 
alia, Uganda had violated the territorial integrity and political independence 
of the DRC contrary to Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter and Article 
3 of the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity.133 The DRC contended 
that the Ugandan army had invaded seven provinces in the DRC since 
August 1998. It was also alleged that the Ugandan army had committed 
massacres, rape, abductions, murders systematic looting and human rights 
violations in DRC territory.134 In response, Uganda denied any a violation of 
the DRC’s territory and any crimes committed against its neighbour.  
 
The issue of territorial violation by Uganda originated from an agreement 
between the two countries. Prior to 1998, President Laurent Kabila had 
allowed Ugandan forces to enter Eastern DRC for security purposes. 
However, consent was withdrawn in July 1998 in an agreement made by the 
host government governing foreign troops in the Congo.135 Uganda 
contested that its consent was primarily directed toward foreign troops and 
not specifically to Ugandan troops. Uganda further argued that, even if its 
consent had been withdrawn, Uganda has the right to self-defence after 
September 1998. 
                                            
132 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of 
Congo v Uganda) ICJ Rep (2005) p 168  
133 Application Instituting Proceeding, Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda) 23 June 1999 p 13-15  
134 ibid p. 7-9  
135 Armed Activities (n 131) para  99 p 211  
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The Court found Uganda had no claim to self-defence under Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter. This is because Uganda did not claim there was an 
attack or an imminent attack against it. Uganda alleged that the DRC 
government had collaborated with Sudan by assisting an opposition military 
group in Uganda; the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). Uganda corroborated 
its claim by presenting several examples of evidence, such as intelligence 
reports, eye witness accounts and the deployment of military weapons. 
However, the Court was not convinced that the evidence could be relied 
upon to show there was an agreement between DRC and Sudan in support 
of the opposition group in Uganda.136 Due to weak evidence linking the 
attacks against Uganda with the DRC, the Court found no case for self-
defence by Uganda. The Court further explained that even if there were an 
armed attack, Uganda’s actions would fail to meet the criteria of necessity 
and proportionality. The Court ruled: 
 
“[S]ince the preconditions for the exercise of self-defence do not exist 
in the circumstances of the present case, the Court has no need to 
enquire whether such an entitlement to self-defence was in fact 
exercised in circumstances of necessity and in a manner that was 
proportionate. The Court cannot fail to observe, however, that the 
taking of airports and towns many hundreds of kilometres from 
Uganda’s border would not seem proportionate to the series of trans 
border attacks it claimed had given rise to the right of self-defence, 
nor to be necessary to that end.”137 
 
The passage above is indicative of how the Court applies the requirements 
of necessity and proportionality. It first considers whether there is an armed 
attack. If the answer is affirmative the Court then decides if the principles of 
necessity and proportionality were applied. In this case, the Court 
exemplifies the siege of airports and towns to evaluate the two requirements 
                                            
136 ibid para 130 p 219  
137 ibid para 147 p 223  
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for self-defence. The Court notes the distance between the Uganda border 
and the sieged areas were ‘hundreds of kilometres’ apart. However, if the 
Uganda forces had taken towns several kilometres away from its border, 
then would that have constituted compliance with the two requirements for 
self-defence? The Court is silent on this point. Yet, this passage suggests 
that the distance between the border and the area attacked may sway 
judgment over the legality of force in self-defence in particular its relevance 
to the requirements of necessity and proportionality.  
 
Another significance of this case, despite the Court’s dismissal on the 
applicability of self-defence, is it raises the question of attribution. The claim 
made by Uganda that DRC and Sudan were responsible for the attacks 
committed by ADF could not be substantiated. In reaching that position, the 
Court applied the test used in Nicaragua:  
 
“The attacks did not emanate from armed bands or irregulars sent by 
the DRC or on behalf of the DRC, within the sense of Article 3(g) of 
General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) on the definition of 
aggression…”138 
 
Judge Kooijmans in his Separate Opinion commented on this by stating the 
Court does not only endorse the jurisprudence of Nicaragua but the Court 
also rejected Uganda’s claim that mere tolerance towards non-state actors 
could trigger the right to self-defence.139  
 
Meanwhile, it is true that the Court may and rightly so avoided from 
answering the contentious issue of self-defence in this case. However, if the 
Court wishes to clarify the matter on the law of self-defence against non-
state actors in its jurisprudence, the Court had the opportunity to do so. 
However, it remained reticent. In fairness, the Court was focused on judging 
                                            
138 Ibid para 146  
139 Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans in Armed Activities on the Territory 
of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda) ICJ Rep (2005)  
para 22  
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a case regarding the claim of Uganda’s use of force in DRC – an inter-state 
matter and not ADF’s action in Uganda.140 
 
In sum, the Court approached the issue of necessity and proportionality in 
each case based on the facts presented by the relevant parties. It can be 
observed that there is no fix method in determining what constitute as 
necessity and proportionality. However, this case shows that fulfilment of the 
principles of necessity and proportionality by the invoking state is decisive in 
the legality to use force in self-defence. Another significance of this case 
was that the Court used a test espoused in Nicaragua case to determine the 
attribution of a non-state actor with a state.  
 
7. Conclusion  
 
The Caroline incident has had a huge effect in shaping our understanding of 
the law on self-defence. It is the focal point of reference for the right to self-
defence under customary law and from this source of authority several 
doctrines emerged in relation to the scope of self-defence. In particular, 
several legal rules were established, namely, that the right to self-defence 
should be limited to necessity and proportionality, that the right to self-
defence against non-state actors exists, and that states have the right to 
anticipatory self-defence and the right to pre-emptive self-defence. 
 
Caroline self-defence doctrines have contributed to the development of jus 
ad bellum. In the nineteenth century, there were several legal grounds 
allowing states to exercise force lawfully. However, after the creation of the 
United Nations Charter in 1945, the only legal basis upon which it is legal to 
exercise force is Article 51; i.e. on the grounds of self-defence. However, 
Article 51 is not the only source of law touching on the right to self-defence, 
and it is far from clear in terms of mentioning the scope of self-defence. For 
instance, the limitations on self-defence are not mentioned in Article 51, and 
customary international law is thereby required to establish this limitation. 
                                            
140 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (3rd edn, OUP 
2008) 134  
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Furthermore, cases from the ICJ confirm that self-defence must comply with 
necessity and proportionality, establishing that these are part of the 
customary requirement of self-defence. In customary law, this is a reference 
to the Caroline doctrine, which establishes the limitations of necessity and 
proportionality. Although self-defence post-1945 is governed by Article 51 
self-defence, the applicability of customary self-defence remains significant. 
 
Although the Caroline incident is argued to have a significant impact in jus 
ad bellum, yet there are several factors that may diminish its status as 
source of law in customs. For example, it can be questioned that the 
Caroline incident was not intended to have any legal implications and it was 
merely a political disagreement between two states. Furthermore, a dispute 
which only affected two countries could hardly be said as a general practice 
and opinio juris of states. In addition, the Caroline’s impact in international 
law may not have any relevance in contemporary international law as 
customs do not freeze in time and state practice changes. Therefore, it could 
be seen here that the Caroline affair may not be so significant in 
international law today.  
 
However, in legal literature, the Caroline incident still preserves its status as 
a focal point on many aspects of the law on self-defence in customs. There 
are many legal narratives or doctrines that emanate from the affair. The 
creation of the Caroline doctrines in customary international law reflects the 
possibility of translating such an incident into legal rules. There was an 
interpretive process involved in transforming the details of the incident into 
several doctrines. How an incident becomes a legal rule is unclear in legal 
literature. This thesis contributes to discussion in the literature of self-
defence by attempting to justify the creation of the Caroline doctrines. This is 
by interpreting the incident through the requirement of opinio juris and state 
practice or by literal interpretation from the sources.  However, it is observed 
that the difficulty of understanding the existence of Caroline doctrines 
originates from unclear method of interpreting classical event like the 
Caroline incident. This may result in abuses of interpretation and therefore 
open to speculation. 
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Despite the problems of interpretation, it is argued that the Caroline incident 
establishes doctrines of self-defence which are still recognised till today 
although it may change according to state practice and Article 51. The ICJ 
reiterates that any use of force in self-defence must fulfil the requirement of 
necessity and proportionality. This then becomes the jurisprudence of the 
Court and solidifies the prominence of the Caroline doctrine in contemporary 
international law. The meaning of each term, necessity and proportionality 
and their application remains unclear. Therefore, the following Chapter will 
examine the scope of necessity in the context of self-defence.
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Chapter 4: Necessity within the Legal Framework of Self-
Defence 
 
1. Introduction  
 
This Chapter will commence by evaluating the issues surrounding the 
meaning of necessity within the legal framework of self-defence. It will serve 
as a preliminary framework for the following Chapter which will assess 
further the principle of necessity.  
 
Another originality of this thesis is by understanding the role of necessity in 
the framework of self-defence. In this Chapter, this study will argue that 
necessity has a dual role. First, it acts as a requirement to self-defence and 
second, necessity acts as a limitation to use force.  
 
This Chapter is divided into six sections. In Section 2, the interpretation of 
necessity will be examined from multiple perspectives. Namely, viewing 
necessity as a matter of last resort, subjective and objective tests to 
determine necessity, interpreting necessity according to the Webster 
Formula (the Caroline incident) and finally, seeing necessity in relation to the 
aim of self-defence.  
 
Section 3 will discuss the relationship between necessity and proportionality. 
It will start by explaining necessity in jus ad bellum. Due to the fact that self-
defence is determined by both necessity and proportionality, it is imperative 
when analysing necessity to consider the principle of proportionality. 
Accordingly, section 3 will attempt to assess the implications of 
proportionality with necessity and the relationship between the two 
principles.  
 
The main aim of this Chapter is to deconstruct the content of the principle of 
necessity, so that it can be elaborated on further in Chapter 5. Therefore, it 
will first explore necessity as a requirement for the use of force self-defence 
involving the exercise of force. In such cases, necessity is judged based on 
the existence of a threat or an armed attack and determines use of force as 
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a last resort. Secondly, it will also cover the limitations imposed on the 
defensive use of force; i.e. that the invoking state should only employ force if 
it is necessary. Therefore, both aspects are considered to comprise the 
content of necessity.  
 
It is argued in this Chapter that necessity and proportionality can be 
considered separately however, it is acknowledged that there are 
overlapping areas between necessity and proportionality. This is inevitable 
as all aspects of self-defence are interrelated. In this thesis, the idea of  
necessity as a limitation to self-defence may seem to conflate with the 
principle of proportionality. Yet, it is maintained that the distinction between 
the two is that necessity as a limitation focuses on the aim of self-defence 
whilst proportionality focuses on the scale and intensity on the use of force in 
self-defence.  
 
Section 5 will discuss the application of necessity in self-defence against 
state or non-state actors, serving as a prelude to the next Chapter. Finally, in 
Section 6, this Chapter will conclude that the meaning of necessity  could be 
interpreted in multiple ways and the essential elements of necessity can be 
understood by examining the role of necessity within the framework of self-
defence. This is by exploring the question whether necessity is a pre-
condition of self-defence or limitation to self-defence or both.  
 
2. Interpretation of Necessity 
 
The meaning of necessity must first be understood within the legal 
framework of self-defence. This will indicate the scope of the principle of 
necessity and the application of necessity in a self-defence framework. From 
a wider perspective, the term necessity is used to denote various aspects of 
international law. In other branches of international law, necessity conveys 
diverse meanings, and the replication of necessity in the context of jus ad 
bellum may alter its meaning for the purpose of self-defence. Thus, the 
process of defining necessity herein must focus specifically on the 
perspective of the law of self-defence.  
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The process of defining necessity can be undertaken in respect of four main 
aspects. First, necessity can be viewed as a test prior to exercising force, 
and this test could be seen as either subjective or objective. Second, 
necessity can be seen to indicate that force is only to be used as a matter of 
last resort. Third, necessity can be defined according to the Webster text. 
Finally, necessity can be viewed in relation to the aims of self-defence. All 
four aspects inform how legal literature defines necessity in self-defence.  
 
The simple meaning of necessity, according to Oxford Dictionary describes 
circumstances that inevitably demand a specific result. The etymology of 
necessity derives from the Latin word necessitate (nominative necessitas).1 
This definition may not denote necessity within the law of self-defence, but 
may indicate basic tenets that can be utilised to define necessity in general. 
In the context of the law of self-defence, necessity is regarded as the use of 
force by a victim state when no other methods for resolution are available.2  
 
a. Necessity as a Matter of Last Resort  
 
The meaning of necessity reflects a situation in which the use of force is 
unavoidable, and in which force is exercised for the purpose of self-defence. 
It is often reported that the use of force is necessary because there are no 
other means to redress the conflict. The difficulty in this respect is to 
evaluate when and how to determine there are no alternative means 
available to uphold the security of the attacked state, thereby necessitating 
the use of force in self-defence. Necessity should be regarded as a matter of 
last resort and non-forcible avenues should be preferred over the use of 
force.  
                                            
1 C. T Onions and others (eds), The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology 
(OUP 1966)  
2 Judith Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force (CUP 
2004) 4-7; Elizabeth Williamhurst, ‘Principles of International Law on the 
Use of Force by States in Self-Defence’ (Chatham House, October 
2005) 7 ; Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (3rd 
edn, OUP 2008) 150  
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The position that necessity is seen as a matter of last resort is an 
uncontentious one within the legal literature, even amongst scholars.3 Cases 
before the ICJ reflect the view that necessity carries the meaning that an 
attacked state must first exhaust non-forcible means before exercising 
defensive force.4 Thus, the meaning of necessity refers to the final option 
available to an aggrieved state for the purpose of self-defence.  
 
However, the notion that an attacked state must exhaust all non-forcible 
means is a misplaced notion of necessity. While necessity entails the belief 
that force is indeed a last resort, this should not be at the cost of the 
attacked state’s interest. This is based on the assumption that the victim 
state may not have all options available for consideration. This perhaps 
might be because it is imperative to address the conflict immediately, or 
because diplomatic channels cannot resolve the pressing needs of the 
attacked state. Furthermore, the attacked state must consider the 
effectiveness of any non-forcible measures. It must ask itself whether for 
instance, negotiations with the opposing party would end the armed attack or 
threat. If the likelihood is that non-forcible measures would not end the 
attack or threat, the victim state has no option but to exercise force in self-
defence. It is argued that such a situation meets the criterion of necessity.5 
Therefore, although necessity is a last resort for an attacked state to 
consider it should not restrain itself from the use of force if such action 
jeopardises its own security. 
 
                                            
3 E.g. Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (5th edn, CUP 
2013) 232; Rosalyn Higgins, The Development of International Law 
Through the Political Organs of the United Nations (OUP 1963) 205  
4 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States) ICJ Rep 1986 p 122 para 237; Oil Platforms (Islamic 
Republic of Iran v. United States of America) ICJ Rep 2003 p 198 para. 
76; Memorial of the DRC, 206-207, para 5.28; Armed Activities DRC v 
Uganda ICJ Rep 2005 para 147  
5 Gardam, (n 2) 152-153 
- 144 - 
Judge Robert Ago explained that the condition of ‘necessity’ requires that 
force must only be used if there is no alternative available to the attacked 
state. He further states: 
 
“…had it (the attacked state) been able to achieve the same result by 
measures not involving the use of armed force, it would have no 
justification for adopting conduct which contravened the general 
prohibition against the use of armed force. The point is self-evident 
and is generally recognized: hence it requires no further discussion.”6 
 
Ago attempted to conclude discussions on necessity by acknowledging that 
the use of force must be seen as a final option available to an attacked state.  
 
Another aspect of necessity can be interpreted in light of Article 51 of the UN 
Charter. The provision states that the attacked state may exercise the right 
to self-defence ‘until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain peace and security.’7 The effect of this provision limits the victim 
state to exercise its right to self-defence until the Security Council is in a 
position to intervene.8  
 
The word necessity in Article 51 does not necessarily connote the same 
meaning as that intended by the customary international law of self-defence. 
This is because the use of the word necessity in the provision does not 
describe the rights of the attacked state. Rather it explains the action of the 
Security Council, outlining if any measure is necessary for the Council to 
                                            
6 Robert Ago, Addendum – Eight report on State Responsibility on the 
internationally wrongful act of the state, source of international 
responsibility (part 1) (A/CN.4/318/Add.5-7) 1980, vol. II(1) p. 69 
7 Article 51 of the United Nations Charter 1 UNTS XVI (emphasis added)  
8 Some scholars describe that this part of Article 51 has little practical 
significance. See. Tom Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the UN 
Charter (CUP 2010) 74 
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take in order to maintain peace and security.9 This point is further amplified 
in the following sentence, in a provision which states: 
 
“Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence 
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any 
way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the 
present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in 
order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”10 
 
The provision above clarifies that the word necessity is not used to describe 
the context and the rights of the attacked state while waiting for the Security 
Council to intervene in a conflict. Thus, the word necessity in Article 51 
should not be read as similar to the principle of necessity in customary 
international law.  
 
Nonetheless, the word necessity in Article 51 does indicate a timeline 
establishing the necessity of the use of force in self-defence. The provision 
explains the Charter does not restrain states from exercising the inherent 
right to self-defence, but that the use of force should cease to exist once the 
Security Council has ‘taken measures to necessary to maintain peace and 
security’, however this is defined. This implies that once the Security Council 
intervenes to mediate the situation, the attacked state can no longer rely on 
the principle of necessity, because Article 51 prevents continuing action. 
Therefore, in this regard, the period in which it is permitted to attack in self-
defence in the context of necessity is the moment from the initial armed 
attack, until the point the Security Council intervenes. Outside this timeline, 
the state cannot invoke the principle of necessity when exercising the right to 
self-defence. 
 
                                            
9 Randelzhofer and Nolte in ‘Article 51’ in Bruno Simma and others (eds.) 
The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (Vol. II, 3rd edn, OUP 
2012) 1428 
10 UN Charter (n 7).  
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The meaning of ‘until the Security Council has taken the measures 
necessary to maintain peace and security’ in the context of necessity is 
unclear.11 As argued previously, the word ‘necessary’ as contained in the 
provision, might indicate the period allocated to the attacked state in the 
exercise of self-defence. However, it is unclear if the measures advocated 
by the Security Council would achieve the intended outcome – ‘maintain 
peace and security’. The Security Council has the privilege of determining 
the actions to be taken to achieve peace and security.12 In terms of the 
definition of necessity in the context of SC powers, it should be noted, 
however, that not all measures are effective in mediating a conflict. 
Moreover, taking a measure does not necessarily result in an end to conflict 
between the parties. Furthermore, some measures are only intended to 
settle the situation temporarily, as the conflict may endure after the Security 
Council takes action.  
 
b. Subjective or Objective Necessity  
 
The meaning of necessity can be approached by viewing necessity as a test. 
Notwithstanding the question of what constitutes necessity, further analysis 
can be made on the ‘how’ question of necessity; i.e. how to assess necessity 
as a test. The outcome could be in the form of the objective assessment of 
necessity, or alternatively, could be a subjective test of necessity or both.  
 
The first case in which the question of necessity was considered was in 
Nicaragua. The Court considered the term ‘necessity’ in several sources 
relevant to the case. Firstly, ‘necessity’ was cited in reference to the Treaty 
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of 1956, to which the US and 
                                            
11 See  similar discussion on self-defence and the Security Council (the ‘until 
clause’ discussion) in Chapter 2 (3) iii – Self-Defence and the Security 
Council 
12 The Security Council may exercise its powers under Chapter VII of the 
United Nations Charter. Any measures may take in the form of non-
forcible measures (Article 41) or forcible measures (Article 42).  
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Nicaragua were contracting parties.13 In paragraph 1 (d) of Article XXI it 
states:  
 
“The present Treaty shall not preclude the application of measures:  
(d) necessary to fulfil the obligation of a Party for the maintenance or 
restoration of international peace and security, or necessary to protect 
its essential security interests.”14 
 
Secondly, the Court considered the meaning of necessity in the context of 
self-defence. The US claimed it was acting in self-defence against 
Nicaragua, but the Court responded by stating:  
 
“Taking into account the whole situation of the United States in 
relation to Central America, so far as the Court is informed of it (and 
even assuming that the justification of self-defence, which the Court 
has rejected on the legal level, had some validity on the political 
level), the Court considers that the mining of Nicaraguan ports, and 
the direct attacks on ports and oil installations, cannot possibly be 
justified as "necessary" to protect the essential security interests of 
the United States.”15 
 
The Court judged there was no case of ‘necessity’ for the US to recourse to 
force in self-defence and so that the US had failed to meet the standard of 
‘necessity’ set out in the 1956 Treaty. The Court offered a poignant reminder 
of the scope of necessity, thus, ‘…whether a measure is necessary to 
protect the essential security interests of a party is not, purely a question for 
the subjective judgment of the party.’16 As such, based on this judgment, the 
Court claimed the assessment of necessity should be an objective test. 
 
                                            
13 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America) ICJ Rep 1986 p 116 para 222 
14 Emphasis added  
15 ibid p 141 para 282  
16 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America) ICJ Rep 1986 p 141 para 282 
- 148 - 
Judge Schewebel argues, in his dissenting judgment, that in the course of 
exercising force in self-defence the US in fact fulfilled the requirement of 
necessity as required in self-defence.17 He further explained that the 
requirement of necessity is broadly a subjective test, and not an objective 
one as suggested in the main judgment. Judge Schewbel based this position 
on the assumption that the victim state knows best what constitutes a 
necessity demanding the exercise of defensive force in a particular situation. 
He further questions the capacity of the Court to make a decision about 
‘necessity’ on behalf of the victim state. He questions:  
 
“Is the Court in a position to adjudge the necessity of continued 
United States recourse to measures of collective self-defence? I 
doubt that it is… Such a judgment, involving as it does an appraisal of 
the motives and good faith of Nicaragua and the United States, is 
exceedingly difficult for this Court now to make.”18 
 
Therefore, based on the above discussion, the test for necessity should lie 
with the state suffering from the unlawful use of force. In the course of 
receiving threats or unlawful force, the state in question can consider various 
options to end the act of aggression; this would also include asking itself 
whether a forceful riposte is necessary. Under the United Nations Charter 
system, the use of force is illegal, contrary to Article 2(4). This makes the 
belligerents in any conflict conscious of the fact that the use of force can only 
be employed in self-defence. When arriving at the conclusion that force is 
necessary for defensive purposes, in practical terms, the victim state should 
make a determination that takes into account all possible considerations 
within a short period of time. For this reason, the Court is not ideally placed 
to judge what is necessary or unnecessary for self-defence, because the 
environment of conflict is tumultuous in comparison with the calm of the 
Courtroom. This further strengthens the proposition that necessity is a 
                                            
17 Dissenting Judgment Judge Schewebel in Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America) ICJ Rep 1986 p 296 para 76  
18 ibid p 293-294 para 69 
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decision to be made by the victim state and not a third, albeit independent, 
party.  
 
In addition, the question of what constitutes necessity in a particular situation 
cannot be judged separately from other circumstances. The Dissenting 
Judgment of Judge Schwebel made this point clearly, by highlighting the 
possibility that factors might exist that are not apparent to the Court but are 
which taken seriously by the victim state. The example used by the learned 
judge was concerning available information disclosed to the Court in that 
proceeding. Countries do not always disclose their full intelligence 
knowledge to the public, and even were such data available to the Court, ‘It 
would be difficult for the Court to establish the true motives, and the 
reasonableness, of the policy of a Party on a question such as this, even if it 
were present in Court’.19 In addition, while another state’s intelligence 
agency might be directly or indirectly involved in a conflict, it is not 
necessarily privy to Court proceedings, and may not submit their knowledge 
of the case.20 Therefore, the Court is unable to examine all aspects of the 
situation, which may prevent the Court from understanding the case fully. 
Due to this weakness, the Court is incapable of assessing what would be 
necessary for the victim state over a particular period of time, based on the 
knowledge made available to them. Therefore, according to this argument, 
the question of how the necessity test should be determined is better served 
by the victim state, and not another entity. Thus, the necessity examination 
is indeed a subjective test.  
 
Despite demanding the necessity test be made as a subjective test by some 
judges, in cases post-Nicaragua the Court upheld the view that necessity is 
accepted as an objective assessment. In Oil Platforms21, the US attacked 
several oil installations within the territory of Iran citing grounds of self-
defence. The issue of necessity in this case was judged in relation to the 
                                            
19 ibid para 71 p 294  
20 ibid para 71 p 295  
21 Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States 
of America) ICJ Rep 2003 p . 161  
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Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the US 
and Iran from 1955. In it, Paragraph 1(d) of Article XX states: 
 
“The present Treaty shall not preclude the application of measures… 
necessary to fulfil the obligations of a High Contracting Party for the 
maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, or 
necessary to protect its essential security interests.”22  
 
In opining that the US invoked the right to self-defence, the Court decided 
that it had the jurisdiction to judge on matter on the use of force under 
international law although it restricted this to the consent of the parties and 
the scope of Article XX of the 1955 Treaty.23 The Court also determined that 
necessity, as quoted in the 1955 Treaty could be read in conjunction with 
necessity for the purpose of self-defence.24 The Court concluded that the 
interpretation of necessity in self-defence ‘must have been necessary for 
that purpose is strict and objective, leaving no room for any "measure of 
discretion"’.25 This judgment substantiates the jurisprudence that the 
necessity test for self-defence must be read objectively and not as a 
subjective test.  
 
Based on the jurisprudence of the ICJ on the test of necessity, it is argued 
that it might be the case that the test for necessity requires both subjective 
and objective elements. This is because different sets of facts warrant 
different way of judging necessity for the purpose of self-defence. Taking the 
example as above, the facts in Nicaragua is different from Oil Platforms. As 
such, it requires different way of determining necessity. Therefore, it is 
argued that necessity may have both elements of subjective and objective 
tests depending on the issues in hand.  
 
                                            
22 Emphasis added  
23 Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States 
of America) ICJ Rep 2003 p 182-183 para 42 
24 ibid p 183 para 43  
25 ibid p 196 para 73 
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c. Necessity and the Webster Formula 
 
The principles of necessity and proportionality in the law of self-defence 
originate from the Caroline incident in 1837, as discussed in Chapter III of 
this thesis. Following the incident, Secretary Webster wrote that self-defence 
is limited to both necessity and proportionality. By referring back to the origin 
of necessity in the context of self-defence, it may become apparent how 
necessity should be interpreted in international law on the use of force. It is, 
however, argued that the meaning of necessity in the Caroline incident is 
influenced by the development of modern jurisprudence in international law. 
In particular, necessity in self-defence is interpreted according to Article 51 
of the UN Charter, which recognises the principles of necessity and 
proportionality. As discussed above (in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ in 
Chapter 3 (6) and Chapter 4 (b) – Subject or Objective test for necessity) it 
shows that the meaning of necessity has developed and refined through the 
cases brought before the ICJ.  
 
The Caroline incident resulted in exchanges of correspondence between the 
British and American governments. This correspondence disputed the 
parameters of necessity, and the following passage is regarded as 
embodying the definition of necessity. It states that, ‘…to show a necessity 
of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no 
moment of deliberation.’26 This is a strict reading of necessity, as underlined 
by the phrase, ‘no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation’, which 
implies that force should only be exercised only when there is no other 
alternative. It also indicates appropriate timing for the exercise of force. The 
meaning of ‘no moment of deliberation’ suggests that even negotiation 
between two conflicting parties is not feasible as force is necessary to 
defend a state’s interest. Therefore, interpreting necessity in light of the 
Webster text could be categorised as denoting strict view of necessity.  
 
                                            
26 British and Foreign State Papers 1840-1841 (Vol. XXIX, James Ridgway 
and Sons 1857) 1337-1138  
- 152 - 
In Caroline, necessity could be subject to reassessment if seen through the 
United Nations Charter. At the time of the Caroline incident, the state of 
international law was dissimilar to that in contemporary international law. In 
fact, it is questionable whether at the time there was any international law. In 
the nineteenth century, there were no intergovernmental organisations 
governing the rights of each state, and there was no regulation on the use of 
force. The use of force could be exercised by any state, regardless of 
motivation. However, with the inception of the United Nations Charter, the 
use of force was strictly prohibited; it was rendered permissible in self-
defence or with the approval of the Security Council. Therefore, necessity 
under the Caroline doctrine, and necessity in the current state of 
international law are different and cannot be treated equally.27 An extreme 
view would suggest that the Caroline incident has no relevance at all in the 
modern international law because Article 51 and state practice have 
superseded the legal authority on the law of self-defence.28  
 
An additional difference between Caroline necessity and necessity in 
contemporary international law is that the aggrieved state is offered the 
option of mediating the conflict. According to the Caroline incident, the 
description for necessity makes no mention of other options being available 
to the victim state, such as a dialogue between the aggressor and the victim 
state. This strict definition of necessity may be challenged on the basis of 
practicality in the twenty-first century. It is arguably the case that in any 
conflict, the option of not resorting to force is always available. This is 
because diplomatic channels provide alternative avenues of dispute for 
belligerents to consider. Disputes could take the form of negotiation 
overseen by a third party, such as the United Nations, or a regional 
organisation (for instance the Arab League and Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN)). These organisations support competing parties to 
deescalate tension and to avoid the use of force if both parties to the conflict 
                                            
27 Gardam (n 2) 149-150  
28 See Maria Occelli, ‘Docking the Caroline: Understanding the Relevance of 
the Formula in Contemporary Customary International Law Concerning 
Self-Defense‘ (2006) 14 Cardozo Journal of International Law 429-480 
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wish. Alternatively, competing states may choose a judicial process to settle 
disputes, such as the ICJ. Therefore, in contemporary international affairs, 
there is always the option to avoid the use of force. Thus, the strict 
interpretation of ‘no moment of deliberation’ cannot be deemed to reflect the 
meaning of necessity in the current context of international law.  
 
While the meaning of Caroline necessity could be regarded as detached 
from modern law on self-defence, nonetheless, there are several examples 
in state practice that still define necessity based on the Caroline incident. 
During a meeting of the UN Security Council on the issue of Israel’s raid on 
Iraq’s Osirak nuclear plant, Israel claimed that it had acted in self-defence, 
and moreover, that it regarded the use of force as necessary. Other Security 
Council members unanimously disagreed, stating that there was a need to 
invoke the right to self-defence because there was no necessity to do so. 
Representatives of the United Kingdom commented ‘It has been argued that 
the Israeli attack was an act of self-defence. But, it was not a response to an 
armed attack by Iraq. There was no instant or overwhelming necessity for 
self-defence’.29 The language used by diplomats was similar to that used in 
correspondence by Secretary Webster from 1837, and ironically by the same 
country. The Ugandan representative was explicit in his definition of 
necessity based on the Caroline incident, remarking:  
 
“The requirements of self-defence… have well been established since 
the famous North American case of The Caroline in 1837… The rule 
of necessity established in the case of The Caroline and stated by 
then American Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, is that self-
defence is justified only when the necessity of that self-defence is 
‘instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment 
for deliberation.”30 
 
This illustrates that in some state practice, the meaning of necessity in self-
defence still resonates, albeit partially, from the Caroline incident. It would be 
                                            
29 UN Doc. S/PV.2282 (8 June 1981) p 10 para 106 (emphasis added)  
30 ibid p 2 para. 14-15    
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inaccurate to dismiss the prominence of the Caroline incident when defining 
the contemporary meaning of necessity in self-defence.31 This also shows 
that the Caroline doctrine is still relevant in the context of international law 
albeit minimally. Therefore, using a historical perspective to define necessity 
is acceptable, with some limitations.  
 
Alternatively, it may be the case that necessity for the purpose of self-
defence simply means necessity as understood in plain English. This view 
may seem attractive as it is simple. Yet, one cannot disregard that the ICJ 
has made several pronouncement with regards to the scope of necessity in 
self-defence. Therefore, it is argued that in defining necessity, it is 
unavoidable to take into account the historical context of necessity (in the 
Caroline incident) as well as the jurisprudence of the ICJ with regards to this 
area of law (jus ad bellum)  
 
In summary, it is feasible to interpret necessity based on the Caroline 
incident because it is the origin of the principle. The meaning of necessity in 
the Webster text context resulted in a restrictive use of the term necessity. 
However, it may be difficult to apply legally the meaning of necessity in the 
contemporary international context. This is because the existence of 
alternative options for an aggrieved state to recourse to non-forcible 
measures will always be available in the modern environment of diplomatic 
efficiency. In addition, the meaning of necessity has developed through the 
jurisprudence of the ICJ and state practice. As such, the full meaning of 
necessity cannot solely be relied from the Caroline incident.  However, it 
would be imprecise to describe the concept necessity as having lost the 
meaning conveyed at its inception. Therefore, necessity can be interpreted 
in light of the Caroline incident, but with more emphasis on the UN Charter 
rather on the history of necessity.   
  
                                            
31 James Green, ‘Docking the Caroline: Understanding the Relevance of the 
Formula in Contemporary Customary International Law Concerning Self-
Defense’ (2006) 14 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 429-480  
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d. Aim of Self-Defence in Relation to Necessity  
 
Another way of analysing necessity is by examining the relationship between 
necessity and the aim of self-defence. The aim of self-defence is relevant to 
the entire framework of self-defence. It is therefore important first to 
understand the purpose of self-defence and then reflect the role of necessity 
in achieving it. This includes the assessment of necessity relative to fulfilling 
the aim of self-defence.  
 
The use of force in self-defence must serve to achieve a legitimate goal, 
which is repelling an attack or preventing (halt and repel) an attack from 
succeeding.32 The victim state must act with the intention to fulfil a legitimate 
aim of self-defence. To exercise force beyond the legitimate aim of self-
defence may be considered an unlawful use of force. In Armed Actvities, the 
Court commented on the scope of self-defence and restrictions on the use of 
force: 
 
“Article 51 of the Charter may justify a use of force in self-defence 
only within the strict confines there laid down. It does not allow the 
use of force by a State to protect perceived security interests beyond 
these parameters. Other means are available to a concerned State, 
including, in particular, recourse to the Security Council.”33  
 
The Court emphasised that self-defence cannot extend beyond the 
legitimate aim of self-defence. Thus, the use of force beyond the lawful 
purpose of self-defence may amount to aggression or a reprisal.34 The Court 
also stated that if force were required and the aim was no longer within the 
‘parameters’ of self-defence, the state concerned might then seek the 
                                            
32 Olivier Corten, The Law Against War (Hart Publishing 2012) 484; Bruno 
Simma (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (Vol. II, 
3rd edn, OUP 2012) 1426  
33 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of 
Congo v. Uganda) ICJ Rep 2005 p 223 para 148  
34 Tom Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the UN Charter (CUP 2010) 
95 
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approval of the Security Council to use force, not by invoking the right to 
self-defence. This shows strict application of the right to self-defence.  
 
In a complex situation where a state has multiple aims in using force for self-
defence, this positions the state concerned precariously between the legal 
and illegal use of force. In the framework on the use of force, whether as 
established in the United Nations Charter or in customary international law, 
self-defence is an exception to the prohibition on the use of force. Therefore, 
the use of force cannot be exercised lightly, and can only be utilised for the 
sole purpose of self-defence. However, repelling or preventing an armed 
attack could also take place concurrent with other aims, such as the 
protection of human rights or regime change.  
  
Article 51 requires that the use of force in self-defence does not exceed what 
is permitted by need. This premise seems pertinent when assessing the 
purpose of self-defence in light of the prohibition on the use of force. 
Compliance from the invoking state with the notion of exercising self-defence 
according to the legitimate aim of self-defence indirectly upholds the 
framework of jus ad bellum, which determines that the only permissible use 
of force is for self-defence. If an additional purpose for self-defence (other 
than repelling or preventing an armed attack) were to be recognised as 
lawful, the framework of jus ad bellum would lose its integrity as a legal 
mechanism prohibiting from using force except in genuine cases of self-
defence. Furthermore, any state that exercises self-defence to repel or 
prevent an armed attack will enhance the legitimacy of the use of force. 
Other parties would be unlikely to criticise the use of force were it apparent 
that it was necessary to prevent an armed attack only. Therefore, the 
benefits of following the aim of self-defence also give credibility to the state 
using force, and support the integrity of the self-defence framework.  
 
Alternatively, it is also possible to argue that self-defence could be exercised 
with other purposes aside from the use of force. This is on the basis that in 
certain circumstances, to achieve a goal (legitimate aim of self-defence), it is 
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necessary to act in a way not regarded as self-defence.35 For instance, if 
state A suffers a continuous attack from State B, then in order for State A to 
repel or prevent an armed attack, it must change the government of State B, 
and this can be categorised as a lawful act of self-defence. Olivier Corten 
argues that multiple aims in self-defence are deemed lawful with the 
requirement that the main or ultimate aim of the use of force is self-defence, 
and that this must be specified clearly.36  
 
In its main judgment on Nicaragua, the Court concluded that the US had 
acted unlawfully for failing to meet the requirement of necessity and 
proportionality in self-defence. The Court opined that there was no necessity 
for the US to take defensive measures against Nicaragua, because the 
measures took place several months after the major offensive from the 
armed opposition against the Government of El Salvador had been wholly 
repulsed.37 However, in Judge Schwebel’s Dissenting Opinion, he argued 
that there had been an armed attack against El Salvador and the US was 
lawful to exercise the right to collective self-defence against Nicaragua.38 He 
also argues that the US fulfilled the requirement of necessity by the 
persistent failure of Nicaragua to cease armed subversion against El 
Salvador.39 Judge Schwebel in respect to multiple aims associated with the 
use of force, and interpreting the meaning of necessity in self-defence 
argued that:  
 
“Even if it be accepted, arguendo, that the current object of United 
States policy is to overthrow the Nicaraguan Government - and that is 
by no means established - that is not necessarily disproportionate to 
                                            
35 Bruno Simma (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 
(Vol. II, 3rd edn, OUP 2012) 1426-1427 
36 Olivier Corten, The Law Against War (Hart Publishing 2012) 485  
37 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America) ICJ Rep 1986 p 122 para 237  
38 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel  in Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America) ICJ Rep 1986 p 271 para 12-13 
39 ibid p 269 para 9  
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the obvious object of Nicaragua in supporting the Salvadoran rebels 
who seek overthrow of the Government of El Salvador.”40 
 
Judge Schwebel hinted that the purpose of self-defence, inter alia, is to 
overthrow a government, and in doing so may repel or prevent an armed 
attack. This could be regarded as lawful self-defence, showing there are 
some who are willing to interpret multiple aims that deem self-defence 
lawful, although Judge Schwebel’s view is a Dissenting Opinion.  
 
It can be concluded that there are two jurisprudences with regard to the aim 
of self-defence, and relationships established based on the principle of 
necessity. Firstly, it can be said acting in necessity if self-defence is 
exercised only to repel or prevent an armed attack. Secondly, necessity 
could also be seen as exercising force in self-defence alongside aims such 
as regime change.  
 
In summary, the definition of necessity in jus ad bellum could be viewed from 
multiple angles. The majority of scholars agree that the use of force can only 
be used as a matter of last resort. Necessity connotes that force is 
inevitable. Another way of viewing necessity in self-defence is by applying 
the necessity test. This test determines whether the attacked state is in a 
situation where it is necessary to use force. However, the problem with the 
necessity test concerns whether it is seen as an objective or subjective test 
or both. The ICJ argues the necessity is an objective test. Another meaning 
of necessity is associated with the source of the law on self-defence in 
customary international law. This is in reference to the Webster text, which 
sets out the principles of necessity and proportionality. By referring necessity 
to the Caroline incident, a restrictive view of necessity is denoted, which may 
seem inapplicable in contemporary international law. Finally, it is argued that 
the meaning of necessity should be attached to the aim of self-defence. This 
restricts the use of force in self-defence as a tool to achieve the legitimate 
goal of self-defence and to prevent self-defence as a pretext for aggression.  
                                            
40 ibid p 270 para 9  
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3. The Relationship Between Necessity and 
Proportionality  
 
Equally important in understanding the role of necessity in the framework of 
self-defence is the principle of proportionality. Proportionality plays an 
important role in determining whether an act of self-defence is legal or illegal 
although this is not the only consideration. It reflects the importance of both 
proportionality and necessity when assessing the legality of self-defence. 
Like the principle of necessity, proportionality can be interpreted in various 
ways.  
 
This section seeks to clarify the meaning of proportionality in the context of 
jus ad bellum. Following that, it will focus on the similarities and distinctions 
between necessity and proportionality in jus ad bellum.  
 
a. Definition of Proportionality in Jus ad Bellum   
 
Crucial to this thesis is the meaning of proportionality in the context of jus ad 
bellum. Proportionality is generally the main restraint placed upon states 
when exercising force in self-defence.41 The meaning of proportionality has 
created a rift amongst commentators in terms of the scope of 
proportionality.42 In particular, disagreements arise when discussing how to 
measure proportionate force, and when determining on what basis force 
should be regarded as proportionate.  
 
An obvious point of reference when interpreting proportionality involves 
measuring it in relation to a threat or an armed attack. The meaning of 
proportionality in this case relies on the premise that the proportionate use of 
force is only employed to neutralise the threat or an armed attack.43 
Commentators on the Chatham House discussion on self-defence upheld 
                                            
41 Gardam (n 2) 8-10 
42 Gray (n 2)150  
43 Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 51 in Bruno Simma (eds), The Charter of 
the United Nations: A Commentary (3rd edn, Vol. II, OUP 2012) 1407-
1408  
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this point, when they assessed that any ‘force used must not be excessive in 
relation to the harm expected from the attack’.44 However, some scholars 
reject the suggestion that the proportionate use of force must correspond 
with the initial armed attack, because it would deprive the victim state of an 
effective response to an armed attack.45  
 
However, it is argued that the opposite position is more practical in defining 
the meaning of proportionality. That is proportionality is linked with the aim of 
self-defence. According to this argument, proportionality takes into account, 
among others, the scale of the use of force in self-defence as well as the aim 
of self-defence. In other words, the riposte (proportionality) is not relative to 
the scale of an armed attack or threat. As discussed previously, the 
legitimate aim of self-defence is that necessity and proportionality must 
serve to fulfil the aim of self-defence. This argument negates the proposition 
that force used in self-defence must be commensurate with the threat or 
armed attack. This is because when defensive force is used to achieve the 
aim of self-defence, the force may not necessarily correspond to the threat 
of armed attack.  
 
Several commentators confirm that the use of force must fulfil the 
requirement of proportionality and be able simultaneously to achieve the 
aims of the self-defence operation. Antonio Cassese argues that any force 
used must be judged both against legitimate ends and against the attack 
against which it is responding.46 Meanwhile, David Kretzmer argues that the 
assessment of proportionality depends on various factors, such as whether 
the armed attack is ongoing, if attacks have ended, if they are against non-
state actors and if the force exercised serves to achieve the aim of self-
defence.47 However, he concedes that the legitimate aim of self-defence is 
                                            
44 Elizabeth Williamhurst, ‘Principles of International Law on the Use of 
Force by States in Self-Defence’ (Chatham House, October 2005) at 10  
45 Tom Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the UN Charter (CUP 2010) 
112 
46 Antonio Cassese, International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 355   
47 David Kretzmer, ‘The Inherent Right to Self-Defence and Proportionality in 
Jus Ad Bellum’ (2013) 24 EJIL 235-282, 269- 276 
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an unsettled area of jus ad bellum, which differs from the aim of self-defence 
and affects how proportionality is measured.48 While Yoram Dinstein argues 
that ‘it is perhaps best to consider the demand for proportionality in the 
province of self-defence as a standard of reasonableness in response to 
force by counter-force’.49 
 
Meanwhile, cases before the ICJ do not further the scope of studies of 
proportionality in jus ad bellum. In fact, they confuse analysis of 
proportionality in self-defence.50 In Oil Platforms, the Court commented that 
two separate attacks were made by the US against Iran on 19 October 1987 
and 18 April 1988 in response to alleged armed attacks by Iran. The Court 
stated: 
 
“As to the requirement of proportionality, the attack of 19 October 
1987 night, had the Court found that it was necessary in response to 
the Sea Isle City incident as an armed attack committed by Iran, have 
been considered proportionate. In the case of the attacks of 18 April 
1988, however, they were conceived and executed as part of a more 
extensive operation entitled ‘Operation Praying Mantis’…The question 
of the lawfulness of other aspects of that operation is not before the 
Court, since it is solely the action against the Salman and Nasr 
complexes that is presented as a breach of the 1955 Treaty; but the 
Court cannot assess in isolation the proportionality of that action to 
the attack to which it was said to be a response; it cannot close its 
eyes to the scale of the whole operation, which involved, inter alia, the 
destruction of two Iranian frigates and a number of other naval 
vessels and aircraft. As a response to the mining, by an unidentified 
agency, of a single United States warship, which was severely 
damaged but not sunk, and without loss of life, neither ‘Operation 
Praying Mantis’ as a whole, nor even that part of it that destroyed the 
                                            
48 ibid 260-269  
49 Yoram Dinstein, War Aggression and Self-Defence (3rd edn, CUP 2001) 
184   
50 James Green, The International Court of Justice and Self-Defence in 
International Law (Hart Publishing 2009) 86 
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Salman and Nasr platforms, can be regarded, in the circumstances of 
this case, as a proportionate use of force in self-defence.”51  
 
In the passage above, the Court asserted that the reading of proportionality 
must be weighed according to the entire self-defence operation. In a further 
example, the Court examined proportionality in reference to the type of 
weaponry used;52 although in other cases, such as DRC v Uganda, the 
Court focused on the modus operandi of self-defence taken by the victim 
state. The Court stated: 
 
“the taking of airports and towns [by Ugandan forces] many hundreds 
of kilometres from Uganda’s border would not seem proportionate to 
the series of transborder attacks it claimed had given rise to the right 
of self-defence, nor to be necessary to that end.53  
 
The Court seems to offer diverse opinions on the meaning of proportionality, 
and no coherent definition of proportionality can be extracted from its 
judgments.  
 
In summary, it is a relatively uncontentious point to state that proportionality 
in jus ad bellum affects the legality of any self-defence action. However, any 
analysis of how proportionality is measured remains subject to discussion. 
One way of measuring proportionality is according to threat and attack. 
Alternatively, proportionality can be measured in relation to the aims of self-
defence. The latter approach is more practical because it is hard to quantify 
the armed attack committed by the aggressor. Therefore, proportionality is 
measured among others the scale of the defensive force and whether the 
force employed achieved the aim of self-defence.  
 
                                            
51 Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States 
of America) ICJ Rep 2003 para 77  
52 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
ICJ Rep 1996 p 245 para 42  
53 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of 
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b. The Relationship between Necessity and Proportionality  
 
Despite differences between necessity and proportionality in jus ad bellum; 
both principles are required to maintain the legality of use of force in self-
defence. It is often argued that necessary use of force affects proportionality 
and vice-versa.54 This section examines the close relationship between 
necessity and proportionality and seeks to determine how far the two 
principles interact with one another.  
 
Necessity and proportionality are inextricably linked; indeed, as explained by 
one commentator ‘if a use of force is not necessary, it cannot be 
proportionate and, if its proportionate it is difficult to see how it can be 
necessary’.55 Similarly, Olivier Corten argues that necessity and 
proportionality are two intertwining concepts that serve the same purpose. 
He asks a rhetorical question: ‘what is a disproportionate measure if not a 
measure that goes beyond that its purpose requires, that is, which is not 
necessary for the pursuit of that same purpose?’56 This reflects the influence 
of necessity over proportionality and vice-versa.  
 
In practice, the mutuality of necessity and proportionality was apparent 
during the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in Lebanon in 2006. Israel declared its 
actions against Hezbollah were an act of self-defence; it invoked Article 51 
of the UN Charter after suffering an attack from Hezbollah originating from 
within Lebanon.57 Several states criticised Israel for employing 
disproportionate force in self-defence.58 Despite this condemnation, Israel 
defended its actions stating that proportionality was linked to necessity in its 
actions against Hezbollah. The Israel government stated:  
                                            
54 James Green, The International Court of Justice and Self-Defence in 
International Law (Hart Publishing 2009) 89 
55 Gray (n 2) 150 
56 Olivier Corten, The Law Against War (Hart Publishing 2012) 488 
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“One important principle established by international law for the 
"reasonable military commander" seeking to make this difficult 
balance, is that the proportionality of a response to an attack is to be 
measured not in regard to the specific attack suffered by a state but in 
regard to what is necessary to remove the overall threat.”59 
 
The Israeli government pointed out that proportionality in self-defence must 
be seen in relation to necessity. Israel put forward the case that necessity 
and proportionality are indeed linked. A further example was during the 
1990-1 Persian Gulf conflict, which also saw an interaction between the two 
principles. During the conflict, the UN Security Council passed a resolution 
calling for the withdrawal of Iraq’s military forces from Kuwaiti territory.60 The 
British ambassador to the Security Council highlighted the principle of 
proportionality in terms of the necessity to undertake military action, when he 
stated:  
 
“Some have suggested that military action being taken by the allies is 
in some way excessive or disproportionate and thus exceeds the ‘all 
necessary means’ authorized in resolution 678 (1990) to bring about 
the liberation of Kuwait. But the nature and scope of military action is 
dedicated not by some abstract set of criteria but by the military 
capacity of the aggressor, who has refused all attempts to remove 
him from Kuwait.”61 
 
This example reflects the fact that proportionality was seen as part of the 
overall practice of self-defence that was necessary to liberate Kuwait from 
                                            
59 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs - ‘Responding to Hizbullah attacks from 
Lebanon: Issues of proportionality’ 
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the invasion of Iraq. This again shows the connection between 
proportionality and necessity in the overall scheme of self-defence 
requirements.  
 
c. Necessity in Jus ad Bellum  
 
Another principle in the formula of self-defence is the notion of necessity. 
Necessity, similar to proportionality, requires the invoking state to exercise 
force in self-defence if necessary as performed in proportionate measure. 
Failure to comply with the requirement of necessity renders the invoking 
state’s use of force prima facie illegal. In fact, the first point of reference 
following an armed attack or threat concerns whether necessity arises to 
compel the affected state to launch a riposte. As such, necessity is an 
important aspect in the law of self-defence, which this thesis tries to 
highlight. In the next Part, this thesis will outline the components of necessity 
in self-defence.  
 
The issue of necessity will be explored broadly in this thesis as the basis of 
this work concentrates on the role of necessity in the framework of self-
defence. Arguably, there is more to the simplistic perception of necessity in 
jus ad bellum, as necessity divides into two parts; first, necessity prior to 
exercising the use of force, and second, necessity when exercising the use 
of force. The details of this argument will be outlined below. Further to this 
argument, this thesis seeks to clarify the application of necessity in state 
versus state, and state against non-state actor settings. By doing so, the 
aspect of necessity in the two settings could be extracted for analysis.  
 
Necessity covers any forceful action taken by an invoking state, and so must 
be by way of a last resort, asserting the right of the state to use force 
unilaterally.62 The use of force must be seen as the only response to counter 
                                            
62 Judith Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force by States 
(CUP 2004) 6 
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threat of an armed attack after considering non-forcible options.63 The 
meaning and scope of necessity were aptly described by Judge Ago in his 
report on State Responsibility, which describes necessity as follows:  
 
“[A]ction taken in self-defence must be necessary is that the State 
attacked… must not, in the particular circumstances, have had any 
means of halting the attack other than recourse to armed force. In 
other words, had it been able to achieve the same result by measures 
not involving the use of armed force, it would have no justification for 
adopting conduct which contravened the general prohibition against 
the use of armed force.”64 
 
The principle of necessity in self-defence, as explained in Chapter III, 
originated from the Caroline incident of 1837. Although the requirements of 
necessity and proportionality are absent from the UN Charter regime, it is 
still widely regarded that both principles are an integral part of the jus ad 
bellum framework. 
.  
4. Components of Necessity in Self-Defence  
 
a. Introduction 
 
The discussion above has focused on various aspects of the interpretation of 
necessity in self-defence. In this Section, the discussion on necessity will be 
explored further by examining the components of necessity, and how a state 
determines necessity. This thesis considers necessity in two parts: first, 
before the use of force, when a state is deciding to exercise the right to self-
defence, and, second, during the use of force. In the two periods, pre- and 
during the use of force, necessity is evaluated in relation to self-defence.  
 
                                            
63 Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (5th edn, CUP 2012) 
231-232 
64 Robert Ago, Addendum Eight Report on State Responsibility to ILC (1980) 
YILC Vol. II (A/CN.4/318/Add.5-7) (Part 1) para. 120 p. 69  
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As mentioned earlier, the originality of this thesis is by examining the role of 
necessity in self-defence framework. This is by posing the question: ‘what is 
the role of necessity in the law of self-defence?’ In doing so, it gives several 
indications as to the role of necessity. It is argued that necessity has a dual 
role. First, necessity acts as a requirement to exercising the right to self-
defence. Without the existence of necessity, self-defence cannot be invoked 
by a state, and therefore it would be illegal to exercise self-defence due to 
failure to meet this requirement. The second role of necessity is the limitation 
on force used in self-defence. This creates necessity as a restraining 
element when a state is taking defensive measures. It is acknowledged that 
the latter aspect of necessity is confusing as it may distort the difference 
between necessity and proportionality. To a certain degree, necessity as a 
limitation can be seen as a proportionality and not necessity. It is argued that 
this is where necessity and proportionality overlaps. However, the difference 
is necessity as a limitation to self-defence focuses solely on meeting the aim 
of self-defence while proportionality relates to the scale and intensity of the 
defensive force.  
 
b. The First Role of Necessity – A Requirement 
 
The first role of necessity in the framework of self-defence is to act as 
requirement. This means showing there is a serious threat to the state and 
that force is necessary to defend itself. A state that fails to meet this 
requirement does not meet the prerequisite of the right to self-defence.  
 
i. Existence of a Threat or an Armed Attack  
 
Prior to exercising the right to self-defence, the aggrieved state must 
establish the requirement of necessity as a response to a threat or an armed 
attack. The existence of either a threat or an armed attack indicates that the 
victim state must respond, although not necessarily with force. 
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Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, the requirement required as a 
prerequisite to the right to self-defence is proof of an armed attack.65 Such 
proof demonstrates that circumstances exist that compel the state to 
exercise defensive force. However, not all threats or armed attacks are likely 
to result in exercising the right to self-defence. Only certain types of 
aggression merit self-defence by force. The invoking state must first 
determine that the attack threatens the survival or the vital interests of the 
victim state.66 Thus, a response in self-defence must be based on what is 
necessary to protect the continued existence of the state.67  
 
A problem arises, in that defining a threat to the vital interest of a state 
demanding a response in self-defence requires a subjective judgment. As 
established above, the only party that can truly understand the nature of 
such a threat is the aggrieved state, and perceptions over what interests are 
vital for the existence of a state vary. Despite the difficulty of ascertaining 
threats and the vital interest of a state, an invoking state must prove a threat 
or armed attack warrants the state using force for defensive purposes.  
 
ii. Force as ‘A Last Resort’ 
 
Another aspect of necessity in terms of requirement is that force must be 
used only as a last resort. As discussed earlier, a state must exhaust non-
forcible options in response to threats, although there is no obligation to 
consider all options. By adding force as a last resort to the meaning of 
necessity shows force will not be used indiscriminately, but only when there 
is no other feasible way to address the conflict.  
 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits states from using force in 
international affairs. Therefore, for a state to violate this prohibition they must 
                                            
65 Article 51 of the UN Charter (1945) 1 UNTS XVI. The provision used the 
phrase ‘if an armed attack occurs...’ 
66 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
ICJ Rep 1996 p 263 para 96  
67 James Green, The International Court of Justice and Self-Defence in 
International Law (Hart Publishing 2009) 77 
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prove they are acting in self-defence. To do so, the state must show that it 
has taken steps to resolve the dispute amicably, but has found it necessary 
to exercise defensive measures. If the concept of ‘the use force as a last 
resort’ were not appended to necessity as a requirement, states would be 
more likely to invoke self-defence as a preferential tool to resolve disputes. 
Therefore, it is necessary to make force a last resort as part of the 
requirement of necessity.  
 
An additional aspect that can be drawn from the meaning of necessity is 
immediacy. Immediacy shows there is a temporal aspect in place when a 
state launches a defensive attack. The principle of immediacy requires the 
state to consider the time lapse between an armed attack and any response 
by force.68 It also signifies there must not be an undue time-lag between the 
armed attack and the exercise of the right to self-defence.69 The notion of 
‘immediacy’ or ‘instancy’ in the formula of necessity in self-defence indicates 
the need for states to react in a timely manner to the perceived threat or 
armed attack.70 Therefore, immediacy incorporates the idea of time into the 
judgement of necessity.  
 
Arguably, immediacy is an integral part of necessity. The role of immediacy 
in self-defence aims to provide a timeframe in which it is eligible for a state 
to use force relative to the moment of an armed attack. A long time lag 
between the moment an armed attack takes place and the use of force in 
self-defence diminishes the right of the invoking state to act in self-defence; 
as it enables the possibility of engagement in diplomatic negotiations.71 
                                            
68 Tom Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the UN Charter (CUP 2010) 
99 
69 Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (5th edn, CUP 2014) 
233 
70 Judith Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force by States 
(CUP 2006) 150 
71 Tom Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the UN Charter (CUP 2010) 
102; Judith Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force by 
States (CUP 2006) 151 Both authors categorised immediacy under 
necessity. While other authors such as Yoram Dinstein define 
immediacy in a separate heading. See also Thomas Franck, Recourse 
to Force (CUP 2004) 98  
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Thus, in principle, time is of the essence when a state is considering whether 
it is necessary to take defensive measures. If a state does not comply with 
the principle of immediacy (acting in self-defence within a reasonable time) 
this may render all measures of self-defence unnecessary. Because of the 
nature of immediacy in self-defence, it is essential for it to be a component of 
necessity and not a separate entity in the self-defence framework.   
 
The issue of time in relation necessity was treated as a requirement for self-
defence in the aforementioned case of Nicaragua. In its judgment, the Court 
considered the time taken for the US to launch defensive measures against 
Nicaragua, and consequently dismissed the claim by the US; stating it had 
failed to fulfil the requirement of necessity in the December 1981 attack. The 
Court judged:  
 
“…cannot be said to correspond to a ‘necessity’ justifying the United 
States action against Nicaragua on the basis of assistance given by 
Nicaragua to the armed opposition in El Salvador. First, these 
measures were only taken, and began to produce their effects, 
several months after major offensive of the armed opposition against 
the Government of El Salvador had been completely repulsed… and 
the actions of the opposition considerably reduced in consequence. 
Thus it was possible to eliminate the main danger to the Salvadorian 
government without the United States embarking on activities in and 
against Nicaragua. Accordingly, it cannot be held that these activities 
were undertaken in the light of necessity.”72 
 
The details of this judgment exemplify the role of necessity as a requirement. 
First, the Court questioned the timing and the immediacy of the situation, 
and judged the lapse in time between armed attack and the response 
unfavourably. Second, the Court considered necessity in light of alternative 
options to the use of force. The Court found that force was not the last resort 
available to the US, and claimed ‘it was possible to eliminate the main 
                                            
72 Nicaragua Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States of America) ICJ Rep (1986) p 122 para 127   
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danger to the Salvadorian government without the US embarking on 
activities in and against Nicaragua’. This reflects the belief that the use of 
force in self-defence by the US was not a last resort.  
 
In practice, several examples can be put forward to show how necessity acts 
as a requirement to self-defence, whether from the perspective of an 
existence of a threat or an armed attack, force as a last resort or immediacy, 
or any combination of the three. First, during a Security Council meeting on 
the issue of the Six Day War, Israel claimed that it had suffered attacks from 
Arab states and was under threat from a mass army congregating at the 
border of Egypt-Israel.73 Israel stated that only when its security ‘was 
becoming smaller’ and its safety had been breached, only then had Israel 
decided to use force in self-defence.74  
 
Another example reflecting the role of necessity as a requirement for self-
defence was during Israel’s raid against Iraq’s Osiraq nuclear reactor in 
1981. This case study is often used as an example of pre-emptive self-
defence. For this purpose, it will be shown that there is a scope for 
evaluating the principle of necessity. In this case study, Israel claimed that 
the nuclear reactor could be used as a military against Israel and that it was 
‘in its final stage of construction’.75 Israel claimed that it had attempted to 
settle the nuclear threat through diplomatic channels, but unsuccessfully, 
and so it invoked the right to self-defence.76, 77 In the passage below, Israel 
justifies its action by explaining the element of necessity as a requirement to 
self-defence where the threat was endangering the existence of Israel: 
 
“The decision taken by my Government in the exercise of its right of 
self-defence…We sought to act in a manner which would minimize 
                                            
73 UN Doc S/PV. pp.14-19 paras. 142-194 (Statement to the Security 
Council by Israel Foreign Minister Eban, 6 June 1967) 
74 UN Doc S/PV. p.15 para. 155 (Statement to the Security Council by Israel 
Foreign Minister Eban, 6 June 1967)  
75 UN Doc S/PV.2280 (12 June 1981) p. 8 para. 57  
76 UN Doc S/PV.2280 (12 June 1981) p. 8 para. 67 and p. 10 para. 94  
77 UN Doc S/PV.2280 (12 June 1981) p. 11 para. 97 
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the danger to all concerned, including a large segment of Iraq’s 
population. We waited until the eleventh hour after the diplomatic 
clock had run out, hoping against hope that Iraq’s nuclear arms 
project would be brought to a halt. Our Air Force was only called in 
when there was less than a month to go before Osirak might have 
become critical.”78  
 
Despite Israel’s attempt to highlight all the elements of necessity as a trigger 
for the right to self-defence, it received no support from the members of the 
Security Council. This resulted from disagreement among the Security 
Council members over whether Israel had fulfilled the requirement of 
necessity in launching actions in self-defence. Amongst the criticisms 
levelled against Israel were that it had failed to seek alternative solution to 
forcible measures. For instance, Japan stated that Israel could have pursued 
its nuclear concerns by approaching International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) for consideration, and therefore claimed that ‘Israel’s resorting 
directly to military measures is absolutely unjustifiable’.79 However, the US 
representative at the Security Council, claimed Israel’s action proceeded 
from the conviction that it had failed to exhaust peaceful means.80 This 
signifies that it is a pre-requisite that a state seek an amicable solution 
before using force.  
 
Another point raised in the discussion touched on the threat from the Osirak 
nuclear plant. The argument put forward by Israel when citing self-defence 
was that the nuclear reactor posed a threat to its security and so must be 
dealt with immediately. Members of the Security Council therefore dismissed 
the existence of the threat and the immediacy of the matter. For instance, 
France, which had assisted Iraq in building the nuclear reactor, established 
that the reactor was purely intended to meet civilian aims, and incapable for 
the production of atomic bombs.81 Furthermore, the Director General of IAEA 
                                            
78 UN Doc S/PV.2280 (12 June 1981) p. 11 para. 102 
79 UN Doc S/PV.2282 (8 June 1981) para. 95 p. 9  
80 (1981) UNYB 276  
81 UN Doc S/PV.2282 para. 48 p. 5  
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confirmed that the Osirak nuclear reactor was safe for civilian use in 
accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).82 United Kingdom also 
expressed the view that there was no instant or overwhelming necessity for 
self-defence, because the nuclear reactor was safeguarded by the NPT 
regime.83 This shows there must be a serious threat in existence and an 
urgent need (immediacy) when reacting with force.84  
 
In summary, the right to self-defence can be invoked if the principle of 
necessity is fulfilled. Necessity in this respect is seen as a requirement to 
engage in self-defence, because of the existence of a threat or an armed 
attack, with force being the final option and immediacy being present. Failure 
to show the elements of necessity as a requirement to self-defence affects 
the legality of the use of force.  
 
c. The Second Role of Necessity – Limitation on the Use of 
Force in Self-Defence  
 
The second role of necessity in the law of self-defence is to limit force.85 This 
requires the invoking state to restrict the use of force as deemed necessary 
to achieve the legitimate aim of self-defence. Excessive force is deemed 
unnecessary and may be considered illegal. Necessity as a limiting factor 
resembles the previously discussed principle of proportionality. Arguably, to 
assess necessity, proportionality must be considered. This is because some 
features of proportionality are applicable to discussions on necessity.86  
 
As argued above, a state that pleads for self-defence must demonstrate it is 
necessary to exercise force for defensive purposes. If a state exercises the 
                                            
82 UN Doc S/PV.2282 para. 55 p. 5  
83 UN Doc S/PV.2282 para. 106 p. 10 
84 Indeed there are separate arguments to suggest this is an example for 
pre-emptive self-defence. See Natalino Ronzitti ‘The Expanding Law of 
Self-Defence’(2006) 3 JCSL 343-359; Istvan Pogany, ‘Nuclear Weapons 
and Self-Defence in International Law’ (1986-87) 2 Connecticut Journal 
of International Law 97  
85 Gardam (n 2) 149; Gray (n 2) 149     
86 Gray ibid 150  
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right to self-defence, it would not do so without restriction. Restriction 
arguably covers two areas in jus ad bellum namely, necessity and 
proportionality. This thesis argues that, not only does necessity act as a pre-
requisite to self-defence, but it also acts as a factor restraining self-
defence.87 The word necessity itself conveys the notion that force is 
necessary for self-defence. This is where necessity and proportionality 
overlap. Proportionality by nature restrains the use of force. The fact that 
necessity cannot be separated from proportionality suggests that necessity 
plays a role in limiting the use of force in self-defence. However, there are 
clear distinctions to be made between the two. Proportionality generally 
refers to the size, duration and target of the force used, whilst necessity as a 
limitation ensures the use of force is in relation the aim of self-defence.88  
 
The second role of necessity as a limitation in self-defence relates to 
assessments of whether the use of the force meets the aim of self-defence. 
If the use of force is retaliatory, deterrent or punitive in character, it is 
deemed unnecessary, as it does not serve the legitimate aims of self-
defence.89 Therefore, states must limit the use of force to defensive 
purposes.  
 
In advancing the narrative of necessity as a limiting factor in self-defence, it 
is inevitable to acknowledge the conflation between necessity and 
proportionality. The criticism that may be raised here is that necessity (as a 
limitation) can simply be construed as proportionality. In addition, if it is 
disproportionate use of force, is it not that it is also failing to meet necessity 
as a limitation to self-defence? This thesis, however, maintains that there is 
a difference between proportionality and necessity (as a limitation). 
 
The interaction between necessity (as a limitation) and proportionality can be 
explained in the following hypothetical example. If a state uses defensive 
                                            
87 Lindsay Moir, Reappraising the Resort to Force (Hart Publishing 2010) 11  
88 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (3rd edn, OUP 
2008) 150  
89 Randelzhofer and Nolte, ‘Article 51’ in The Charter of the United Nations: 
A Commentary (3rd edn, OUP 2012) 1425 
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force excessively, the action of the state could be interpreted in two ways. 
First, if the force is used extensively but failed to meet the aim of self-
defence, the state could be said using force disproportionately (failing to 
meet the condition of proportionality) and failed to meet the principle of 
necessity. Second, if a state uses force extensively but meet the aim of self-
defence, the state could be regarded as meeting the principle of necessity 
(as a limitation) but fail to meet the principle of proportionality. The 
underlying objective here is in meeting the aim of self-defence for necessity 
(as a limitation) while proportionality focuses on the size and scale of the 
defensive force.  
 
Some have questioned the role of necessity as a limiting factor in self-
defence post the UN Charter. In the nineteenth century, the term necessity 
was a limiting factor for nations when they were exercising force in 
accordance with doctrine derived from the Caroline incident. However, the 
role of necessity in UN Charter regime is disputed. Article 51 of the UN 
Charter performs a controlling function on states, although allowing the 
exercise of self-defence. As described by one commentator:  
 
“…necessity was a limiting factor at a time when there are no limits, 
and took the place of restraints on the resort to force. Nowadays, the 
situations in which states may resort to force are already limited, and 
this factor should be borne in mind in determining the requirements of 
necessity under the Charter system.”90 
 
Although it may be said that necessity may diminish in relevance in terms of 
the use of force in self-defence, states and the ICJ continue to cite necessity 
as a benchmark when examining legality in the use of force. Thus, necessity 
continues to have a role in the self-defence regime.  
 
Theoretically, it is possible to decipher the meaning of necessity and 
partition it into two roles. In practice, however, the division of the two roles of 
                                            
90 Judith Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force by States 
(CUP 2004) 149  
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necessity are less clear. Several factors cause confusion in the two roles. In 
state practice, speeches by heads of states and diplomats are often not 
explicit in their meaning as regards necessity in self-defence. The idea of 
necessity may be referenced but it is not contextualised. It is open to 
interpretation whether necessity refers to the requirement to self-defence, 
which triggers the right, or if it is indicated as a limitation on the use of force 
making the confusion worse; in such cases necessity refers to international 
humanitarian law. Similarly, in legal literature, with few exceptions, 
commentators overlook the intricacies of the role of necessity in self-defence 
regimes. Thus, it may be that scholars understand the role of necessity but 
they are unclear about what aspect of necessity they are referring to. It is 
perhaps also the case that legal literature uses the term necessity as a 
requirement and a limitation interchangeably. It is important for the 
jurisprudence of jus ad bellum to understand the role of necessity, and to 
establish how the different elements of necessity affect the legal framework 
of self-defence.  
 
d. Conclusion 
 
The discussion of necessity as a principle in the self-defence framework can 
further be extended by analysing the components of necessity. This can be 
achieved by understanding the role of necessity in fulfilling the legitimate aim 
of self-defence. It is argued that necessity has two distinct yet related roles 
in self-defence. First, it is treated as a requirement that states seek to 
achieve prior to claiming they are acting in self-defence. The requirement 
consists of several elements; namely, there must be a threat, and the state 
should consider peaceful means of resolving the conflict demanding an 
immediate imperative to react with force. All these elements combine to 
establish necessity as a requirement for self-defence. The second role of 
necessity is as a limiting factor when the invoking state is exercising self-
defensive measures. Necessity restricts the force employed by the invoking 
state to achieve the legitimate aim of self-defence. This prevents the state 
concerned from over-using permissible force. The second role of necessity 
bears similarities to the principle of proportionality. However, proportionality 
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determines the scale and duration of the defensive measures. By 
understanding the different roles of necessity in self-defence, it is possible to 
clarify the position of necessity in the self-defence framework. This may 
encourage practitioners and commentators to re-think the concept of 
necessity, and its use in the jurisprudence of jus ad bellum.  
 
5. The Application of Necessity in Self-Defence against 
State and Non-State Actors  
 
a. Introduction  
 
The concept of necessity in the legal framework of self-defence can be 
further analysed by understanding the application of necessity as applied to 
state and non-state actors.  
 
This section will attempt to demonstrate the differences in the application of 
necessity in self-defence according to the identity of the aggressor. 
Differences stem from the constructs of international law, which focus on 
state institutions. Contemporary laws on the use of force are being 
challenged by the growing threat from terrorist groups. Therefore, the 
general framework on self-defence requires further revision to adapt the 
different applications of necessity to states and non-state actors.  
 
b. Terrorism in International Law 
 
The effects of terrorism in international law have permeated various aspects 
of international affairs. They have affected international security, the 
sovereignty of states, international trade, international humanitarian law, 
international human rights and the law on the use of force. The adverse 
effects of terrorism are currently keenly felt in international law. International 
law has been compelled to address the growing threat of terrorism in the 
international arena. One of the aims of the UN Charter is ‘to maintain 
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international peace and security’91; this requires states to take measures to 
ensure international relations are not affected by terrorist activities.  
 
As the threat that terrorism will endanger international security and 
destabilise state institutions becomes more intense, states are choosing to 
undertake additional non-forcible initiatives to counter this threat by 
establishing an applicable international legal framework. A series of 
international conventions have been drafted to address the issue of 
terrorism. Among these are conventions directed towards specific activities 
in the realm of international affairs, covering civil aviation,92 maritime 
affairs,93 hostage situations,94 and financial checks.95 All these international 
instrument function independently and do not comprise a holistic approach. 
As one commentator described, this is a ‘piecemeal’ approach to tackling 
terrorism.96  
 
The post 9/11 period saw a new set of international efforts to combat 
terrorism through international law. A more comprehensive legal framework 
was established to prevent the activities of terrorists. In SC Res. 1373 (2001) 
the Security Council called upon Member States to implement major 
international Conventions and protocols relating to terrorism and established 
a SC Counter-Terrorism Committee.97 In 2004, A UN report entitled ‘A More 
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility’ was published by the Secretary–
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General’s High Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change, and 
outlined a comprehensive strategy against terrorism to assist states in 
confronting terrorism.98 It includes the prevention of terrorist activities such 
as upholding the rule of law, protecting human rights, reducing poverty, 
preventing state collapse, and overseeing the control of dangerous 
materials.99 The efforts in combatting terrorism were further intensified by 
refinements to the UN counter terrorism strategy. In 2006, the Secretary-
General released another report dissuading people from resorting to 
terrorism or supporting it, denying terrorists the means to carry out an attack 
and deterring states from supporting terrorism.100 This comprehensive and 
holistic approach by the UN in combatting terrorism meant there was a 
marked difference in approaches after the 9/11 attack. By establishing a 
legal framework, it was possible to take measures collectively and effectively 
to meet the challenges of terrorism through non-forcible efforts.   
 
The interpretation of the law on the use of force depends on the threats 
enacted by terrorist groups. Where the threat from terrorist groups is critical 
and capable of exerting similar destruction to those by state actors then 
states would seek to reconcile the existing law to challenge a non-state 
actor. Under the law, states and terrorist groups are two distinct entities, and 
cannot be treated equally. This difference affects jus ad bellum in several 
ways. First, the threat exerted by terrorist groups cannot be undermined 
simply because it is a non-governmental organisation. For instance, the 
number of death caused by the 9/11 attacks reflect the ability for Al-Qaeda 
to organise massive destruction with maximum casualties using an 
unconventional method of execution. The ongoing attacks by Al-Qaeda in 
other parts of the world, such as the bombing in London in 2004 and Madrid 
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in 2005, show the ability of terrorist groups to disrupt international peace and 
security. Thus, the law on the use of force is necessarily affected. The law 
has to be reformed to meet the challenges faced, whilst simultaneously still 
retaining the measures required to supervise inter-state conflicts.  
 
Another difference between a state and a non-state actor in international law 
is the legal obligations imposed on states. This creates an imbalance in legal 
obligations.101 A state is expected to act according to international norms 
and principles in all their internal or external affairs. Such obligations have 
an effect on how states can behave when using force. For example, a state 
that invokes the right to self-defence has to comply with the rules of jus ad 
bellum and international humanitarian requirements, and failure to do so 
may deem its use of force as unlawful. Another scenario would be that a 
state would be expected to exercise force reasonably in accordance with the 
rules on State Responsibility to ensure that its conduct does not breach 
international obligations.102 For instance, states have the duty not to 
knowingly allow their territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of 
other states.103 This obligation assumes that every state has the 
responsibility to refrain from organising, encouraging, instigating or 
participating the organisation of irregular forces, armed bands or terrorist 
groups within its territory, and to prevent an incursion from its territory into 
the territory of another state.104 These are among some of the 
responsibilities of a state in international law. Irrespective of whether a state 
is threatened or attacked by another state or a non-state actor, the onus of 
legal responsibility still lies with the state exercising the right to self-defence.  
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In contrast, terrorist groups are free from legal accountability in jus ad 
bellum.105 They have no international obligations and may exercise force at 
any time without considering the implications in jus ad bellum or jus in bello. 
In the example of 11 September 2001, Al-Qaeda attacked the US by 
hijacking several civilian aircrafts and purposefully targeting public buildings 
and killing thousands of civilians. If Al-Qaeda were a state actor, it would 
have been judged to have been acting unlawfully under a series of 
international conventions, treaties and customary laws. However, Al-Qaeda 
disregards such legal responsibility and disrupts international security.  
 
The existence of large organised terrorist groups on the international stage 
affects the landscape of the law on self-defence.106 Notwithstanding the 
effects on the principles of necessity and proportionality by non-state actors, 
there is also concern over nation states’ involvements with terrorist groups. 
This question is important when apportioning legal responsibility. It is 
necessary to ask, to what extent a state has control over a terrorist group, 
making it consequently responsible for the unlawful conduct of a non-state 
actor. For instance, if state A is in conflict with state B but is using a proxy or 
auxiliary (such as a terrorist group), state A is deemed to have instructed the 
terrorist group to breach the security of state B. In this situation, it is 
important to determine how the use of a non-state actor affects state A’s 
accountability for the unlawful conduct of the terrorist group? One way to 
assess states’ involvement with a non-state actor is by examining state 
control mechanisms.  
 
Recalling the discussion in Chapter 2, in legal literature, there are three main 
approaches in determining legal responsibility of a state for actions of non-
state actors. First, ‘effective control test’ is a method where it assess the 
                                            
105 Non-state actors can be held responsible under other international laws 
such as international criminal law, Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute for 
crimes against humanity or international humanitarian law for instance 
under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional 
Protocol II (applicable to member states and ‘dissident armed forces or 
other organized groups…’) 
106 Antonio Cassese, ‘Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal 
Categories of International Law’ (2001) 12 EJIL 993-110, 995-998 
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involvement of a state in participating in financing, organising, training and 
supplying the non-state armed group.107 Second, ‘dependence test’ enquires 
whether the non-state actor is dependent on the state and controlled by the 
state.108 Both of these tests were developed in Nicaragua (the ICJ). Finally, 
‘overall control test’ requires a state to wield overall control over the non-
state actor including coordinating and planning activities.109 The latter test 
was pronounced in International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) with regards to the characterisation of an armed conflict.  
 
6. Conclusion  
 
Necessity is an important principle in the law of self-defence as it affects 
legality when a state invokes the right to self-defence. The term necessity is 
broadly used in international law as a basis for exceptionalism in legal 
obligations. The focus in this Chapter is on scrutinising the meaning of 
necessity in the context of jus ad bellum. The scope of necessity can be 
viewed from several angles; namely defining necessity as a matter of last 
resort, subjectivity or objectivity in necessity, seeing necessity according to 
its origin (the Caroline incident) and defining necessity based on the aim of 
self-defence. All four aspects of necessity can result in a different 
interpretation and enhance the in-depth meaning of necessity in self-
defence.  
 
Aside from necessity, it is important to highlight the role of proportionality in 
the framework of self-defence as well as its relationship to the principle of 
necessity. It is argued that, necessity is closely linked with proportionality, as 
it governs similar aspects of the use of force. However, necessity could also 
be distinguished from proportionality.  
 
                                            
107 Nicaragua (n 4) p 64-65 para 114 
108 Ibid para 109  
109 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic Judgment in the Appeals Chamber of 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) IT-94-1-
A (15 July 1999) p 56 para 131  
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It is further argued that there are two main components of necessity based 
on its role in jus ad bellum. First, the role of necessity as a component of the 
law of self-defence acts as a requirement and a necessity, and must be 
assessed before a state can exercise force in self-defence. The invoking 
state must show a necessity to use force. This could be in the form of the 
existence of a threat of armed attack, and the use of force as a last resort for 
the attacked state consider. The second role of necessity is as a limitation 
on the use of force when a state is exercising the right to self-defence. The 
second role of necessity is akin to the principle of proportionality, because 
certain facts are relevant when assessing both principles. It is argued in this 
Chapter that necessity as a limitation focuses on meeting the aim of self-
defence while proportionality considers the scale and duration of the 
defensive force. Highlighting the dual roles of necessity amplifies the 
meaning of necessity in the framework of self-defence, assisting scholars in 
defining its role in self-defence.  
 
The principle of necessity could be further analysed in terms of its 
application against state and non-state actors. It is proposed that necessity 
requires further adaptation to match a climate that is increasingly focused on 
terrorism. Three tests that were developed by the ICJ and ICTY to determine 
whether a non-state actor is acting on behalf of a state. The ‘dependence 
test’, ‘overall control test’ and ‘effective control test’ were used in the 
jurisprudence of international tribunals, although the latter test was regarded 
as the primary method of assessment. The choice of test used affects how a 
state respond in self-defence, and consequently the meaning of necessity 
relates to the entity of the aggressor.  
 
The next Chapter shows how necessity is applied when a state invokes self-
defence against non-state actors. It focusses on the roles of necessity as a 
requirement and a limitation of self-defence.
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Chapter 5: Legal Standard of Necessity in the Framework of 
Self-Defence 
 
1. Introduction  
 
As evaluated in the previous chapter, the principle of necessity is an 
important aspect of the law of self-defence. A state that employs self-
defence must adhere to the principle of necessity to any use of force. 
However, as discussed, necessity is an abstract notion that can be 
interpreted in multiple paradigms, and which is subject to several variables. 
In the legal literature concerning jus ad bellum, the meaning of necessity for 
self-defence remains undefined and multiple interpretations are valid. This 
Chapter proceeds based on the finding that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
concept of necessity that encompasses all situations. It aims to clarify the 
situation by unravelling the factors affecting the meaning of necessity in self-
defence, and in so doing argues that the meaning of necessity is affected 
fundamentally by whether a state faces a state or a non-state actor (e.g. a 
terrorist organisation). To develop this argument this study examines several 
sources and case studies, and analyses the associated commentary.  
 
The Chapter will approach necessity from two angles. Firstly, factors 
affecting the lawfulness of self-defence in the general framework of jus ad 
bellum, according to several norms set out in international law, e.g. the 
principle of sovereignty. All states are required to respect other states’ 
sovereignty and as established in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, to refrain 
from the use of force against another state. However, the prohibition in 
Article 2(4) does not apply when a state invites another state to use force 
within its territory; this is known as an ‘invitation to intervene’. In such 
scenarios, raising the issue of self-defence is irrelevant, as self-defence is 
the unilateral use of force without permission of the host state.  
 
In the Second part of this Chapter, the principle of necessity is examined by 
studying factors that affect the meaning of necessity. Arguably, there are 
three factors affecting how necessity is determined. First, it is judged 
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according to whether the defensive measure is taken in anticipatory or pre-
emptive self-defence, which relies on the concept of imminence. Imminence 
is absent in pre-emptive self-defence, and so it is argued that the use of 
force in pre-emptive self-defence cannot be deemed to meet the condition of 
necessity. However, anticipatory self-defence is argued to fulfil the condition 
of necessity.   
 
The second factor affecting the meaning of necessity is the aim of the action 
taken in self-defence. It is important to consider the aim of self-defence, as it 
determines how a state determines whether the use of force is necessary. A 
commonly accepted aim of self-defence is to halt or repel an armed attack, 
and this is described as a legitimate aim of self-defence. For instance, the 
necessity to use force in self-defence is judged according to whether it is 
necessary to halt and repel an armed attack. However, the concept of 
halting and repelling an armed attack is one that is challenged if the notion of 
anticipatory self-defence is accepted, as in this instance no armed attack 
has occurred. Similarly, the halt and repel school notion may be seen as 
irrelevant or pointless in the case of finished attacks, as there is no longer a 
need to halt or repel. Therefore, in the case of a completed attack the 
legitimate aim of self-defence is no longer applicable.  
 
The third and final factor affecting the meaning of necessity concerns the 
aggressor entity. This Chapter argues that the aggressor entity, whether a 
state or a non-state actor, influences how necessity is seen by the invoking 
state. In fact, it is the main submission of this Chapter that the application of 
necessity in self-defence is heavily dependent on the entity of the aggressor. 
Therefore, this Chapter will explore the standard of necessity in the context 
of terrorism, by examining the theory of ‘unwilling or unable’, which provide 
the platform from which to assess whether it is necessary to use force 
against a non-state actor in another territory.  
 
2. Factors Affecting Lawfulness of Self-Defence  
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The general law governing the use of force includes norms in international 
law. Fundamental amongst these norms is the principle of sovereignty, and 
the prohibition on the use of force against another state. In any use of force, 
including when exercising the right to self-defence, the invoking state must 
consider the implication of force upon sovereignty of the affected state, and 
the prohibition to use force.  
 
The principle of sovereignty and the prohibition on the use of force may 
affect the lawfulness of any state claiming to exercise self-defence. These 
two factors are poignant considerations when determining the lawfulness of 
the use force in self-defence, including if it is directed toward a non-state 
actor. Observing that a state must consider these two factors, acting in self-
defence against a non-state actor is a situation that requires the invoking 
state to balance the interests of its national security from terrorist attack 
emanating from over its border, and the use of force in another state.1 This 
inevitably violates the sovereignty of the affected state contravening the 
prohibition on the use of force.  
 
The following section explores the effect of foreign intervention on 
sovereignty, by way of consent. As explained above, this is commonly 
termed ‘invitation to intervene’. When a state consents to a foreign entity’s 
intervention in their internal affairs, this automatically overrides the principle 
of sovereignty and the prohibition on the use of force.2 However, the issue of 
consent is complex, and sometimes makes it difficult to determine 
lawfulness in particular situations. This also affects the lawfulness of the use 
of force.  
 
a. Sovereignty 
 
                                            
1 Noam Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Non-State Actors (OUP 
2010) 36-37  
2 Gregory Fox, ‘Intervention by Invitation’ in Marc Weller (ed), The Oxford 
Handbook on the Use of Force in International Law (OUP 2015) 818-
819; David Wippman, ‘Military Intervention, Regional Organizations, and 
Host-State Consent’ (1996) 7 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 209, 209  
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The principle of sovereignty is an important concept in modern international 
legal discourse. The history of the modern principle of sovereignty can be 
traced to the Treaty of Westphalia3 in 1648, which recognised the 
emergence of the European nation state.4 This gave each state exclusive 
rights to exercise territorial jurisdiction and legal independence, free from 
any intervention by foreign powers in its domestic affairs.5 The concept of 
sovereignty has been developing and evolving ever since the establishment 
of the nation-state system, in the 16th and 17th centuries.  
 
In contemporary international law, the concept of sovereignty is still pertinent 
as a principle for regulating interstate relations. For instance, Article 2(1) of 
the UN Charter states, “The Organisation (the UN) is based on the principle 
of the sovereign equality of all its members”.6 Prior to the establishment of 
the UN, the principle of sovereignty had already been enshrined as a 
concept of modern international law in the early 20th century. The case of 
Wimbledon in the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) illustrates 
this point.7 The Court remarked, “the right of entering into international 
engagements is an attribute of State sovereignty”.8 The Court, in this case 
interpreted the concept of sovereignty as confined to consent-based on legal 
rules. Nonetheless, the notion that a state is sovereign and capable of 
entering into a legal binding relationship under its own freewill was confirmed 
and acknowledged in the Lotus case in 1927.9 This reflects the importance 
                                            
3 Treaty of Westphalia (24 October 1648) 1 Parry 271; 1 Parry 119  
4 Samantha Besson, ‘Sovereignty’ in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (Online)  
5 Samantha Besson, ‘Sovereignty’ in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (Online)  
6 Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter 1945 1 UNTS XVI  
7 S.S Wimbledon (United Kingdom v Japan) 1923 PCIJ (Ser. A) No. 1 (17 
August 1923) 25  
8 S.S Wimbledon (United Kingdom v Japan) 1923 PCIJ (Ser. A) No. 1 (17 
August 1923) 25  
9 The Court states that:  
‘The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free 
will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as 
expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the 
relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a 
view to the achievement of common aims.’ 
- 188 - 
of the principle of sovereignty in contemporary international law. However, 
the traditional understanding of sovereignty in the early 19th century 
concerned state’s exclusive power over their own territory was challenged by 
evolving issues in international law such as human rights, self-determination, 
economic and technological interdependence.10  
 
Meanwhile, an aspect of sovereignty that remains a core principle is 
territorial sovereignty. This refers to the notion that a state has the fullest 
authority over the territory it governs.11 It is ad rem to raise the issue of 
territorial sovereignty in any discussion on the use of force, as it affects the 
lawfulness of an action. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter expressly obliges 
member states to refrain from the use of force against the “territorial integrity 
or political independence of any state”.12 Therefore, the rule that a state is 
sovereign relates to its primacy in administering its territory free from foreign 
intervention.  
 
By default, any use of force against a territory of another state is a violation 
of the affected state’s sovereignty, and the prohibition in the Charter Article 
2(4). This includes determining whether a state directs the use of force 
against a non-state actor. The challenge of today’s jus ad bellum is to 
balance the principle of sovereignty, which each state must observe at all 
times, while addressing terrorist threats.13 However, the restrictions imposed 
by sovereignty and prohibitions against the use of force, as contained in 
Article 2(4) can be overcome if the host state consents to the intervention of 
a foreign entity, including the use of force within its territory. 
                                                                                                                           
S.S Lotus (France v. Turkey) 1927 PCIJ (Ser. A) No. 10 (7 September 1927) 
18 
10 David Held, ‘The Changing Structure of International Law: Sovereignty 
Transformed?’ in David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds), The Global 
Transformations Reader (2nd edn, Polity 2003) 162-175; Jens Bartelson. 
‘The Concept of Sovereignty Revisited’ (2006) 17 EJIL 463-474; Helene 
Ruiz Fabri, ‘Human Rights and State Sovereignty: Have the Boundaries 
been Significantly Redrawn?’ in Philip Alstan and Euan MacDonal (eds), 
Human Rights, Intervention, and the Use of Force (OUP 2008) 33-86 
11 Malcolm Shaw, international Law (5th edn, CUP 2008) 490 
12 Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter 1945 1 UNTS XVI  
13 Malcolm Shaw, international Law (5th edn, CUP 2008) 43-44 
- 189 - 
 
b. Exemption to the Rule of Sovereignty: Consent to Use 
Force  
 
The use of force by one state in another state’s territory on the basis of 
consent is generally accepted in international law.14 This is commonly 
termed ‘invitation to intervene’. Consent may be given by one state to 
another state (or group of states) for various reasons, such as combatting 
international terrorism. Such consent effectively overrides the principle that a 
state is free from intervention by a foreign state, thus, the intervening state is 
not then acting contrary to Article 2(4) of the prohibition. Article 20 of the 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility states:  
 
“Valid consent by a State to the commission of a given act by another 
State precludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation to the former 
State to the extent that the act remains within the limits of that 
consent.”15 
 
In Nicaragua, the Court stated “it is difficult to see what would remain of the 
principle of non-intervention in international law if intervention, which is 
already allowable at the request of the government of a State, were also to 
be allowed at the request of the opposition”.16 The Court confirmed the 
lawfulness of an invitation to intervene in DRC v Uganda. In this case, the 
Court reiterated that consent can be given by one state to another state 
upon the request of the government.17 In addition, the Court also 
                                            
14 Gregory H. Fox, ‘Intervention by Invitation’ in Marc Weller (ed), The Oxford 
Handbook on the Use of Force in International Law (OUP 2015) 816-840  
15 Article 20 of Draft Article Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts 2001 UN Doc. A/RES/56/83 (28 January 2002)  
16 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
US) ICJ Rep. p. 14, p. 126 para. 246 
17 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v Uganda) ICJ Rep. 
2005 p. 168, p. 196-199. para. 42-53  
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emphasised that consent can be withdrawn subsequently if the consenting 
state chooses to do so.18 
 
Despite the lawfulness of invitations to intervene in international law, this 
area is not free from dispute. Indeed, scholars have questioned the legality 
of intervention by dividing the type of conflict faced by the inviting state. The 
reasons for intervention may vary according to whether the situation faced is 
a civil war,19 political opposition, or a struggle for self-determination;20 thus, 
not all consent can be treated equally. Furthermore, adding to the complexity 
of this area is the basis of the invitation. A state may permit another state to 
intervene in its domestic affairs on the grounds of a treaty obligation, or 
based on previous practice.21 As such, consent may vary according to its 
legal foundation.  
 
A complex aspect of the invitation to intervene concerns the question of who 
is an appropriate authority to issue consent. There is an abundance of state 
practice implied when a government gives consent, and often the context is 
questionable.22 The main suspicion when giving consent to another state to 
interfere in the domestic affairs of a host state, concerns whether the 
invitation is intended as a genuine consent or as a pretext for the unlawful 
use of force.23 
                                            
18 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v Uganda) ICJ Rep. 
2005 p. 168, p. 196-199. para. 42-53  
19 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (3rd edn, OUP 
2008) 82-84 
20 Louise Doswald-Beck, ‘The Legal Validity of Military Intervention of the 
Government’ 56 (1985) BYIL 189-252, 200-207 
21 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (3rd edn, OUP 
2008) 92-96 
22 Among others France’s intervention in Tunisia in 1980 to combat 
insurgents emanating from Libya, US support in Guatemala in 1954 
through coup and involvement of  Senegal in Guinea-Bissau in 1998 
against army uprising (Keesings (1998) 42323).See also Christine Grey, 
International Law and the Use of Force (3rd edn, OUP 2008) 99-105 The 
author extensively analyse the complexity Lebanon’s consent for Syrian 
troops in Lebanon and the role of other states which affects the Syria’s 
legal position in Lebanon.  
23 Louise Doswald-Beck, ‘The Legal Validity of Military Intervention of the 
Government’ 56 (1985) BYIL 189-252, 211 
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A recent example of this, which illustrates the difficulty of establishing the 
appropriate body to give consent, is the Ukraine. At the end of 2013, an 
uprising occurred, mainly centred in Kiev in which many Ukrainians opposed 
the government’s policies.24 The uprising eventually led to the overthrow of 
President Yanukovych; Ukraine’s Parliament voted to remove him and chose 
an interim leader.25 President Yanukovych later fled the country, claiming he 
was still the democratically elected President of Ukraine and that the coup 
against him was illegal.  
 
The uprising in Ukraine focused on Crimea, a peninsula in southern Ukraine. 
Ukraine claimed that Russia had committed an act of aggression by illegally 
entering its territory.26 Russia explained to the Security Council that its 
actions had been carried out at the request of Ukraine’s fugitive President, 
and that it had the right ‘to use the armed forces of the Russian Federation 
to establish legitimacy, peace, law and order and stability in defence of the 
people of Ukraine.’27 Subsequently, Russia deployed thousands of its forces 
to Crimea, annexing the territory after a referendum held on 16 March 
2014.28 
 
The situation in Ukraine demonstrates the problem of determining the 
appropriate authority to give consent to a foreign state to intervene. In this 
example, the question concerned whether the consent given by President 
Yanukovych could be regarded as legitimate and lawful as he was the de 
jure President of Ukraine. Commentators were divided on this issue.29 
                                            
24 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-26248275 (accessed on 16 
September 2014)  
25 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26304842 (accessed 3 
September 2014)  
26 UN Doc. S/PV.7124 (1 March 2014) p.3 
27 UN Doc. S/PV.7125 (3 March 2014) p.4  
28 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-26248275 (accessed on 16 
September 2014)  
29 Gregory Fox, ‘Ukraine Insta-Symposium: Intervention in the Ukraine by 
Invitation’ http://opiniojuris.org/2014/03/10/ukraine-insta-symposium-
intervention-ukraine-invitation/ (accessed on 22 September 2014);  
Grigory Vaypan ‘(Un)Invited Guests: The Validity of Russia’s Argument 
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Noting the complexity of the requirement of consent to intervene, there was 
a stark contrast indicated regarding the straightforward principle enunciated 
by the ICJ in the Nicaragua and DRC v Uganda cases, regarding allowing 
states to use force by invitation. Whether the consent given by the president 
is lawful or otherwise is subject to continuous debate; this shows that 
intervention by invitation involves more detailed consideration if it is to be 
considered the legal use of force.  
 
The invitation to intervene should be judged on the validity of the consent. 
Consent may be given by a government to another state by way of an 
international or regional legal framework, or in accordance with mutual 
understanding. Oliver Corten argues that for consent to be considered valid 
it must possess four conditions. First, it must be anterior to the act. Second, 
should be given freely and unvitiated. Thirdly, the consent must clearly be 
established, and fourthly, it must be relevant to the act in question.30  
 
However, in practice, not all consent is likely to conform to Corten’s four 
conditions. The situation in Pakistan exemplifies this. After the 9/11 attacks, 
the US government embarked on its ‘War on Terror’ campaign, mainly 
focusing on Al-Qaeda and associated organisations.31 The terrorist group 
was believed to be based in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), 
north of Pakistan, at the border with Afghanistan. The US repeatedly 
                                                                                                                           
on Intervention by Invitation’ (5 March 2014) Cambridge Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 
http://cjicl.org.uk/2014/03/05/uninvited-guests-validity-russias-argument-
intervention-invitation/ (accessed on 23 September 2014); Zachary 
Vermeer, ‘Intervention with the Consent of a Deposed (but Legitimate) 
Government? Playing the Sierra Leone Card (6 March 2014) Blog of the 
European Journal of International Law   
http://www.ejiltalk.org/intervention-with-the-consent-of-a-deposed-but-
legitimate-government-playing-the-sierra-leone-card/ (accessed 22 
September 2014)  
30 Olivier Corten, The Law Against War (Hart Publishing 2012) 266-276 
31 See President George Bush’s speech at the Joint Session of the 107th 
Congress, 20 September 2001. http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Spee
ches_George_W_Bush.pdf  
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launched counter-terrorist operations using drone planes targeting militants 
within the FATA region.32 
 
There are conflicting opinions regarding the validity of the consent based 
upon which the US drones operated in Pakistan.33 Pakistan’s government 
strenuously denied that it had explicitly consented to the US launching drone 
operations within its territory against the terrorists, circumventing the 
possibility of tacit consent by Pakistan.34 Many Pakistanis saw the drone 
operations as a violation of their state sovereignty, and condemned the 
killing of innocent civilians unaffiliated to terrorist groups. However, sources 
suggest that Pakistan tacitly permitted the US to use its drones in the FATA 
region.35 Such claims have some merit. The drone strikes in FATA may have 
assisted the Pakistani government to strengthen its security in the country, 
especially in the FATA region. This effectively represents the US and 
Pakistan governments working together to eradicate terrorism, although 
                                            
32 Sikander Ahmed Shah, ‘War on Terrorism: Self Defense, Operation 
Enduring Freedom, And the Legality of U.S Drone Attacks in Pakistan’ 
(2010) 77 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 77-129, 
113-115 
33 See Dawood I. Ahmed, ‘Rethinking Anti-Drone Legal Strategies: 
Questioning Pakistani and Yemeni “Consent”’ (2013) 8 Yale Journal of 
International Affairs 1-11  
34 ‘No ‘tacit consent’ to US for Drone Strikes: Pakistan’  
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-09-
28/news/34148524_1_drone-strikes-drone-attacks-missile-strikes (28 
September 2012); ‘Pakistan is Not Co-Operating with US over Drones, 
Ministry Insists’ (The Guardian, 28 September 2012) 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/28/pakistan-military-drones-
america.  See admission from ‘two anonymous senior White House 
Officials’ on Pakistan’s tacit approval of the drone operation in Pakistan. 
This reported in ‘U.S. Unease Over Drone Strikes’ (Wall Street Journal, 
26 September 2012)   
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100008723963904441004045776415208
58011452   
35 Chris Wood, ‘Drone Strikes in Pakistan’ The Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism 28 September 2012 
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/09/28/pakistan-
categorically-rejects-claim-that-it-tacitly-allows-us-drone-strikes/; See 
Former Pakistan’s President, Pervez Musharraf, admitted there was a 
limited drone operations conducted by the US approved by the Pakistani 
government. http://edition.cnn.com/2013/04/11/world/asia/pakistan-
musharraf-drones/  
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politically, admitting cooperation with the US was unpopular among the 
public.  
 
After evaluating the competing views of consent given by Pakistan’s 
government over the drone operations, it is argued that consent must be 
clearly established in order to substantiate the validity of any consent. In the 
case of Pakistan, if the US were not given consent to launch drone strikes in 
FATA, then they would have amounted to violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty 
and thereby be unlawful.36 Conversely, if consent was given, and the US 
exercised force within the remit of this consent, their actions would not 
contravene the prohibition on the use of force. The lack of an admission by 
Pakistan that consent existed leaves legal commentators with limited 
knowledge of the facts, impeding full analysis of the situation.  
 
As mentioned previously, scholars are divided on the legality and the scope 
of consent in international law. They differ on the issue of whether consent 
stands as an independent basis for one state choosing to exercise force in 
another state, including consent to the use of force against a non-state 
actor37. If consent is not sufficient to justify the use of force in another state, 
the alternative component of the lawful unilateral use of force is self-
                                            
36 See statement by Ben Emmerson, UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-
Terrorism and Human Rights, on the drone operations in FATA. He 
concluded that due to no consent by the Government of Pakistan, the 
operation is a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
(14 March 2013)  
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID
=13146&LangID=E 
37 Sean Murphy, ‘The International Legality of US Military Cross-Border 
Operations from Afghanistan into Pakistan’ (2009) 85 International Law 
Studies 109-139, 118 (Argues that once consent is given it sufficient as 
a legal basis for the US to use force in Pakistan). See contrast, Mary 
O’Connell, ‘Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of 
Pakistan 2004-2009’ Notre Dame Law School, Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 09-43 (find 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1501144) p. 16-17 
(argues that consent to use force in the host state by an external states 
is not applicable in the absence of armed conflict hostilities)  
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defence.38 It is therefore advantageous that the acting state (the state 
receiving the consent) to offer multiple justifications to use force in another 
state, preferably consent and the right to self-defence.39 However, Ashley 
Deeks argues that the acting state must not blindly accept the invitation to 
act, as this conflicts with domestic law and the international human rights 
obligations of the host state.40 She further asserted that the acting state has 
a ‘duty to inquire’ and seek due diligence regarding the nature of the 
consent.41 It follows that if consent does not preclude wrongfulness in using 
force in another state, the only provision the acting state could rely on is the 
right to self-defence. The right to self-defence still dominates discussions 
over the legality of the use of force, even in the context of consent. Part 3 
below will discuss factors affecting the role of necessity in the law of self-
defence.  
 
                                            
38 Marko Milanovic, ‘More on Drones, Self-Defense, and the Alston Report 
on Targeted Killings’. Can be found at: 
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/03/07/hilj-symposium-consent-to-the-use-of-
force-jus-cogens-and-manifest-violations-of-domestic-law/(published (5 
June 2010) (The author argues that if consent is given it is irrelevant to 
discuss about self-defence.); Benedict R. Wiot, ‘Drone Defense: The 
Inherent Right of Self-Defense and U.S Drone Strikes in Pakistan’ 1-25. 
The author argues for the permissibility of drone strikes as a right to self-
defence and further contests that some aspects of jus ad bellum do not 
provide realistic self-defence framework in combatting current terrorist 
threat. (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1986509) (6 
June 2011)  
39 Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Address at Annual 
Meeting of American Society of International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), 
available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm; John 
B. Bellinger III, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Address at London 
School of Economics: Legal Issues in the War on Terrorism (Oct. 31, 
2006)  
40 Ashley Deeks, ‘Consent to the Use of Force and International Law 
Supremacy’ (2013) 54 Harvard Journal of International Law 1-60, 33 
41 Ashley Deeks, ‘Consent to the Use of Force and International Law 
Supremacy’ (2013) 54 Harvard Journal of International Law 1-60, 33; 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/drones-and-targeted-killings-can-self-defense-
preclude-their-wrongfulness/ (the author hinted that even a state that 
invokes the right to self-defence is not free from international human 
rights norms.) See opposing view on the ‘duty to inquire’ 
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/03/07/hilj-symposium-consent-to-the-use-of-
force-jus-cogens-and-manifest-violations-of-domestic-law/  
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In summary, the rule that a state may invite another state to intervene in its 
domestic affairs is permissible under international law. A legitimate 
government of a state may invite another state to intervene within its 
territory. As shown above, invitations to intervene may be straight-forward 
exercises in which a host state permits another state to use force within its 
jurisdiction. However, the details of this consent may result in confusion 
about the authority in-charge of issuing the consent, such as in the case of 
Ukraine and Russia. The case of Pakistan illustrates that consent must be 
established and confirmed by the host state. If consent cannot be affirmed, 
then any use of force by a foreign entity in the host state is unlawful. 
However, scholars, such as Ashley Deeks, argue that not all types of 
invitation should be accepted, and that consent must conform to domestic 
laws and human rights obligations. If consent does not preclude 
wrongfulness, a state can only rely on the right to self-defence to justify its 
use of force in another state.  
 
3. Factors Affecting the Principle of Necessity  
 
As stated elsewhere in this thesis, the law of self-defence requires that a 
state should comply with the principles of necessity and proportionality, and 
failure to do so may be deemed unlawful.42 Specifically on the subject of 
necessity, a state must consider all relevant factors when considering what 
action is necessary in self-defence. Whilst this thesis argues that necessity 
is heavily influenced by the nature of the aggressor (depending on whether it 
is a state or non-state actor), other considerations also influence the 
meaning of necessity under the law of self-defence.   
 
                                            
42 ICJ cases:  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States of America) ICJ Rep 1986 p 94 para 176; 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ 
Rep 1996 p 245 para 41; Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic 
Republic of Iran v. United States of America) ICJ Rep 2003 p 198 para 
76; Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo (Democratic Republic of 
Congo v. Uganda) ICJ Rep 2005 p 223 para 147 
 Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (OUP 1963) 
279 
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Arguably, there are at least three considerations influencing the meaning of 
necessity in the course of self-defence. First, the claims of anticipatory or 
pre-emptive self-defence will have an effect on the meaning of necessity. 
Article 51 permits states to use force in self-defence in the event of an 
armed attack. To launch action in self-defence before the occurrence of an 
armed attack arguably falls outside the perimeter of Article 51. However, 
some authors have argued that anticipatory self-defence is lawful and 
permitted by the provision.43 A more contentious view which is shared by few 
scholars suggests that pre-emptive self-defence is lawful in international law; 
at least permissible in limited circumstances.44 Nonetheless, were both the 
claims regarding anticipatory and pre-emptive self-defence to be accepted in 
jus ad bellum, they might then prove relevant to the meaning of necessity.  
 
The second factor that may affect the meaning of necessity involves 
understanding the aim of self-defence. In order to understand to what extent 
force is necessary, a benchmark must be established to prevent a state from 
employing the unnecessary use of force. This can be achieved by 
understanding the aims of actions in self-defence. States invoking self-
defence and employing force that extends beyond the scope of self-defence 
may be regarded as an unnecessary use of force, and as such is deemed 
unlawful. As discussed in Chapter IV of this thesis, the majority view of 
                                            
43 Such as Derek Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law (OUP 1958) 
1855-186; Thomas Franck, Recourse to Force (CUP 2004) 97; Robert 
Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law (Vol. 1, 
Longman 1992) 421-422 (‘Normally anticipatory self-defence is unlawful 
but not in all circumstances’); See Helen Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and 
the Framework of International Law (CUP 2005) 209-212  
44 Thomas Franck, Recourse to Force (CUP 2004) 97-108 (He argues that 
the centrality of any pre-emptive strikes relies on the probity of evidence 
which compels the victim state to react. He displays the permissibility of 
pre-emptive strikes on Israel’s aerial strike of Osirak nuclear plant and 
deemed it as lawful); David Wippman, ‘Do New Wars Call New Law?’ in 
David Wippman and Michael Evangelista (eds), The New Wars, New 
Laws? Applying Laws of War in 21st Century Conflicts (Martinus Nijhoff 
2005) 1-28; See the arguments calling for pre-emptive self-defence in 
light of the changing warfare against non-state actors Lindsay Moir, 
Reappraising the Resort to Force (Hart 2010) 75-81; David B. Rivkin Jr. 
and Lee A. Casey, ‘Using Force Lawfully in the 21st Century’ (2006) 81 
International Law Studies 319-336 
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scholars regarding the legitimate aim of self-defence relates to repelling an 
armed attack. The concept of necessity in self-defence becomes problematic 
when states invoke self-defence but incorporate parallel aims.  
 
Finally, the principle of proportionality also influences the meaning of 
necessity in self-defence. The principle of necessity aligns with the principle 
of proportionality when assessing the legality of self-defence. There is, 
therefore, inevitably a correlation between proportionality and necessity.45  
 
a. Necessity in Anticipatory and Pre-Emptive Self-Defence  
 
The debate on anticipatory and pre-emptive self-defence here is a 
continuation of discussions raised in Chapter II.46 Generally, arguments in 
support of, and against anticipatory and pre-emptive self-defence centre on 
the lawfulness of both claims in international law, and whether there is a 
sound basis for them in the UN Charter, or under customary international 
law. Specifically, the discussion focuses on the interpretation of Article 51, 
which requires the existence of ‘an armed attack’.  
 
i. Distinction between Anticipatory and Pre-Emptive Self-
Defence  
 
To reiterate and develop the discussion raised in Chapter II, it is important to 
elaborate on the debate on the permissibility of anticipatory self-defence as 
defined in Article 51. The debate started in 1958, when Bowett argued in 
favour of the inclusion of anticipatory self-defence in the provision. He 
argued that Article 51 cannot be interpreted restrictively, and that this can be 
substantiated by examining the travaux prepartoire of the UN Charter.47 In 
                                            
45 James Green, The International Court of Justice and Self-Defence in 
International Law (Hart Publishing 2009) 89; Christine Gray, 
International Law and the Use of Force (3rd edn, OUP 2008) 150; Olivier 
Corten, The Law Against War (Hart Publishing 2012) 488  
46 Chapter II 3.b) Anticipatory Self-Defence of this thesis.  
47 Derek Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law (OUP 1958) 188-189 
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contrast, Brownlie, writing in 1963, argues that Article 51 prevents states 
from invoking anticipatory self-defence, regardless of how the provision is 
interpreted; he further suggested that arguments to the contrary (in support 
of anticipatory self-defence under Article 51) are either unconvincing or 
based on ‘inconclusive pieces of evidence’.48  
 
The debate has been continued by more recent scholars, who have argued 
for and against the interpretation of anticipatory self-defence in Article 51. 
For example, inter alia, Mc Courbey and White, Dinstein,49 Franck,50 
Higgins,51 and Ruys52 have all contributed to discussions on anticipatory 
self-defence. Discussions became more heated post the 9/11 attacks, when 
jus ad bellum focused on the application of self-defence against non-state 
actors.53  
 
The concept of pre-emptive self-defence is not a new terminology in jus ad 
bellum, but discussion of it was reignited post 9/11 when the United States 
published its National Security Strategy in 2002.54 The term pre-emptive self-
defence is often referred as the ‘Bush Doctrine’ as it relates to President 
                                            
48 Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force By States (OUP 
1963) 276-278  
49 Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (5th edn, CUP 2012) 
194-196 
50 Thomas Franck, Recourse to Force (CUP 2004) 98-99 
51 Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The Attitude of Western States Towards Legal Aspects 
of the Use of Force’ in Antonio Cassese (ed), The Current Legal 
Regulation of the Use of Force (Martinus Nijhoff 1986) 442  
52 Tom Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the UN Charter (CUP 2010) 
255-267 
53 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edn, 
OUP 2012) 752; Noëlle Quénivet, ‘The World after September 11: Has It 
Really Changed?’ (2005) 16 EJIL 561-577; Antonio Cassese, ‘Terrorism  
is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law’ 
(2001) 12 EJIL 993-1001; Theresa Reinold, ‘State Weakness, Irregular 
Warfare, and the Right to Self-Defense Post-9/11’ (2011) 105 AJIL 244-
286; Michael Byers, ‘Terrorism, The Use of Force and International Law 
After 11 September’ (2002) 51 ICLQ 401-404  
54 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (The White 
House, September 2002) 
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Bush authorising the use of force by expanding the traditional meaning of 
self-defence.55 
 
The meaning of anticipatory and pre-emptive self-defence in legal literature 
varies between scholars, and some authors use these terminologies 
interchangeably.56 Other terms have also been used to describe similar 
notions, such as ‘preventive’ self-defence. Nevertheless, for the purpose of 
clarity, it is restated here that there are differences between each term, 
which are not universally used in all publications. The following meaning is 
used in this thesis. ‘Anticipatory self-defence’ denotes the use of force prior 
to an armed attack where the attack is deemed as ‘imminent’.57 Whilst ‘pre-
emptive self-defence’ refers to the use of force without an armed attack, and 
where the attack is perceived as remote (not imminent).58 Any use of force 
prior to an armed attack in general is defined as ‘preventive self-defence’.59 
In spite of any claims to self-defence, whether anticipatory or pre-emptive, 
the two conditions of necessity and proportionality must be observed.60  
 
The distinction between anticipatory and pre-emptive self-defence concerns 
the notion of imminence. The proponents of anticipatory self-defence argue 
that in the absence of an actual attack, an imminent attack permits the 
defending state to recourse to force.61 However, the meaning of imminence 
is a broad concept within the principle of necessity, encompassing among 
                                            
55 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (3rd edn, OUP 
2008) 209-210 
56 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (3rd edn, OUP 
2008) 211-212 
57 James Green, The International Court of Justice and Self-Defence in 
International Law (Hart Publishing 2008) 28 
58 Niaz Shah, ‘Self-Defence, Anticipatory Self-Defence and Pre-Emption: 
International Law’s Response to Terrorism’ (2007) 12 JSCL 95-126, 110  
59 James Green, The International Court of Justice and Self-Defence in 
International Law (Hart Publishing 2008) 28 
60 See Section 4 of Chapter 2 of this thesis  
61 The UK-Attorney General position the legality of anticipatory self-defence 
in the House of Lords Debate 21 April 2004, Columns 369-370; In the 
UN Secretary-General Report  on High Panel (2004) (A/59/565 - 2 
December 2004) p. 54 Para.188; In Larger Freedom Report 2005 
(A/59/2005, 21 March 2005) para. 124; Tom Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and 
Article 51 of the UN Charter (CUP 2010) 255-257  
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others, the temporal dimension of an armed attack, the nature of the attack 
and the circumstance of irreversible emergency.62 These factors can all be 
construed within the definition of imminence for the purpose of self-defence.  
 
However, arguably pre-emptive self-defence extends beyond what is 
expressly permitted in jus ad bellum.63 The use of force in self-defence must 
conform to the requirement of Article 51 that there is an ‘armed attack’. Even 
if the armed attack has not yet occurred, the affected state should only 
invoke the right to self-defence if an armed attack is imminent (anticipatory 
self-defence). The problem with allowing pre-emptive self-defence is that it 
could be used by a state to justify initiating actions in self-defence based on 
latent and obscure threats, consequently threatening the validity of the entire 
legal system and opening it up to abuse.64 It is evident that allowing pre-
emptive self-defence would undermine the aim of restraining a state from the 
use of force in the international legal system into perilous slope.65 Therefore, 
pre-emptive self-defence is unlawful under the present jus ad bellum regime. 
Nonetheless, for the purpose of academic discussion, this section will 
include the claim of pre-emptive self-defence when analysing the principle of 
necessity.  
 
In summary, according to the traditional meaning of self-defence in Article 51 
of the UN Charter, and customary international law, a state might choose to 
exercise the right to self-defence if an armed attack occurs. Moreover, self-
defence prior to the occurrence of an armed attack is permissible if the 
attack is imminent; this is referred to as anticipatory self-defence. However, 
pre-emptive self-defence describes the use of force prior to an armed attack 
                                            
62 Elizabeth Wilmhurst (ed), ‘Principles of International Law on the Use of 
Force by States in Self-Defence’ (Chatham House, October 2005) 8-9  
63 Consider opposing arguments in support of pre-emptive self-defence. See 
e.g. Anthony Arend, ‘International Law and the Preemptive Use of 
Military Force’ (2003) 26 The Washington Quarterly 89-103; Michael 
Reisman and Andrea Armstrong, ‘The Past and Future of the Claim of 
Preemptive Self-Defense’ (2006) 100 AJIL 525-550  
64 Thomas Franck, ‘What Happens Now? The United Nations after Iraq’ 
(2003) 97 AJIL 607-620, 619  
65 Noam Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Non-State Actors (OUP 
2010) 62  
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in cases where an armed attack is not imminent, and so falls outside the 
perimeter of Article 51 and customary international law. Allowing states to 
act on the basis of pre-emptive self-defence undermines the spirit of the UN 
Charter of non-aggression; however, it will be considered below in the 
discussion presented concerning the implication of anticipatory and pre-
emptive for necessity.  
 
ii. The Effects of Anticipatory and Pre-Emptive Self-Defence in 
Necessity  
 
Despite continued debate on the lawfulness of anticipatory and pre-emptive 
self-defence, there are limited discussions directed toward the principles of 
necessity and proportionality, and how these principles are realised.66 There 
are some scholars who agree that anticipatory self-defence is lawful, 
whether substantiated by Article 51 or under customary international law. 
However, it is important to also establish the status or position of necessity 
and proportionality in anticipatory and pre-emptive self-defence.67 There is a 
gap in the academic literature regarding this link. Arguably, if anticipatory 
and pre-emptive self-defence are to be considered lawful, this then 
substantially shifts how necessity and proportionality are interpreted in the 
framework of self-defence. It suggests necessity and proportionality are not 
generic concepts aligned with all types of self-defence, but can be 
interpreted according to context.  
 
                                            
66 See Judith Gardam,  Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force by 
States (CUP 2004); Abraham Sofaer, ‘On the Necessity of Pre-Emption’ 
(2003) 14 EJIL 209-226; Dapo Akande and Thomas Liefländer, 
‘Clarifying Necessity, Imminence, and Proportionality in the Law of Self-
Defense’ (2013) 107 AJIL 563-570; Daniel Bethlehem, ‘Self-Defense 
Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate Ators’ (2012) 
106 AJIL 769-777; Christian J Tams and James G Devaney, ‘Applying 
Necessity and Proportionality to Anti-Terrorist Self-Defence’ (2012) 45 
Israel Law Review 91-106  
67 Christian Henderson, ‘The Use of Force and Islamic State’ (2014) 1 
Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 209-222, 219 
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The traditional meaning of self-defence in Article 51 requires the occurrence 
of an armed attack against a victim state, which might then use force against 
the attacking state. This means the invoking state invokes necessity based 
on the requirement that an armed attack has occurred. However, in 
anticipatory self-defence, the use of force takes place prior to the existence 
of an armed attack; thus, the victim state might find it difficult to invoke 
sufficient necessity. At the very least, the interpretation of necessity would 
not be similar to the reactive (traditional) meaning of self-defence. This is 
because the issue raised concerns how each state fulfils the requirement of 
necessity if no armed attack has occurred, in cases of anticipatory self-
defence.  
 
Arguably, if Article 51 attaches the meaning of necessity to the existence of 
an armed attack, then the claim of anticipatory self-defence might still fulfil 
the requirement of necessity because the armed attack is imminent, even if it 
has not yet occurred. Waldock argues that, even if a physical armed attack 
has not yet occurred, but the attack has been mounted, then it could be said 
to have begun.68 Furthermore, it is reasonable to suggest that it would be 
contrary to the spirit of international law on self-defence if an armed attack 
were expected and certain to hit the victim state, and yet the law denies the 
right of the victim state to react.69 Therefore, anticipatory self-defence is 
acknowledged as justified and meeting the criteria of necessity subject to an 
imminent armed attack. Nonetheless, the position of necessity in anticipatory 
self-defence reflects the understanding that necessity is not a generic 
principle, as it is subject to different factors, as in the case of anticipatory 
self-defence.  
 
Accepting pre-emptive self-defence may undermine the principle of 
necessity in the law of self-defence. Notwithstanding the dispute over the 
lawfulness of pre-emptive self-defence, it is difficult to establish how 
                                            
68 Humphrey Waldock, ‘The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual 
States in International Law’ (1952) 81 Recueil Des Cours 451, 498  
69 Tom Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the UN Charter (CUP 2010) 
250  
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necessity could be proven if there is no imminent attack, and where the 
attack seems to be too remote to occur. Certainly, the absence of an 
imminent attack in cases of pre-emptive self-defence could be regarded as 
resulting in the unnecessary use of force, and consequently deemed illegal 
(as failure to meet the condition of necessity). If an armed attack is not 
imminent this then raises the question of whether the victim state has 
explored non-forcible options to counter the existing threat (as a last resort).  
 
The position of necessity in pre-emptive self-defence against a non-state 
actor is even more obscure. It is difficult to see how a state can justify acting 
in necessity against a terrorist group that has not launched an armed attack 
on its territory. In such a scenario, the problems of whether it is necessary to 
use force in at all, and the violation of the principle of sovereignty is 
amplified. This context further reflects the conceptual difficulty associated 
with necessity in the application of pre-emptive self-defence. Meanwhile, it is 
understood that the type of self-defence then shapes the principle of 
necessity, whether reactive, anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defence. Thus, 
it could be said that there is no one-size-fits-all necessity for establishing 
types of self-defence. 
 
iii. The Effects of Necessity in Anticipatory and Pre-Emptive Self-
Defence against Terrorism   
 
The above sub-section examined the difficulty of accommodating the 
principle of necessity when self-defence is invoked prior to the occurrence of 
an armed attack. This part extends that analysis by including non-state 
actors in the discussion contrasting the effects of self-defence with the 
principle of necessity.  
 
The inclusion of non-state actors in the debate alters the dynamic of how 
one analyses the claims of anticipatory and pre-emptive self-defence. This is 
because the use of force is not directed towards a state entity (the host 
state). Rather the measure taken is targeted at a non-state actor 
(independent of any host state machinery) within the territory of the host 
- 205 - 
state. Recalling the discussion above, a state invoking self-defence against 
a terrorist group prima facie violates the sovereignty of the host state, and 
the prohibition on the use of force.   
 
Claiming anticipatory self-defence against a non-state actor requires an 
armed attack to be imminent. Some scholars argue that the principle of 
necessity conforms to the general framework of self-defence, even if a state 
claims anticipatory self-defence. For instance, Jennings and Watts perceive 
no conceptual difficulty in examining necessity in the context of anticipatory 
self-defence, even against non-state actors. They offer the following 
example:  
 
“When… a State is informed that a body of armed men is organized 
on neighbouring territory for the purpose of a raid into its territory, and 
then the danger can be removed through an appeal to the authorities 
of the neighbouring country or to an appropriate international 
organization, no case of necessity has arisen. But if such an appeal is 
fruitless or not possible, or if there is danger in delay, a case of 
necessity arises, and the threatened State is justified in invading the 
neighbouring country for the purpose of disarming the intending 
raiders.”70  
 
Here Jennings and Watts reflect the difficulty with determining necessity 
when acting against non-state actors. The case of necessity in anticipatory 
self-defence against a state is ‘simpler’ than determining necessity in 
anticipatory self-defence against a non-state actor. In the case of the latter, 
the victim state has to consider other international norms, such as the 
sovereignty of the host state (even though force is directed toward a non-
state actor). Lubell describes this as an ‘additional stage’, which must be 
undertaken when determining necessity in a non-state actor situation.71 The 
                                            
70 Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law (Vol. 1, 
Longman 1992) 421-422 
71 Noam Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Non-State Actors (OUP 
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role of non-state actors in the context of necessity is further discussed 
below.  
 
Claims to enact pre-emptive self-defence, which is in itself controversial, is 
made more contentious when directed toward non-state actors. The majority 
of scholars are sceptical of the scope of pre-emptive self-defence and 
question whether pre-emptive self-defence against terrorism meets the 
requirements of necessity and proportionality. Gray, for instance, raises a 
poignant question in this regard, stating: 
 
“[W]hether self-defence against terrorist attacks is permissible only 
when there has been an actual past attack or whether a purely pre-
emptive action in lawful, and if so, how such a purely pre-emptive 
action could be necessary and proportionate. Moreover, would pre-
emptive action be legal only against terrorism or also against other 
dangers?”72  
 
In this case the argument for force against a non-imminent threat may seem 
unconvincing. Rather the argument is undermined by whether the invoking 
state chooses to pursue non-forcible measures prior to employing force. For 
this reason, it is a challenge to accommodate necessity within the scope of 
pre-emptive self-defence.  
 
Alternative Solutions: Maintain the Principle of Necessity and 
Proportionality Only and Discard Other Considerations   
 
Scholars who have discussed the issues of necessity and proportionality 
have often focused on the individual content of the principles.73 This 
provides an in-depth understanding of the meaning of necessity and 
proportionality as concepts in self-defence, widening the academic 
                                            
72 Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (3rd edn, OUP 2008) 208 
73 Kimberley Trapp, ‘Back to Basics: Necessity, Proportionality, And the 
Right of Self-Defence Against Non-State Terrorist Actors’ 56 (2007) 
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discussion of jus ad bellum. However, states often invoke anticipatory or pre-
emptive self-defence, whether targeted at states or non-states, and the 
concept of necessity and proportionality in such contexts remains 
ambiguous.74 Therefore, there is additional scope for legal literature to 
discuss the position of necessity and proportionality in relation to anticipatory 
and pre-emptive self-defence. Admittedly, it is difficult to explain the 
concepts of necessity and proportionality in a fluid situation that is heavily 
reliant on the facts and circumstances associated with a particular incident.75 
This makes this area of law complex.  
 
To analyse necessity in the context of each type of self-defence, and in 
accordance with the nature of the aggressor is a complicated exercise. It 
requires minute observations within each scenario, which depend on a 
multitude of factors. Alternatively, a radical solution may be considered to 
override the complexity of the law of self-defence. This would involve 
removing any consideration of the nature of the aggressor and the type of 
self-defence, but maintaining the principles of necessity and proportionality 
as benchmarks for lawfulness. In other words, whatever the claim to self-
defence is, the fact that it is taken as an example against a terrorist group in 
pre-emptive fashion is immaterial. The act of self-defence is deemed lawful if 
it can be shown that the invoking state complies with the principles of 
necessity and proportionality. Therefore, the centrality of any self-defence 
measures are the fulfilment of the principles of necessity and proportionality.  
 
The negation of other considerations, associated with the lawfulness of self-
defence, aside from necessity and proportionality is admittedly contentious. 
Nevertheless, maintaining the legality of self-defence as seen through the 
prism of necessity and proportionality seems plausible. Article 51 of the UN 
Charter is silent on the permissibility of anticipatory or pre-emptive self-
                                            
74 Dapo Akande and Thomas Liefländer, ‘Clarifying Necessity, Imminence, 
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defence, and relies on the requirement that self-defence be predicated on 
the existence of an armed attack. Concurrent to Article 51 is the authority 
from the Caroline incident, which establishes the guiding principles of 
necessity and proportionality.76 Combining the two sources of law, self-
defence demands as a minimum the existence of an armed attack, necessity 
and proportionality.77  
 
Cases considered by the ICJ show that the Court is relatively silent on the 
permissibility of anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defence. For example, in its 
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Use of Nuclear Weapons in Armed 
Conflict, the Court indirectly touched on the issue of anticipatory self-
defence. The Court stated that it was unable to determine with unanimity 
whether the use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in extreme 
circumstances of self-defence.78 However, the Court maintained that any 
use of force in self-defence must apply the requirements of Article 51, which 
include reporting to the Security Council, and establishing the conditions of 
necessity and proportionality, ‘whatever the means of force used in self-
defence’.79 The Court is silent on the legality of anticipatory self-defence, but 
firm on the statement that self-defence measures must comply with the 
conditions of necessity and proportionality.  
 
In a more recent case, the Court was required to determine the issue of pre-
emptive self-defence between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and 
Uganda. The Ugandan High Command issued a document ‘Safe Haven’ 
instructing action on self-defence without the need for an armed attack. 
These instructions could be regarded in legal terms as anticipatory self-
                                            
76 See Chapter 3 of this thesis  
77 Article 51 also requires the invoking state to inform the Security Council 
for invoking the right to self-defence but failure to do so does not 
necessarily alter the legality of self-defence. 
78 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
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defence or pre-emptive self-defence, as military operations were sometimes 
taken without an imminent attack.80 The Court judged the objectives of the 
operation ‘Safe Haven’ as contrary to the concept of self-defence as 
understood in international law.81 The Court continued: 
 
“The Court recalls that Uganda has insisted in this case that operation 
“Safe Haven” was not a use of force against an anticipated attack. As 
was the case also in the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) case, 
“reliance is placed by the Parties only on the right of self-defence in 
the case of an armed attack which has already occurred, and the 
issue of the lawfulness of a response to the imminent threat of armed 
attack has not been raised” (I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 103, para. 194). 
The Court there found that “[a]ccordingly [it] expresses no view on 
that issue”. So it is in the present case.”82 
 
The Court rightly judged there was no need to answer on the issue of 
anticipatory self-defence, because it was not raised by Uganda. However, 
had the Court been concerned with the claim of anticipatory or pre-emptive 
self-defence in international law, which may or may not affect the legality of 
self-defence, the Court would have had the opportunity to address the 
matter in this judgment. Meanwhile, the Court deviates from answering this 
thorny issue. However, the importance of necessity and proportionality are 
deemed contentious in all cases regarding self-defence put before the ICJ. It 
may be argued, therefore, that by following the jurisprudence of the ICJ, the 
legality of self-defence is dependent on states meeting the conditions of self-
defence and not on how the defensive measures were taken.  
 
                                            
80 Michael Reisman and Adrea Armstrong, The Past and Future Claim of 
Preemptive Self-Defense (2006) 100 AJIL 525-550, 535  
81 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of 
Congo v. Uganda) ICJ Rep 2005 p 126 para 119  
82 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of 
Congo v. Uganda) ICJ Rep 2005 p 222 para 143  
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Maintaining the conditions of self-defence, necessity and proportionality, and 
removing any consideration of preventive self-defence affects the lawfulness 
of a defensive measure; however, this may seem contradictory. The 
meaning of necessity can be construed as permitting anticipatory or pre-
emptive self-defence. The Caroline incident established customary 
requirements that state choosing to invoke the right to self-defence must 
comply with necessity and proportionality. In the incident, the British 
government was arguably exercising self-defence although the 
revolutionaries had committed no armed attack against the British-Canadian 
government.83 The Caroline incident establishes the definition of necessity in 
the circumstances of anticipatory self-defence84 by defining necessity as 
‘instant overwhelming no choice of means and no moment of deliberation’. If 
this is accepted, then it is hard to disassociate the meaning of necessity from 
the concept of anticipatory self-defence, which enacted by the British during 
the Caroline incident. Therefore, there is a strong historical attachment 
between anticipatory self-defence and the meaning of necessity. Thus, 
necessity could be seen as an embodiment of anticipatory self-defence.  
 
Sofaer argues that the principle of necessity permits the use of pre-emption 
in self-defence if all criteria are met. He outlines these criteria as follows, 
firstly, the nature and magnitude of the threat involved; secondly, the 
likelihood that a threat would materialise unless pre-emptive action is taken; 
thirdly, the availability of non-forcible measures, and lastly, whether the use 
of pre-emptive force is consistent with the terms and purposes established 
under the UN Charter and other international laws.85 According to him, if all 
the four conditions are met, the use of pre-emption in self-defence is 
deemed as lawful under the principle of necessity. Therefore, even if legal 
discourse omits the question of how self-defence was employed, (whether 
reactive, anticipatory or pre-emptive), and maintains the two conditions of 
necessity and proportionality as a benchmark for the lawfulness of self-
                                            
83 See Chapter 3 on the doctrines established through the Caroline incident.  
84 Noam Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Non-State Actors (OUP 
2010) 56 
85 Abraham Sofaer, ‘On the Necessity of Pre-emption’ (2003) 14 EJIL 209-
226, 220 
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defence, necessity itself allows the use of force in anticipatory or pre-
emptive self-defence. This once again shows the possibility that the principle 
of necessity could be used as a basis upon which to justify anticipatory self-
defence.  
 
The above has shown that the jurisprudence of self-defence is problematic 
when seeking to interpret the concept of necessity. While necessity might 
restrict a state’s use of force in self-defence against an aggressor, as states 
must only utilise force to what is necessary to respond to an armed attack,86 
at the same time it might serve as a justification to launch self-defence 
including anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defence. The next Chapter 
discusses state practice and reveals that necessity can serve both as a 
requirement and a limitation to self-defence.  
 
b. Necessity and the Aim of Self-Defence87  
 
A further factor that can shape the meaning of necessity in jus ad bellum is 
the aim of self-defence. This requires a querying of the end goal a state 
seeks when invoking the right to self-defence. If a state were acting in self-
defence, the use of force would be intended as a defensive measure and not 
for any other purpose. However, what constitutes an acceptable aim when 
employing the use of force in self-defence in international law must first be 
established.  
 
The main purpose of applying rules on the use of self-defence is that they 
limit states from using more force than is necessary to achieve the intended 
outcome. The aim of self-defence then becomes the benchmark for any use 
of force in self-defence. A state that employs force to achieve the aim of self-
defence could be said to be acting within the confines of the principle of 
necessity and proportionality. In contrast, a state that uses force that 
                                            
86 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America) ICJ Rep 1986 p 94 para 176   
87 This issue of aim of self-defence briefly has been discussed in Chapter 4 
2d) 
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extends beyond the aim of self-defence could be condemned for 
unnecessary use of force, because it is no longer for self-defence and 
therefore unlawful. Viewing necessity in the context of the aim of self-
defence may give an indication of the force necessary, using the aim as a 
point of reference. Therefore, it could be suggested that there is a 
connection between examining necessity as principle in jus ad bellum and 
the aim of self-defence.  
 
If necessity is shaped by the aim of self-defence, it is then important to 
clarify whether this is then a benchmark from which to assess necessity. 
There is wide support in legal literature for the notion that the aim of self-
defence is to repel and halt an armed attack.88 Therefore, this thesis will 
consider repelling and halting an armed attack to be a legitimate aim of self-
defence.  
  
The legitimate aim of self-defence, as described above, is generally not a 
contentious issue as repelling and halting an armed attack is an accepted 
basis for self-defence. However, the legitimate aims of self-defence may be 
more difficult to apply in the complex situations that often occur affect 
military operations. Arguably, the legitimate aim of self-defence varies 
depending on each situation, and is based on several factors such as the 
nature and scale of the attack, and the entity of the aggressor.89 The 
following section intends to extend this debate by examining necessity in 
                                            
88 For example Olivier Corten, The Law Against War (Hart Publishing 2012) 
484; Bruno Simma (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A 
Commentary (Vol. II, 3rd edn, OUP 2012) 1426; Jennings and Watts 
(eds), Oppenheim’s International Law (Vol. 1, Longman 1992)  417-418; 
Natalia Ochoa-Ruiz and Esther Salamanca-Aguado, ‘Exploring the 
Limits of International Law relating to the Use of Force in Self-defence’ 
(2005) 16 EJIL 499-524, 515 
89 For instance, Kretzmer, in arguing in the context of proportionality and the 
aim of self-defence argues that the aim of self-defence is conditional 
upon several factors. David Kretzmer, ‘The Inherent Right to Self-
Defence and Proportionality in Jus ad Bellum’ (2013) 24 EJIL 235-282, 
240. See also Ian Brownlie, ‘International Law and the Use of Force By 
States’ (OUP 1963) 281; Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Report of 
the International Law Commission, 32nd Session, [1980] II (2) ILC Ybk 1, 
26, 53-54  
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relation to the aim of self-defence in two different contexts, as based on 
armed attack. First, complete armed attacks and second, ongoing armed 
attacks.   
 
i. Completed Armed Attacks 
 
In cases where an armed attack has ended before the victim state can 
riposte by force, the legitimate aim of self-defence, which is to halt and repel 
an armed attack, seems inapplicable. To use force where there is no longer 
an ongoing attack, if following the strict reading of the legitimate aims of self-
defence, would no longer be regarded as a defensive measure. In fact, one 
of the major criticisms of Article 51 is that it relies on the occurrence of an 
armed attack as a trigger for the right to self-defence, although by the time 
the victim state is about to launch an act of self-defence, the aggression has 
ended. The only available forcible option for the victim state, therefore, is to 
pursue it through the Security Council mechanism. However, this leads to a 
question over the legitimacy of the victim state invoking the right to self-
defence.  
 
In jus ad bellum literature, the use of force on the basis of reprisal is 
unlawful, as force can only be invoked unilaterally under Article 51.90 If a 
victim state suffering from a completed armed attack insists on exercising 
force such an act may amount to a reprisal.91 In relation to the legitimate 
aims of self-defence, a victim state may no longer able to execute measures 
in self-defence to prevent or halt an armed attack when the aggression is 
complete; otherwise, the victim state would be judged guilty of reprisal. In 
this scenario, the victim state is in an uncomfortable legal position. 
Conversely, if the victim state does nothing to redress the armed attack 
                                            
90 Declaration on Friendly Relations; SC Res. 188 in 1965; SC Res 248 
(1968) of 24 March 1968; Resolution on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention; The International Court considered in the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons that, ‘armed reprisals . . . are 
considered to be unlawful . . . any right to [belligerent] reprisals would, 
like self-defence, be governed inter alia by the principle of 
proportionality’, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 246 
91 Lindsay Moir, Reappraising the Resort to Force (Hart Publishing 2010) 56 
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committed against its territory or interests, its government may be judged 
incapable of maintaining national security and of securing its borders against 
foreign attacks. On the other hand, if it decides to use force in response to 
aggression this may be seen as a form of reprisal; more importantly, the use 
of force, even if invoked in self-defence, does nothing to repel or halt an 
armed attack that has already ended.  
 
The problem stated above is the consequence of following the school of 
thought that demands self-defence be strictly only to ‘repel and halt an 
armed attack’. Very few scholars challenge the belief that reprisal is in 
conformity with Article 51 on self-defence. Amongst them, Yoram Dinstein 
argues for a concept, which he terms ‘defensive armed reprisal’ as an 
aspect of the self-defence measure ‘short of war’ where the victim state may 
respond to an armed attack even when the aggression is complete.92 He 
concedes that the word ‘reprisal’ may cause uneasiness, but he maintains 
that defensive armed reprisal must still conform to all the conditions of self-
defence (such as the occurrence of an armed attack as opposed to a breach 
of international law, and the observance of the principles of necessity and 
proportionality), therefore it is quintessentially a defensive measure.93  
 
Other authors appear to observe the legitimate aims of the self-defence 
ruling, and do not deviate from its meaning. For instance, Ronzitti maintains 
that it is not lawful self-defence if the attack has ended and the wrongdoer 
has restored the status quo ante; for example, the attacker has reverted to 
his territory.94 Dinstein argues that this narrative is unrealistic, as it would 
                                            
92 Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (5th edn, CUP 2012) 
244-255 
93 Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (5th edn, CUP 2012) 
244-255; See in contrast to Grey’s argument. She argues that a state 
that fails to satisfy the conditions of necessity and proportionality of self-
defence cannot be regarded as self-defence but reprisal. This is based 
her views on the action taken by the US afgainst Iran and three 
dissenting judgments in Oil Platforms case. Christine Grey, International 
Law and the Use of Force (OUP 2008)122-123    
94 Natalino Ronzitti, ‘The Expanding Law of Self-Defence’ (2006) 11 JCSL 
343-359, 355 
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mean that the victim state must accept an attack from an aggressor unless it 
responds on the spot, and this would encourage further attacks.95  
 
In addition, Dinstein claims it is practical to suggest that although every act 
of self-defence has an underlying defensive foundation, they should also 
have elements that are punitive and deterrent, in order to ensure the 
aggressor does not to repeat the attack in the future.96 It is easy to conclude 
that Dinstein’s views, are located at the borderline between legal and illegal 
use of force, and as such, very controversial. Reprisal that is cloaked with 
the notion of self-defence for revenge or as a lesson, whether for the future 
(future oriented goals) cannot be described as defensive.97  
 
Despite divergence in scholarly opinion on how to exercise force to halt and 
repel an armed attack, in practice it is difficult, if not impossible, to meet the 
legitimate aims of self-defence in a completed armed attack. In terms of 
necessity in self-defence, the same conclusion can also be drawn. It would 
be hard to argue that self-defence is necessary for such a motivation. This 
links necessity to the perspectives of requirement (to trigger the right to self-
defence) and limitation (restricting force to what is necessary to achieve the 
aim of self-defence) when the armed attack has ended. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that self-defence to overcome completed attacks does not comply 
with the requirement of necessity if a state wishes to launch self-defence 
after completion of the armed attack.  
 
In other situations, a victim state may consider such an attack to be one 
among many armed attacks. This is commonly known as the ‘accumulation 
of events’98 theory, whereby the armed attack is one of a series of armed 
                                            
95 Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (5th edn, CUP 2012) 
252  
96 ibid 251 
97 Oscar Schachter, ‘The Right of States to Use Armed Force’ (1984) 82 
Michigan Law Review 1620-1646, 1638; Christine Grey, International 
Law and the Use of Force (OUP 2008)197-198 
98 Christine Grey, International Law and the Use of Force (OUP 2008) 155-
156. In contrast see ND White, ’The United Nations and Counter-
Terrorism: Multilateral and Executive Law-Making’ in Ana María Salinas 
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attacks. By framing the initial armed attack as an ongoing attack, the victim 
state may then regard the aim when using force against the aggressor as 
halting or repelling an armed attack. The test of necessity in this situation 
concerns whether the use of force is necessary to achieve the legitimate 
aims of self-defence. The answer seems to be affirmative. However, this 
then only answers the requirement aspect of necessity and not the limitation 
characteristic. In other words, the question of what extent is force necessary 
for the victim state to act in self-defence in order to achieve the legitimate 
aim of self-defence is unanswered. This is contrast with the situation when 
force is necessary to counter the threat or armed attack, which is affirmative.  
 
Commentators are divided on answers to the limitation aspects of self-
defence, although the basis of self-defence is broadly accepted. Some argue 
that it is acceptable for the force employed to eliminate foreseeable future 
threats, and any measures to restore the security of the attacked state pre-
armed attack.99 An extreme view would suggest that the victim state might 
choose to exercise force until it is able to annihilate the aggressor, thus not 
creating any further threats or attack in the future. A modest position calls for 
a cautious use of force to reduce further threats deemed reasonable and 
foreseeable.100 The many narratives offered by scholars concerning 
fulfilment of the aim of self-defence in situations where attacks are ongoing, 
reflect that the legitimate aim of self-defence fits well if there is an ongoing 
rather than a completed armed attack.  
 
Arguably, whilst determining a legitimate aim for self-defence in the case of 
completed attack, focus should be on the question of whether it is necessary 
for victim states to act with force against their aggressors. If so, it is asked to 
what extent force is necessary to achieve the desired result. The end result 
                                                                                                                           
de Frias and others (eds), Counter-Terrorism International Law and 
Practice (OUP 2012) 60-61 (Nigel White also criticise the term ‘war on 
terror’ as it would give the impression that force is to be used until there 
is no more international terrorism). 
99 Judith Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force by States 
(CUP 2004) 157  
100 David Kretzmer, ‘The Inherent Right to Self-Defence and Proportionality 
in Jus ad Bellum’ (2013) 24 EJIL 235-282, 270  
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of self-defence is typically determined by the scale of the attack, the threat 
brought by the attack, and most importantly the identity of the attacker. A 
careful and reasonable outcome must be delivered by a defensive measure 
if it is intended for defensive purposes only (not aggression). Franck states, 
it would be reductio ad absurdum not to allow states recourse to self-
defence once an armed attack has occurred, but it would be equally 
untenable for a state to utilise outright force without any restriction.101 
Therefore, acts committed in self-defence ‘must not exceed in manner or 
aim of necessity provoking them’.102 This requires the victim state to only 
use military force to eliminate the source of the attack, or to prevent an 
attack from occurring again, which must simultaneously comply with the 
principle of proportionality.103 Thus, even following a completed armed 
attack, a victim state can still act in self-defence, but this would then be 
confined to the defensive use of force only.  
 
ii. Anticipatory Self-Defence  
 
In cases of anticipatory self-defence (as opposed to pre-emptive self-
defence), the victim state relies on the notion that an armed attack is 
imminent.104 This means that while an armed attack has not yet occurred, 
force will be used. The literal reading of Article 51 requires the existence of 
an armed attack on the injured state as a trigger for enactment of the right to 
self-defence. However, anticipatory self-defence presupposes the 
imminence of an armed attack as sufficient for a victim state to launch action 
in self-defence. 
 
There has been increasing acceptance that the imminence of an armed 
attack entails the exercise of lawful self-defence. For example, the UN High 
                                            
101 Thomas Franck, Recourse to Force (CUP 2008) 98  
102 S Knauft, ‘Proposed Guidelines for Measuring the Propriety of Armed 
States Responses to Terrorist Attacks’ (1996) 19 Hastings International 
and Comparative Law Review 763-788, 774  
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104 See for example Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International 
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Level Panel acknowledged that states cannot be expected to jeopardise 
their security when they know an armed attack is imminent requiring a 
military response.105 It is evident that the use of force in anticipatory self-
defence calls for immediate action to halt and repel any oncoming attack. 
With regard to the question of necessity, it is apparent that a state suffering 
from an imminent attack can lawfully consider it necessary to use force. 
However, this only answers part of the requirement of necessity, and does 
not resolve the limitation aspect. A question may be raised here as regards 
to anticipatory self-defence, regarding the extent to which force is necessary. 
 
Noting that anticipatory self-defence hinges on beliefs about imminence, the 
injured state must only seek to address the imminence aspect of an armed 
attack, and no more than what is considered necessary to neutralise the 
imminent attack. For instance, if a rocket is launched from State A to State 
B, and the rocket is expected to hit State B, it is only necessary for State B 
to address the situation of the rocket by neutralising the rocket. It would be 
considered unnecessary if State B were to destroy other non-related military 
machinery in State A, because the existence of such machinery is not an 
imminent issue in anticipatory self-defence.  
 
Arguably, it is also a matter of imminence if the use of force extends beyond 
an immediate threat to the prevention of further attacks. This includes 
removing the wider threat of reasonable future attacks by an ‘imminent 
aggressor’.106 There may be an unsubstantiated narrative, and a possibility 
that once an aggressor has attacked a state there is a potential it will do so 
again. This part should be looked at in perspective. Merely assuming there 
will be an attack is not the same as having specific information that an attack 
is incoming. To presume an attack will occur, although this is not proven, let 
alone considered imminent, arguably falls outside the general definition of 
necessity as it pertains to the use of force in self-defence. Furthermore, it 
                                            
105 Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change UN 
Doc. A/59/565 2 December 2004 (2004) Paras. 188-189 
106 David Kretzmer, ‘The Inherent Right to Self-Defence and Proportionality 
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would be difficult for a victim state to conform to the principle of 
proportionality in the case of an attack that is not imminent which is yet to 
materialise. Therefore, it can be concluded that the legitimate aim of self-
defence in anticipatory self-defence must refer to imminent armed attack and 
must not employ force beyond that which is necessary in relation to the 
imminent threat.   
4. Necessity in Self-Defence against Non-State Actors  
 
The above discussion has attempted to define the meaning of necessity 
from various angles, fully exploring the factors affecting the meaning of 
necessity. This section extends this discussion further by examining the 
meaning of necessity in the context of self-defence against terrorism. As was 
argued earlier, the majority of scholars are inclined to accept the law of self-
defence is applicable against non-state actors.107 If this is an accepted legal 
position, several questions can be raised: What is the standard of necessity 
if a state exercises self-defence against a non-state actor? Can any threat 
posed by terrorists constitute sufficient necessity to launch action in self-
defence? What criteria be met before as state can be said to be acting out of 
necessity in its exercise of self-defence? Thus, it is asserted here, that 
acceptance of self-defence against non-state actors demands the crafting of 
a standard to suit the meaning of necessity in relation to terrorism.  
 
The acknowledgement that states may use lawfully force in self-defence 
against a non-state actor is not only a sound legal argument, but is also a 
pragmatic approach. The emergence of international terrorism has disrupted 
the traditional relationships state to state. States no longer have a monopoly 
over the use of force, and they are also no longer the sole custodians of 
international peace and security. As the landscape of international security 
                                            
107 See Chapter 3(c) of this thesis. See also others e.g. Christoph Müller, 
‘The Right of Self-Defense in the Global Fight against Terrorism’ (2006) 
81 International Law Studies 351-366, 354; Nicholas Rostow, ‘Before 
and After: The Changed UN Response to Terrorism Since September 
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changes, it is imperative that international law react to determine what 
practices constitute appropriate responses under the law in cases of 
international terrorism.  
 
An example in which states had to react to threats and attacks by terrorist 
groups was the 9/11 attack in the US organised by Al-Qaeda. Following the 
attack, two prominent Security Council Resolutions were adopted to meet 
the threats posed by terrorist groups.108 Although the two Resolutions do not 
endorse the right to self-defence against non-state actors, it does however 
indicate the willingness of states to employ self-defence against non-state 
actors.109 A more contemporary example in which states have encountered 
a need to react to terrorism is the rise of Islamic State. This terrorist group is 
currently in control of large swathes of land in Iraq and Syria, wholly 
disregarding the political boundary between the two countries. Members of 
the UN agree that Islamic State represents a threat to international peace 
and security,110 and so it is incumbent upon international law to address this 
danger.  
 
In relation to jus ad bellum, it is argued that the application of the law of self-
defence is not the same when directed against a state and a non-state actor. 
As raised previously, in relation to factors affecting the lawfulness of self-
defence, force taken in self-defence, as directed toward a terrorist group 
unavoidably violates the sovereignty of the host state unless consent is 
given. Arguably, threats from terrorist groups present a unique set of 
challenges that differ from those from state actors, and arguably they are 
even more perilous. It can be extremely challenging for a state to have 
advanced knowledge of an incoming terrorist attack, in particular when the 
                                            
108 SC Res. 1368 (2001)(S/RES/1368 (2001) 12 September 2001) and SC 
Res. 1373 (S/RES/1373 (2001) 28 September 2001) 
109 See discussion on Self-Defence against Non-State Actors in Chapter 2. 
See also Christoph Müller, ‘The Right of Self-Defense in the Global Fight 
against Terrorism’ (2006) 81 International Law Studies 351-366, 354  
110 Security Council Resolution (S/Res/2170 (2014)) 15 August 2014  
- 221 - 
attacks are operated by small cells that are more or less impervious.111 
Furthermore, it is not an exaggeration to assume that terrorist groups acting 
in a sophisticated manner, and in the current climate, may in the future 
possess weapons of mass destruction such as biological or nuclear 
materials, further endangering international security.112 Therefore, the law of 
self-defence must reflect the reality that terrorists are capable of causing 
instability within states.  
 
When accepting that self-defence is applicable to non-state actors, it must 
also be agreed that the condition of necessity must also be addressed in the 
context of terrorism. It is submitted that the principle of necessity cannot be 
seen as a generic concept that is static and incapable of accommodating 
different types of threats. Certainly, there are differences between necessity 
in the context of states and non-states actors. Therefore, a distinction 
between necessity applied to different types of entities must be appreciated. 
Furthermore, when expanding necessity as concept to cover non-state 
actors, it is necessary to question the standard or benchmark whereby a 
state can regard it is necessary to act in self-defence. 
 
Arguably, an alternative standard must be crafted to address the proximity 
between the host state and the non-state actor. By examining the proximity 
of the two parties, such a standard might define necessity as applicable if 
the host state is unable or unwilling to resolve a terrorist threat originating 
from within its borders. This situation is often referred to as ‘unwilling or 
unable theory’. This school of thought presumes that a victim state has the 
right to self-defence if the host state is unable or unwilling to prevent 
terrorists operating within it from attacking or threatening another state. A 
contemporary example of the unwilling or unable theory is the Islamic State 
in Syria, which will be discussed in the next Chapter. 
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The unwilling or unable theory specifically focuses on the ability of a host 
state to maintain its internal security. As such the onus is on the host state to 
stop extraterritorial use of force by any entity, rather than on the victim 
state’s right to use force against an aggressor. The theory of unable or 
unwilling may be supported by international jurisprudence, based on cases 
where the legal duty rested on the host state. For example, in the Corfu 
Channel case, the Court enunciated that states have an obligation not to 
knowingly allow other non-governmental activists, including terrorist groups, 
to use their territory to endanger the safety of other states.113 The unable or 
unwilling theory may also be associated with the attribution of a state. For 
instance, a host state may be liable for the conduct that occurs within its 
borders, and which affects international relations, unless proven to be 
otherwise.114 Whatever the perspective taken by commentators, a common 
theme that can be derived concerns the ability of a host state to prevent any 
internationally wrongful conduct from spreading across a border affecting the 
security of another state. Therefore, on this basis, the unable or unwilling 
school of thought may have some resonance in international law.  
 
Within the legal literature, Ashley Deeks famously articulated the unwilling or 
unable hypothesis in 2012, although she was not the first to use the phrase 
‘unwilling or unable’.115 She stresses that the unwilling or unable concept is 
not new to international law and that in fact the concept has historical 
lineage in the law of neutrality, as expounded by a prominent jurist in the 
eighteenth century, Emer de Vattel.116 She further contends that the 
unwilling or unable narrative was considered on several notable occasions in 
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Law 483-550, 499  
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international law, such as in the 1907 Hague Conventions and even in the 
famous Caroline incident in 1837.117  
 
Ashley Deeks explains that the meaning of unwilling or unable as:  
 
“The ‘unwilling or unable’ test requires the victim state to ascertain 
whether the territorial state is willing and able to address the threat 
posed by the nonstate group before using force in the territorial 
state’s territory without consent. If the territorial state is willing and 
able, the victim state may not use force in the territorial state, and the 
territorial state is expected to take the appropriate steps against the 
nonstate group. If the territorial state is unwilling or unable to take 
those steps, however, it is lawful for the victim state to use that level 
of force that is necessary (and proportional) to suppress the threat 
that the nonstate groups poses.”118  
 
In her view, the unwilling or unable is a test in the framework of self-defence 
that is associated with terrorism. The test demands that the victim state 
make a judgment as to when it is necessary to use force. She further adds 
there are at least five factors which the victim state is required to consider:  
 
“The victim state must (1) attempt to act with the consent of or in 
cooperation with the territorial state; (2) ask the territorial state to 
address the threat itself and provide adequate time for the latter to 
respond; (3) assess the territorial state‘s control and capacity in the 
relevant region as accurately as possible; (4) reasonably assess the 
means by which the territorial state proposes to suppress the threat; 
and (5) evaluate its prior (positive and negative) interactions with the 
territorial state on related issues.”119 
 
                                            
117 Ashley Deeks, ‘“Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for 
Extraterritorial Self-Defense’ (2012) 52 Virginia Journal of International 
Law 483-550, 497-502 
118 Ibid 487-488 
119 Ibid 506  
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On the surface, the doctrine of unable or unwilling requires a review of the 
narratives articulated by Ashley Deeks to resolve the problem of necessity in 
self-defence against non-state actors. This test could be set out as a new 
standard against terrorism to determine necessity, providing a benchmark 
for the victim state to employ force. 
 
As stated previously, the notion that a host state is at the receiving end of a 
defensive action from another state, due to the host state’s inability to stop 
terrorism from occurring across-borders is not a new legal development. For 
example, Michael Schmitt argues that the victim state must seek to establish 
cooperation with the host state before launching any defensive action. 
However, ‘if the sanctuary state either proves unable to act or chooses not to 
do so, the state under attack may, following a reasonable period for 
compliance (measured by the threat posed to the defender), non-
consensually cross into the latter’s territory for the sole purpose of 
conducting defensive operations’.120 This is akin to the five points outlined by 
Ashley Deeks.    
 
The theory of unwilling or unable arguably overlaps with other discussions 
on the subject of self-defence, as it focuses on the role of the host state. 
Arguably, there are two main areas in the general legal discourse in self-
defence. First, the unwilling or unable doctrine substantiates the discussion 
of attribution, whereby the activities that take place within the border of the 
host state can be attributed to it, even if executed by a non-state organ. For 
example, Kimberly Trapp argues that if a state is unable or unwilling to take 
steps to counter-terrorism within its borders, this lack of action is enough for 
the victim state to show acquiescence between the host state and the non-
state actor, thereby warranting the use of force against the non-state 
                                            
120 Michael N Schmitt, “’Change direction’ 2006: Israeli operations in 
Lebanon and the International Law of Self-Defense” (2008) 84 
International Law Studies 266-301, 287 
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actors.121 This reflects the similarities between discussions about attribution 
and the theory of unable or unwilling.  
 
Second, the test of unable or unwilling corresponds with the capability of the 
host state. As argued earlier, this test focuses on the host state’s capability 
to counter threat, rather than the competence of the victim state to resist 
terrorist activities. Thus, the standard of whether a state is unable or willing 
is applied to the host state, rather than the inability or unwillingness of the 
victim state to take action against terrorism. This also implies whether the 
host state is competent to meet its international obligations to prevent 
terrorism from being undertaken abroad. Therefore, the doctrine of unwilling 
or unable relates to the compliance of the host state with its international 
obligations, and does not stand on its own as a premise in the interpretation 
of necessity in self-defence. The doctrine relates to other aspects of jus ad 
bellum, such as the discussion of ‘attribution’ and the capability of the host 
state. However, this doctrine is not free from criticism.  
 
Ashley Deeks argues that the unwilling or unable doctrine is at present an 
established rule in international law. However, some commentators see this 
premise as somewhat doubtful. For example, Kevin Jon Holler is critical 
about endorsing the doctrine as part of customary international law, claiming 
it lacks the historical evidence that the test exists as part of state practice.122 
In particular, Ashley Deeks claims that the unwilling or unable test stems 
from centuries old law: the law of neutrality. However, Kevin Jon Holler 
points out that neutrality law and the unwilling or unable doctrine are two 
separate laws, regulating different scenarios, whereby the law of neutrality 
regulates the behaviour of two legitimate belligerents in armed conflict and 
not that of states and non-states actors.123 Therefore, Kevin Jon Holler 
                                            
121 Kimberly Trapp, ‘Back to Basics: Necessity, Proportionality, and the Right 
of Self-Defence Against Non-State Terrorist Actors’ (2007) 56 ICLQ 141-
156, 150  
122 http://opiniojuris.org/2011/12/15/ashley-deeks-failure-to-defend-the-
unwilling-or-unable-test/  
123 http://opiniojuris.org/2011/12/15/ashley-deeks-failure-to-defend-the-
unwilling-or-unable-test/  
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argues that the unwilling or unable test cannot be described as an 
established rule in international law.  
 
Another aspect of the unwilling or unable doctrine that is a subject of 
contention is the lack of clarity. Based on this doctrine, if the host state is 
unable or unwilling to prevent terrorist armed attacks from advancing into 
another state, then it is considered necessary to use defensive force. Clear 
as this might appear, there are nonetheless some more complex questions 
that demand detailed answers: First, who determines that a state is unable 
or unwilling; and second, how does one judge that a state is unable or 
unwilling to take steps to counter terrorist activities within a host state?  
 
The appropriate entity to judge whether a state is ‘unwilling or unable’ is the 
victim state. This is because it is the victim state that is directly affected by 
the incompetence of the host state’s actions to counter terrorism.124 It should 
therefore be asked if, in a different scenario, it would be appropriate for 
another state or international organisation to determine whether a state is 
unable or unwilling. Thus, this study ask: If the Security Council passes a 
Resolution confirming state X is unable or unwilling, or a third state acting in 
the spirit of collective self-defence finds that state X is unable or unwilling, 
does this mean the victim state may initiate self-defence?  
 
A more complex problem associated with the doctrine concerns, which 
states fall within the category of unable or unwilling. By default, a state 
lacking a national security institution with a terrorist related concern within its 
borders could arguably be cited as unable or unwilling. The example used by 
Ashley Deeks regarding the unwilling or unable theory largely attributed it to 
countries that are ineffective at countering terrorism, e.g. Pakistan, Mali, 
Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Congo.125 These countries are known for their 
security inefficiencies. This then creates two types of states: a group of 
                                            
124 See Chapter 4 of this thesis on ‘Subjective or Objective Necessity’ 
125 Ashley Deeks, ‘“Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for 
Extraterritorial Self-Defense’ (2012) 52 Virginia Journal of International 
Law 483-550, 549-550 
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states willing to apply the doctrine such as the US, United Kingdom, 
Australia, France, and the second tier of states mentioned earlier. The 
different treatment of states as a result of the application of the doctrine is 
likely to be less acceptable to those states that are considered poor and 
ineffective. This is one of the drawbacks of the unable or unwilling theory. 
 
For this reason, some scholars have rejected the adoption of the unwilling or 
unable theory when evaluating the expansion of the role of necessity in self-
defence. Dawood Ahmed argues that power inequality in the application of 
the unwilling or unable doctrine not only results in unfair treatment of weaker 
states, but also hinders legitimate exercise of self-defence.126 For weaker 
states, such as the Yemen to exercise self-defence against powerful states 
such as the US, would be seen as contrary to the doctrine as the US is 
considered a competent entity to combat terrorism, although Yemen might 
have a genuine claim of self-defence. The perverse effects of the unwilling 
or unable doctrine undermine any legitimate claim it might have under 
customary international law on self-defence, largely because it could be 
used as a means to segregate states based on how effectively they are able 
to counter terrorism.  
 
Indeed, articulation of the unwilling or unable doctrine offers new perspective 
in jus ad bellum literature. Specifically, the doctrine contributes to the debate 
about how a state might interpret the meaning of necessity as part of the 
condition to exercise the right to self-defence, where previously the meaning 
of necessity had not been developed as far as the principle of 
proportionality.127 Therefore, the test of unwilling or unable could be deemed 
a step forward in furthering understanding of necessity in self-defence, 
although it is not universally accepted.  
                                            
126 Dawood Ahmed, ‘Defending Weak States Against the ‘Unwilling or 
Unable’ Doctrine of Self-Defense’, (2013) 9 Journal of International Law 
and International Relations 1-37, 24  
127 See Daniel Bethlehem, ‘Principles Relevant to the Scope of a State’s 
Right of Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by 
Nonstate Actors’, (2012) 106 AJIL 1-8, 7; Christian Tams, ‘The Use of 
Force against Terrorists’ (2009) 20 EJIL 359-397, 385; Tom Ruys, 
‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the UN Charter (CUP 2010) 461   
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Another contribution of the unwilling or unable doctrine in legal scholarship is 
that it may subconsciously provide a new standard by which to assess the 
meaning of necessity. Indeed, Ashley Deeks suggested transforming 
unwilling or unable from a standard to a ‘rule-like’ norm.128 Despite 
opposition, the international community is currently witnessing the unwilling 
or unable doctrine being applied in contemporary armed conflict, such as 
that against Islamic State.129  
 
It is important however to retain sight of the role that necessity plays in an 
armed conflict. It can be argued that there are three points to mention when 
assessing necessity in the legal framework of self-defence, each of which is 
judged at a different period of the conflict.  
 
First, necessity is to be considered prior to the use of force. Thus, it is seen 
as a condition (or a requirement) before exercising the right to self-defence. 
The decision about whether the use of force in self-defence is necessary is 
usually dependent on the judgment of the affected or victim state. This is 
subjective, and necessity in relation to the pre-use of force might relate to 
the unwilling or unable doctrine. This creates a question as to whether the 
host state is ineffective to contain terrorist activity - a judgment undertaken 
by the victim state. Second, necessity is considered during the use of force. 
This usually takes the form of asking ‘to what extent is force necessary to 
achieve the aim of self-defence’. Assessing the role of necessity during an 
armed conflict acts as a restraint on the use of force. This assessment is 
also determined subjectively by the victim state when launching defensive 
measures. Finally, necessity is determined objectively by other parties. It is 
usually examined by international organisations such as the organs of the 
                                            
128 Ashley Deeks, ‘“Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for 
Extraterritorial Self-Defense’ (2012) 52 Virginia Journal of International 
Law 483-550, 514-515  
129 See the claim of self-defence against Islamic State in Syria with regards 
to unwilling or unable test http://justsecurity.org/20118/claus-kreb-force-
isil-syria/#more-20118 ; http://justsecurity.org/14414/international-law-
airstrikes-isis-syria/ ; http://justsecurity.org/20118/claus-kreb-force-isil-
syria/#more-20118  
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United Nations, the ICRC, international courts and tribunals and writings by 
legal commentators. Therefore, the assessment of necessity could be seen 
as encompassing all aspects of an armed conflict – pre-, during and post-
self-defence.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
The principle of necessity in the legal framework of self-defence can be 
analysed by understanding its role in the wider spectrum of jus ad bellum. By 
invoking the right to self-defence, a state must take into account the 
sovereignty of the affected state and of the prohibition against the use of 
force. However, such restrictions can be overcome if the host state 
consents. The consent may include the use of force against a non-state 
actor within the territory of the host state. In a situation where the invitation 
to intervene is granted, it is irrelevant to justify force in self-defence, as the 
right to self-defence is only applicable when force is used in a foreign state 
without prior permission. However, the state that issues the permission to 
intervene must nonetheless comply with the conditions attached to lawful 
consent by host state.  
 
The principle of necessity can be analysed by dissecting various factors 
affecting the principle. It is the main contention of this thesis that necessity 
cannot be seen as a universal concept in jus ad bellum, applicable to all 
types of self-defence. It follows that necessity must be determined according 
to the entity of the aggressor, whether it is a state or a non-state actor, as 
this will influence how the victim state interprets the meaning of necessity. 
Sofaer argues that the principle of necessity is affected by several factors, 
such as the magnitude of the threat or and attack, the likelihood that an 
attack will materialise and the non-forcible options available to the victim 
state. This Chapter contributes to the argument raised by Sofaer that there 
are other factors also influencing the meaning of necessity. First, necessity 
is influenced by whether self-defence is invoked in anticipatory or pre-
emptive fashion. Preventive self-defence differs from traditional self-defence 
as the existence of an ‘armed attack’ is absent. In anticipatory self-defence, 
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it is lawful for a state to invoke self-defence in the case of an imminent 
armed attack.  However, it becomes problematic if a state invokes pre-
emptive self-defence (absent of imminent armed attack), as this would not 
be regarded as action according to necessity.  
 
Second, the principle of necessity is affected by the aims associated with the 
use of force in self-defence. A legitimate aim for self-defence is halting or 
repelling an armed attack, as supported by the majority of scholars. Thus, 
the legitimate aim of self-defence becomes the benchmark for lawfulness in 
self-defence, and any use of force beyond this legitimate aim is therefore 
considered unnecessary and so unlawful. The difficulty assessing necessity 
in this regard arises when an armed attack is complete. The aim of repelling 
or halting an armed attack becomes redundant when there is no continued 
armed attack. The difficulty of maintaining this aim for self-defence will be 
illustrated in the next Chapter in relation to state practice. To continue to use 
force in self-defence after an armed attack, where an armed threat no longer 
exists may be seen as unnecessary. For anticipatory self-defence, a state 
might have a continuing basis upon which to use force in order to halt and or 
repel an imminent attack. Therefore, it would be regarded as an 
unnecessary use of force if the victim state were required to repel an 
incoming armed attack.  
 
This thesis establishes that the entity of the aggressor, i.e. whether a state 
or a non-state actor, fundamentally defines the meaning of necessity. It is 
submitted that necessity in self-defence cannot be treated equally when a 
state is acting in self-defence against a state and when it is acting against a 
terrorist group. Therefore, a distinction must be made according to whether 
an armed attack is launched by a state or a non-state actor.  
 
One way of judging whether a victim state has shown that it has met the 
requirement of necessity to use force in self-defence against a terrorist 
group is by analysing the proximity of the host state and the non-state actor. 
The ‘unwilling or unable’ doctrine provides a platform from which to 
determine whether a state is acting out of necessity when employing force in 
- 231 - 
self-defence. Simple as it might appear, the doctrine does not resolve the 
problem of necessity entirely. The ‘unwilling or unable’ test, if accepted in 
state practice, only addresses the issue of necessity as a pre-requisite for 
self-defence; it does not address the problem of applying necessity during 
the use of force. This is a significant point highlighting the problematic nature 
of the concept of necessity as it stands today.  
 
The ‘unwilling and unable’ test also creates adverse effects, when weaker 
states are labelled as ineffective at containing terrorist threats, as this would 
mean weaker states can never invoke self-defence against terrorist attacks 
launched from powerful states. This undermines the entire purpose of Article 
51, which requires the occurrence of an ‘armed attack’ to exercise self-
defence, making no reference to the military effectiveness of a state. 
Nonetheless, the theory of ‘unwilling or unable’ contributes to the discussion 
about how a state can interpret the meaning of necessity. 
 
Following the discussions presented in this Chapter, this study will conduct 
an analysis of necessity in state practice when self-defence is invoked 
against a non-state actor in the next chapter. In that analysis, necessity will 
be seen in reference to the two roles argued earlier, necessity as a 
requirement to self-defence and as limitation on the use of force in self-
defence.
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Chapter 6: Necessity in State Practice 
1. Introduction  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis discuss the content and relevant 
considerations associated with the exercise of necessity in self-defence. 
Following on from Chapter 4, this chapter will now apply the discussion to 
the concept of necessity as practiced by states, with a specific focus on self-
defence against terrorism. This includes applying the two roles of necessity, 
as a requirement and limitation in employing force in self-defence. 
Specifically, this chapter identifies the dynamics of necessity in self-defence 
in reference to non-state actors.  
 
This chapter will analyse three case studies, to depict instances when self-
defence was invoked against terrorist groups by a state. These three case 
studies share several common themes that benefit the analysis of necessity 
in self-defence against terrorism. The first common feature across the case 
studies is that all the states concerned explicitly invoked the right to self-
defence. Therefore, the analysis specifically relates to the use of force on 
the grounds of self-defence, and excludes other justifications. The second 
feature that the self-defence invoked by the states concerned was directed 
toward a non-state actor. This allows exploration of the application of 
necessity in situations where self-defence is invoked by a state against a 
non-state actor. Finally, the three state practices referred to in this chapter 
all occurred following the 9/11 incident. It is important to comprehend the 
characteristics of the period when these incidents occurred in order to 
understand the context in which the international community received action 
in self-defence against a non-state actor. Many scholars have argued that 
the events on 9/11 changed the legal landscape on jus ad bellum in relation 
to terrorism, thereby informing subsequent developments.1 As such, 
analysing state practices post-9/11 provides insight into how the concept of 
                                            
1 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International 
Law (CUP 2010) 294-295 
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necessity developed in an era when self-defence against terrorism was 
accepted widely.  
  
The three case studies concern the following incidences of state practice: 
action in 2001 in Afghanistan; 2006 in Lebanon; and 2014 in Syria. In 2001, 
after the 9/11 attacks, the US invoked the right to use force in self-defence 
against Al-Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan. The US claimed that the 9/11 
attack constituted an armed attack for the purpose of Article 51 of the UN 
Charter. The acts of aggression against the US were acknowledged as such 
by states and international bodies; including the Security Council and NATO. 
On 7 October 2001, the US officially launched a military operation in 
Afghanistan.  
 
The second case study will analyse the use of force by Israel against 
Hezbollah, which occurred in Lebanon in 2006. Israel invoked the right to 
self-defence in response to rocket attacks; rockets were launched from 
within Lebanese territory and targeted military positions in Israel. The 
attacked resulted in the deaths of three Israeli soldiers. Following the attack, 
Israel launched action in self-defence in Lebanon on 12 July 2006.  
 
Finally, this chapter will examine self-defence in relation to armed attacks by 
Islamic State. At the time of writing, the international community continues to 
face threats and attacks from Islamic State, which is based in parts of Syria 
and Iraq. This study focuses on one airstrike operation against Islamic State, 
which took place on 23 September 2014 in Syria.  
 
In this chapter, each incident will be analysed individually and comparatively, 
in order to explore further the concept of necessity. However, this chapter 
does not aim to assess the legality of each incident in totality. Rather, the 
focus is confined to the assessment of necessity in each state’s practice. At 
the end of this chapter, there will be an overall assessment of necessity 
based on the combined analysis of the three states’ practices.  
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Following on from the previous chapter, it is argued that discussions about 
necessity can generally be divided into two categories, based on the role of 
necessity - as a requirement to exercise self-defence and as a limitation to 
the use of force. The role of necessity as a requirement to self-defence can 
reasonably be established by understanding the circumstances faced by the 
victim state prior to its exercise of the use of force. This includes inter alia 
posing the question whether a non-forcible option the invoking state could 
consider before employing force exists. Another role for necessity is as a 
limiting factor in the use of force in self-defence. A state cannot employ force 
without restriction, even if force is considered permissible under international 
law by way of self-defence. Thus, it is necessary to consider whether the 
intensity of any force employed is necessary to achieve the legitimate aims 
of self-defence. 
 
Arguably, it is difficult to determine how far the extent of any force employed 
against a non-state actor is necessary. This is due to the nature of terrorist 
groups: the fact that they are evasive and their physical presence and 
capability is unknown makes it difficult for the victim state to limit any 
defensive measures to what is necessary. Furthermore, the victim state is 
then subject to the possibility of another attack. The desire to avoid this risk 
can affect how states react to a terrorist threat, thereby determining the 
extent to which they decide force is necessary. In addition, it is argued that 
necessity cannot be seen as one-size-fits-all concept in the law of self-
defence. Different sets of circumstances, in particular against a non-state 
actor, call for different types of necessity analysis. However, this does not 
mean that a state may use force without limits due to necessity; all states 
must comply with the rule of proportionality in jus ad bellum and with the 
requirements set out in jus in bello.  
 
Here, the premise is that state practice will reflect the dynamics of necessity 
within a situation where self-defence is invoked against a terrorist group. To 
explore this, the discussion follows all aspects of necessity within a 
defensive measure. Admittedly, there are areas of overlap between 
necessity and proportionality. This is inevitable as the two principles are 
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inter-related in legal discourse. Nonetheless, state practice, as presented in 
this chapter will explore self-defence in light of the principle of necessity.  
 
2. Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan (2001)  
 
The first example in which the principle of necessity can be analysed post 
9/11  is action taken against Al-Qaeda by the US. In 2001, following the 9/11 
attacks, the US launched military strikes against Al-Qaeda, a terrorist 
organisation which was, at that time, based in Afghanistan. The US justified 
its use of force by invoking the right to self-defence under Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter.2  
 
The war in Afghanistan in 2001 contributed extensively to the literature on 
jus ad bellum as related to primary and secondary sources of international 
law. It is one of the major invocations of the right to self-defence in the 
twenty-first century. In particular, the incident contributed to academic 
discussions on the right to self-defence against a terrorist group, which was 
a contentious point before 9/11 and remains the subject of keen debate 
today. Some commentators have argued that 9/11 marked a turning point in 
the law of self-defence, as action taken in its aftermath confirmed that the 
right to self-defence can lawfully be invoked against non-state actors.3 As 
described by Dinstein, the incident of 9/11 ‘should have dispelled all 
lingering doubts concerning the application of Article 51 to non-State 
actors’.4 Therefore, it is appropriate to use this example to analyse the 
invocation of self-defence against terrorist groups, in accordance with the 
existing principle of necessity.  
 
                                            
2 Letter from Ambassador John Negroponte, Permanent Representative of 
the USA to the UN in New York, to the President of the Security Council, 
S/2001/946, 7 October 2001  
3 Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (5th edn, CUP 2011) 
227-229; Michael Byers, War Law (Grove Press 2005) 67; Noam Lubell, 
Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Non-State Actors (OUP 2010) 34 
4 Dinstein ibid 227  
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At the time of writing, the military operation in Afghanistan by the US and 
NATO has officially ended (28 December 2014).5 Due to the long duration of 
the operation, it is necessary to recall some key features  when approaching 
this case study. Firstly, as this analysis seeks to explore the principle of 
necessity in relation to terrorism, it will only focus on the role of non-state 
actors, and the discussion will be limited to the concept of necessity in self-
defence. As far as possible, the study will exclude any state involvement 
against other states. Secondly, it is worth emphasising that the following 
analysis is predicated on the premise that the military operation in 
Afghanistan was taken on the basis on self-defence and not based on any 
other justifications that may confuse the legal analysis, such as humanitarian 
intervention. Therefore, this case study will be analysed only through the 
lens of the law on self-defence. 
 
a. Factual Events  
 
On 11 September 2001 (elsewhere referred to as 9/11), Al-Qaeda hijacked a 
number of civilian aircrafts and crashed them into key buildings at the heart 
of the US.6 The most notable attack was directed toward the World Trade 
Centre in New York City, which resulted in the collapse of the Twin Tower 
buildings. In total, the incident killed 2,977 people and caused injury to more 
than 6,000 individuals.7 The scale of the attacks shocked the international 
community.  
 
This incident reflected the capability of a terrorist group to conduct large 
scale attacks using unconventional methods. This event then raised 
questions about international security. If the US, the state with the most 
advanced military capability in the world, was prone to attack from Al-Qaeda, 
it was then equally possible that other states may also be vulnerable to 
                                            
5 ‘Statement by the President on the End of the Combat Mission in 
Afghanistan’ (The White House, 28 December 2014) 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/28/statement-
president-end-combat-mission-afghanistan (accessed: 23 July 2015)  
6 See ‘Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States’ (2004)    
7 9/11 Commission Report , (August 2004) p 552 at footnote 188 
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similar terrorist attacks, whether from Al-Qaeda or other international 
terrorist organisations. This shifted the paradigm of international security 
concern from states against states, to states against non-state actors. From 
the perspective of international law, the question raised was whether it is 
lawful for a state to exercise self-defence against a non-state actor. Despite 
the significance of this incident in international law, this was not the first time 
since the United Nations Charter had come into effect that a terrorist group 
had successfully attacked a state. In fact, numerous incidents have occurred 
involving terrorist organisations and states.8 Nonetheless, the gravity of this 
single incident affecting thousands of people in the United States attracted 
the attention of the international community.  
 
The day after the attack, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1368 
(2001), which condemned the attacks in the US.9 In this Resolution, the 
Security Council described the terrorist attacks as ‘a threat to international 
peace and security’. The preamble to the Resolution recognises ‘the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the 
Charter’.10 In another Security Council Resolution regarding the same 
incident, the Security Council reaffirmed the inherent right to self-defence, as 
prescribed in the UN Charter.11 In two UN Security Council Resolutions, the 
right to self-defence was mentioned in relation to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
However, some commentators have argued that reiterating the right to self-
defence in a Security Council resolution without specifying the details does 
not necessarily mean that the Security Council has now officially approved 
the use of force in this way.12 It may be said that the resolutions merely 
stated the obvious fact that all states are afforded the right to self-defence 
                                            
8 See Thomas Franck, Recourse to Force (CUP 2004) (Franck in Chapter 4 
of his book outlines several instances where states invoked self-defence 
against state-sponsored terrorism.) 
9 UN Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001) (12 September 2001)  
10 ibid 
11 UN Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001) (28 September 2001) 
12 Amos Guiora, ‘Anticipatory Self-Defence and International Law – A Re-
Evaluation’ (2008) 13 JCSL 3-24, 14-15; Ryan Williams, ‘Dangerous 
Precedent: America’s Illegal War in Afghanistan’ (2011) 33 University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 563-613, 592-593  
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under the UN Charter and customary international law.13 Nonetheless, many 
have emphasised that the two Security Council resolutions indicate that an 
armed attack against the US had taken place.14  
 
On 7 October 2001, the US launched Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan, citing self-defence.15 The United Kingdom joined the US in 
Afghanistan by invoking Article 51 on the right to collective self-defence.16 
Thus, the legal basis for the use of force in Afghanistan in 2001 was one of 
self-defence.  
 
b. Analysis of Necessity  
 
At the time of writing, Operation Enduring Freedom, which lasted for thirteen 
years, has ended. There is considerable difficulty proving necessity in self-
defence in relation to a conflict of such long duration. Certainly is hard to 
argue that any defensive military campaign lasting for several years is 
necessary and proportionate.17 It is also difficult to justify the extent to which 
                                            
13 Thomas Franck, ‘Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense’ (2001) 95 AJIL 
839-843; 843 (Thomas Franck states that ‘As a matter of law, however, 
there is no requirement whatever that a state receive the blessing of the 
Security Council before responding to an armed attack’) 
14 Helen Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law 
(CUP 2005) 190; Michael Byers, ‘Terrorism, the Use of Force and 
International Law after 11 September’ (2002) 51 ICLQ 401-414, 401-
402; See also Jutta Brunnée, ‘The Security Council and Self-Defence: 
Which Way to Global Security?’ in Niels Blokker and Nico Schrijver 
(eds), The Security Council and the Use of Force (Martinus Nijhoff 2005) 
130-132 (It is argued that in certain circumstances it is beneficial that the 
issue on the use of force in self-defence albeit a unilateral action is 
debated in the Security Council as it may control the extension of the 
right to self-defence.) 
15 Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America 
to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council 
S/2001/946 (7 October 2001)  
16 Letter from the Chargé d’affaires of the Permanent Mission of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations 
addressed to the President of the Security Council S/2001/947 (7 
October 2001)  
17 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (3rd ed, OUP 2008) 
203  
- 239 - 
the entire operation was deemed necessary and the proportionality of the 
extended use of force over a period of many years.  
 
The analysis of Operation Enduring Freedom, as it targets non-state actors 
is confusing. When the US and the United Kingdom launched attacks in self-
defence in Afghanistan, both countries implicated the conduct of Al-Qaeda 
as associated with the Taliban regime, the then de facto government of 
Afghanistan.18 This creates a distortion when evaluating the principle of 
necessity in self-defence solely in conjunction with a non-state actor. 
However, this study will limit itself to the analysis of self-defence against Al-
Qaeda, as far as possible.  
 
A further obstacle to the analysis of Operation Enduring Freedom was the 
length of time taken to complete the operation, in view of the fact that the 
claim to self-defence is a temporal right.19 Consequently, this analysis will 
focus solely on the period between 7 October 2001, when the first defensive 
attack was launched, and the formation of the new government in 
Afghanistan in December 2001.20 The new government was established 
following the Bonn agreement; which came into effect on 22 December 
2001, and was recognised by the UN Security Council.21 It is possible to 
argue that this effectively ends the timeline of the self-defence period.  
 
Due to the significance of this state practice, the use of force in self-defence 
against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan is a good case study and reflects 
contemporary state practice. This case study has contributed extensively to 
the debate on the use of self-defence against non-state actors. It would be 
                                            
18 See Lindsay Moir, Reappraising the Resort to Force (Hart Publishing 
2010) 43-46 
19 See TD Gill, ‘The Temporal Dimension of Self-Defence: Anticipation, Pre-
emption , Prevention and Immediacy’ (2006) 11 JCSL 361-369  
20 ‘Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-
Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions’ UN Doc. 
S/2001/1154 (5 December 2001)  
21 ‘Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-
Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions’ UN Doc. 
S/2001/1154 (5 December 2001)  
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an oversight of this research to disregard the importance of this state 
practice and the development of jus ad bellum post-Afghanistan 2001. On 
this basis, it is crucial that this case study is highlighted and confined to the 
discussion of the principle of necessity and the role of the non-state actor.  
 
c. Necessity as a Requirement and Limitation to Self-Defence  
 
The following part of this chapter will argue that, in the case study of Al-
Qaeda in Afghanistan, the US invoked the right to self-defence and was 
thereby legally required to fulfil both elements of necessity and 
proportionality in its use of force. Necessity in self-defence requires the US 
to show that Al-Qaeda committed an armed attack or made a threat, which 
necessitated the use of force.  
 
The history between the US and Al-Qaeda dates back to 1998. On 7 August 
1998, a terrorist organisation led by Osama Bin Laden bombed two US 
embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania.22 In response, 
the US exercised the right to self-defence by bombing Osama Bin Laden’s 
terrorist organisation in Sudan and Afghanistan.23 In an another incident in 
2000, Al-Qaeda bombed the US Naval destroyer, USS Cole, while it was 
harbouring at the Yemeni port of Aden.24 This resulted in the death of 
seventeen and the injury of thirty-nine American sailors.25 Thus, the attacks 
committed by Al-Qaeda towards the US did not start in 2001.  
                                            
22 See UN Doc. S/Res/1189 (1998) (13 August 1998) 
23 Letter Dated 20 August 1998 from the Permanent Representative of the 
United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the 
President of the Security Council S/1998/780 (20 August 1998) 
24 See Department of Defense USS Cole Commission Report (2001); 
Raphael Perl and Ronal ORouke, ‘Terrorist Attack on USS Cole: 
Background and Issues for Congress’ (CRS Report for Congress, 30 
January 2001) http://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-
reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/t/terrorist-attack-on-uss-cole-
background-and-issues-for-congress.html  
25 See Department of Defense USS Cole Commission Report (2001); 
Raphael Perl and Ronal ORouke, ‘Terrorist Attack on USS Cole: 
Background and Issues for Congress’ (CRS Report for Congress, 30 
January 2001) http://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-
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When analysing the necessity of the military operation against Al-Qaeda, it is 
important to examine whether any other options were available that the US 
could have pursued after the 9/11 attacks, including the non-use of force. 
The US, however, judged that the use of force was necessary, and this was 
evident in a letter from the US Permanent Representative at the Security 
Council, which stated that the 9/11 attacks were an ‘on going threat to the 
US and its nationals posed by the Al-Qaeda organisation with the assistance 
of the Taliban regime.’26 It further claims that the use of force was necessary 
on the basis that: 
 
“Despite every effort by the United States and the international 
community, the Taliban regime has refused to change its policy. From 
the territory of Afghanistan, the Al-Qaeda organization continues to 
train and support agents of terror who attack innocent people 
throughout the world and target United States nationals and interest 
in the United States and abroad”.27  
 
In fact, before the US launched military operations in Afghanistan, it gave the 
Taliban government two weeks to destroy the terrorist elements that were 
operating within its borders.28 This indicates that, before using force in self-
defence, the US had attempted to exhaust non-forcible action by persuading 
the Taliban government. Since there was no fruitful outcome of their attempt 
to persuade the Taliban to assist the US in capturing those responsible for 
the 9/11 attacks, the US argued that it was then necessary for it to act in 
self-defence. 29 
                                                                                                                           
reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/t/terrorist-attack-on-uss-cole-
background-and-issues-for-congress.html  
26 Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America 
to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council 
S/2001/946 (7 October 2001)  
27 ibid  
28 President George W Bush Addresses to the Joint Session of the 107th 
Congress, Washington on 20th September 2001.  
29 See also Remarks by President George W Bush ‘Address to the Nation on 
Operations in Afghanistan’ on 7 October 2001. President Bush explained 
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A close analysis of the context of why it was necessary for the US to invoke 
the right to self-defence makes it clear that there is an element of state 
involvement, i.e. the Taliban’s role, in shaping the meaning of necessity, 
even though the conflict was between the US and Al-Qaida. This also relates 
to the question of attribution - what was the relationship between Al-Qaida 
and Taliban? In Nicaragua, the ICJ introduced the ‘effective control’ test to 
determine state responsibility for the conduct of a non-state actor.30 Also in 
Nicaragua, the Court propounded ‘dependence test’ which requires the non-
state actor to have complete dependence on the state in all fields.31 While 
‘overall control’ test in Tadic asked whether a particular armed conflict was 
an international or non-international in character. In the present case, there 
is no doubt there was a close relationship between the two parties but it is 
unknown whether Al-Qaeda is subordinate to Taliban or vice versa.  
 
Also evident is the gravity of the armed attack against the US. To use the 
words of Nicaragua, ‘the scale and effects would have been classified as an 
armed attack rather than a mere frontier’.32 Worthy of consideration in this 
respect is the Court’s reference to the UN GA resolution on the Definition of 
Aggression, inter alia includes, ‘the sending by or on behalf of a state of 
armed bands, irregulars or mercenaries which carry out acts of armed force 
against another state of such gravity as to amount to acts listed (in the 
Resolution)’.33 However, such reference to determine the existence of an 
armed attack may find difficulty as there is no precise conformity exist 
                                                                                                                           
that the United States had given ample opportunity for the Taliban 
government to close down terrorist camps and hand the leader of Al-
Qaeda but failed to meet such demands. See UN Doc. S/RES/1267 
(1999) (15 October 1999) In 1999, the Security Council passed a 
Resolution requesting the Taliban to handover Osama Bin Laden and 
other terrorist associates with which the Taliban failed to comply.  
30 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America) ICJ Reports 1986 p 64-65 para 114  
31 Ibid para 109 
32 Nicaragua (n 30) p 103 para 195 
33 General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX), Definition of Aggression, 14 
December 1974 at Article 3(g).  
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between the notions of armed attack and aggression.34 Nonetheless, the 
scale of the attacks by Al-Qaeda on 9/11 meets the meaning of an ‘armed 
attack’ for the purpose of Article 51 and this triggers the right to self-defence.  
 
As explained above, the US claimed that the use of force was necessary 
because the Taliban government did not co-operate with the United States in 
countering Al-Qaida in Afghanistan. This premise gives rise to a hypothetical 
question, which may be put forward with respect to the meaning of 
necessity. If the Taliban regime had cooperated with the US to capture Al-
Qaeda members and dismantle all terrorist training camps in its borders, 
would the use of force against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan still have been 
regarded as necessary in the context of self-defence? The likelihood is that it 
would not have been regarded as necessary. Therefore, it is necessary to 
take into account the Taliban government’s role in the conflict in order to 
understand the meaning of necessity in this case.  
 
Alternatively, the US might have chosen a different course of legal action in 
response to the 9/11 attacks, i.e. by taking recourse to international criminal 
law. Taking this route would have indicated that the US still had other 
options and thus, the choice of self-defence as the only response was not 
necessary.  
 
The use of criminal law to suppress terrorism has long been debated in 
international law. The history of terrorism in the context of international law 
has been exemplified by the 1937 League of Nations Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, which discussed the general 
meaning of terrorism, although it never entered into force.35 Since then, 
international law has approached terrorism through thematic conventions, 
such as criminalising terrorism in bombings, airplane hijackings, and 
hostage-taking. The move to criminalise certain acts at the level of 
international law materialised with the adoption of the Rome Statute in 
                                            
34 Moir (n 18) 48 
35  League of Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Terrorism (16 November 1937) 
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1998.36 This statute allows for the formation of judicial authority and 
prosecution, which has the power to indict individuals or groups suspected of 
committing serious crimes listed in the statute. However, the Rome Statute 
is limited to four types of crimes, which do not include terrorism.37  
 
Individual criminal acts may entail violation of international law for serious 
breaches of norms. Prior to the establishment of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) in 2002, international law had already provided a limited platform 
to try individuals for allegations of mass atrocities, for example the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)38 and 
Rwanda (ICTR)39. As a result of the establishment of international tribunals 
and criminal courts, there has been a degree of success in prosecuting 
individuals who were responsible for crimes committed on a large scale. This 
enhances the credibility of international criminal law as an option, which 
states may consider in the event of mass crimes.  
 
The advances in the area of international criminal law make it possible to 
argue that it would have been feasible for the US to prosecute the 
organisers of the 9/11 attacks under this legal regime, instead of invoking 
the right of self-defence. The fact that the US had recourse to this alternative 
legal option, rather than self-defence, raises the question of whether, based 
on the doctrine proceeding from the Caroline incident, the act of self-defence 
in Afghanistan was ‘overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no 
moment of deliberation’. Although the investigation of the perpetrators of the 
9/11 attacks and the establishment of judicial institutions under international 
                                            
36 UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (17 July 1998)  
37 The crimes are genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crime 
of aggression. Some authors propose for the crime of terrorism to be 
included in the ICC’s jurisdiction – see. Aviv Cohen, ‘Prosecution 
Terrorists at the International Criminal Court: Reevaluating an Unused 
Legal Tool to Combat Terrorism’ (2012) 20 Michigan State International 
Law Review 219-257, 250-255  
38 UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) 25 May 1993  
39 UN Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) 8 November 1994 
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criminal law for their trial would have presented its own challenges, the idea 
itself is not new and unachievable.40  
 
Before the 9/11 attacks, the US was open to the idea of using criminal law 
for terrorism-related crimes. For example, after the attacks by Al-Qaeda at 
American embassies in 1998 and the USS Cole bombing in 2000, the US 
used criminal law methods to investigate, extradite and prosecute the 
persons responsible for the attacks.41 However, the US government appears 
to have had a change in attitude following the 9/11 attacks. On 20 
September 2001, President George Bush used the term ‘war on terror’ for 
the first time to describe the action against the organisers of the 9/11 
attacks.42  
 
The term ‘war’ against a terrorist group may seem to overstretch the 
paradigm of international security. Some commentators are sceptical of the 
phrase ‘war on terror’ and claim that the US uses that phrase as a rhetorical 
device designed to legitimate other policy goals, or in an attempt to loosen 
some legal constraints to the use of force.43 Furthermore, it is questionable 
whether it is appropriate for a powerful country such as the US to declare a 
war on a non-state actor. This point was emphasised by Christopher 
Greenwood, a judge at the ICJ, who stated that: 
 
                                            
40 Helen Duffy (n 14) 75. See. Yves Beigbeder, Judging War Criminals 
(Palgrave 1999)186-199. The author outlines the challenges faced 
during the establishment of the International Criminal Court. The 
feasibility of the creation of the ICC was partly due to the success and 
experience from the ICTY and ICTR. For challenges of setting up 
international tribunals see Rachel Kerr, The International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (OUP 2004) 41-59 
41 Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘The Choice of Law Against Terrorism’ (2010) 4 
Journal of National Security Law and Policy 343-368, 347 
42 Actual speech: Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end 
there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been 
found, stopped and defeated. 
43 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (3rd edn, OUP 
2008) 1; Lindsay Moir, Reappraising the Resort to Force (Hart 
Publishing 2010) 1 
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“In the language of international law there is no basis for speaking of 
a war on [Al-Qaeda] or any other terrorist group, for such a group 
cannot be a belligerent, it is merely a band of criminals, and to treat it 
as anything else risks distorting the law while giving that group a 
status which to some implies a degree of legitimacy.”44  
 
By contrast, the argument in support of criminal law enforcement against Al-
Qaeda’s members may not address the fundamental issue of deterring 
threats from that terrorist group. Wedgwood describes the fallacies of 
recourse to prosecution as: 
 
“Courtroom victories did not shut down Al-Qaeda’s network of 
recruitment or its training camps. Nor did judicial verdicts quell Al-
Qaeda’s appetite for violence. The guilty verdict in the East African 
embassy bombings case was delivered in a courtroom six blocks 
away from the World Trade Center, three months before the towers 
were toppled.”45 
 
 The US seems to follow this school of thought, which believes that judicial 
machinery does not end the threat of terrorism. As explained by President 
Bush, the main goal of the ‘war on terror’ is to eradicate terrorism anywhere 
in the world.46  
 
With regard to the legal analysis of necessity for the purpose of self-defence, 
the fundamental question that must be addressed by the US was whether 
the use of force was a last resort. The US clearly had a choice of law 
between invoking the right to self-defence and attempting to prosecute the 
perpetrators using the international criminal law route. Despite having had 
                                            
44 Christopher Greenwood, ‘War, Terrorism and International Law’ (2004) 56 
Current Legal Problems 505, 529  
45 Ruth Wedgwood, ‘Countering Catastrophic Terrorism: An American View’ 
in Andrea Bianchi (ed), Enforcing International Law Norms Against 
Terrorism (Hart Publishing 2004) 109 
46 Delivered on 20 September 2001  
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the option of pursuing criminal law, the US instead chose to invoke the right 
to self-defence over any other alternatives.47  
 
There are propositions to suggest that the US may have had recourse to 
force by acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. There were some 
indications that this was feasible at the time. Firstly, The Security Council 
Resolution which was passed immediately after the 9/11 attacks 
demonstrated the strong support of Member States for the use of existing 
powers prescribed by the UN Charter to the Security Council in order to 
bring those responsible for the attacks to justice.48 Similarly, other 
intergovernmental organisations, such as the UN General Assembly49, 
NATO50, OAS51, EU52 and ASEAN53, also lent their political support to the 
adoption of counter-terrorist measures by the US. If the use of force in 
Afghanistan had been authorised by the Security Council, the US may not 
have been tied to the principles attached to the right to self-defence, such as 
necessity and proportionality, although the US may still have had to fulfil its 
                                            
47 Stephen Neff, War and the Law of Nations (CUP 2005) 387-390 
48 UN Doc. S/Res/1368 (2001) (12 September 2001) ‘Expresses its 
readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks 
of 11 September 2001, and to combat all forms of terrorism, in 
accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of the United 
Nations.’ 
49 UN Doc. A/RES/56/1 (2001) (18 September 2001)  
50 ‘Statement by the Secretary General of NATO Lord Robertson’ Press 
Release PR/CP (2001) 121, (11 September 2001). Available at 
http://nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-121e.htm ; ‘Statement by the North 
Atlantic Council’ Press Release PR/CP (2001) 122 (11 September 
2001). Available at http://nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-122e.htm 
51 ‘OAS Secretary General Condemns Acts of Terrorism in United States’ (E-
002/01) 11 September 2001. Available at 
http://www.oas.org/charter/docs/comuni_eng/E_002.htm ; ‘Statement 
From The OAS General Assembly’ (E-005/1). Available at 
http://www.oas.org/charter/docs/comuni_eng/E_005.htm  
52 ‘Statement by President Prodi on the Attacks against the United States’ 
(Brussels, 12 September 2001) IP/01/1265  
53 ASEAN Standing Committees Chairman's Letter To US Secretary of State 
Colin Powell On Terrorists Attack Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei 
Darussalam, 13 September 2001. Available at 
http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-political-security-
community/item/asean-standing-committees-chairman-s-letter-to-us-
secretary-of-state-colin-powell-on-terrorists-attack-bandar-seri-begawan-
brunei-darussalam-13-september-2001  
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obligation under jus in bello. Alternatively, the US may have considered 
using force based on humanitarian intervention, although this is a relatively 
difficult argument to make and is indeed a controversial justification.54 
Nevertheless, it was one of the options made available for consideration by 
the US.55 In spite of this, the US opted for unilateral self-defence to exercise 
force against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. 
 
The second aspect of necessity as a limitation to self-defence focuses on 
meeting the aim of self-defence. It is argued earlier that the legitimate aim of 
self-defence is to repel or halt an armed attack from succeeding. Recalling 
John Negroponte’s statement to the Security Council, the US made it clear 
that their intention was ‘to prevent and deter further attacks on the United 
States. These actions include measure against Al-Qaeda terrorist training 
camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan…’.56 
Similarly, the UK also explained its aim for invoking the right to self-defence 
as ‘following the terrorist outrage of 11 September, to avert the continuing 
threat of attacks from the same source.’57 
 
It is difficult to assess with minute detail whether the coalition forces 
(including the US and the UK) met the legitimate aim of self-defence and 
                                            
54 See Carlo Focarelli, ‘The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and 
Humanitarian Intervention: Too Many Ambiguities for a Working 
Doctrine’ (2008) 13 JCSL 191-213 (The author lays out the doubts 
raised by UN member states regarding the ‘emerging norm’ of 
responsibility to protect). In contrast see S/Res/1973 (2011) (17 March 
2011) on the use of force on the basis of humanitarian intervention in 
Libya in 2011.  
55 Michael Byers, ‘Terrorism, The Use of Force and International Law after 
11 September’ (2002) 51 ICLQ 401-414, 404-405; See also Helen Duffy, 
The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law (CUP 2005) 
179-183; Olivier Corten, ‘Human Rights and Collective Security: Is There 
an Emerging Right of Humanitarian Intervention?’ in Philip Alston and 
Euan MacDonald, Human Rights, Intervention and the Use of Force 
(OUP 2008) 132-133 
56 Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the 
United States of America to the UN to the  President of the UN Security 
Council, UN Doc S/2001/946 (7 October 2001) 
57 Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the Chargé d’affaires of the Permanent 
Mission of the United Kingdom to the UN to President of the UN Security 
Council, UN Doc S/2001/947 (7 October 2001)  
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conclude that the use of force was limited to the aim of self-defence. 
However, there is an indication that the US was able to achieve this. On 5 
December 2001, following an agreement, a new government was formed in 
Afghanistan to establish government institutions including the creation of 
Afghanistan military force. In the agreement, the Interim Authority was given 
the role of internal security and the control of all ‘mujahidin. Afghan armed 
forces and armed groups in the country’.58 Although this agreement does not 
state conclusively that the coalition forces were able to meet the aim of self-
defence, however, it does indicate that the US was able to remove the threat 
of Al-Qaida from being part of the government of Afghanistan. This can be 
interpreted to mean that the US was able to at least curb the threat of Al-
Qaida based in Afghanistan.  
 
In conclusion, the US invoked the right to self-defence by explaining to the 
Security Council that the 9/11 attacked was organised by Al-Qaeda. It also 
explained the reasons for initiating Operation Enduring Freedom on 7 
October 2001. By explaining why the use of force was necessary, this shows 
that the US considered that it fulfilled the principle of necessity in self-
defence. This also indicates that necessity is regarded as a requirement for 
invoking the right to self-defence. The military operation of the US concluded 
with an agreement that removed Al-Qaida as part of government institution. 
This can be seen as halting the threat exerted by Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.  
 
3. Israel v. Hezbollah (2006)  
 
In 2006, Israel invoked the right to conduct a self-defence operation against 
Hezbollah, a terrorist group based in the territory of Lebanon. The incident 
culminated in the 2006 Lebanon war, which took place from 12 July until 14 
August of that year. The conflict illustrates a situation in which self-defence 
                                            
58 Letter dated 5 December 2001 from the Secretary-General addressed to 
the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2001/1154 (5 
December 2001) 6  
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was invoked against a non-state actor, raising key aspects associated with 
necessity in self-defence as present throughout the event.  
 
This analysis will seek to examine whether a case of necessity existed for 
Israel’s launch of defensive measures against Hezbollah in self-defence.59 
This will be followed by an examination of whether Israel fulfilled the second 
aspect of necessity, i.e. to limit the use of force to what is necessary to 
achieve the legitimate aim of self-defence. To that end, this analysis will be 
divided according to the first and second roles of necessity in the self-
defence framework.  
  
a. Factual Events  
 
On 12 July 2006, Hezbollah fired several rockets from Lebanese territory 
across a UN peace keeping operation area (the ‘Blue Line’) and targeted the 
Israel Defence Force (IDF) position at the Israeli town of Zarit.60 Hezbollah 
fighters pursued further attacks against several IDF positions, which resulted 
in the death of eight soldiers, the injury of several troops and the capture of 
two IDF personnel on that day.61 Israel responded by launching ground, air 
and sea attacks against Hezbollah positions. These attacks were conducted 
by bombing strategic locations, including roads and bridges in southern 
Lebanon.62 The hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel continued until 
August 2006, when the Security Council passed a resolution calling for a 
permanent ceasefire and respect for the UN peace-keeping mission.63  
                                            
59 See on the question of attribution Christian Tams, ‘The Use of Force 
against Terrorists’ (2009) 20 EJIL 359-397, 379 
60 UN Doc. S/2006/560 (21 July 2006) See also Security Council Report 
Lebanon/Israel 20 July 2006 No. 5 
61 For brief facts of the conflict see 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/lebanon-change-of-
direction.htm 
62 For brief facts of the conflict see 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/lebanon-change-of-
direction.htm  
63 UN Doc. S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) See also S/2007/392 (28 June 
2007). See also Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon established by 
Human Rights Council A/HRC/3/2 (23 November 2006) para. 40 pg. 20. 
The Commission reported that ‘On 12 July 2006, a new incident 
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Following the first attack on 12 July 2006, Israel wrote a letter, informing the 
Security Council that ‘the terrorist infiltrated Israel and kidnapped two Israeli 
soldiers, taking into Lebanon’.64 In that letter, Israel also attributed the 
responsibility of the attacks to Lebanon, as the attacks originated from there, 
and similar responsibilities were also attributed to other states.65 For this 
reason, Israel argued that it reserved the right to self-defence in accordance 
with Article 51 of the UN Charter.66 Meanwhile, five days after the first attack, 
Lebanon informed the Security Council that IDF had killed more than 100 
civilians within four days and destroyed major infrastructures in Lebanon, 
including Beirut International Airport and other airports.67 The Lebanese 
government rebutted the accusation that it had assisted Hezbollah in 
attacking Israel. In a letter to the Security Council, Lebanon stated that:  
 
“The Lebanese Government announced from the first instance when 
the events broke, that it had no prior knowledge of what happened. 
Nor did it endorse the operation carried out by Hezbollah, which led to 
the abduction of two Israeli soldiers.”68 
 
However, this non-cooperation alleged by the Lebanese government 
between itself and Hezbollah was disputed by Israel, who claimed that 
Lebanon had advance knowledge about the planning of the attacks.  
 
In this conflict, the main belligerency occurred between Hezbollah and Israel. 
Israel explicitly invoked the right to self-defence against the terrorist group. 
Such a situation is a clear example of a state exercising self-defence against 
a non-state actor. The issue of whether or not self-defence occurs is not in 
                                                                                                                           
between Hezbollah military wing and IDF… The situation began when 
Hezbollah fighters fired rockets at Israeli military positions and border 
villages while another Hezbollah unit crossed the Blue Line, killed eight 
Israeli soldiers and captured two.’  
64 UN Doc. A/60/937 – S/2006/515 (12 July 2006)  
65 UN Doc. A/60/937 – S/2006/515 (12 July 2006)  
66 UN Doc. A/60/937 – S/2006/515 (12 July 2006)    
67 UN Doc. A/60/941 – S/2006/529 (15 July 2006)  
68 UN Doc. A/60/941 – S/2006/529 (15 July 2006)  
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contention. On the contrary, the invocation of self-defence can easily be 
established. However, Israel implicated Lebanon and other states in the 
armed attacks launched by Hezbollah.69 In Israel’s view, the attacks were 
not solely committed by Hezbollah, but with the assistance of the Lebanese 
government. If the argument made by Israel is true, then self-defence is not 
only exercised against Hezbollah but also directed against Lebanon. In other 
words, Israel invoked self-defence against a state and a non-state actor.70  
 
In invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter, Israel was required to meet the 
conditions of necessity and proportionality. Specifically for the condition of 
necessity, it was incumbent upon Israel to demonstrate that it was necessary 
to employ force in self-defence.  
  
b. Analysis of Necessity According to the Framework of Self-
Defence  
 
This part of the chapter focuses on the role of necessity in the conflict 
between Israel and Hezbollah. It examines whether Israel fulfilled the 
principle of necessity as required by the law of self-defence, and if so, how 
does Israel justify the use of force as necessary. In addition, there will also 
                                            
69 It is disputed whether Israel responded in self-defence against Hezbollah 
solely or whether it was directed against both Lebanon and Hezbollah. It 
may be that Hezbollah acted as auxiliaries of Lebanon and regarded as 
de facto organ of Lebanon. See Dinstein, (n 3) 219. See also Ruth 
Wedgwood, ‘Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden’ 
(1999) 24 Yale Journal of International Law 559-576, 565 Assuming that 
Lebanon has assisted Hezbollah in the armed attack against Israel 
directly or indirectly, Lebanon cannot expect to insulate its territory 
against measures of self-defence if it had the capacity to shut down 
Hezbollah’s operation within its border.  
70 It is suffice to show a link between the host state and the terrorist 
organisation within the territory to warrant the host state responsible for 
the attacks committed by the terrorist. Raphaël van Steenberghe, ‘Self-
Defence in Response to Attacks by Non-state Actors in the Light of 
Recent State Practice: A Step Forward?’ (2010) 23 LJIL 183-208, 200; 
See also Kimberly Trapp, ‘Back to Basics: Necessity, Proportionality, 
and the Right to Self-Defence Against Non-State Actors’ (2007) 56 ICLQ 
141-156 
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be an analysis of whether the force taken by Israel was necessary to 
achieve the legitimate aim of self-defence. 
 
This analysis is divided into two parts, which are based on the two roles of 
necessity. Firstly, it will explore the role of necessity as a requirement to self-
defence. This will be done by determining the existence of an armed attack 
and questioning whether the use of force was a last resort to trigger the right 
to self-defence. Secondly, necessity will be examined as a limitation on the 
use of force during the conflict. This will be approached by assessing 
whether the use of force corresponds to the legitimate aim of self-defence. In 
this case, it is argued that Israel reasonably applied the principle of necessity 
to justify that the armed attacks against its territory warranted the use of 
force in self-defence and thus satisfied the requirement aspect of necessity. 
However, Israel failed to demonstrate that the force employed throughout 
the conflict was necessary to achieve the legitimate aim of self-defence.  
 
i. First Part of Necessity (Requirement)  
 
The starting point of analysis on necessity as a requirement to self-defence 
is to ask if the situation before the use of force required Israel to invoke 
Article 51. Israel claimed that the conflict started when Hezbollah launched a 
series of rocket attacks from Lebanon. The Lebanese government implicitly 
accepted that the rockets were launched from its territory but maintained that 
it had no prior knowledge of these attacks.71  
 
According to Article 51, the right to self-defence can only be triggered if there 
is an ‘armed attack’. The rockets targeted towards Israel’s territory may be 
regarded as an armed attack against Israel.72 To illustrate this point, the 
                                            
71 UN Doc. A/60/941 – S/2006/529 (15 July 2006)  
72Opposite argument see Giuliana Capaldo, ‘Providing a Right of Self-
Defense Against Large-Scale Attacks by Irregular Forces: The Israeli-
Hezbollah Conflict’ (2007) 48 Harvard International Law Journal Online 
101-112, 105-106. The author argues that the attacks targeted at Israel 
on 12 July 2006 did not meet the ‘armed attack’ threshold as required in 
Article 51. See also Victor Kattan, ‘The Use and Abuse of Self-Defence 
in International Law: The Israel –Hezbollah Conflict as a Case Study’ 
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death of two Israeli soldiers and the kidnaping of several IDF soldiers by 
Hezbollah is a clear attack against Israel. On this basis, it is possible to 
establish the existence of an armed attack according to Article 51.73 The 
issue here is not a question of an existence of an armed attack but rather 
who is the author of the armed attack. In order to answer this question, it 
alludes the discussion on the question of attribution. Is Lebanon responsible 
(or partly responsible) for the armed attacks orchestrated by Hezbollah?  
 
Article 8 of the ILC on State Responsibility states that an action carried out 
‘on the instruction of, or under the direction or control of, that State,’ amounts 
to an act of a State.74 In Nicaragua, the Court cited Article 3(g) of Definition 
of Aggression 1971 which created the ‘effective control’ test to determine 
state’s responsibility for the conduct of a non-state actor.75 Similarly, the test 
propounded in Tadic, the ‘overall control’ test may be considered in this state 
practice.76 However, it must be noted the test in Tadic was an issue to 
determine the characterisation of the armed conflict.  
 
Applying the tests stated above to the present state practice, it is hard to 
make conclusive answer that Lebanon was responsible for the conduct of 
Hezbollah. At least publicly, the government of Lebanon denied any 
                                                                                                                           
(2005) 12 Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law 31-50, (in SSRN 
pg. 13-14) The author argues that even if Israel that the 12th July attack 
is a series of attack (using the needle prick justification to invoke self-
defence) needle prick doctrine is’ only a theory and not a rule of 
international law, it carries little judicial weight’. Lebanon may also use 
this doctrine likewise by arguing that Israel frequently entered Lebanon’s 
water and territory in the past.  
73 Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon pursuant to Human 
Rights Council Resolution. A/HRC/3/2 (23 November 2006) para. 61 
p.23; Michael Schmitt, ‘”Change Direction” 2006: Israeli Operations in 
Lebanon and the International Law of Self-Defense’ (2008) 29 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 127-164, 139-141 
74 Article 8 of Drafts Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts 2001 UN Doc. A/56/49(Vol.1)/Corr.4  (12 December 
2001)  
75 Nicaragua (n 30) p 103 para 195 
76 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic Judgment in the Appeals Chamber of 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) IT-94-1-
A (15 July 1999) pp. 34-35 paras. 83-87  
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involvement of the attacks against Israel and claimed it was unaware of the 
attacks in advance. As such, the question remains, whether it was lawful for 
Israel to use self-defence against Hezbollah based in Lebanon?  
 
Article 51 of the UN Charter is silent with regards to the author of an armed 
attack and it imposes no restriction whether self-defence can be directed 
against a state or a non-state actor. In Nicaragua, the Court states that ‘if 
such an operation, because of its scale and effects, would have been 
classified as an armed attack rather than as a mere frontier incident had it 
been carried out by regular armed forces.’77 Israel claimed that the attacks 
executed by Hezbollah, the death of two Israeli soldiers, the kidnaping of 
several IDF soldiers and continuous attacks in Israel amounts to an armed 
attack for the purpose of Article 51. Furthermore, as argued in Chapter 2, 
there is a strong body of opinion based on state practice that a state may 
invoke the right to self-defence against a non-state actor.78 As such, it may 
be argued that Israel has the right to self-defence against Hezbollah 
although it is contestable whether Lebanon is responsible (or partly 
responsible) for the conduct of Hezbollah.  
 
The next question relating to necessity as a requirement is whether force 
was a last resort for Israel. The existence of an armed attack against Israel 
may be an indicator that it was necessary for Israel to respond in self-
defence. Israel asserted that the armed attack caused the launch of 
operations for self-defence necessary. According to Israel, there were two 
main justifications for the use of armed force in self-defence. Firstly, the 
armed attacks against Israel and the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers 
compelled Israel to respond with force.79 Furthermore, Israel asserted that it 
had restrained itself for several years ‘bearing the brunt of countless attacks’ 
and the incident on 12 July left Israel no choice but to react.80 Secondly, 
Israel viewed the attacks as ‘a grave threat’ to Israel’s northern border and 
                                            
77 Nicaragua (n 30) p 103 para 195  
78 See discussion in Chapter 2 – ‘d. State Practice in Self-Defence against 
Non-State Actors’  
79 UN Doc. A/60/937 – S/2006/515 (12 July 2006)    
80 UN Doc. S/PV.5489 (14 July 2006) p.6  
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claimed that ‘the ineptitude and inaction of the Government of Lebanon has 
led to a situation in which it has not exercised jurisdiction over its own 
territory for many years’.81 On both grounds, Israel considered that it was 
necessary to use force in response to the attacks. 
 
It is debatable whether Israel’s recourse to force was a matter of last resort. 
Following the Caroline formula, self-defence can only be justified if there is a 
situation, which is ‘instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and 
no moment of deliberation’. It may be argued that Israel fell short of meeting 
this standard of necessity as portrayed in the Caroline case. Given that 
Israel had a strategic advantage in terms of military capability and 
diplomacy, it did in fact have had other options apart from recourse to force, 
if it so wished.82 Although this does not necessarily mean that Israel was 
prevented from using force in self-defence, it does show that Israel had other 
non- forcible options, which it could have chosen. However, even if there 
were alternative options, it is questionable in such circumstances where 
several IDF soldiers were kidnapped, it is effective to employ non-forcible 
measure. Necessity as a matter of last resort does not entail the invoking 
state to use all alternative means to redress the conflict but rather for the 
state to use practicable means within reach.83  
 
It could also be argued that, although its need to respond to the continuous 
rocket attacks by Hezbollah was pressing, Israel could have sought 
cooperation from Lebanon prior to invoking self-defence against Hezbollah. 
Tams and Devaney describe the principle of necessity in self-defence 
against non-state actors, arguing that: 
 
“As a general rule, for self-defence to be necessary, the victim state 
has to make an attempt to have the host state suppress the terrorist 
threat. Alternatively, the victim state might attempt to cooperate with 
                                            
81 UN Doc. A/60/937 – S/2006/515 (12 July 2006)    
82 Victor Kattan, ‘The Use and Abuse of Self-Defence in International Law: 
The Israel –Hezbollah Conflict as a Case Study’ (2005) 12 Yearbook of 
Islamic and Middle Eastern Law 31-50, 46  
83 Dinstein (n 3) 232 
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the host state against terrorists (so that joint enforcement operations 
help to avoid resort to force), or seek the host state’s consent to 
extraterritorial anti-terrorist measures.”84 
 
Israel could have asked for Lebanon’s assistance in finding both the 
perpetrator of the rocket attacks and the kidnapped soldier. However, the 
history of the two countries and their past conflicts might have meant that is 
was not conducive for Israel to request military assistance from government 
of Lebanon. This left Israel with no choice of means but recourse to self-
defence. Therefore, it could be argued that Israel fulfilled the requirement of 
necessity to exercise the right to self-defence.  
 
As a summary, necessity as a requirement in self-defence explores the 
situation that necessitates Israel to use force before launching any defensive 
measures. The rocket attacks initiated by Hezbollah against Israel which 
resulted in two deaths of IDF soldiers triggered Israel to invoke the right to 
self-defence. Israel claimed that this was an armed attack in accordance 
with Article 51 of the UN Charter and thus satisfied the criteria set out in the 
provision. Furthermore, several IDF soldiers were kidnapped by Hezbollah 
and continuous rocket attacks compelled Israel to claim that it was 
necessary to use force in self-defence. The claim of necessity to launch self-
defence by Israel could be supported by the broad agreement from member 
states in the Security Council. Therefore, it can be concluded that Israel 
reasonably justified the necessity of launching self-defence operations, and 
thus meets the requirement aspect of necessity.  
 
ii. Second Part of Necessity (Limitation) 
 
The second role of necessity acts a limitation to self-defence. To determine 
necessity as a limitation is to analyse whether the force used by the invoking 
                                            
84 Christian Tams and James Devaney, ‘Applying Necessity and 
Proportionality to Anti-Terrorist Self-Defence’ (2012) 45 Israel Law 
Review 91-106, 98 
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state was indeed necessary to achieve the legitimate aim of self-defence.85 
In this case, if the force employed by Israel does not achieve the intended 
outcome of legitimate self-defence, it may be deemed that Israel used 
unnecessary force, which would consequently be regarded as unlawful use 
of force.  
 
Recalling the discussion regarding the difference between necessity as a 
limitation and proportionality, the principle of proportionality focuses on the 
intensity of the use of force. While necessity as a limitation emphasise on 
whether the invoking state employs force meeting the aim of self-defence.  
 
Necessity as a limitation can be assessed by examining the physical 
consequence of the defensive measures and whether the force employed 
able to achieve the aim of self-defence.86 In doing so, it is unavoidable that 
the facts that are relevant for assessing necessity is also relevant in 
                                            
85 The ICJ held that ‘the requirement of international law that measures 
taken avowedly in self-defence must have been necessary for that 
purpose is strict and objective’ Oil Platforms (Iran v. US) 2003 ICJ Rep 
161, para. 73; Natalia Ochoa-Ruiz and Esther Salamanca-Aguado, 
‘Exploring the Limits of International Law relating to the Use of Force in 
Self-defence’ (2005) 16 EJIL 499-524, 515  
86 The assessment in terms of physical effects as a result of military strikes 
some writers argue that this must only be seen in terms of jus in bello 
and should not be conflated with jus ad bellum. See Andreas 
Zimmermann ‘The Second Lebanon War: Jus ad bellum, jus in bello and 
the Issue of Proportionality’ (2007) 11 Max Planck Yrbk of United 
Nations Law (2007) 99-141, 125-126; Yäel Ronen, ‘Israel, Hizbollah, and 
the Second Lebanon War’ 9 (2006) Yearbook of International 
Humanitarian Law 362-393, 390-391 
 
However, The ICJ in its Advisory Opinion concerning the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons held that the assessment of 
proportionality in jus ad bellum may overlap in jus in bello. The Court 
stated that: 
 
‘use of force that is proportionate under the law of self-defence, must, in 
order to be lawful, also meet the requirements of the law applicable in 
armed conflicts which comprise in particular the principles of 
humanitarian law.’ (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
para. 42)  
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determining proportionality.87 This is because the nature of both principles of 
necessity and proportionality are interrelated.88 This makes necessity 
relevant to the meaning of proportionality and vice versa. Thus, the 
measurement of proportionality partly informs the meaning of necessity.89  
 
In a debate in the Security Council following the first attacks on 12 July 
2006, the majority of the member states agreed that Israel had the right to 
exercise self-defence.90 However, not all of those states agreed that Israel 
employed proportionate force for the purpose of self-defence. Throughout 
the conflict, the main criticism of Israel was its excessive use of defensive 
force. This can be illustrated by some remarks from member states in the 
Security Council; for instance, the Argentinian representative Mr Mayoral 
said: 
 
“My country is extremely concerned at the Israeli military actions… at 
the excessive use of force, the imposition of collective punishment the 
destruction of civilian infrastructure – in particular the destruction of 
airports, power station bridges and roads – as well as attacks against 
populated areas that endanger the lives of innocent civilians, and the 
imposition of a sea, air and land blockade against Lebanon.”91 
                                            
87 Israel’s use of force in Lebanon is regarded as disproportionate but this 
also links to other analysis, the principle of necessity in pursue of 
legitimate aim of self-defence. David Kretzmer argues that: 
‘The problem… is not the consideration of the damage caused as a factor in 
assessing proportionality, but the absence of a serious analysis of the 
other side of the coin: the necessity of the force which caused the 
damage in advancing the legitimate ends of self-defence.’ David 
Kretzmer, ‘The Inherent Right to Self-Defence and Proportionality in Jus 
Ad Bellum’ (2013) 24 EJIL 235-282, 279 
88 Anders Henriksen, ‘Jus ad Bellum and American Targeted Use of Force to 
Fight Terrorism’ (2014) 19 JCSL 211-250, 231; Albrecht Randelzhofer 
and Georg Nolte, ‘Article 51’ in Bruno Simma and others (eds), The 
Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (Vol. 2, 3rd edn, OUP 
2012) 1427 
89 Noam Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Non-State Actors (OUP 
2010) 64 
90 UN Doc. S/PV.5489 (14 July 2006) with exception with Lebanon which 
regards Israel action as an aggression.  
91 UN Doc. S/PV.5489 (14 July 2006) p.9 
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Similar criticism was also raised by other member states such as Japan, 
who regarded Israel’s action as excessive use of force, and the UK, who 
called for Israel to take measured and proportionate force.92 France too 
made the same assessment, condemning the disproportionate nature of 
Israel’s response.93 Therefore, there was widespread disapproval amongst 
the member states of the Security Council of the excessive forced used by 
Israel. Israel, meanwhile, did not offer any justification for the use of force in 
such a scale, but did argue that its actions were in direct response to the 
attacks committed by Hezbollah.94 
 
With regard to second role of necessity as a limiting factor in the use of 
force, it is argued that Israel failed to limit the use of force to what is 
necessary to achieve the legitimate aim of self-defence. In addition, it is also 
argued that Israel failed to comply with the principle of proportionality. This 
could also be exemplified by the deliberation of the Security Council. The 
main theme of the debate was the excessive use of force and 
disproportionate defensive measures by Israel. The analysis of necessity as 
a limiting factor focuses on the physical damages perpetrated by Israel, such 
as sea blockades and the destruction of bridges, airports and other major 
infrastructures in Lebanon. The question raised is: were these actions, which 
were the result of force taken by Israel, necessary to neutralise the threat of 
an armed attack by Hezbollah? 
 
Israel may argue that extensive use of force was necessary to defend itself. 
The destruction of major infrastructures in Lebanon and the unfortunate 
deaths of civilians during the conflict may still be regarded as necessary self-
defence. Israel was responding to the threat of a non-state actor, a terrorist 
group that is known for its secretive and evasive nature, and was 
simultaneously trying to recover its captured soldiers. Moreover, continuous 
attacks were targeted against Israel’s territory during that conflict and 
                                            
92 UN Doc. S/PV.5489 (14 July 2006) p.12 
93 UN Doc. S/PV.5489 (14 July 2006) p.17  
94 UN Doc. S/PV.5489 (14 July 2006) p.6 
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consequently, Israel responded in self-defence. In such a situation, it could 
be understood why Israel deemed the use of extensive force to be 
necessary.  
 
Proportionality in jus ad bellum relates to the overall operation of the 
defensive attacks.95 In this state practice, the scale and nature of Israel’s 
attacks in response to Hezbollah would raise the question of proportionality, 
as heavy attacks were executed in some areas of Lebanon.96 The 
disproportionality of Israel’s defensive response can be demonstrated by the 
figures from the UN mandated Commission of Inquiry, which found that by 
the end of the 33-day conflict, 1,191 people had been killed, 4409 injured, 
and 900,000 people had fled their homes.97 The extensive damage caused 
by Israel’s bombardment throughout the conflict could lead some people to 
question whether Israel’s actions in Lebanon were defensive at all: the 
aftermath of the conflict could be characterised as offensive, and even 
punitive.98 Thus, Israel’s response in self-defence can be regarded as a 
disproportionate and excessive use of force.99  
  
As observed by the Security Council, no other member states besides 
Lebanon denied that Israel had the right to invoke Article 51. However, other 
states were concerned by the disproportionate force pursued by Israel in 
Lebanon.100 The action taken by Israel does not reflect the assertion that the 
                                            
95 See Judith Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force (CUP 
2004) 156 
96 Noam Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Non-State Actors (OUP 
2010) 252 
97 Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon pursuant to Human 
Rights Council Resolution. A/HRC/3/2 (23 November 2006) para. 11 pg. 
3  
98 Victor Kattan, ‘The Use and Abuse of Self-Defence in International Law: 
The Israel –Hezbollah Conflict as a Case Study’ (2005) 12 Yearbook of 
Islamic and Middle Eastern Law 31-50, 32 
99 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (3rd edn, OUP 
2008) 241 
100 When the Lebanon conflict broke out the first meeting in the Security 
Council was held on 14 July 2006. Except Lebanon, other member 
states accepted Israel has the right to self-defence. Those states were 
France, Argentina, China, Congo, Denmark, Ghanam Greece, Japan, 
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use of force was merely responding to the threat from Hezbollah or repelling 
an attack in progress; this is important to show that Israel was at least trying 
to achieve the legitimate aim of self-defence. The force exerted by Israel 
was more than what was necessary, thus constituting a disproportionate use 
of force. This excessive use of force devastated infrastructures and caused 
a high number of deaths. Therefore, it is argued that in this instance, Israel 
failed to limit the use of force to what was necessary for defensive purposes.  
 
If it is argued that in this state practice Israel failed on both counts, the 
principles of necessity as a limitation and proportionality, then what is the 
difference between the two concepts in practical terms? As suggested 
earlier, necessity as a limitation focuses on the aim of self-defence. 
 
Israel in this instance, whilst invoking the right to self-defence, it also has 
other objectives for the use of force. On this basis, it is argued that the acts 
of Israel is no longer confined to halting and repelling an armed attack from 
succeeding (legitimate aim of self-defence). Prime Minister Olmert explained 
the objectives of Israel action as follows:  
 
“And in Lebanon, we will insist on compliance with the terms 
stipulated long ago by the international community; The return of the 
hostages, A complete cease fire, Deployment of the Lebanese army 
in all of Southern Lebanon, Expulsion of Hizballah from the area, and 
fulfillment of United Nations Resolution 1559… We will not suspend 
our actions… we are exercising self-defense in the most basic and 
essential sense.”101 
 
                                                                                                                           
Peru, Qatar, Russia, Slovakia, the United Kingdom, Tanzania and the 
United States. Some states were explicit in their condemnation of the 
attacks at Israel and some called for de-escalation. See S/PV.5489 
(2006) (14 July 2006)  
101 Prime Minister Ehud Olmert speech at Knesset 17 July 2006 (available 
at: https://www.knesset.gov.il/docs/eng/olmertspeech2006_eng.htm) 
See also UN Doc. S/PV.5492 (20 July 2006) p.3 
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In addition, Israel also pursued the objective of reinstating its deterrence 
policy during the conflict.102 This had, amongst other aims, the aim of 
neutralising Hezbollah’s military power by eliminating its senior leaders, 
undermining Hezbollah’s military symbol in the region and preventing further 
weaponry supply to Hezbollah by foreign states.103 However, the objective of 
restoring Israel’s power of deterrence may be considered as an excessive 
use of force in the context of self-defence, as this would demonstrate that 
Israel may have used more force that was necessary to bring about an 
immediate end to the conflict.104 By creating other aims of self-defence to 
justify its use of force, Israel was no longer claiming to use force purely for 
self-defence. Therefore, Israel did not meet the principle of necessity as a 
limitation to self-defence. 
 
able to claim that it was conforming to the principle of necessity in self-
defence. Despite the extensive use of force by Israel, it may be argued that, 
because Israel had expressed its objectives of self-defence, it was acting 
lawfully in compliance with the principle of necessity.105 
 
Several states in the Security Council criticised Israel for not focusing the 
use of force for self-defence. For instance, Mr Churkin, the Russian 
representative in the Security Council, claimed that ‘the scale of the use of 
force [used by Israel], the casualties and the destruction demonstrate that 
the actions stated for achieving this purpose go far beyond a counter-
terrorist operation’.106 The Ghanaian representative also described Israel’s 
actions of the previous eight days as ‘disproportionate and excessive’.107 
The remarks made by Russia and Ghana were not exceptional. Other states 
                                            
102 Yehuda Ben Meir, ‘Israel Government Policy and the War Objective’ (The 
Institute for National Security Studies, Vol. 9, Aug. 2006) p.2 
103 Yehuda Ben Meir, ‘Israel Government Policy and the War Objective’ (The 
Institute for National Security Studies, Vol. 9, Aug. 2006) p.2  
104 Yäel Ronen, ‘Israel, Hizbollah, and the Second Lebanon War’ (2006) 9 
Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 362-393, 390 
105 Yäel Ronen, ‘Israel, Hizbollah, and the Second Lebanon War’ (2006) 9 
Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 362-393, 387-388 
106 UN Doc. S/PV.5493 (Resumption 1) (21 July 2006) p.2 
107 UN Doc. S/PV.5493 (Resumption 1) (21 July 2006) p.9  
- 264 - 
agreed that Israel indeed has the right to exercise self-defence, but believe 
that its claim of self-defence is weakened by the fact that it exercised force 
without limitation and consequently used unnecessary force.  
 
There are several conclusions which can be drawn from this case study. 
Firstly, this case study confirms that, in practice, the principle of necessity in 
self-defence has a broad definition and can generally be divided into two 
categories, which correspond to the two roles of necessity - as a 
requirement to self-defence and also as a limitation to the use of force. For 
example, Israel justified its use of force by claiming that that had been 
compelled to respond with force due to the armed attacks and the 
imminence of the attacks. Furthermore, Israel argued that it had no other 
choice apart from recourse to self-defence. Most member states in the 
Security Council agree that Israel was right to initiate self-defence, but the 
same states that agreed that Israel had the right to self-defence also 
criticised its failure to limit the use of force to what was necessary to achieve 
the legitimate aim of self-defence. Therefore, this illustrates that necessity in 
self-defence has two different roles.  
 
Secondly, Israel was criticised for employing disproportionate use of force 
and it is argued that Israel also failed to meet the second aspect of 
necessity. This is because Israel expressly state that it had other objectives 
in pursuing the use of force alongside with defensive use of force. Therefore, 
it cannot be said that the use of force by Israel was purely to achieve the aim 
of self-defence. This state practice shows that a state fails on both counts, 
necessity as a limitation and proportionality. So does this mean that any 
state that employs disproportionate use of defensive force automatically fails 
the second aspect of necessity? The role of necessity as a limitation in the 
framework of self-defence, its purpose is to observe whether the use of force 
by a state meets the legitimate aim of self-defence. As for proportionality, the 
issue is the scale and intensity of the force employed by a state. In 
hypothetical scenario, a state may achieve the legitimate aim of self-defence 
(by halting or repelling an armed attack from succeeding) but nonetheless 
the state may be guilty for employing disproportionate use of force. The 
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distinction can be seen here, necessity as a limitation focuses on achieving 
the aim of self-defence.  
 
c. Conclusion 
 
In summary, the Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006 makes it possible for this 
study to examine the application of necessity in a situation of self-defence 
against a non-state actor. Israel maintained that there was a case of self-
defence against Hezbollah, where the initial armed attacks originated from 
territory of Lebanon. With regard to the first role of necessity as a pre-
condition to self-defence, Israel was able to reasonably justify that the use of 
force against Hezbollah was necessary, on the basis that the attacks were 
continuous and several soldiers had been killed and kidnapped. As argued 
by Israel, these actions compelled them to launch force in response to the 
attacks. However, Israel failed to limit its use of force to what was necessary 
to achieve the legitimate aim of self-defence. Rather, Israel explained that 
not only was it using force to address the current threat from Hezbollah, it 
was also trying to use the opportunity to resolve disputes between Israel and 
Hezbollah by adopting a deterrence policy towards Hezbollah. If necessity is 
strictly seen only as the temporal use of force for the purpose of defence, 
Israel needed to restrict its use of force to a response to the armed attacks 
fired by Hezbollah from the 12 June 2006 onwards. The destruction caused 
by Israel’s actions indicates that the extensive use of force was not 
necessary. Therefore, Israel cannot be said to have limited its defensive 
measures to what was necessary, even though it was right to initiate self-
defence.  
 
4. Islamic State (2014)108  
 
On 23 September 2014, a coalition force led by the US launched air strikes 
in Syria against two terrorist organisations: Khorasan Group, a splinter 
                                            
108 The terrorist group is often referred as IS, ISIL/ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq 
and the Levant/Syria) or Dawlah al-Islamiyah fi al-Iraq wa-Sham, Arabic 
acronym Dai’sh or Daesh.  
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terrorist organisation from Al-Qaeda, and Islamic State.109 Iraq had 
requested assistance from the US and other states in responding to the 
terrorist threats by Islamic State headquartered in Syria. The US invoked 
Article 51 of the UN Charter for collective self-defence in response to the 
request made by Iraq, and invoked individual self-defence against Khorasan 
Group.  
 
This part of the chapter will specifically examine the legality of the self-
defence conducted by the coalition forces against Khorasan Group and 
Islamic state on 23 September 2014 and will assess whether the use of 
force meets the requirement of necessity. This will be approached by 
separating the two roles of necessity. Firstly, this part seeks to investigate 
whether the claim of necessity to self-defence warranted the launch of 
defensive air strikes by the coalition against the terrorist groups. This will 
include an investigation of whether the victim states had any non-forcible 
options available to them. Additionally, it will examine whether the armed 
attack or threats made by Islamic State can be attributable to Syria. 
Secondly, necessity will be considered as a limiting factor in the use of force 
by the coalition forces. This will be done by assessing whether the air strikes 
employed were consistent with the legitimate aim of self-defence. 
 
a. Introduction  
 
The establishment of Islamic State is still unclear, but it has some origins in 
another terrorist group, Al-Qaeda. In 2002, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is 
reported to have set up an organisation, Tawhid wa Al-Jihad, and later 
pledged allegiance to Bin Laden and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).110 Following the 
                                            
109 ‘US Confirms 14 Air Strikes against ISIS in Syria’ (the Guardian, 23 
September 2014) http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/23/us-
launches-air-strikes-against-isis-targets-in-syria (accessed: 23 July 
2015); ‘Syria: US Begins Air Strikes on Islamic State Targets’ (BBC, 23 
September 2014) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
29321136 (accessed: 23 July 2015)  
110 ‘What is Islamic State’ http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
29052144 (Accessed: 23 March 2015). For more information see 
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death of al-Zarqawi in 2006, AQI created another group, which was called 
Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). In 2010, Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi became the new 
leader of ISI. He later strengthened ISI’s capabilities and in 2013, he 
announced the merger of ISI with forces in Levant, naming the newly 
merged force as Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL or ISIS). At the time 
of writing, Islamic State is currently in control of parts of Syria and northern 
Iraq, with 31,000 fighters and estimated assets of $2 billion USD, making it 
the wealthiest terrorist group in the world.111  
 
According to international law, Islamic State has the status of a non-state 
actor or a terrorist group.112 On 15 August 2014, the Security Council 
adopted a Resolution recognising Islamic State as splinter group of Al-Qaida 
which is associated with Al-Nusra Front, another terrorist group based in 
Syria.113 Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council 
tacitly approved the use of force against Islamic State, Al-Qaida, and Al-
Nusra Front.114  
 
Although the conflict against Islamic State is sanctioned by the SC, there is a 
case that it may be viewed under the right to self-defence. This is because 
                                                                                                                           
http://www.dw.de/evolution-of-the-islamic-state/a-17842591 ; 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/11/-sp-isis-the-inside-story  
111 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11146689/The-
rise-of-Islamic-State-how-the-jihadi-group-conquered-territory-in-Iraq-
and-Syria-in-90-seconds.html (Accessed: 28 March 2015)  
112 Analysis on the statehood of Islamic State based on 1933 Montevideo 
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States – Yuval Shany and 
others, ‘ISIS: Is the Islamic State Really a State?’ The Israel Democracy 
Institute (14 September 2014) http://en.idi.org.il/analysis/articles/isis-is-
the-islamic-state-really-a-state/  
113 Security Council Resolution (S/Res/2170 (2014)) 15 August 2014 p.5 
para 18  
114 Security Council Resolution (S/Res/2170 (2014)) 15 August 2014 p. 3 
para. 6. The Security Council states that: 
‘Reiterates its call upon all States to take all measures as may be necessary 
and appropriate and in accordance with their obligations under 
international law to counter incitement of terrorist acts motivated by 
extremism and intolerance perpetrated by individuals or entities 
associated with ISIL, ANF and Al-Qaida and to prevent the subversion of 
educational, cultural, and religious institutions by terrorists and their 
supporters.’ 
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Islamic State’s base is in Syria. Syria, thus far, has not publicly given 
permission to other states (except Russia and Iran) to use force in its 
territory. Since the civil unrest in Syria, the National Coalition for Syrian 
Revolutionary and Opposition Forces was established in November 2012 
and was recognised by some states as the ‘the legitimate representative’ of 
the Syrian people.115 However, the de facto government led by Bashar Al-
Assad is still in control of other parts of Syria, including the capital city, 
Damascus.116 Thus far, the de facto government of Syria has not given 
consent to Iraq or the coalition forces for the use force in Syria.117 This 
leaves self-defence as the only lawful basis for intervention in Syria.  
 
In contrast to the situation in Iraq, the use of force in Iraq does not require 
Iraq (or other coalition forces) to invoke the right to self-defence. This is a 
matter of internal security which requires the government of Iraq to enforce 
its national law.118 The involvement of other countries in countering Islamic 
State within Iraq is lawful with the consent of Iraq. However, nearly all states 
participating in the operation against Islamic State in Iraq have the consent 
of the Iraqi government.119  
 
 
                                            
115http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2016392%20201
2%20INIT - Council of the European Union Resolution 16392/12 (19 
November 2012). The Syrian Opposition Council was recognized as 
representative of Syrian people by the United States see. 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/11/200435.htm (11 November 
2012)  
116http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14703856 (Accessed: 13 
April 2015)  
117 See Around the World, Mixed Reaction to U.S-Led Airstrikes in Syria, 
Washington Post (23 September 2014)   
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/around-world-
mixed-reaction-to-us-led-airstrikes-in-syria/2014/09/23/16985bb6-4352-
11e4-9a15-137aa0153527_story.html  
118 See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. 2004 p. 194 para. 138. 
The Court stated that Article 51 is only applicable if the attacks emanate 
from outside the victim’s territory and not within the border of the 
affected state.  
119 See. e.g., http://justsecurity.org/21431/canadian-bombs-syria-readers-
guide-legality-airstrikes-isil/ (Accessed: 3 April 20, 2015) 
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This part focuses on the airstrike operation conducted against Islamic State 
in Syria on 23 September 2014. It will examine whether the actions of the 
coalition forces during that operation were lawful in accordance with jus ad 
bellum, in particular the principle of necessity.  
 
b. Necessity as a Requirement  
 
Necessity as a requirement in the framework of self-defence requires the 
evaluation of circumstances prior to exercising defensive measures. This is 
done by deciding if an armed attack has taken place against Iraq or 
members of the coalition forces, which would then trigger Article 51. In 
addition, it is necessary to determine if attacks are attributable to Islamic 
State and, if so, whether Syria contributed to the occurrence of an armed 
attack.  
 
According to public sources, Islamic State, which is based in Ar-Raqqa in 
Syria, has conquered large swathes of land in northern Iraq, including the 
important cities of Mosul and Tikrit.120 The Iraqi government is currently 
trying to push Islamic State from its territory, but the centre of Islamic State’s 
administration is in Syria. Islamic State has become infamous for the 
atrocities that it has committed against Yazidis, a minority religious sect in 
northern Iraq; these include the killing of hundreds of men and the 
enslavement of abducted women.121 Islamic State has also made other 
attacks on foreign nationals. For instance, the terrorist group beheaded 
several foreign citizens, including, among others, two British aid workers,122 
an American,123 30 Ethiopian Christians,124 and 21 Egyptians125. Thus, the 
attacks and threats of Islamic State can be said to be worldwide, and are not 
                                            
120 http://www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-state/p14811  
121 ‘IS Yazidi attacks may be genocide, say UN’ BBC (19 March 2015) 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-31962755  
122 http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/13/world/meast/isis-haines-family-
message/; http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-29485405  
123 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-30073602  
124http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/1
1548360/Islamic-State-murders-30-Ethiopian-Christians-in-Libya.html 
125 http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/02/16/uk-mideast-crisis-egypt-village-
idUKKBN0LK1L420150216  
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exclusive to Iraq. This is in line with the UN Security Council Resolution, 
which describes Islamic State as a threat to international peace and 
security.126  
 
The conduct of Islamic State in Iraq has undoubtedly reached the threshold 
of scale and effects for constituting an armed attack as described in Article 
51.127 However, it is questionable whether the beheading of an American, for 
instance, constitutes an armed attack against America by the Islamic State. 
In Nicaragua, the Court distinguished ‘the most grave forms of the use of 
force’ (those constituting an armed attack) from ‘other less grave forms’.128 
This jurisprudence of the ICJ was confirmed in the Eritrea Ethiopia Claim 
Commission, where the Commission held that ‘relatively minor incidents’ do 
not fall within the meaning of armed attack in Article 51 of the UN Charter.129 
However, this line of narrative may be in conflict with the judgment in Oil 
Platforms, where the Court held that it cannot ‘exclude the possibility that the 
mining of a single military vessel might be sufficient to bring into play the 
inherent right to self-defence’.130 Accordingly, the beheading of foreign 
citizens by the Islamic State cannot conclusively be said to be an armed 
attack on those countries affected.  
 
Nonetheless, even if no direct armed attack by Islamic State on the countries 
of the affected victims took place, this does not prevent other states from 
joining Iraq in collective self-defence against Islamic State in Syria. In a letter 
to the President of the Security Council, Iraq’s Foreign Minister informed the 
Security Council that it had asked the US to lead international forces in 
                                            
126 S/RES/2170 (2014) 15 August 2014 p.3  
127 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America) ICJ Rep. 1986 p. 14  p.195  
128 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America) ICJ Rep. 1986 p 101 para 191  
129 Partial Award Jus Ad Bellum Ethiopia’s Claims 1-8 Ethiopia v. Eritrea (19 
December 2005) p 4 para 12  
130 Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United State 
of America) ICJ Rep. 2003 p 195 para 72  
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strikes on Islamic State strongholds.131 This was later confirmed by the letter 
from the US to the Security Council, in which the US invoked their right to 
individual and collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51.132 The 
act of inviting the US and other states to join Iraq in countering Islamic 
States in Syria allows other states to use force in collective self-defence.  
 
Prior to exercising self-defence, Iraq was required to consider whether any 
non-forcible means of ending the conflict were available. Following the 
Caroline formula, necessity can only be considered if the circumstances 
requiring Iraq to initiate self-defence were ‘…instant, overwhelming, leaving 
no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation.’133 Assuming that Iraq 
had other alternatives besides the use of force, such as peaceful 
negotiation, it is highly unlikely that Iraq would have conceded any territory 
to Islamic State or recognised Islamic State as a legal entity.  
 
The situation regarding Islamic State is murkier when viewed through the 
lens of international politics. In order to appreciate the complexity of the 
situation and the necessity of the use of force against Islamic State, the 
assessment on the law of self-defence against Islamic State cannot exclude 
the politics that shapes the current state of affairs. As explained earlier, 
Islamic State is currently in control of parts of Iraq and Syria. The 
governments of Iraq and Syria are continuously trying to remove Islamic 
State from their respective territories. All members of international 
community, including the US, United Kingdom, Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, are 
affected, either directly or indirectly, by the rise of Islamic State. As such, 
these countries all have a common opponent. In view of the fact that the 
                                            
131 Letter from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations 
addressed to the President of the Security Council S/2014/691 (22 
September 2014)  
132 Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of 
America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-general 
S/2014/695 (23 September 2014)  
133 British and Foreign State Papers 1840-1841 (Vol. XXIX, James Ridgway 
and Sons 1857) 1337-1138  
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Security Council has unanimously passed resolutions134 allowing member 
states to take necessary steps to prevent terrorism, including endorsement 
to act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the international community is 
still divided on how to circumvent Islamic State. This is particularly the case 
for states that have a strong interest in the conflict. The conflict could 
possibly end sooner if the various member states were to make a concerted 
effort to cooperate with one another in order to diminish Islamic State.  
 
Nevertheless, the politics between countries affects how states react to 
Islamic State. In Iraq, the government has given the coalition forces135 
permission to strike Islamic State within its territory.136 At the same time, Iraq 
has invoked the right to collective self-defence against Islamic State137 by 
targeting several Islamic State strongholds in Syria alongside the coalition 
forces. In Syria, the government is also attacking Islamic State, the same 
opponent targeted by Iraq. However, Syria has not given permission for 
foreign forces to enter its airspace, even though it would be beneficial for 
Syria to do so. In part, the reason for Syria’s decision not to grant permission 
for foreign forces to enter its airspace is the fact that Syria is a close ally of 
both Russia and Iran, and is suspicious of any American intervention within 
its border. Furthermore, Syria deploys Hezbollah, a militia group from 
                                            
134 See UN Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2169 (2014)(30 July 2014); 
S/RES/2171 (2014) (21 August 2014); S/RES/2178 (2014) (24 
September 2014); S/RES/2170 (2014) (15 August 2014); S/RES/2199 
(2015) (12 February 2015) 
135 List of countries participating in anti-Islamic State coalition. This operation 
is known as ‘Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve’ 
with the aim of responding to Islamic State. See press release by Staff 
Sgt. Bryan Dominique, ‘Inside the Coalition to defeat ISIL’ (CJT-OIR, 21 
April 2015). See also ‘Who is in the anti-Islamic State Coalition and 
What they are Contributing?’ (The Telegraph, 26 September 2014) 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11124070/
Who-is-in-the-anti-Islamic-State-coalition-and-what-they-are-
contributing.html (accessed: 31 July 2015)  
136 Letter from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations 
addressed to the President of the Security Council S/2014/691 (22 
September 2014)  
137 Letter from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations 
addressed to the President of the Security Council S/2014/691 (22 
September 2014)  
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Lebanon, to counter Islamic State and internal opposition to Bashar Al-
Assad’s presidency in Syria.138  
 
As for the coalition forces, not all partners agree to the use of force against 
Islamic State in Syria. For example, the United Kingdom allowed its forces to 
strike Islamic State in Iraq, but not in Syria; this was due to a lack of support 
from British Parliamentarians.139 However, since several British 
holidaymakers were murdered in Tunisia by a terrorist linked to Islamic 
State, the British government is reconsidering its stance towards striking 
Islamic State.140 Turkey, a country that shares a border with Iraq and Syria 
and is a member of NATO, is greatly affected by Islamic State, although the 
terrorist group has not acquired any land from Turkey. Nonetheless, Turkey 
has suffered from an influx of refugees from Syria and Iraq: at the time of 
writing, the total number of refugees has reached nearly 1.5 million.141 In 
                                            
138 ‘Syrian President Admits Military Setbacks, in First Public Speech for a 
Year’ (The Guardian, 26 July 2015). In his speech, President Bashar al-
Assad acknowledged Hezbollah’s assistance as important and effective 
in pushing back Islamic State and Al-Nusra Front from the Syrian-
Lebanese border. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/26/syrian-
president-public-speech-bashar-al-assad (accessed: 30 July 2015)  
139 House of Commons Hansard on Syria and the Use of Chemical 
Weapons. The motion to strike in Syria was defeated by 285 votes and 
272 votes in favour of military operation. (Thursday, 29 August 2013). 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm13082
9/debtext/130829-0001.htm#1308298000001 (accessed: 30 July 2015) ; 
‘Syria Crisis: Cameron Loses Commons Vote on Syria’ 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-23892783 (accessed: 28 July 
2015). At the time of writing, the UK undertook drone operation in Syria 
and killed two of its citizens involved in Islamic State. Prime Minister 
David Cameroon informed the House of Commons that the UK invoked 
the right to self-defence under Article 51 see 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmhansrd/cm15090
7/debtext/150907-0001.htm#1509074000002 (House of Commons 
Hansard, 7 September 2015 at Column 25 and 26.) See also UK 
submission to the President of the UN Security Council UN Doc. 
S/2015/688 (7 September 2015)  
140 See Michael Fallon, the Secretary of State for Defence on Britain and 
International Security (Column 1669, 2 July 2015) 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmhansrd/cm15070
2/debtext/150702-0002.htm#15070233000001  
141 The United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) as of January 2015. 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48e0fa7f.html (accessed: 31 July 2015)  
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addition to fighting against Islamic State, Turkey has a long standing dispute 
with the Kurds, who are seeking self-determination. This dispute particularly 
concerns the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which the Turkish government 
considers to be a terrorist group.142 At the same time, the same PKK is 
fighting against Islamic State in northern Iraq. On 24 July 2015, Turkey 
launched air attacks against Islamic State in Syria and PKK bases in 
northern Iraq for the first time.143  
 
The description above explains the complexities of countering one terrorist 
group which have been caused by the political situations of the states 
involved. This analysis does not take the longstanding Sunni-Shia divide into 
consideration; this division has affected the greater Middle-East region for a 
long time. With this in mind, it is even more difficult to determine when it is 
necessary to act in self-defence against Islamic State, given that Syria is 
also fighting against Islamic State. As such, the question is: is it necessary 
for the coalition forces to attack Islamic State in Syria if Syria is also 
countering Islamic State? However, the ability of the Syrian government to 
effectively prevent Islamic State from operating beyond its territory is 
questionable.  
 
                                            
142 For further analysis, see Chatham House Research Paper, Cengiz 
Gunes and Robert Lowe, ‘ The Impact of the Syrian War on Kurdish 
Politics Across the Middle East’ (Chatham House, July 2015); Neil 
Quilliam and Jonathan Friedman, ‘Turkey Joined the Fight Against 
Islamic State, but not for the Reasons You Think’ (Reuters Blog, 28 July 
2015) http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/07/28/turkey-joined-
the-fight-against-islamic-state-but-not-for-the-reasons-you-think/ 
(accessed: 31 July 2015)  
143 ‘Turkey Stages First Air Strikes on Islamic State in Syria’ (Reuters, 24 
July 2015) (accessed: 29 July 2015) 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/07/24/uk-mideast-crisis-turkey-
islamicstate-idUKKCN0PY0AQ20150724. See also a letter sent by 
Turkish representative at the UN to UN Secretary-General and the UN 
Security Council by citing Article 51 of the UN Charter. ‘Turkey Justifies 
Syria Air Strikes in Letter to the United Nations’ (Reuters, 25 July 2015) 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/07/24/uk-mideast-crisis-turkey-un-
idUKKCN0PY2H420150724?mod=related&channelName=worldNews 
(accessed: 29 July 2015)  
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The fact that the non-state actor in this case is a terrorist group makes it 
difficult to consider the use of non-forcible measures. A terrorist group often 
operates in secrecy, their methods of attack are usually violent and, more 
importantly, terrorist groups have no standing in international law, as 
international law is state-centric. Naturally, states find it very difficult to seek 
non-forcible options when they are under attack from a non-state actor, so 
they immediately launch into self-defence.  
 
It is worth considering Syria’s position in relation to the meaning of 
necessity. Islamic State’s centre of administration is based in the territory of 
Syria, over which Syria has jurisdiction. This raises the following question: 
due to its reluctance or inability to prevent Islamic State’s attacks from going 
abroad, can Syria be held responsible for the actions committed by Islamic 
State? Syria’s unwillingness or inability to stop Islamic State may justify Iraq 
to use necessity as grounds for invoking self-defence against Islamic State 
in Syria.144  
 
The “unwilling or unable” theory is not widely embraced by scholars and 
there are strong oppositions to its absorption in the literature on jus ad 
bellum. Yet, the phrase “unwilling or unable” was used by the US in a letter 
to the Security Council in which it attacked Islamic State:  
 
“ISIL and other terrorist groups in Syria are a threat not only to Iraq, 
but also to many other countries, including the United States and our 
partners in the region… as reflected in Article 51 of the Charter of the 
United Nations, when, as is the case here, the government of the 
State where the threat is located is unwilling or unable to prevent the 
use of its territory for such attacks.”145 
                                            
144 See. Ryan Goodman, ‘International Law – and the Unwilling and Unable 
Test – for US Military Operations in Syria’ (12 September 2014) 
http://justsecurity.org/14949/international-law-unwilling-unable-test-
military-operations-syria/  
145 Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of 
America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-general 
S/2014/695 (23 September 2014) (emphasis added)  
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The letter further adds: 
 
“The Syrian regime has shown that it cannot and will not confront 
these safe havens effectively itself.”146 
 
The Syrian government was unable to prevent Islamic State from exporting 
its attacks beyond the Syrian border; consequently, Iraq was victimised by 
Islamic State. As a result, Iraq’s territory is partially controlled by the terrorist 
group. Such a situation leaves Iraq with little choice but to resort to the use 
of force in order to regain its territory and also to defend itself against Islamic 
State fighters based in Syria.  
 
Another point that can be raised here is whether Syria is responsible for the 
conduct of Islamic State within its territory. Applying the tests introduced in 
Nicaragua, ‘effective control test’ and ‘dependence test’147, and the ‘overall 
control test’ propounded in Tadic,148 it seems that Syria cannot be attributed 
to the conduct of Islamic State. This is because Syria itself is a victim of the 
terrorist attacks by the Islamic State and trying to neutralise the threat within 
its border.  
 
As such, the attacks coordinated by Islamic State towards other states might 
be contentious and some, e.g. the beheading, may possibly fall short of the 
threshold for constituting an armed attack. Nevertheless, there is no doubt 
that the invasion of Iraq’s territory by Islamic State meets the requirements 
of an armed attack as stipulated in Article 51. This also signifies that Iraq 
was in a situation where it needed to invoke the right to self-defence in order 
to regain its lost territory and to use defensive measures to stop attacks from 
                                            
146 Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of 
America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-general 
S/2014/695 (23 September 2014)    
147 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America) ICJ Rep 1986 p 64-65 para 114 and p 109  
148 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic Judgment in the Appeals Chamber of 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) IT-94-1-
A (15 July 1999) para 131 p 56 
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Syria. Therefore, it can be argued that Iraq, and the coalition forces acting 
under collective self-defence, satisfy the requirement aspect of necessity to 
exercise self-defence.  
 
c. Necessity as a Limitation 
 
Once the requirement aspect of necessity has been fulfilled and the 
defensive measure is launched, necessity is then seen as limitation on self-
defence. The use of force in self-defence must be limited to that which is 
necessary to achieve the legitimate aim of self-defence.149 In this instance, 
Iraq and the coalition forces must restrict their use of force, only using the 
amount of force which is necessary for the purpose of self-defence. Force 
must be directed to repel an armed attack or threat launched by Islamic 
State. This part will examine the calculi of necessity during the airstrike and 
the difficulty of assessing necessary force against a non-state actor that 
controls a vast territory.  
 
The air operation which took place on the night of 22 September 2014 
targeted two terrorist groups in Syria, namely the Khorasan Group and 
Islamic State. President Barack Obama described the Khorasan Group as 
‘seasoned operatives in Syria’, whereas the attack targeted at Islamic state 
was in response to the situation in Iraq.150 Thus, there were two separate 
justifications offered to explain the attacks.  
 
The airstrikes against Islamic State was a direct response to the attacks by 
Islamic State against Iraq. Iraq gave the following explanation of these 
attacks to the Security Council: 
 
“ISIL has established a safe haven outside Iraq’s borders that is a 
direct threat to the security of our people and territory. By establishing 
this safe haven, ISIL has secured for itself the ability to train for, plan, 
                                            
149 See in Chapter 5 3ii) Necessity and the Aim of Self-Defence 
150 Statement by President Barrack Obama on Airstrikes in Syria on 23 
September 204. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/09/23/statement-president-airstrikes-syria  
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finance and carry out terrorist operations across our borders. The 
presence of this safe haven has made our borders impossible to 
defend and exposed our citizens to the threat of terrorist attacks.”151 
 
The US confirmed that it had joined the other partners in collective self-
defence against Islamic State by firing several air missiles targeted at 
Islamic State, primarily in Ar-Raqqah and Aleppo.152 The US Department of 
Defense spokesperson described the strikes as ‘very successful’.153 
Because this action was invoked in self-defence, the US and the coalition 
forces must meet the requirements of the principles of necessity and 
proportionality in their use of force.  
 
The same response was directed against Khorasan Group, which was the 
target of several air missiles. However, the legal situation with regard to 
Khorasan Group is different to that regarding the strikes against Islamic 
State, even though both groups are geographically based in Syria. The 
airstrike against Khorasan Group was an act of individual self-defence by the 
US and this airstrike was not related to any attacks made by Islamic State in 
Iraq.154 It was further revealed that the US claimed that this attack was an 
act of anticipatory self-defence against Khorasan Group which was made on 
the following basis:  
 
“In terms of the Khorasan group… these strikes were undertaken to 
disrupt imminent attack plotting against the United States and western 
targets. These targets have established a safe haven in Syria to plan 
                                            
151 Letter from Iraq’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations 
addressed to the President of the Security Council S/2014/691 (22 
September 2014)  
152 Department of Defense Press Briefing on Operations in Syria on 23 
September 2014. 
http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5505 
153 Department of Defense Press Briefing on Operations in Syria on 23 
September 2014. 
http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5505  
154 Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of 
America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-general 
S/2014/695 (23 September 2014)  
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external attacks, construct and test improvised explosive devices, and 
recruit westerners to conduct operations. The United States took 
action to protect our interests and to remove their capability to act.”155  
  
The lawfulness of anticipatory self-defence against the Khorasan Group is 
more complex than that of the strikes against Islamic State. The legality of 
anticipatory self-defence as a legal basis for the use of force in jus ad bellum 
is contentious amongst scholars, and this is further complicated in a situation 
of anticipatory self-defence against a non-state actor.156  
 
Whilst the two airstrikes against Khorasan Group and Islamic state are 
invoked under individual and collective self-defence respectively, they are 
still subject to the conditions of necessity and proportionality. The question of 
how one determines if the use of force meets the principles of necessity and 
proportionality in a terrorist-controlled area such as Syria makes it difficult to 
fulfil the limitations of self-defence against a terrorist group. Fact-based 
assessment is used to make a judgement on whether the defensive 
measures are deemed necessary and proportionate.157 The targeted areas 
were located within an Islamic State stronghold and there is no independent 
mechanism to verify if the use of force meets the criteria of necessity and 
proportionality. If Iraq and the US claimed that the strikes were necessary for 
self-defence, it would be very difficult to disagree without hard proof that the 
force was unnecessary and disproportionate.  
 
The restriction of information is an apparent difficulty of applying the principle 
of necessity and proportionality in self-defence against a non-state actor. 
                                            
155 Department of Defense Press Briefing on Operations in Syria on 23 
September 2014. 
http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5505  
156 See D'Alessandra F, ‘Jus ad bellum in Syria: The Meaning of the US 
Airpower Campaign’ International Bar Association: Human Rights Law 
Newsletter (March, 2015) 37-41 at 39. The author rejects the argument 
of anticipatory self-defence exists in the airstrike against Khorasan and 
the US failed to prove the imminence of the attack by Khorasan.  
157 Monica Hakimi, ‘Defensive force against Non-State Actors: The State 
Play’ (2015) 91 International Law Studies 1-31, 30 
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The case of Syria illustrates that it is not easy to determine if the use of a 
defensive measure is necessary or proportionate. Both of these principles 
act as a legal benchmark for the use of force in self-defence. Thus far, it is 
unknown whether such use of force is limited to defensive purposes. 
However, Iraq and the coalition forces must comply with the limitations, and 
failure to do so may result in the action being deemed to be unlawful. The 
objective assessment of whether the use of force is limited to achieve the 
aim of self-defence is adversely affected by lack of knowledge.  
 
In some circumstances, the use of force can be shown to be necessary at 
some point in the future. For instance, parties to the conflict may refer the 
matter to international tribunal or to the ICJ to determine the lawfulness of 
the action in jus ad bellum. In previous cases, the ICJ referred to documents 
disclosed by involved parties and independent reports assessing the 
conflicts.158 Alternatively, necessity and proportionality can be assessed by a 
UN commission, which may judge the totality of the conflict.159 However, this 
shows that necessity as a limitation to self-defence cannot be determined 
immediately or soon after force is launched.  
 
The problem of limited information also has implications for the theory of 
‘unwilling or unable’,160 if this theory is to be accepted. To suggest that Syria 
is unwilling or unable to fight Islamic State, and thus allow the use of force in 
                                            
158 For instance, in DRC v Uganda, the Court examined the documents 
presented by both parties to determine the claim of self-defence (High 
Command document from Uganda dated 11 September 1998 for 
operation ‘Safe Haven’. However, the Court was cautious to accept 
documents that were unsigned, unauthenticated especially political and 
intelligence documents. See Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo (DRC v Uganda) ICJ Rep. 2005 p. 168, para. 127 p. 218 
159 For example, recently the UN Human Rights Council established a 
commission of enquiry to investigate violations of international 
humanitarian law and international human rights law in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory for the military operations that occurred on 13 June 
2014. See Mandate to establish commission of enquiry UN Doc 
A/HRC/28/79 (26 March 2015). Outcome of the enquiry, UN Doc 
A/HRC/29/CRP.24 (24 June 2015)  
160 See discussion in Chapter 5 Section 4  
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self-defence in Syria, is merely an assumption.161 Based on open records, 
there is, to date, no public pronouncement by the Syrian government of it 
being incapable or reluctant to combat Islamic State. In fact, Syria is 
determined to fight Islamic State as this group is threatening the national 
security of Syria as much as it is destabilising the internal security of Iraq. 
Therefore, hard proof of evidence is required to deem Syria to be unwilling 
or unable, but this cannot be proved if the information available is limited.  
 
In summary, whilst the role of necessity can be seen as limiting defensive 
measures, validated data is required to analyse if the invoking state or states 
abide by the rule. The problem stems from the limited amount of information 
available to corroborate if the extent of the force used was necessary to 
repel or avert an armed attack and threats from Islamic State and Khorasan 
Group. This problem is inherently unique to cases of self-defence between a 
state and a non-state actor. In particular, the problem is further complicated 
by the inaccessibility of the targeted areas, as these places are strongholds 
of terrorist groups.  
 
5. Analysis and Conclusion 
 
The three case studies examined above exemplify the points of law raised 
when a state invokes the right to self-defence against a non-state actor and 
the commentaries focus on the aspect of necessity during the course of 
military operations in each incident. Several noteworthy conclusions can be 
derived from all three state practices, and these can be divided generally 
into three themes.  
 
Firstly, the concept of necessity itself can be seen from multiple paradigms, 
and this concept is subject to how necessity is perceived by the affected 
states in a conflict. This matter can be further sub-divided into two 
considerations. The first of these is the overlap (although not the same) in 
                                            
161 There is also a possibility that the Syrian government is harbouring or 
supporting Islamic State. However, this position is denied by the 
government of Syria.  
- 282 - 
the meanings of necessity and proportionality, as described earlier in this 
thesis. Some criteria of necessity are also relevant in determining the 
meaning of proportionality. This can be exemplified by the state practices 
analysed earlier. An example of this is the question ‘to what extent is force 
necessary to achieve the legitimate aim of self-defence?’ The implication of 
such a question inevitably encroaches on the analysis of proportionality, i.e. 
determining whether such force is proportionate in self-defence.  
 
In the context of necessity, a lawful use of defensive force must achieve the 
legitimate aim of self-defence, and force taken must only be intended for 
self-defence. It should not serve any other purpose and self-defence must 
not be invoked as a smokescreen for aggression. However, in remote 
circumstances, achieving the legitimate aim of self-defence may result in 
what appears to be a disproportionate use of force. If the use of defensive 
force is disproportionate, it may easily be argued that the force used is 
unnecessary, meaning that the invoking state fails to meet the conditions of 
necessity. This complexity and interrelation between necessity and 
proportionality can be illustrated by the Israel-Hezbollah conflict, in which 
Lebanon’s public infrastructures were badly destroyed by Israel and many 
lives were lost, to which many members of the Security Council described 
Israel’s response as disproportionate. Therefore, necessity does not stand 
as a principle on its own in the framework of self-defence, but it is influenced 
by the principle of proportionality. Commentators should perhaps pay greater 
attention to the similarities and differences between the two concepts in the 
literature on jus ad bellum in order to appreciate the overlaps and 
distinctions of the two concepts.  
 
Secondly, necessity can be judged on the aim of self-defence. The extent to 
which self-defence is necessary relates to the aim of self-defence. In this 
thesis, it is argued that a state must maintain that the purpose of self-
defence is to halt and repel an ongoing armed attack, although anticipatory 
self-defence is permissible in some instances. A state that does not 
subscribe to the “halt and repel” school of thought can easily undermine the 
strict procedure of jus ad bellum. For instance, a state that has a lawful right 
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to exercise defensive force and uses the opportunity to pursue a different 
nationalistic agenda undermines the premise that self-defence is merely for 
self-defence. Therefore, necessity can be examined in light of the purpose of 
self-defence.  
 
The second theme that can be derived from the state practices is the role of 
the host state in relation to the meaning of necessity. In the case of self-
defence against a non-state actor, where the host state’s relationship with 
the non-state actor is minimal, or when the terrorist group is independent 
from the host state, this relationship may alter the meaning of necessity in 
self-defence. This can be seen in all of the three case studies above, namely 
as Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Islamic State in 
Syria. Each of these terrorist groups has a different relationship with the host 
state. For instance, the Taliban government was not willing to cooperate with 
the US government to destroy Al-Qaeda, although there is no proof that Al-
Qaeda was operating under the instruction of Taliban government. 
Meanwhile, Islamic State is based in Syria and is in control of a large part of 
the country. The Syrian government is trying to prevent the attacks by 
Islamic State from going abroad but simultaneously rejects any foreign 
intervention. This reflects the different dynamics of the necessity to use force 
in self-defence by the victim state, which are partly subject to the relationship 
between the host state and the non-state actor.  
 
The final theme illustrated by the case studies is the threat of terrorism in 
international security. The first two case studies (Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan 
and Hezbollah in Syria, which happened in 2001 and 2006 respectively) 
show that a vague relationship existed between the host state and the 
terrorist group. In Lebanon, the government denied that it supported 
Hezbollah in the attack against Israel. In contrast, in 2014, Islamic State was 
in control of large territories in two states, Syria and Iraq, and has used their 
occupied territory to launch armed attacks. By comparing the two situations 
in Lebanon and Syria, it can be seen that the terrorists in Syria represent a 
greater risk to international security than Hezbollah. Of course, the three 
state practices cited in this study do not comprise a complete picture of 
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terrorism on a global scale. However, they do show that it is feasible that 
non-state actors may become more dangerous and capable of subjugating 
lands from a state. The emergence of terrorism on an international level has 
implication for the law on the use of force. Due to the significance of 
contemporary terrorism in international security, the principle of necessity in 
jus ad bellum must also be adjusted to suit the current threat. Therefore, the 
concept of necessity in self-defence cannot be seen as a static concept  
incapable of enacting changes in international law, but rather as a concept 
that can adapt to new circumstance without undermining the essential 
purpose of self-defence, whether the threat emanates from terrorism or from 
other states.  
 
In conclusion, the principle of necessity in the framework of self-defence is 
essential for analysing the lawfulness of a defensive measure. Despite the 
restrictions imposed on the invoking state which require it to comply with the 
principle of necessity, it is not easy to determine an abstract concept such as 
the principle of necessity in a complex military situation, especially with 
regard to the use of force against terrorism. As a result, there are a multitude 
of ways in which the meaning of necessity in the law of self-defence can be 
interpreted and applied. Nonetheless, the principle of necessity acts a 
requirement to launch self-defence and as a limitation to the use of 
defensive force. The use of force must only be employed to achieve the 
legitimate aim of self-defence, and self-defence cannot be used as an 
excuse to advance any other national interest. The state practices 
mentioned earlier reveal that not all circumstances share the same elements 
of necessity. Different circumstances require a different analysis of 
necessity.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion: Overall Observations about 
Necessity in Self-Defence Framework and State Practice 
 
This thesis began by outlining the general framework of self-defence in 
international law. This involved analysing Article 51 of the UN Charter in 
reference to the right to self-defence in customary international law.  Within 
customary international law on self-defence, any use of force for the purpose 
of defensive measure must comply with a well-established condition with the 
requirements of necessity and proportionality.  
 
In this thesis, there are two main contribution to the existing legal literature 
on the law of self-defence. First, this research focuses on the establishment 
of the guiding principles of self-defence in customary international law. The 
principles of necessity and proportionality find its origin from the Caroline 
incident in 1837. From this incident, several other legal rules that are 
associated with it such as the right to anticipatory self-defence, pre-emptive 
self-defence and the use of force in self-defence against non-state actors. 
However, the present literature does not justify how the Caroline doctrines 
came into existence. It is  assumed that there was interpretive process that 
transformed the Caroline incident into legal rules. This thesis attempts to 
validate the Caroline doctrines by using several methods of creating 
customary law. This research observes that it is difficult convert the Caroline 
affair in legal rules due to unclear method of interpreting classical incident 
like the Caroline case. As a result, several interpretations can be created by 
relying on the Caroline incident and this may open misinterpretation and 
even worse, abuse.   
 
The second contribution of this thesis is by exploring the meaning of 
necessity. This is by examining factors that affect the meaning of necessity 
in self-defence such as the aim of self-defence, anticipatory or pre-emptive 
self-defence, and whether the aggressor is a state or a non-state actor. This 
research also investigate the role of necessity in jus ad bellum. It can be 
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argued that necessity has two roles. First, it acts as a requirement to self-
defence and this is by establishing the existence of threat or an armed attack 
and force as the only last resort. The second part of necessity is it acts as 
limitation when state exercises the right to self-defence. This restraint role of 
necessity is linked with the legitimate aim of self-defence which is halt and 
repel an armed attack. The use of force beyond the aim of self-defence is 
regarded as unnecessary use of force. Therefore, the second role of 
necessity is measured by the aim of self-defence. In order to validate the 
existence of the two roles of necessity, three state practices are used to 
demonstrate how necessity is viewed in a particular situation. However, it is 
discovered that it is difficult to maintain necessity as a limitation in self-
defence against terrorism. This is because non-state actors are often 
secretive and evasive thus difficult to validate the use of force meets the aim 
of self-defence.  
 
Aside from the areas examined in this thesis regarding necessity in self-
defence framework, there are additional unresolved elements of necessity 
that would benefit from further analysis by researchers in the future. Firstly, it 
is beneficial to understand the threshold of necessity in self-defence against 
a non-state actor. This area of discussion raises a concern regarding the 
extent to which an armed attack or violence executed by a non-state actor 
can be regarded as necessary as a trigger for the right to self-defence. 
Refining the threshold of necessity for a terrorist armed attack might restrict 
a state’s use of force in self-defence to only what is necessary.  
 
Secondly, another issue that is important to highlight here is the role of the 
Caroline incident in shaping the meaning of necessity. Most lawyers concur 
that the Caroline incident established the principles of necessity and 
proportionality. When recalling that these principles were established in the 
nineteenth century it becomes imperative to re-examine them to determine if 
there is any relevance to attached contemporary legal argument concerning 
necessity to the past.  
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Another aspect that has been highlighted throughout this study is the aim of 
self-defence against a non-state actor. Initially, when reviewing former 
judgments, this thesis argued for the importance of maintaining the 
legitimate aims of self-defence, irrespective of the entity of the aggressor. 
However, existing state practice illustrates that there are difficulties meeting 
the legitimate aims of self-defence when countering terrorism. This therefore 
raises a question regarding whether the aim of self-defence, as one currently 
accepted in jus ad bellum literature, should be amended to reflect the reality 
that states are facing terrorist groups and not state armed attacks.  
 
Finally, an aspect of the consideration of necessity refers to the principle of 
imminence. The role of imminence in the framework of self-defence 
deserves greatest attention when considering self-defence against a non-
state actor. It is pivotal for international legal literature to represent how, and 
to what extent, imminence shapes the outcomes of self-defence. To date, 
imminence has had a role in contributing to self-defence narratives; this is an 
important aspect to reappraise in the current international context.  
 
a. Threshold of Necessity in Self-Defence against Non-State 
Actors  
 
The application of necessity is currently more relevant in self-defence 
against non-state actors than in self-defence between states. This is 
because the two entities have different responsibilities under international 
law. There is a general acceptance that a high burden of proof is required if 
self-defence is to be applied against a non-state actor.1 The UN Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions, asserted in 2013 that ‘there is an 
emerging view that the level of violence necessary to justify a resort to self-
defence ought to be  set higher when it is in response to an armed attack by 
                                            
1 Albrecht Randelzhofer and Georg Nolte, ‘Article 51’ in Bruno Simma and 
others (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (Vol. 2, 
3rd edn, OUP 2012) 1424 
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non-State actors than to an attack by another State’.2 This remark resonates 
with the principles of international law, which require states to respect the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states, even when the lawful use 
of force targets a non-state actor.   
 
When self-defence is directed toward a non-state actor, this act inevitably 
compromises the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the host state. 
Although the use of force must be directed toward the non-state actor, and 
the host state may not have consented to the use of its territory as a base for 
terrorist operations, the use of defensive force implies that the host state is 
responsible for the conduct of a non-state actor in its border. For this reason, 
it seems logical that the standard of necessity be elevated to trigger the right 
to self-defence against a non-state actor, relative to that applied when 
directed toward a state actor. The level of armed attack deemed necessary 
by a non-state actor must be more serious than an armed attack undertaken 
by a state.  
 
The three state practices enumerated above illustrate the difficulty 
encountered when applying necessity to real life situations. For example, in 
cases targeting the Islamic State, the application of necessity is problematic 
in areas that are inaccessible and controlled by terrorist groups. It is 
problematic to determine if an airstrike launched by the US can ever be 
limited to what is necessary to achieve the intended outcome. It may be that 
the airstrikes fall below the threshold of action required to repel an armed 
attack by Islamic State, but due to a lack of information, this view cannot be 
substantiated.  
 
To complicate the debate over necessity, claims made for anticipatory self-
defence make it even more challenging to conform to the principle of 
necessity as a requirement and limitation in cases of self-defence. For 
example, when US launched strikes against Khorasan Group on the basis of 
anticipatory self-defence, it is hard to verify when an attack from the terrorist 
                                            
2 Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary an, or Arbitrary Executions 
at 89.  UN Doc A/68/382 (13 September 2013) by Christof Heyns  
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group was imminent. Researchers and practitioners are at the mercy of 
upholding the US version of events, being forced to accept the narrative they 
offer at face value, in the absence of concrete contradictory evidence. 
However, if it is true that it was necessary for the US to launch action in self-
defence against Khorasan Group, then the problem persists. Certainly, is 
unknown whether the airstrike was limited to what is necessary; thus, by 
implication it is also not possible to argue that it was proportionate. Thus, if 
necessity and proportionality cannot be proven, this renders the airstrike as 
prima facie unlawful. However, this may not necessarily be the correct 
judgment, thereby underlining the difficulty encountered when seeking to 
apply the principle of necessity against a non-state actor in an area 
controlled by terrorists. Therefore, this shows the need to understand and 
refine the threshold of necessity in a self-defence framework to target non-
state entities.  
 
b. Standard of Necessity based on the Caroline formula  
 
Another observation that can be made in this thesis concerns the relevance 
of the Caroline incident in the framework of self-defence. The customary 
principles of necessity and proportionality were established as a result of the 
Caroline incident in 1837, based on phrases adopted from correspondence 
penned by Mr Daniel Webster.3 The incident happened long before a proper 
international legal system was established; however, the spirit of the 
Caroline still reverberates in contemporary international law. The inclusion of 
the Caroline incident as a foundation to the parameters of self-defence 
continues to beset doctrinal divisions in jus ad bellum.  
 
                                            
3 Some authors dismiss the significance of the Caroline doctrine in jus ad 
bellum. See Maria Occelli, ‘’Sinking’ the Caroline: Why the Caroline 
Doctrine’s Restrictions on Self-Defense Should Not Be Regarded as 
Customary International Law’, (2003) 4 San Diego International Law 
Journal 467-490 
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According to the Caroline incident, the definition of necessity is ‘instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation’.4 
It is questionable whether this definition remains pertinent in contemporary 
warfare. As shown above, in state practice there is a broad acceptance that 
it is lawful for a state to exercise in self-defence against a non-state actor 
and when so doing that states must fulfil the principle of necessity. It then 
follows that it is important to establish the elements of necessity that must be 
applied when invoking self-defence against a non-state actor. Some would 
opine that the Caroline incident formula is still applicable, even if self-
defence is directed against a non-state actor.5 Furthermore, some would 
argue that Caroline self-defence is applicable in today’s world, because 
customary self-defence is not a static concept and is capable of adaption.6 If 
accepting this narrative, then the meaning of necessity in the Caroline 
formula must be altered to respond to current problems.  
 
The dilemma of Caroline necessity is twofold. First, necessity as a guiding 
principle in self-defence continues to be shaped by history. This means 
adhering to the phrase ‘instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, 
and no moment of deliberation’ in all circumstances, irrespective of whether 
self-defence is against a state or a non-state actor, or whether the conflict 
involves weapons of mass destruction or is a minor border clash. This may 
result in a rigid definition of necessity that could then be deemed 
inapplicable. Second, necessity is taken solely as a principle detached from 
its history.7  The danger of the latter option is that the term necessity is too 
abstract to have a concrete impact on circumscribing state to use force. A 
state may justify necessity as a pretext for aggression and yet still claim to 
                                            
4 Judith Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force by States 
(CUP 2004) 56 
5 See. Albrecht Randelzhofer and Georg Nolte, ‘Article 51’ in Bruno Simma 
and others (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 
(Vol. 2, 3rd edn, OUP 2012) 1423-1424 
6 21 April 2004, Parliament Debate House of Lords (2004) 356  
7 Michael Bothe, ‘Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-emptive Force’ (2003) 14 
EJIL 227-240, 232 The author argues that the Caroline formula did not 
survive during the Kellog-Briand Pact or the UN Charter although admits 
that the Caroline formula has influence customary international law in jus 
ad bellum.  
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be acting within the law of self-defence. For this reason, the former option to 
attach necessity to the Caroline definition might still seem to be the best 
option although it is unsatisfactory. Indeed, at the very least, it does define 
the restrictions imposed on a state in using force in self-defence.8  
 
The influence of the Caroline incident in the law of self-defence still appears 
relevant, including in how it shapes the meaning of necessity in self-defence 
against a non-state actor. The definition of necessity provided by the 
Caroline incident has been criticised as restrictive and incapable of adjusting 
to current threats; however, there is no credible alternative upon which to 
base the meaning of necessity in self-defence. At present, Caroline 
necessity seems to be the standard for necessity in the law of self-defence.  
 
c. Aim of Self-Defence against Non-State Actors  
 
A further issue discussed in this thesis, in relation to necessity against a 
non-state actor, was the aim of the act of self-defence. In Chapter 5, this 
thesis maintained that a legitimate aim in self-defence, whether against a 
state or a non-state actor should be to repel or avert an armed attack.9 The 
sole reason for exercising force must be defensive. Arguably, this position is 
increasingly being recognised as unachievable in the context of facing 
terrorism.  
 
The framework of self-defence gives the invoking state a temporary right to 
use force, stating that it must be for the sole purpose of self-defence. This 
prevents states from using self-defence to disguise other motivations. 
However, self-defence against a non-state actor is not often a straight choice 
between using force or not using force. The threats and attacks launched by 
terrorist groups come in various forms, and typically involve ‘pin prick’ 
                                            
8 See. Michael Bothe, ‘Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-emptive Force’ 
(2003) 14 EJIL 227-240. The author limits the scope of necessity to 
anticipatory self-defence but rejects pre-emptive self-defence because it 
overstretches the meaning of necessity in the Caroline formula.  
9 See Chapter 4 in 2 d) Aim of Self-Defence in Relation to Necessity  
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attacks on a large scale, such as the 9/11 attacks, attacks by small cells in 
foreign countries, and suicide bombings.10 With these kinds of attacks, it is 
reasonable to re-visit how the threat proffered affects the aim of self-
defence, and question whether the aim to ‘halt and repel’ an armed attack is 
still appropriate.  
 
The difficulty of the strict application of the legitimate aims of self-defence 
was exemplified in relation to state practice in Chapter 6. For example, when 
Israel launched action in self-defence against Hezbollah, the Prime Minister 
of Israel explicitly announced that the force used was not only intended to 
resist immediate attacks and recapture the abducted soldiers, but also to 
establish Israel’s supremacy in the conflict to prevent future attacks. If legal 
literature accepts that the aim of self-defence is only to address the 
immediate threat then it is questionable whether the action by Israel was in 
line with the legitimate aims of self-defence. Noting the uncertainty that a 
non-state actor may pose to the victim state, it is understandable, although 
legally contentious, that sometimes when countering terrorism, the use of 
force in self-defence might also include action intended to maintain the 
security of the host state.  
 
Conversely, if accepting the argument that self-defence must be purely for 
self-defence, no other motives are permissible in any instance, whether 
against a state or a terrorist group. This seems to be the majority view of 
scholars. When a state responds only in self-defence to individual armed 
attacks executed by terrorist groups the possibility of another attack 
occurring is acknowledged. Therefore, it may be reasonable for a victim 
state to utilise force that extends beyond the aim of repelling or averting an 
armed attack, to fulfil the motive of stopping a further attack. The problem is 
most pertinent when the host state is struggling to enforce national law 
within its territory. This can be seen in all the examples given in Chapter 6: 
Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Islamic State in Syria. 
Host states have become safe havens, from which these respective terrorist 
                                            
10 Yoram Dinstein categorises conflict as measure short of war and war. 
Dinstein Y, War Aggression and Self-Defence (5th ed, CUP 2012) 242 
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groups can launch attacks into other states. In view of these circumstances, 
it is essential to ask if the international legal community is willing to continue 
to apply existing definitions of the legitimate aims of self-defence loosely, or 
if it will establish another aim of self-defence specifically to respond to 
terrorism. This question is yet to be resolved, although it is being, and will 
be, shaped by ongoing state practice.   
 
Another factor that might affect the aim of self-defence is the character of the 
aggressor. The aims of self-defence are also informed by dispute as to 
whether an aggressor is a state or a non-state actor. In situations where the 
aggressor is a state, international legal mechanisms and diplomacy provide 
channels to hold the aggressor state accountable for its conduct. For 
instance, political and economic sanctions may be imposed on the attacking 
state in response to its aggression towards another state. Alternatively, 
belligerent states might seek to resolve disputes through negotiation, 
persuasion, or by submitting cases to international tribunals. In contrast, in 
situations where a state responds to an attack or threat from a terrorist 
group, the victim state does not have the privilege of relying on an 
international mechanism to hold the aggressor accountable for its conduct. 
This is because terrorist groups have no legal standing in international law. 
Comparing the two scenarios, a victim state is at a disadvantaged if the 
attacking entity is a non-state actor because it is expected that the victim 
state to use force by maintaining the legitimate aims of self-defence. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to ask if there is an imbalance in the threat posed 
by terrorist groups in comparison to state actors; and if so if this might 
require the victim state to use force beyond the normal aim of halting or 
repelling averting an armed attack when facing a terrorist group. 
 
If the reality suggests that states cannot fulfil the legitimate aims of self-
defence when facing a non-state actor, or that to adhere to such aims would 
be at the cost of future instability within the victim state, then: should the 
legitimate aims of self-defence be adapted to meet the type of the 
aggressor? This contentious area cannot be resolved by merely illustrating 
several instances of state practice. Rather, it is incumbent upon legal 
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scholars to craft appropriate self-defence aims to suit the threats and armed 
attacks non-state actors pose. Certainly, as noted by the UK Attorney 
General, self-defence is not a static concept, which means that it must be 
reviewed in light of the current international environment.11  
 
d.  Imminence in Self-Defence against Non-State Actors  
 
A final observation that can be identified in this thesis is the principle of 
imminence within the law of self-defence. Doubtless, imminence plays an 
important role in the framework of self-defence, and imminence influences 
how self-defence is executed. For instance, proponents of anticipatory self-
defence justify the lawful use of force, only if the invoking state can prove an 
attack is imminent. However, scholars rarely extensively debate the issue of 
imminence in self-defence. The few academics that had sought to analyse 
imminence have faced a struggle voicing their ideas, only achieving limited 
success in articulating the meaning of imminence.12  
 
Several issues are associated with imminence in jus ad bellum literature. 
First, the concept of imminence in self-defence can be analysed critically in 
respect to evidence. Supporters of anticipatory self-defence rely on the 
principle of imminence to justify self-defence prior to an armed attack, for 
which Article 51 requires the existence of an armed attack to exercise force.  
This makes imminence a partial requirement of self-defence. This issue 
rests upon the evidence that there is an imminent armed attack. The 
requirement stipulated in Article 51 states that there must be an armed 
                                            
11 The UK-Attorney General position the law of self-defence in the House of 
Lords Debate 21 April 2004, Column 370.  
12 Daniel Bethlehem, ‘Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed 
Attack by Nonstate Actors’ (2012) 106 AJIL 769-777; Dapo Akande and 
Thomas Liefländer, ‘Clarifying Necessity, Imminence, and Proportionality 
in the Law of Self-Defense’ (2013) 107 AJIL 563-570 See opposing 
debate. Dire Tladi, ‘The Nonconsenting Innocent State: The Problem 
with Bethlehem’s Principle 12’ (2013) 107 AJIL 570-576; Mahmoud 
Hmoud, ‘Are New Principles Needed? The Potential of the 
Establishment Distinction Between Responsibility for Attacks by 
Nonstate Actors and the Law of Self-Defense’ (2013) 107 AJIL 576-579   
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attack to initiate self-defence, offering the benefit of tangible proof that a 
victim state has been attacked. Whilst a state claiming an imminent attack 
and subsequently using force on the basis of self-defence might not 
necessarily provide concrete evidence that an armed attack is imminent.  
 
The evidential problem of imminence becomes more acute in situations of 
self-defence against terrorism. Understandably, for states to obtain 
information from terrorist groups requires them to work in covert operations 
thus, information gathered is not usually disclosed publicly. The risk of 
exposing secretive information publicly is that it may jeopardise intelligence 
work by the defending state. However, if imminence is regarded as a pre-
requisite for self-defence, there must be evidence to show that an armed 
attack by a non-state actor is imminent. Absence of proof is tantamount to 
failure to meet the requirement, and the act of self-defence may 
subsequently be regarded as unlawful.  
 
The discussion of state practice in Chapter 6, examined the case in which 
the US invoked anticipatory self-defence against Khorasan group located in 
Syria, asserting that it anticipated an imminent attack from the terrorist 
group.13 However, the US never explained the nature of the attack, nor did it 
offer corroborating evidence. Merely suggesting that an attack from a 
terrorist organisation is imminent does not necessarily justify that a state can 
lawfully use force in self-defence. Evidence of an imminent attack is an 
important precursor to enhance credibility in the use of force, to avoid the 
accusation that self-defence is being used as a pretext for aggression.  
 
                                            
13 Rear Admiral John Kirby, Press Secretary for Department of Defense said:  
‘In terms of the Khorasan group, which is a network of seasoned Al Qaida 
veterans, these strikes were undertaken to disrupt imminent attack 
plotting against the United States and western targets. These targets 
have established a safe haven in Syria to plan external attacks, 
construct and test improvised explosive devices, and recruit westerners 
to conduct operations.’   
Department of Defense Press Briefing on 23 September 2014. Can be found 
at 
http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5505  
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It appears that the difficulty in establishing evidentiary proof in the context of 
imminence in self-defence affects two extreme ends of the spectrum. On the 
one hand, a state claiming imminent armed attack by disclosing in-depth 
information could risk exposing its intelligence operations but it enhance its 
credibility to use force. However, failure to show substantiated evidence that 
there is an imminent attack could easily raise the suspicion that the 
defending state uses self-defence to cover up the unlawful use of force. 
Thus, a middle ground must be found to balance the competing interests of 
lawful self-defence on the grounds that there is an imminent attack, thereby 
preventing misuse of self-defence as an excuse for unlawful force.  
 
Furtherance on the complex point of imminence; assuming that a middle 
ground can be found, however it is formulated,  and a state has a lawful 
claim to anticipatory self-defence, i.e. there is an imminent armed attack, 
there is no authority for the defending state to submit its case to for a 
judgment of its claims. Ultimately, the victim state itself must judge whether 
the information compiled suggests an imminent armed attack. 
Notwithstanding what happens when the conflict is referred to an 
international tribunal sometime in the future, Article 51 only requires that the 
defending state inform the Security Council it has invoked the right to self-
defence. However, state practice seems to suggest the Security Council or 
the General Assembly are amongst the appropriate bodies to probe 
evidence with regard to imminent attack in anticipatory self-defence.14  
Nevertheless, these organisations are highly politicised bodies, and may not 
necessarily make decisions based on objective legal examinations. Thus, 
the concept of imminence is reliant on the existence of evidence, as 
eventually determined by the invoking state.  
 
Another observation highlighted in this study dealt with the elements 
comprising imminence. It is important that this area of law is further 
developed to establish a clear understanding of the elements that comprise 
imminence in jus ad bellum. The discussion regarding what constitutes an 
                                            
14 Thomas Frank, Recourse to Force (CUP 2004) 107 
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an imminent armed attack was reignited by Daniel Bethlehem in 2012, in 
which he outlines several considerations that are relevant when deciding 
there will be an imminent or actual armed attack by non-state actors.15 He 
argues: ‘there is little scholarly consensus on what is properly meant by 
‘imminence’ in the context of contemporary threats’.16 He further states that 
the meaning of imminence should be shaped and refined according to 
threats or attacks from today’s non-state actors.  
 
By dividing the principle of imminence into two categories potentially 
expands the meaning of imminence. Some writers are reluctant to accept 
states invoking anticipatory self-defence without providing specific evidence 
on the nature and planning of the imminent attack.17 This is because failure 
to provide evidence of an imminent attack may be seen as endorsing 
anticipatory self-defence and also pre-emptive self-defence, which is a 
highly contentious area of law.18 As a result, the strict requirement for 
anticipatory self-defence based on an imminent attack may be defeated 
where there is a loose interpretation of imminence. For imminence to have a 
significant effect, such as curbing states from abusing anticipatory self-
defence whilst maintaining the need for states to respond to incoming attack, 
evidence is required to show an attack is imminent.  
 
In summary, this thesis attempted to unravel the meaning of necessity in 
self-defence, to apply it in the situation of self-defence against non-state 
actors. Whilst this thesis analyses the meaning of necessity, other areas of 
self-defence are equally important, as they may also contribute to our 
                                            
15 Daniel Bethlehem, ‘Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed 
Attack by Nonstate Actors’ (2012) 106 AJIL 769-777. See also. Michael 
J Glennon, ‘The Emerging Use-of-Force Paradigm’ (2006) 11 JCSL 309-
317, 311-312 
16 Daniel Bethlehem, ‘Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed 
Attack by Nonstate Actors’ (2012) 106 AJIL 769-777; 773   
17 Mahmoud Hmoud, ‘Are New Principles Needed? The Potential of the 
Establishment Distinction Between Responsibility for Attacks by 
Nonstate Actors and the Law of Self-Defense’ (2013) 107 AJIL 576-579 
18 Ibid.    
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understanding of necessity. The challenge posed now is to investigate and 
analyse other concepts within the law of self-defence that are relevant to 
approaches to threats and attacks by terrorist groups.  
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